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ABSTRACT
The environmental governance of multinational corporations in developing countries is 
relatively understudied. Much of the existing work on the greening of industry focuses on one 
scale of governance (international, national or local), without adequately accounting for the 
socio-spatial complexities, either external or internal to the firm, which influence the take up 
and implementation of corporate environmentalism at the site level. My thesis explores how 
and why corporate environmentalism has evolved in three South African fuel oil refineries 
(two in Durban and one in Cape Town) between 1994 and 2006.
Institutional and organisational theory, with insights from the literature on spatialities of 
corporate greening, informs this study. An analytical framework of multinational corporation 
complexity and organisational field dynamics is established to explore the process of 
institutional and organisational change. At the macro or organisational field level, actors 
compete to construct meanings of legitimate corporate environmental practice. Organisational 
fields are shaped by the interaction between institutional actors, institutional logics and 
governance structures. At the micro level, firm legitimation strategies and characteristics may 
explain how corporate greening differs.
The research findings are triangulated using key informant interviews, document analysis and 
social network analysis. Punctuated by key events, bifurcated processes of institutional and 
organisational change are documented. In Durban changing normative and cognitive 
institutions drove the evolution of regulation: above all, an internationally networked civil 
society exercised discursive power by demanding environmental justice and corporate 
accountability from the private and public sectors. In Cape Town the organisational field 
remained fragmented as community-driven discursive strategies did not achieve significant 
governance outcomes and institutional and organisational change evolved more slowly. The 
company with the most significant home country and parent company pressure, Shell/Sapref, 
made the most gains in repairing its legitimacy and improving its environmental performance. 
In sum, corporate environmentalism in post-apartheid South Africa has been contested and 
constructed by processes of scalar and place-based politics.
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1 THE GOVERNANCE OF MNCs, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM AND 
SOUTH AFRICA
1.1 Introduction
Within the context of economic globalisation, there have been increasing calls for stronger 
governance of multinational corporations (MNCs) that span the social, economic, political 
and environmental impacts of their operations. The supposed limited capacities of the state 
have opened up new spaces for non-state governance such as market, civil society and 
industry initiatives (Glasbergen 1998: 4; Levy and Newell 2005; Newell 2001a; Sonnenfeld 
and Mol 2002; World Bank 2000). Foreign direct investment flowing into developing 
economies has increased from $35.7 billion in 1990 to $233 billion in 2004 (UNCTAD 2007). 
Through liberalisation and globalisation MNCs are arguably the most important actors in the 
global economy. The case can therefore be made for increased recognition of their 
responsibilities towards the countries in which they operate (UNCTAD 2003: 164). This trend 
can be demonstrated as MNCs operating in developing countries face increasing social and 
environmental risk both in terms of global ‘reputational capital’ and local ‘social license to 
operate’ (Kytle and Ruggie 2005; Joyce and Thomson 1999)
Indeed, MNCs operating in developing countries face unique risks and responsibilities. 
Operating in multiple societies around the world is complicated by the fact that MNCs have to 
respond to different and sometimes conflicting expectations. The study of the legitimacy of 
business in society is not new (Ruef and Scott 1998), but is gaining increased recognition as 
governance gaps in the management of environmental public or quasi-public goods -  such as 
air, water and biodiversity -  and delivery of equitable and sustainable development benefits 
are debated from the local to global. The field of what constitutes legitimate corporate 
environmental practice has been widely debated since the rise of the environmental movement 
in the 1970s. Corporate environmentalism is a discretionary activity that varies by sector, 
company and operating context; it can be defined as actions taken by firms that have 
substantive or symbolic commitment to improve corporate environmental performance 
(Mason 2005: 146). However, the meaning of corporate environmentalism has been contested 
throughout the last four decades (Prakash 2000; Howes et al. 1997; Hoffman 2001a).
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This is a ripe research field: as Garcia-Johnson (2000) demonstrates, there is a specific type of 
“voluntary corporate environmentalism” being exported from advanced industrialised 
countries to developing countries through neo-liberal ideology. In addition, host country 
activism and foreign direct liability concerns in home countries construct new frames of what 
constitutes legitimate corporate environmental behaviour (Albertyn and Watkins 2002; 
O'Connor and Hallowes 2002; Ward 2001). Investigating how and why MNCs choose to 
respond to the often rapidly changing societal expectations and operational contexts in 
developing countries provides a unique opportunity for pragmatic and problem-oriented 
research (Davis and Marquis 2005; Wicks and Freeman 1998). Previous work on how MNCs 
seek to mitigate these risks often fails to recognise the complexity and interaction between 
international, regional, home and host country governance mechanisms. Often analysis is 
limited to one type of governance structure, such as international norms, standards and self- 
regulatory initiatives (e.g. Christmann and Taylor 2006; King and Lenox 2000) or at the level 
of industry sectors (Perkins 2007), therefore limiting the ability to rigorously explain changes 
in local corporate behaviour (Gouldson and Sullivan 2007). Corporate environmentalism 
drivers have been examined in advanced industrialised countries (see e.g. Hoffman 1999; 
Kagan et al. 2003), but beyond describing and prescribing corporate environmental behaviour 
(Utting 2002), comparatively little analytical research has taken place on its evolution in 
developing country contexts (Christmann 2004; Garcia-Johnson 2000).1 This study seeks to 
fill these gaps in studies on corporate environmentalism by rigorously explaining changes in 
environmental behaviour of MNC subsidiaries at the site level in a developing country 
context.
A variety of new forms of environmental governance seek to influence corporate behaviour 
from local to global. Environmental governance depends on a complex web of relations and a 
multitude of different activities and processes, all of which conspire to shape and constrain 
actors’ behaviour towards the environment (Levy and Newell 2005). Modes of environmental 
governance can range from conventional approaches where state or market actors take the 
lead role in governing corporate activity, to more ‘hybrid’ modes of governance, where state- 
market-community distinctions blur through multi-stakeholder partnerships and initiatives
1 Christmann (2004) and Garcia-Johnson (2000) are notable exceptions.
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(Carmen Lemos and Agrawal 2006). In addition to these external drivers, internal factors to 
the firm such as strategies, resources and culture may help explain variance in corporate 
responses to external pressures and subsequent corporate environmental performance 
outcomes (Bansal 2005; Delmas and Toffel 2004; Perkins 2007; Suchman 1995). Often 
studies focus on one mode of governance internal or external to the firm, as opposed to 
exploring their relationships and transitions over time. This study differs in that it recognises 
the spatial and socio-temporal complexity of corporate environmentalism, and therefore seeks 
to identify how actors at multiple scales interact to influence the corporate environmental 
performance of industrial facilities.
Understanding of corporate greening in developing countries is limited by a lack of rigorous 
theoretical and methodological approaches that take into account internal and external drivers 
from the local to the global. Thus, the aim of this study is to contribute to our theoretical, 
empirical and policy relevant understanding of corporate greening in a developing country 
context. In order to achieve this tripartite aim the thesis has six objectives:
1. To develop a novel analytical framework utilising institutional and organisational 
theory, informed by debates on the spatialities of corporate environmentalism;
2. To introduce agency and power into the analysis of institutional and organisational 
theory in order to identify mechanisms of institutional and organisational change;
3. To expose the complex dynamics and drivers of corporate environmentalism at the site 
level;
4. To develop a unique research design which utilises methodological triangulation in a 
process-oriented/longitudinal study;
5. To identify the policy-practical lessons learned from the analysis of corporate greening 
in post-Apartheid South Africa; and
6. To explore the generalisability of the research findings within and beyond South 
Africa and to recommend avenues for further study.
It follows that the overarching research question is: How and why has corporate 
environmentalism evolved in post-apartheid South Africa’s oil refining sector? To explore 
this phenomenon the changing environmental performance at three oil refineries in South
17
Africa is studied: Sapref and Enref in Durban, and Calref in Cape Town.2 To address the 
overarching research question, the study seeks to answer two secondary questions:
1. How has the environmental performance of Sapref, Enref and Calref evolved since 
democratisation in South Africa?
2. How and why has each refinery’s environmental performance differed?
To address secondary research question one, environmental performance is assessed using 
primary and secondary data that demonstrates how internal and external processes and 
outcomes have evolved at each refinery (Ilinitch et al. 1998). To evaluate how and why each 
refinery’s environmental performance has differed (secondary research question two), a 
theoretical framework of MNC complexity and organisational field dynamics (see Figure 2.2) 
is used to investigate the contestation of corporate environmentalism from 1994 to 2006 in 
Durban and Cape Town (Hoffman and Ventresca 2002a; Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Scott 
2008). Through the analysis of these research questions the theoretical, empirical and applied 
aims and objectives of this thesis are addressed. A novel analytical framework and research 
design is established using a theoretical approach informed by institutional and organisational 
theory (Hoffman and Ventresca 2002b; Pierson 2000; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 
2001). Within this study, theory is used to guide a reflexive research process that is not purely 
deductive hypothesis testing, or inductive ‘grounded’ theory building (Strauss and Corbin 
1997; Esterberg 2002). The research process evolves iteratively as cycles of theory building 
and refinement emerges between the explanatory units of analysis and qualitative data 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Esterberg 2002).
One of the goals of this research is to unpack the ‘black box’ of institutional theory by 
identifying mechanisms of institutional and organisational change. The theoretical framework 
established in Chapter 2 seeks to identify these mechanisms through the analysis of 
interaction and co-construction between macro level organisational field dynamics and micro 
level firm legitimacy and characteristics. Organisational field dynamics, defined here as 
discursive spaces where actors contest and construct the meaning of issue areas (Hoffman and
2 Sapref is jointly owned by Shell and BP; Shell is the operator. Enref (commonly known as the Engen refinery) 
is 80 percent owned by Petronas, Malaysia’s national petroleum corporation, and 20 percent owned by 
Worldwide African Investment Holdings Ltd, a major black South African investment group. Calref (commonly 
known as the Caltex or Chevron refinery) is 75 percent owned by Chevron, and 25 percent owned by a variety of 
South African investors, see Table 3.2.
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Ventresca 2002b), are explored using three analytical units: institutional actors, or the 
changing relational patterns and power dynamics of field actors (Hoffman and Ventresca 
2002a); institutional logics, the belief systems and associated ideologies and practices taken 
up by field level actors (Scott 2008); and governance structures, such as the regulative, 
normative and cognitive institutions that govern organisational behaviour (McAdam and Scott 
2005). The micro level factors include changing firm strategies which seek to gain, maintain 
or repair host community legitimacy, and firm characteristics such as resources and culture 
(Bansal 2005; Delmas and Toffel 2004; Perkins 2007; Suchman 1995). The research findings 
are triangulated using interview, document and social network analysis. This study’s unique 
mix of theoretical constructs, methodologies and longitudinal analysis contributes to the study 
of institutional and organisational change, which as discussed in Chapters 8 and 9 should help 
guide future studies.
The analytical narrative examines the governance processes that have unfolded since 
democratisation in South Africa with particular attention given to factors internal and external 
to the firm at and between multiple scales. How the refineries change their environmental 
performance over time (secondary research question one) is the subject of the study and, in 
the language of deductive research, the dependent variable. The thesis makes the explanatory 
claim that differences in refinery environmental performance (secondary research question 
two) are a function of complex interactions between the macro and micro analytical units of 
analysis. Although the analytical approach adopted within this study is applied within a 
developing country context, it is equally suitable for analysis of site level environmental 
performance of MNC subsidiaries in developed countries. In order to explain how and why 
corporate environmental performance is governed, most previous work in this area has 
developed and/or tested propositions using statistical analysis of various MNC internal and 
external variables (Delmas and Toffel 2004; Hillman and Wan 2005; Hoffman 1999; Kostova 
1999; Kostova and Roth 2002; Kostova and Zaheer 1999). Here, given the complexity of the 
qualitative data, a theoretical framework (Figure 2.2) guides the research inquiry as opposed 
to being used to develop testable hypotheses. Through detailed longitudinal analysis, thick 
description, pattern matching, and the discussion of rival explanations, the thesis highlights 
how and why the corporate environmental performance of each refinery has changed over 
time. It is hoped that a more clear understanding of the processes and mechanisms of 
institutional and organisational change are achieved through this study’s historical tracing of 
the actor-spaces of corporate environmentalism.
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Chapter 1 frames the study within the context of the broader literature on the governance of 
corporate environmentalism in developing countries, the spatialities of corporate 
environmentalism, and South Africa’s historical and post-apartheid circumstances. Chapter 2 
explores how institutional and organisational theory can be used to investigate the governance 
of corporate environmental performance. A theoretical framework of MNC complexity and 
organisational field dynamics is developed which informs the study’s research design, 
strategy and methods. Chapter 3 links theory to method as the study’s units of analysis, 
research design and indicators of rigour and relevance are discussed. Chapter 4 highlights the 
historical context of the South African liquid fuels industry and compares how the 
environmental performance and parent/subsidiary relations of Enref, Sapref and Calref have 
changed over time. Chapters 5 through 7 use longitudinal field level analysis and an in-depth 
qualitative narrative to explore how corporate environmental performance differs between 
each refinery.
Chapter 5 analyses how the post-apartheid pollution struggle emerges from 1995 to 1999 in 
relation to Enref and Sapref in Durban and Calref in Cape Town. Chapter 6 discusses and 
compares how discursive power is wielded and norms are contested from 2000 to 2003 in 
Durban and Cape Town, and Chapter 7 highlights how regulative institutions evolve in 
Durban and at the national level whereas the field remains fragmented in Cape Town. Chapter
8 compares the findings of Chapters 4 through 7 to identify mechanisms of institutional and 
organisational change and reflects on the role of power and scale within the analysis. Chapter
9 considers the study’s theoretical and policy-practical relevance.
1.2 MNC environmental performance in developing countries
This study explores how industries’ environmental performance is shaped and constrained in 
a developing country context. The following section clarifies how this study’s subject, 
corporate environmental performance, is defined in the literature and how it is investigated 
within this thesis. Then, to situate the study within the changing discourse on MNC 
environmental performance in developing countries, a brief history of the literature is 
discussed.
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1.2.1 MNC environmental performance
To explain how and why corporate environmentalism has evolved in post-apartheid South 
Africa, this study investigates how the environmental performance at three South African fuel 
oil refineries has evolved (secondary research question one), and how and why each refinery’s 
environmental performance has differed (secondary research question two). Secondary 
research question one is the subject of this study or the dependent variable.3 In order to 
explain how the environmental performance of the oil refineries has evolved, the different 
dimensions of environmental performance and how they can be measured and analysed need 
to be specified.
The meaning of corporate environmentalism has evolved throughout the last four decades 
(Prakash 2000; Howes et al. 1997; Hoffman 2001a). Events such as the publication of Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962, the Bhopal gas disaster in 1984, the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 
1989, and Shell Nigeria’s ongoing environmental and human rights controversies have all 
served to fuel the evolving definitions and interpretations of corporate malpractice and, 
broadly speaking, corporate environmental performance. Although there is little consensus on 
a common definition and consistent and reliable set of environmental performance indicators 
(Ilinitch et al. 1998), practitioners have responded by developing environmental performance 
benchmarks and reporting standards to normatively influence corporate behaviour (see Ceres 
2006; FTSE 2006; GRI 2006). On the other hand, academics have developed theoretical 
models to provide consistent approaches within the rapidly evolving fields of corporate social 
and environmental performance (see Carroll 1979; Kolk and Mauser 2002; Lober 1996; 
Wood 1991; Ilinitch et al. 1998).
3 As will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the independent variables or explanatory factors of the study are the 
complex interactions between the factors at the macro and micro levels of analysis.
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Table 1.1: A corporate environmental performance matrix
Internal External
Process Organisational processes 
and structures 
Indicators: e.g. 
environmental management 
systems and clear lines of 
responsibility up to senior 
management for corporate 
environmental performance
Stakeholder Relations 
Indicators: e.g. publication of 
environmental reports and 
data
Outcome Regulatory Compliance 
Indicators: e.g. fines and 
penalties
Environmental Impacts 
Indicators: e.g. actual 
emissions levels and 
incidents
(Source: adapted from Ilinitch et al. 1998)
Process and outcome oriented dimensions of corporate social and environmental performance 
are common themes within this literature. For example, Ilinitch et al. (1998: 388) break 
corporate environmental performance criteria down into processes and outcomes that are both 
internal and external to the company (see Table 1.1). The general categories include internal 
organisational processes and structures, internal compliance with laws and regulations, 
external stakeholder relations and external environmental impacts. Indicators for these 
categories include adoption of environmental management systems, fines and penalties, 
publication of environmental reports and data, and actual emissions levels and incidents.
However, it is important to recognise the limitations of this typology; for example, internal 
regulatory compliance may be influenced by external factors such as threat of regulation. 
Also, internal processes such as environmental management systems may influence 
reductions in environmental emissions and public access to environmental data. Although 
some studies have narrowed the definition of corporate environmentalism to the examination 
of ‘beyond compliance’ corporate policies (see Prakash 2000), here the definition is kept 
broader to include both processes and outcomes in order to see the changing dimensions of 
corporate environmental performance over time. In developing country contexts, where 
regulation may be nonexistent or weakly enforced, it is relevant to maintain a broader 
definition of corporate environmentalism. This analysis also distinguishes symbolic versus 
substantive environmental performance improvements (Christmann and Taylor 2006), and 
seeks to explain how and why the oil refineries engage in these strategies.
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Thus the environmental performance categories in Table 1.1 are useful to guide investigation, 
but the analysis and explanation must be developed using appropriate theory and methods. 
Chapter 3 discusses methods and Chapter 4 discusses how corporate environmental 
performance patterns emerge from the analysis of the three different refineries.
1.2.2 The changing MNC discourse
Since World War II MNCs have substantially increased their operations in the developing 
world. Some of the first studies examining the environmental impacts of industry in 
developing countries occurred during the rise of the environmental movement in the 1970s. 
Although the examination of corporate environmental performance in developing country 
contexts is relatively under-researched with few systematic and in depth studies, a variety of 
ongoing themes at multiple scales can be identified within the literature on the environmental 
performance of pollution intensive MNCs operating in developing countries. They include at 
the international and cross-national levels: the pollution-haven hypothesis (Leonard 1987, 
1988); MNC versus domestic company performance (Pearson and WRI 1987); trade of 
hazardous products and waste (Castleman 1979); technology transfer (Gladwin 1977; 
Gladwin and Wells 1976); foreign direct investment and cleaner production (Wheeler 2001); 
and the export of environmental values (Brown et al. 1993). At the local level the study of 
technological risks, i.e. low probability/high risk events, emerged as a reaction to the Bhopal 
gas disaster in 1984 (Shrivastava 1992). The analytical focuses of these studies differ; they are 
typically divided between evaluating how either internal or external factors to the firm 
influence its corporate environmental performance.
In the 1970s and 1980s MNCs were often considered to be in opposition to the development 
goals of developing countries (Brown et al. 1993; Richter 2001). For example, the UN Code 
of Conduct for Transnational Corporations (UNCTC 1976) and the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (OECD 1976) were initiated in early 1970s. Both documents 
assume the inherent conflict with MNC business objectives and host country development 
objectives. It is important to recognise the political context of the era in order to situate this 
oppositional discourse -  the post-colonial independence of some countries and the socialist 
economic planning doctrines of others provided the backdrop in the decades following WWII 
for the distrust of Western MNCs operating in non-OECD countries (Jenkins 1991; Leys 
1996). Of course, as is discussed in Chapter 4, the fuel oil industry in apartheid South Africa 
during this period was under unique state and global civil society pressures. However, within
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the late 1980s and 1990s there was a discursive shift from a conflictual to a more conciliatory 
tone (Brown et al. 1993).
Coinciding with the fall of communism, the rise of neoliberal ideology and the acceleration of 
global capitalism, the vision of sustainable development rose to public prominence in the late 
1980s with the publication of the landmark Our Common Future report by the Brundltand 
Commission (WCED 1987). Public discourse then embraced the long-term compatibility of 
the environment, social and economic development, replacing the presumption of conflict and 
incompatibility (Brown et al. 1993: 5). The role of business within this high-level debate also 
evolved. For example at the Earth Summit in 1992, Chapter 30 of Agenda 21 highlighted the 
role of business in achieving sustainable development. MNCs began to be considered part of 
the solution in so-called third world development as opposed to the problem.
The reframing of this MNC -  host country relationship occurred within the context of 
growing recognition of developing country capacity limitations. For example, in some cases 
the pace of industrialisation has outpaced the ability of host countries to regulate the 
environmental impacts of MNCs. In addition, governance and institutional structures remain 
underdeveloped. Some developing countries often lack adequate financial resources, data and 
technical expertise, public participation in environmental decision-making, and the means of 
seeking redress in environmental matters (Petkova and W RI2002; W RI2003).
The corporate buzzwords of the last decade reflect this move towards MNC accommodation, 
MNC and host country cooperation, and industry self-regulation: terms such as “corporate 
environmentalism”, “public-private partnership”, “product stewardship”, “co-regulation”, 
“corporate social responsibility” and “corporate citizenship” exemplify this discursive shift 
(Brown et al. 1993: 5). Within the business and environment literature the accommodation 
and legitimisation of corporate practice is exemplified by advocates of eco-efficiency 
(Schmidheiny 1993), the compatibility of environmental regulation and competitiveness 
(Porter and van der Linde 1995b, 1995a), the move towards self and cooperative regulation 
(Glasbergen 1998), the development of markets in low income countries (Prahalad 2005), and 
the evolving corporate social responsibility debate (Carroll 1999). This win/win rhetoric spans 
multiple scales from the international, regional, home and host country, and host community 
levels of analysis.
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However, there are counter currents to these conciliatory overtures. Some of the more recent 
academic literature on the ‘greening of industry’ in developing countries questions its uptake 
and implementation and characterises it as an ad hoc and predominantly symbolic exercise 
(Utting 2002; Tokar 1997; Greer and Bruno 1996). Civil society opposition has emerged at 
multiple scales that feels there cannot be corporate responsibility without accountability 
(Bendell 2004; Newell 2001b; Clapp 2005; FOEI2002, 2006; O'Rourke 2004). Indeed actors 
engaging in the field of corporate environmentalism have advocated for corporate 
accountability legislation (CORE 2006; FOEI 2002; Richter 2001), foreign direct liability 
(Ward 2001; Newell 2001b), shareholder pressure (UKSIF 2006; SIF 2006) and 
environmental justice (Groundwork 2006; ESRC 2001). Many have been critical of how 
business seeks to accommodate stakeholder concern in order to legitimise their positions of 
power in society (Hamann and Acutt 2003; Idemudia 2007; Levy and Newell 2002; Utting 
2000). Often the most vociferous and sustained opposition to subpar MNC environmental 
performance comes from activists in home countries and host communities.
1.3 Governance of corporate environmentalism
Paralleling this changing MNC discourse, as the processes of globalisation, privatisation and 
decentralisation rose to the fore in the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of governance entered the 
academic lexicon with increasing frequency (Rhodes 1996; Rosenau 1995). Governance is 
distinct from government, as it encompasses both state and non-state structures and actors 
whereas government primarily focuses on the institutions and actions of the state (Jordan 
2008: 21; Lemos and Agrawal 2006: 298). Environmental governance in the last decade has 
emerged as a wide field within which explanations and prescriptions of human-environment 
interaction are sought. Its normative and prescriptive dimensions provide a common departure 
point for scholars investigating differing modes of environmental governance, i.e. that human- 
environment interaction should be changed and can be changed (Glasbergen 1998). The 
concept of environmental governance therefore encompasses a broad range of approaches that 
seek to analyse, explain and potentially influence social and environmental change (Jordan 
2008). It moves beyond the study of environmental decision-making to include the wider 
socio-economic and institutional environment within which decisions are made.
Levy and Newell’s (2005: 2-3) definition of environmental governance, which recognises 
both its ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ aspects, captures this dynamic interplay:
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We use the term “environmental governance” to signify the broad range of 
political, economic, and social structures and processes that shape and constrain 
actors’ behaviour towards the environment. Environmental governance thus refers 
to the multiple channels through which human impacts on the natural environment 
are ordered and regulated. It implies rule creation, institution-building, and 
monitoring and enforcement. But it also implies a soft infrastructure of norms, 
expectations, and social understandings of acceptable behaviour towards the 
environment, in processes that engage the participation of a broad range of 
stakeholders.
The environmental governance of corporations from the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ is 
constantly evolving (Howes et al. 1997; Brown et al. 1993). Studies on the changing 
dimensions of corporate environmentalism have focused both on internal (see Prakash 2000) 
and external (see Hoffman 2001b) factors to the firm. While most studies have been 
conducted on the environmental performance of industry in advanced industrialised countries 
where environmental regulation has evolved significantly since the 1970s, free market 
economies are embraced and commitment to democratic government exists, there is an 
increasing body of literature emerging in developing countries (Perkins 2007). Different types 
of governance structures external to the firm range from conventional approaches where state, 
market, industry or civil society actors take the lead role in governing corporate activity, to 
more ‘hybrid’ approaches, where state-market-civil society distinctions blur such as through 
multi-stakeholder partnerships and initiatives (Carmen Lemos and Agrawal 2006).
How do these modes of governance drive corporate environmentalism? Three broad 
categories of primarily external drivers can be found in the literature: environmental 
regulation, global (i.e. international and firm-based) norms and standards, and community- 
driven environmental governance. As will be discussed below, studies often focus on one 
mode of governance, as opposed to exploring their relationships and transitions over time 
(Kagan et al. 2003 is an exception). This study differs in that it recognises the spatial and 
socio-temporal complexity o f environmental governance, and therefore seeks to identify how 
and why a broad range of governance structures emerge, change and interact over time.
1.3.1 National environmental regulation
In both developed and developing countries environmental regulation is one of the key 
drivers of corporate environmental performance (Hoffman 2001a; Jenkins 2000; Kagan et al. 
2003). There are a variety of different regulatory strategies and policy instruments ranging 
from being prescriptive (e.g. command and control) to more flexible and voluntary. In
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advanced industrialised countries, ‘new’ environmental policy instruments (such as market- 
based instruments, information-based approaches, negotiated agreements and voluntary 
regulations) gained increasing preference in the 1980s and 1990s over the alleged burdens of 
traditional command and control regulation in the 1970s (see e.g. Carter 2007; Jordan 2008; 
Jordan et al. 2004; Fiorino 2006; Gouldson and Murphy 1998).
In a particularly insightful study, Kagan and colleagues (2003) explore the importance of 
regulation in shaping the corporate environmental performance of pulp and paper 
manufacturing mills in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the US. In contrast to other 
studies, regulation is just one of the factors compared to other potential mechanisms which 
influence corporate environmental behaviour. They make a unique contribution to the 
literature by exploring the similarity and difference of environmental improvements at the site 
level through the recognition of the complex interaction between regulation, market pressures, 
local and national environmental activism, and corporate environmental management (Kagan 
et al. 2003). This study draws from Kagan et al’s research design and considers a wide range 
of mechanisms which may influence corporate environmentalism in South Africa.
An issue particularly relevant for the implementation of regulation in developing countries is 
the degree to which it is enforced. If regulation is weakly enforced then it may have limited or 
uneven effects on pollution prevention and control (Jenkins 2000). Much of the debate on 
how best to regulate business activities has focused on command and control measures versus 
voluntary and self-regulatory initiatives (Utting 2002: 9). Yet there are limits to the take up 
and implementation of voluntary agreements, both in developed and developing country 
contexts (Damall and Sides 2008; Hanks 2002). Environmental policy instruments are thus 
context specific and often a regulatory mix is needed (Potoski and Prakash 2004; Stavins 
2003). Given much of the literature on environmental policy derives from developed country 
examples, questions have been raised about the extent to which policy instruments can be 
transferred and replicated from developed to developing countries (Utting 2002: 9). Indeed, 
some solutions unique to developing country contexts have been documented in the literature, 
particularly in relation to innovative public disclosure programmes (Blackman et al. 2004). As 
will be discussed in section 1.5.3, South Africa’s environmental regulation has strong 
foundations but, within the timeframe of this study, the regulatory framework is quite 
fragmented, weakly implemented and enforced. It is expected that in the context of this study 
direct or command and control regulation will have little influence over each refineries’
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corporate environmental performance, but that self- and voluntary regulation will have more 
significant impact.
1.3.2 Global diffusion of environmental norms and standards
In the context of weak host country regulation, scholars have explored how economic 
globalisation, trade liberalisation and foreign direct investment may influence the 
environmental performance of MNCs in developing countries. Controversially, some authors 
have claimed that MNCs will exploit cross-country differences, seeking to site manufacturing 
facilities where there is lax regulation thus MNC subsidiaries would adapt environmental 
policies, standards and technologies to the host country conditions (Christmann 2004: 747; 
Korten 1995; Leonard 1988, 1987; Pearson and WRI 1987). Others have explored how MNCs 
have increasingly self-regulated their environmental conduct, implementing uniform 
environmental policies and firm-based standards throughout their operations (Angel and Rock 
2005; Christmann 2004; Christmann and Taylor 2001).4
It is not surprising that the evidence on whether or not developing countries have become 
‘pollution havens’ for the pollution intensive industry of high-income countries and whether 
or not there has been a ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental standards in developing 
countries is mixed. Some find no evidence suggesting that the stringency of a country’s 
environmental regulation significantly impacts competitiveness of pollution-intensive firms 
(Jaffe et al. 1995; Janicke et al. 1997), whereas others have found some evidence of pollution 
haven pressures (Antweiler et al. 2001; Birdsall and Wheeler 1993; Cole and Elliott 2003; 
Mani and Wheeler 1998; Van Beers and Van den Bergh 1997). Vogel in fact suggests that 
trade liberalisation will influence the ‘trading up’ of environmental regulation in the global 
economy (Vogel 1995). What is of interest here is how these processes of economic 
globalisation may or may not drive the greening of industry in South Africa.
There is growing cross-national empirical analysis of themes such as technology transfer and 
the diffusion of environmental norms, values and standards (Angel and Rock 2005; Garcia- 
Johnson 2000; Christmann 2004; Christmann and Taylor 2001; Christmann and Taylor 2006;
4 As will be discussed in Chapter 7, there are cross-overs between these ‘ideal types’ of corporate 
environmentalism drivers. The spread of industry self-regulation through international diffusion processes may 
significantly influence national environmental regulation, e.g. types of host country co-regulation may be 
designed around the take up and implementation of these international norms and standards.
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Cole and Neumayer 2005; Neumayer and Perkins 2004; Perkins 2003, 2007; Perkins and 
Neumayer 2008; Wheeler 2001). This literature often explores the growing convergence 
between industry’s environmental performance in developed and developing countries. For 
example, using survey data from China, Christmann and Taylor (2001) find that multinational 
ownership, multinational customers and exports to developed countries increase self­
regulation of environmental performance. In addition, Angel and Rock focus on the 
uniformity of environmental standards within MNCs and demonstrate that in Southeast Asia 
MNCs may go beyond compliance due to global firm-based standards, and that these 
standards “are providing a platform for learning and innovation within the firm” (2005: 1903).
Although the literature on the global diffusion of environmental norms and standards 
demonstrates potential benefits, it underspecifies how and why ‘unevenness’ in environmental 
performance outcomes occur in practice (Perkins 2007). For example, Ruud (2002: 116) 
reveals that global market forces demonstrated less influence over MNCs in India than 
domestic environmental regulations and firm-level environmental policies and programmes. 
Garcia-Johnson (2000) demonstrates the ‘hegemonic’ transfer of environmental ideas and 
practices from US MNCs within the host countries Brazil and Mexico, and Acutt et al (2004) 
highlight the limitations of implementing the global chemical industry’s code-of-practice, 
Responsible Care, in South Africa and Mexico. In Mexico they find that there is little 
engagement with civil society, and in South Africa, although there is a stronger tradition of 
stakeholder engagement, the code-of-practice lacks societal legitimacy due to its narrow 
focus. Both Garcia-Johnson and Acutt et al demonstrate the global reach and influence of 
corporate environmentalism, but also demonstrate how the uptake and implementation of 
industry and firm-based norms and standards may lead to dissimilar outcomes.
Also germane to this study, within the last decade political scientists have explored the 
‘privatisation’ of environmental governance and the changing role of states, firms and global 
civil society in global environmental governance (Biermann and Pattberg 2008; Cashore 
2002; Clapp 1998; Falkner 2003, 2007; Levy and Newell 2005; Levy and Newell 2002; 
Pattberg 2005). They have highlighted the development and spread of new forms of private 
environmental governance, such as environmental management and certification standards 
like ISO 14001 and the Forest Stewardship Council. Both industry and environmental non­
governmental organisations (NGOs) have become key actors in the process of global 
environmental governance, which, it can be argued, serves to promote global self-regulation
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and the international liberal paradigm (Falkner 2003). This literature breaks new ground by 
asking key questions about the role of business in global environmental governance, but it 
does not specifically address how and why the environmental performance of business is 
governed. Nor does this scholarship consider the environmental performance of industrial 
facilities at the site level; it biases the role of MNCs in international as opposed to local 
environmental politics.
Thus, global norms and standards, which may include international certifiable standards, 
industry initiatives and firm-based environmental policies and standards, may increasingly 
diffuse between parent and subsidiaries, but the quality of their take up and implementation is 
context specific. Driving this diffusion are a variety of pressures and processes, which include 
(Christmann and Taylor 2001; Angel and Rock 2005; Jenkins 2000; Perkins 2007):
• The increasing integration of global MNC production networks;
• MNC pressure on subsidiaries and domestic suppliers to self-regulate environmental 
performance;
• International interest group and NGO pressure on MNCs to improve worldwide 
environmental performance;
• Customer pressure to self-regulate the environmental performance of the supply chain 
and end market country regulatory standards, particularly as exports increase from 
developing to developed countries; and
• The need for global firms to maintain ‘reputational capital’ and minimise legitimacy 
risks as global brands may be one of their most valuable assets.
Although studies that explore the globalisation of environmental norms and standards are 
useful in identifying proximate drivers of corporate environmentalism, they often generalise 
at the national and industry sector levels, and give preference to top-down and cross-national 
processes as opposed to identifying potential heterogeneity in host community or site level 
outcomes (see e.g. Perkins 2007). Indeed, much of this work does not evaluate the quality of 
implementation and subsequent impacts of self-regulatory initiatives.5 From the above 
discussion it is apparent that international, industry and firm level norms and standards are
5 Although in an effort to identify ‘symbolic’ versus ‘substantive’ environmental performance in ISO-certified 
firms in China, Christmann and Taylor (2006) do investigate compliance with international certifiable standards.
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putting increasing pressure on high profile polluters such as the petrochemical industry. 
However, the degree to which this pressure influences corporate environmental behaviour will 
depend upon a variety of different factors including the firm’s reputational risk within the host 
and home countries. This study will show how these international drivers impact site level 
environmental performance in South Africa. Out of the three refineries, it is expected that 
Sapref and Calref, the Shell/BP (UK/EU) and Chevron (US) refineries respectively, will have 
more international, home country and parent company pressure to improve its environmental 
performance than Engen, which is owned by Petronas (Malaysia). Therefore we can expect 
Sapref and Calref to implement ISO 14001 and other industry norms and standards before 
Enref.
1.3.3 Community-driven environmental governance
As highlighted in section 1.2.2 civil society has also engaged with business and government at 
multiple scales calling for corporate accountability. Related to the study of facility-specific 
corporate environmental performance, community-driven environmental governance, such as 
‘community-driven regulation’ and ‘environmental justice’ activism, have significantly 
influenced corporate and government behaviour in certain contexts (Cock 2004; Lund- 
Thomsen 2005; O'Rourke 2004; Agyeman et al. 2003; McDonald 2002; Agyeman 2002; 
Bullard and Johnson 2000). Environmental justice can be defined as the “fair treatment and 
meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, colour, national origin, or income 
with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, 
regulations and policies” (Bullard and Johnson 2000: 558). This rights-based discourse 
emerged in the US in the 1970s and 1980s in relation to proposals to site polluting and toxic 
industries in predominantly poor and black communities, but since then the concept of 
environmental justice has evolved and become broader in scope to address injustices in a 
variety of contexts within, between and across both developed and developing countries 
(Walker and Bulkeley 2006: 655).
As Newell (2005: 548) highlights, poor communities can drive a type of ‘accountability 
politics’, where the legitimacy of private and public sector actors are queried and held to 
account. Indeed, O’Rourke (2002) demonstrates how complaints from community members 
have driven local environmental agencies in Vietnam to take action on industrial pollution 
issues; although he highlights how conflicts within the state between developmentalist and 
environmental concerns may create disincentives for enforcement of environmental
31
regulations. In South Africa, Lund-Thomsen (2005: 628) identifies three ways corporate 
accountability activists may spur changes in corporate environmental behaviour: first, civil 
society ‘critical governance’ engagement strategies have proved successful; second, anti­
globalisation social movements have “increased environmental consciousness, transforming 
the environmental governance structures in South Africa”; and third, community-based 
organisations and NGOs have pressured the enforcement of existing legislation in South 
Africa, enabling corporations to be held to account for polluting practices. In Durban, Barnett 
(2003) has highlighted how the media can play an important role in naming and shaming 
private and public sector actors and influencing governance outcomes (Barnett 2003). Other 
authors have noted how, since democratisation, environmental justice campaigns have had 
mixed success in South Africa (Cock 2004; McDonald 2002).
Yet community-driven governance is not all about confrontational politics: as discussed in 
section 1.2.2, there is a cooperational discourse, which advocates ‘corporate social 
responsibility’, ‘corporate citizenship’ and ‘stakeholder engagement’ (Matten and Crane 
2005; Moon et al. 2005; Zadek 2001). There are often multistakeholder initiatives where 
companies and communities find win/win solutions for the environmental governance of 
industrial facilities, such as through the establishment of Good Neighbour Agreements 
(GNAs) (Illsley 2002; Lewis and Henkels 1998) and other types of cross-sector partnerships 
(Egels-Zanden and Wahlqvist 2007; Selsky and Parker 2005). There is a growing literature on 
why firms ‘should’ incorporate corporate environmentalism into their core business strategy, 
though the evidence of firms actually doing so, particularly in developing countries, is sparse 
(Hoffman 2000; Jenkins 2000; Utting 2002). How and why these interventions have been 
successful and how sustainable they will be in the end is less clear. Many of these studies are 
normative, descriptive and to a lesser degree theoretical -  stating the case for companies to be 
good corporate citizens, as opposed to ground-truthing the evidence (Waddock 2008). As 
mentioned in section 1.2.2, there is a healthy scepticism in some academic circles that seek 
answers to the difficult questions about the role of corporate power in environmental 
governance. As Jordan (2008: 30) emphasises, the literature needs to more explicitly address 
“governance for what and for whom”.
More recently, some academics have called for a renewed research agenda on the role of 
corporate social responsibility in developing countries. They have promoted a ‘critical 
research agenda’ to evaluate the extent to which corporate social responsibility initiatives can
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reduce poverty and maximise sustainable development benefits for the poor and marginalised 
in the global South (Prieto-Carron et al. 2006; Blowfield and Frynas 2005). Some scholars 
have concluded that best practice corporate social responsibility initiatives should reinforce 
state-led development policy in low income host countries (Newell and Frynas 2007). This 
study does not directly engage with the normative literature on how MNCs should behave in 
developing countries, or more generally host countries and communities with weak 
governance structures, rather it takes an analytical approach to explore how and why 
corporate environmentalism has evolved over time driven by factors both external and 
internal to the firm.
In sum, communities engage both government and firms with a variety of different strategies 
including direct action, campaigning, educational, informational, civic science and 
cooperational approaches. However, this literature lacks specificity in relation to the type of 
conditions that lead to ‘successful’ outcomes (Newell 2005), i.e. those that are deemed 
efficient, effective, equitable and legitimate by all relevant stakeholders (Adger et al. 2003). 
The literature also gives preference to the poor and marginalised communities that have much 
less material and structural power than large MNCs and strong governments (see e.g. Garvey 
and Newell 2005; Muthuri 2007), rather than focusing on highly educated, middle-class 
communities that may (or may not) successfully influence a firm’s environmental 
performance. Another potential limitation of community-driven governance is that positive 
outcomes may be confined to particular communities that have suffered disproportionate 
environmental impacts and have achieved a strong degree of collective action and 
organisation (Jenkins 2000: 258). Within the context of this study (see section 5.1 for more 
detail), it is expected that Cape Town’s white middle-class host communities will engage 
more cooperatively with Calref and achieve more significant corporate environmental 
performance gains than South Durban’s Indian, Coloured and African communities. In 
contrast, it is expected that South Durban’s historically disadvantaged communities will 
engage more confrontationally using the rhetoric of environmental justice and rights than 
Cape Town’s northern suburbs, and that Enref and Sapref will resist engaging with 
community activists given the legacy of industrial secrecy in the Basin.
1.3.4 Managerial environmentalism versus environmental justice
This overview illustrates a variety of external and some internal drivers that may influence the 
corporate environmental performance of South Africa’s fuel oil refineries. External drivers
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include domestic environmental regulation, the diffusion of international norms and 
standards, and community-driven governance. Internal drivers include parent company 
policies, practices and subsidiary environmental strategy. Clearly there is crossover between 
these ‘ideal types’ of corporate environmentalism drivers. The spread of industry self­
regulation through international diffusion processes may significantly influence national 
environmental regulation. For example, types of host country co-regulation may be designed 
around the take up and implementation of these international norms and standards. In 
addition, communities may name and shame firms into adopting industry standards. Using an 
original research design, this study seeks to unpack the complexity and interaction between 
these different corporate environmentalism drivers within South Africa’s oil refineries.
Although not directly addressed but apparent from the above discussion, there are various
‘environmentalisms’ that may populate discursive spaces (i.e. organisational fields, see
section 2.2) within the new South Africa. Discourse often revolves around dichotomies such
as conflict versus consensus and radical versus incremental organisational and institutional
change. Corporate environmentalism, as defined in section 1.2.1, can be considered a subset
of a broader discourse, managerial environmentalism, favoured by technocrats and industry
which falls into the latter incremental category seeking win/win business-environment
outcomes. Critics have highlighted how neoliberal governments establish misguided
approaches “that assume that firms and markets are the best arbiters of sound and efficient
environmental policies” (Stevis and Assetto 2001: 251). Perkins definition is apposite:
Managerial environmentalism describes environmental commitments, policies and 
practices aimed at addressing environmental impacts in instrumental ways which 
do not fundamentally challenge dominant patterns of human-environment 
relations. The term overlaps with weak versions of ecological modernisation with 
their emphasis on incremental, technocratic approaches (Murphy and Gouldson
2000). However, managerial environmentalism refers to a broader category of 
regulatory approaches, including conventional directive-based ones rejected by 
proponents of ecological modernisation. (Perkins forthcoming: 1-2)
Thus, much of the above discussion on drivers of corporate environmentalism -  i.e. national 
environmental regulation, global diffusion of norms and standards and cooperative 
approaches by communities and companies to establish voluntary regulatory initiatives -  fits 
within Perkins’ definition of managerial environmentalism. What falls outside of this 
definition is environmental justice and corporate accountability activism that often seeks more 
radical institutional and organisational change using confrontational discursive strategies (as
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discussed in section 1.3.3). Environmental justice seeks equal environmental protection for all 
populations, which, given the legacy of apartheid and South Africa’s new constitution (which 
guarantees the right to a clean and healthy environment), resonates significantly with the 
formerly excluded majority. This analysis will pay close attention to how the discourses of 
managerial environmentalism and environmental justice influence governance processes and 
outcomes in both Durban and Cape Town.
1.4 Spatialities of corporate environmentalism
Implicit within the above discussion of corporate environmentalism drivers is a spatial 
structure. Indeed, scale is one of the foundational concepts in geography (Brown and Purcell 
2005). Environmental regulation occurs at the national scale, global norms and standards at 
the international and community-driven governance at the local scale. These are the analytical 
lenses that academics often use to explore the drivers of corporate environmentalism. 
Although as alluded to above, there are clearly relationships and interactions between scales. 
In fact, as will be discussed below, scalar organisation and politics can help explain the 
diffusion and potential unevenness of corporate environmentalism at the site level.
Before assessing how the concept of scale can be applied within this study it is important to 
recognise the structural context within which this alleged move from ‘government to 
governance’ and the diffusion of managerial environmental approaches has taken place. Some 
geographers have been keen to highlight how the globalisation of neoliberal ideology 
provides the impetus for these changing scalar processes (Himley 2008; McCarthy 2005). 
Indeed, from an Anglo-American perspective it was the Reagan and Thatcher years that 
highlighted inefficiencies of command and control regulation and ushered in an era of market- 
based approaches and self-regulation. Yet the gap that the rollback of government left open in 
the US in the 1980s was initially populated by civil society organisations and NGOs seeking 
to hold companies and government to account (Hoffman 2001a). As Hoffman (2001a) 
explains it was in the late 1980s and early 1990s that environmental performance began to be 
‘institutionalised’ within industry and firms began to more willingly adopt voluntary 
environmental improvements.
Thus through processes of ‘neoliberal’ environmental governance environmental goods and 
services have become increasingly privatised and commodified, governance has been rescaled 
“both ‘downward’ towards the local and subregional scales and ‘upwards’ toward the
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supranational scale” (Himley 2008: 443), and there has been a rise in the role of social 
movements and other nonstate actors in contesting and reworking neoliberal forms of 
governance (e.g. environmental justice and corporate accountability activists) (Himley 2008: 
444-446). Those critical of these trends highlight the extent to which these new spatial 
processes have eroded democracy and accountability (Bailey and Maresh 2009). Particularly 
relevant to this study is how South Africa’s adoption of neoliberal policies (as discussed in 
section 1.5) may influence the spatial organisation of environmental policy and governance.
1.4.1 Conventional scale
Traditionally environmental decision-making is conceptualised from the top-down -  a 
cascading of policies and practices from the international level to the local level (Eckerberg 
and Joas 2004). Yet as discussed above the role of the nation state has been changing with the 
spread of neoliberalism. A ‘hollowing out’ of the nation state as a locus of political authority 
has been widely documented in the literature. Through processes of deregulation, devolution 
of authority, increasing interaction between state and non-state actors, it has been argued that 
traditional authority has moved away from the national state to local and regional government 
and civic and private organisations (Eckerberg and Joas 2004). Highlighting the importance of 
socio-spatial processes allows for a deeper and more meaningful approach to understanding 
the dynamics of changing corporate behaviour. For example, an analytical focus on how 
corporate environmental performance is changing at the local level should recognise the 
factors at multiple scales that may impact host locality processes and outcomes (Ostrom 
1999).
In developing countries, as discussed in section 1.3.1, where state-based regulatory and 
enforcement structures may hold little formal or informal authority, traditional hierarchical 
forms of regulatory power may be dispersed and fragmented. Formal rules, such as laws and 
regulations, are only part of the story: informal rules, such as norms, beliefs and 
cognitive/cultural factors, may also influence corporate behaviour. In addition to explanations 
of top-down (push) diffusion, there is increasing acknowledgement of bottom-up activity, 
where actors “pull” innovations and formal and informal governance structures down from 
the global/regional scale to be applied at the local level (Perkins forthcoming: 12).
Thus, vertical explanations of the diffusion of corporate environmentalism give preference to 
top-down (push) and bottom-up (pull) accounts. Building on the discussion in section 1.3,
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Table 1.2 identifies a wide variety of initiatives at multiple scales that aim to govern corporate 
behaviour. It is relevant to note that the instruments in Table 1.2 and framework in Figure 1.1 
presents ‘ideal types’; there may be governance structures that do not fall neatly within its 
boundaries and these ‘types’ in actuality may blur between categories and scales. For 
example, the UN Declaration on Human Rights can be characterised as both international 
‘soft law’ and a norm that may influence business practices at multiple scales.
Table 1.2: Environmental governance of the petrochemical industry
Categories Types and scales Examples of petrochemical industry environmental 
governance instruments
Global and 
private environ­
mental 
governance
International ‘soft 
law’
ILO standards, Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, 
UN Norms on the Responsibilities o f  Transnational 
Corporations, Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights
Global and 
industry norms, 
standards and 
guidelines
ISO standards, UN Global Compact, AA1000, Global 
Reporting Initiative, Responsible Care, OECD MNE 
Guidelines
International 
initiatives and 
campaigns
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
Publish What You Pay campaign, Business Leaders 
Initiative on Human Rights
Home country Foreign direct liability, e.g. U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act, 
non-financial reporting requirements, shareholder 
resolutions, consumer, NGO and media pressure
Environmental
regulation
Host country Direct and hybrid regulatory instruments; including 
command-and-control and market-based instruments, 
public disclosure programmes, negotiated and voluntary 
agreements, self regulation
Host locality Devolution, implementation and enforcement o f  
environmental policy and management: e.g. permitting, 
air quality monitoring, multistakeholder initiatives and 
industry self regulation
Community/civil
society-driven
governance
Host country and 
host locality
Community, NGO, consumer and media pressure: e.g. 
information and education devices, citizen science, 
participatory community-company engagement, Good 
Neighbour Agreements, community-led monitoring and 
enforcement schemes
From a top-down perspective, as discussed in section 1.3.2, the processes driving global and 
private environmental governance may ‘push’ the implementation and take up of international 
corporate environmental norms, standards and guidelines to host countries and localities. 
Whereas from a bottom-up perspective, as discussed in section 1.3.3, civil society in host 
countries and communities may demand corporate accountability, thus ‘pulling’ international
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norms and standards and applying them to specific point polluters to contest their social and 
environmental performance.
1.4.2 The ‘relational turn’
The discussion above highlights how the diffusion and production of formal and informal 
rules to govern corporate environmental performance occurs at and between spatial scales 
from the global to local. Indeed, globalisation occurs not just at ‘the global’ but at the ‘sub- 
global’, thus is transforming a concept of space: “Space extends in globalisation through the 
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that 
local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens 
1990: 64; in Lange 2003: 415). Yet these global-local, top-down/bottom-up dualisms have 
been contested by some, who argue that in an increasingly networked world (e.g. through 
global flows of capital, information, communication and travel) conventional scalar 
explanations of changing socio-spatial dynamics are less relevant (see e.g. Amin 2002; 
Marston et al. 2005; Yeung 2005). As Jones (2009: 203) highlights, ‘global business spaces’ 
are characterised by increasingly complex interactions between actors and the multiple spaces 
that constitute them. Thus, the dynamics of environmental governance can be understood as 
horizontal, where networks o f  state and non-state actors interact in non-traditional ways to 
shape and constrain environmental processes and outcomes (see e.g. Bulkeley 2005).
For example, originating at the international level, the UN Global Compact seeks to embed 
within businesses ten universal principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment 
and anti-corruption through multistakeholder global networks.6 In addition, originating at the 
local level, the Global Community Monitor, an environmental justice and human rights NGO, 
builds capacity within industrial communities to protect human health and hold industrial 
polluters to account through the use of environmental monitoring tools.7 The Global 
Community Monitor has created a global network of communities impacted by polluting 
industries. In relation to the environmental governance of the extractive industries there is a 
complex and fragmented global-local dynamic, where environmental NGOs follow the oil 
majors, support the creation of local NGOs, and engage with various aspects of resource 
extraction and production value chains (Bradshaw 1998, 2007; Hayter et al. 2003: 21). For
6 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/
1 http://gcmonitor.org/
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example, Bradshaw (1998; 2007) has identified how non-state actors influenced governance 
processes and outcomes in relation to the development of oil and gas resources off of Sakhalin 
Island in the Russian Far East. In relation to this ‘resource periphery’, environmental NGOs 
have held international oil companies to account through the ‘greening’ of global project 
financing (Bradshaw 2007). Here transnational advocacy networks (see e.g. Keck and Sikkink 
1998) were formed to campaign against the Sakhalin-II project. Of interest in the Sakhalin 
case is how local grassroots organisations were incorporated into global NGO networks. 
Bradshaw (2007) highlights important questions related to “governance for what and for 
whom” (Jordan 2008: 30), noting how these advocacy networks did little to benefit Russian 
society at the beginning of the campaign but did focus on local environmental issues towards 
its later stages. Thus the scalar organisation of corporate environmentalism can be quite 
‘messy’ and complex in practice.
Factions within the disciplines of economic and human geography have embraced these 
relational and network understandings of space and place (see e.g. Amin 2002; Marston 
2000; Marston et al. 2005; Massey 2005; Yeung 2005) As Sunley (2008) points out, there are 
two broad relational approaches within economic and human geography. The first relates back 
to the economic sociology of Granovetter (1985), which considers interpersonal and 
interorganisational relationships and interactions based largely on trust, reciprocity and 
collaboration. This is in juxtaposition to poststructuralist thinkers, who consider a wide range 
of networks and interactions between both human and nonhuman actors (i.e. actants as per 
actor-network theory). Driving much of this effort in the latter category within economic 
geography has been work on the spatialities of globalisation (see e.g. Amin 2002). As Amin 
(2002) argues, a ‘scalar epistemology’ is inadequate for conceptualising the nature of 
spatiality in the current era (see also Jones 2009: 208). He argues that “the growing 
routinisation of global network practices -  manifest through mobility and connectivity -  
signals a perforation of scalar and territorial forms of social organisation” (Amin 2002: 395). 
Particularly germane to the study of corporate environmentalism at the site level, Amin (2002: 
397) highlights the need for a shift in emphasis from a “politics of place to politics in place”. 
As discussed in the next section, Amin’s (ibid) recognition of a ‘cosmopolitan politics’ which 
occurs within spatial scales is highly relevant to this study.
More generally, Yeung (2005: 37) defines that the relational turn in economic geography “is 
concerned primarily with the ways in which socio-spatial relations of actors are intertwined
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with broader structures and processes of economic change at various geographical scales”. 
Three distinct bodies of relational literature can be identified in economic geography, which 
include relational assets in local and regional development, relational embeddedness in 
networks, and relational scales (Yeung 2005: 40). Of interest here is the interaction between 
social actors, firms and organisations in the production of environmental governance 
processes and outcomes. This study pays particular attention to how actor networks may defy 
global-local categorisation in the production of new spaces of governance. Although some 
scholars have gone so far as to suggest eliminating scale altogether as a concept in human 
geography (Marston et al. 2005), this study does not take this more extreme line of argument 
(as discussed in the next section).
Another category of literature within economic geography’s ‘relational turn’, which is 
relevant to this study, is that of global production networks (GPNs). The study of GPNs has 
been inspired by global commodity/value chain analysis, the networks and embeddedness 
perspectives in economic and organisational sociology, and actor-network theory (Coe et al. 
2008; Henderson et al. 2002; Hess and Yeung 2006). Research on GPNs “focuses on the 
organisationally and geographically complex webs of intrafirm, interfirm, and extrafirm 
networks that characterize contemporary production systems” (Hess and Coe 2006: 1207). In 
relation to the extractive industries, Bridge (2008: 389) applies a GPN approach to explore 
“the network configurations and regional development impacts” of the sector. He identifies 
how the application of a GPN framework to the extractive industries can advance stalled 
policy debates on the linkages between resource extraction and socio-economic development, 
and highlights the need to fully consider the materiality and territoriality of extractive 
commodities. Bridge expands our understanding of the typical linear production or 
commodity chain (i.e. upstream, midstream and downstream phases) of the oil industry, by 
typologising it as a “global production network of inter-firm and firm-state relations that link 
nationalised oil companies, resource-holding states and publicly traded, transnational oil 
companies” (2008: 389). Different from other GPNs, the GPN for extractive industries 
highlights the prominent role of the state as the primary resource holder, as major operators in 
the global oil industry, and as regulators at each stage of the chain including end consumption 
(ibid: 400). However, conspicuously absent from Bridge’s (2008: 399) illustration of the GPN 
framework for extractive industries is the role of civil society, which is particularly relevant to 
this study’s focus on the downstream (refining) sector. Although Bridge (2008: 415) does 
state in his conclusion how “civil society concerns ‘govern’ the environmental and
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development effects of oil production...through direct pressure on firms and states”; the 
dynamics of the social relations of oil at each stage of the GPN could be identified in more 
detail within his framework.
Implicit in the above discussion, proponents of the GPN approach prefer the concept of
networks over chains, to highlight the “the intricate links -  horizontal, diagonal, as well as
vertical -  forming multi-dimensional, multi-layered lattices of economic activity” (Henderson
et al. 2002: 442). Yet, the application of GPN frameworks and other network-based
approaches have been criticised as overly descriptive and under-theorised (Levy 2008; Sunley
2008; Yeung 2005). GPN frameworks suggest the governance of economic activity, but as
Levy (2008: 951) points out:
The discussion of governance emphasizes economic coordination rather than 
political contestation or the broader institutions and discursive structures in which 
markets are embedded. Moreover, the ideologies that constitute and legitimate 
particular forms of governance, production, and income distribution receive little 
attention.
Levy’s criticisms of GPN frameworks highlight a key gap in the application of network-based 
and relational approaches. To overcome this dilemma Levy borrows from organisational and 
institutional sociology and conceptualises GPNs as contested fields. He highlights the power 
dynamics and political contestation which underpin the order and structure within these 
economic and technological production networks. This study applies a similar field level 
approach (see Chapter 2) to the study of corporate environmentalism in post-apartheid South 
Africa, and utilises social network analysis as a methodology to explore the contestation of 
organisational fields (see sections 2.3 and 3.3.1).
1.4.3 The politics of scale and networks
The above discussion highlights both conventional, i.e. or vertical, understandings of 
environmental governance and relational, i.e. horizontal, understandings. How can these two 
divergent perspectives within the literature be reconciled? Bulkley (2005) argues that both a 
politics o f  scales and a politics o f  a networks can and indeed need to be incorporated into the 
spatial grammar of environmental governance. New hybrid geographies of environmental 
governance are taking shape that do not correspond to “nested hierarchies, the separation of 
levels of decision-making, and the divisions between territorially bound states and the fluid 
relations of non-state actors” (Bulkeley 2005: 898). Bulkeley (2005: 875) argues that common 
ground can be forged between scalar and network geographies, which are in fact mutually
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constitutive. Through the empirical example of a transnational municipal network, Cities for 
Climate Protection programme, she demonstrates how “governing the environment involves 
both political processes of scaling and rescaling the objects and agents of governance, as well 
as attempts to create new, networked, arenas of governance” (ibid). Bulkeley (2005) 
contributes significantly to our understanding of the spatialities of environmental governance. 
This study adopts Bulkeley’s (2005: 897) argument that “networks have scalar dimensions 
which extend beyond their scope” and seeks to also integrate a politics of scale with a politics 
of networks (see also Brenner 2001).
Perkins (forthcoming) also adds to our understanding of the spatialities of corporate
environmentalism. He identifies the complexity of the diffusion of managerial
environmentalism and, like Bulkeley, discusses a range of networks and scales through which
internationalisation processes and outcomes occur in practice. Perkins (forthcoming: 14)
highlights the relevance of the concept of multi-level governance which incorporates both the
vertical and horizontal dimensions of environmental governance:
Although multi-level governance has rarely been applied to the diffusion of 
managerial environmentalism per se, it nevertheless usefully highlights some of 
the complex vertical and horizontal networks through which new norms, 
knowledge and pressures may spread across geographic space.
As discussed in the next section, a multi-scale, multi-actor governance framework is used
within this study as a heuristic to examine both a politics of scale and politics of networks.
Perkins also questions the ubiquity of globalisation and the cross-national convergence of
managerial environmentalism:
Taken together, these insights suggest that it is unrealistic to assume that 
globalisation processes are contributing to the homogenisation of space, and a 
single, globally uniform model of managerial environmentalism. Rather, 
internationalisation is best understood as giving rise to the emergence of multiple 
nationally and/or regionally idiosyncratic managerial environmentalisms, 
constituting hybrids of various extra-local and place-based influences. (Perkins 
forthcoming: 19)
As discussed above in section 1.4.2, Amin’s (2002) argument about the ‘politics in place’ as 
opposed to the ‘politics of place’ is relevant. Indeed, theorists of scalar politics recognise that 
scalar configurations are “the outcomes of socio-spatial processes that regulate and organise 
social power relations...” (Swyngedouw 2004: 26). In order to better understand the adoption 
of managerial environmentalism, Perkins (forthcoming: 22-23) calls for a closer examination 
of the actor geographies of diffusion, the influence of domestic and extra-local pressures, and
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more cross-disciplinary work. This study seeks to address the politics of scale and networks 
by identifying how governance structures emerge through the contestation of discursive 
strategies (e.g. environmental managerialism versus environmental justice discourses) at and 
between multiple scales of analysis.
1.4.4 Multi-scale, multi-actor governance
To illustrate the vertical/horizontal distinction as described by Bulkeley (2005) and Perkins 
(forthcoming), Figure 1.1 contextualises the MNC within a multi-scale, multi-actor 
framework. Implied within this diagram is how multiple actors at multiple scales seek to 
shape and constrain corporate behaviour. The corporate actor is located at the centre of the 
diagram, with governments, markets and civil society represented as external actors 
potentially influencing corporate behaviour. This framework provides a useful heuristic to 
unpack these relationships. Frameworks are a helpful starting point for inquiry into 
environmental governance because they specify the classes of factors, the relationships 
between the factors, and how they loosely fit together into structures governing human- 
environment interactions (Schlager 1999). This study posits that corporate environmental 
behaviour is influenced by the dynamic interplay between the external and internal factors at 
and between multiple scales.8
8 Although, as per Bulkeley’s (2005) work, this study recognises the potential for hybrid geographies where 
processes of re-scaling may coincide with new networked spaces of governance.
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Figure 1.1: A multi-scale, multi-actor governance framework
Government Market/industry Civil society
Global
Regional
Home
country
MNC
environmental
performance
Host
country
Host
locality
Figure 1.1 does not predict the direction through which governance processes emerge. For 
example, governance may be multi-directional; an organisation not only reacts but also 
interacts with its external environment (Hoffman 2001b). This raises the structure versus 
agency debate. How and why corporate actors make decisions at the local level are 
determined by a combination of rules, norms and beliefs that permeate through the multiple 
levels of governance. The emergence of governance structures is related to the ideologies, 
discursive strategies and interests of specific actors (Campbell 2004). For example, the 
environmental performance of each refinery may be significantly influenced by whether or 
not its dominant host community stakeholders pursue ‘efficient’ or ‘just’ corporate 
environmental outcomes.
Thus MNCs have multiple external pressures that emerge from the global to local scales, yet 
MNCs are also actors within this complex governance game. Not identified within Figure 1.1 
are potential internal sources of firm environmental performance heterogeneity in response to 
these governance drivers (which will be discussed in more detail in section 2.4). In addition, 
the discussion so far has been limited to a description of governance instruments and 
structures, this so-called ‘hard’ architecture is often the focus of analytical attention, whereas
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the underlying ‘soft’ architecture of norms, ideas and beliefs, may also significantly influence 
changing governance structures and corporate greening (as will be discussed in Chapter 2) 
(see also Perkins forthcoming: 17). The challenge is to identify which actors and ‘soft’ and 
‘hard’ governance structures emerge to influence the environmental performance of South 
Africa’s fuel oil refineries. To help explain how this complex mix of internal and external 
factors influences corporate behaviour, institutional and organisational theory is drawn upon 
in Chapter 2. However, to situate this study within its research context, the South African 
historical background is discussed.
1.5 The South African context
To understand how and why corporate environmentalism has evolved in post-apartheid South 
Africa, the significance of three contextual factors must be recognised: the impact of the racist 
policies of the colonial and apartheid past on rural and urban environments; the Government’s 
prioritisation of liberal economic policies; and the foundations and fragmentation of 
environmental protection in South Africa.
1.5.1 The history and context of environmental degradation
The term “environmentalism” in South Africa is often referred to as a white middle-class 
concern, synonymous with conservation, finding comparatively little sympathy from the 
previously excluded majority (UNDP 2003; Whyte 1995). Indeed, there is a long history of 
environmental conservation in South Africa, dating back to its colonial and apartheid past. 
Yet there is a more recent history of environmental justice activism in South Africa that, 
instead of focusing on so-called ‘green’ issues, relates to campaigns against industrial 
pollution, lack of basic services and unequal access to natural resources, or so-called ‘brown’ 
and ‘red’ issues (UNDP 2003; Cock 2004; Bond 2002; McDonald 2002; Whyte 1995).
As Jacklyn Cock notes in the opening passage to her 1991 book Going Green: People,
politics and the environment in South Africa:
South Africa, with its mix of First World environmental problems such as acid 
rain, and Third World environmental problems such as soil erosion, is a 
microcosm of the environmental challenges facing the planet. These challenges 
are slowly coming onto the agenda of the liberation struggle in South Africa.
(Cock 1991: 1)
In the early 1990s environmental protection, pollution control and access to natural resources 
began to be framed using the rhetoric of human rights, social justice and equity. As discussed 
in section 1.3.3, this is indicative of the globalisation of environmental justice discourse as
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environmental justice campaigners from the US linked up with activists in South Africa from 
the early 1990s (NG05 2006). How this rights-based discourse has influenced the institutional 
environment within which MNCs operate is a primary theme of this study.
Yet these green, brown and red environmental issues have their roots in South Africa’s 
colonial and apartheid past. The process of conquest and dispossession of Africans in the 
subcontinent dates back to the mid-seventeenth century when the Dutch station was founded 
at the Cape. The seventeenth and eighteenth century Dutch maritime empire and nineteenth 
century British imperialism brought waves of European expansion to South Africa (Beinart
2001). Manipulation of access to land resources has been a key area of political conflict in 
South Africa (Whyte 1995). The Land Acts of 1913 and 1936 reserved 87 percent of the most 
productive agricultural land for whites and 13 percent for blacks.
Yet some caution may be needed when discussing the racial division of land. Beinart (2001: 
13-15) points out that land reserved for African occupation in the early twentieth century did 
not start as the worst land, as it was largely located within higher rainfall zones. In addition, 
Africans frequently stayed on white-owned farm land, and many rural communities in the 
early twentieth century favoured a system of migrant labour dominated by the mining industry 
in order “to be free from the threat of further dispossession” (Beinart 2001: 35).
After 1948, the National government’s policy of apartheid “divide-and-rule” tactics broke up 
the remaining 13 percent into ethnic territories or “homelands” for the African population 
(Whyte 1995). It is estimated that between 1960 and 1985 more than 3.5 million people were 
forcibly relocated (Ramphele and McDowell 1991: 3). The homelands lacked both natural 
resources and trained human resources, and were characterised by poverty and overpopulation 
(Whyte 1995). Thus rural environmental issues such as soil erosion, desertification, water 
shortages and water pollution became prevalent.
This process of dispossession and forced removal occurred within urban areas under the 
auspices of the Group Areas Act, passed in 1950 and then repeatedly amended. It is estimated 
that between 1957 and 1981 600,000 “Coloureds” and Asians were forcibly relocated to 
segregated zones within urban areas (Ramphele and McDowell 1991: 5). This process of 
social engineering attempted to prevent black urbanisation. Dating back to 1921 it was argued 
that Africans should only enter towns as temporary workers. The Native Laws Amendment
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Act of 1937 was enacted to control the flow of Africans to towns by establishing “pass laws”, 
which required “temporary” urban workers to carry passes (Ramphele and McDowell 1991: 
5). Eventually more than one million workers with their families were expelled from white- 
owned farms, where they had often lived for generations, the homelands were consolidated, 
and Africans who owned land in white areas were expelled (Ramphele and McDowell 1991: 
5).
The townships reserved for African occupation were located far from places of employment, 
and the township infrastructure was neglected as a deliberate strategy to discourage 
urbanisation (Ramphele and McDowell 1991: 5). Before 1986 the main population movement 
was to the overcrowded homelands, but with the repeal of influx regulations and the pass 
laws, “the flood gates of African urbanisation were opened” (Ramphele and McDowell 1991: 
5). Overcrowding in the townships led to the rise of squatter settlements in most urban areas. 
Thus the ideology of “separate development” which drove the management of South African 
cities has left a legacy of quite severe green, brown and red environmental issues (Ramphele 
and McDowell 1991: 91), as is discussed in the Durban and Cape Town case studies.
In addition to the environmental degradation of the homelands and lack of basic services such 
as water, energy and sewage facilities to African townships, other large legacy issues facing 
post-apartheid South Africa include: resource intensive and environmentally degrading 
industrial agricultural; discriminating policies and practices preventing African ownership 
rights in natural resources; and weak regulations protecting workers in farms, factories and 
mines (UNDP 2003; McDonald 2002; Bond 2002). Three problems can be identified in 
relation to South Africa’s industrial sector at the end of apartheid (UNDP 2003: 126; 
Bethlehem and Goldblatt 1997): first, the continued dependence of the economy on the 
resource extractive industries, which exact a heavy toll on the natural environment by using it 
as a sink for waste products, often in proximity to poor communities; second, industry’s 
dependence upon access to low energy prices, primarily electricity from heavily polluting coal 
power; and third, the capital stock of equipment used by energy, mining and manufacturing 
industries is old and inefficient meaning that pollution levels are high and energy-efficient 
technology has largely not been adopted. This latter point is particularly relevant in the study 
of the environmental performance of South Africa’s fuel oil refineries.
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1.5.2 South Africa’s economic growth policies
South Africa’s economy transitioned to industrial capitalism in the late nineteenth century as 
the mining sector rapidly grew. Racial differences were institutionalised in order to ensure a 
steady supply of African labour to the mines and white farms, and to depoliticise the potential 
of an organised black political threat (Peet 2002). In the twentieth century South Africa 
industrialised through the growth of manufacturing around primary production, which has 
been termed the ‘Minerals-Energy Complex’ (Fine and Rustomjee 1996). This 
industrialisation process in relation to the fuel oil industry is discussed in Chapter 4. The 
apartheid economy grew impressively in the 1960s and 1970s as the government pursued a 
policy of economic nationalism (Beinart 2001: 176). But South Africa’s comparison with 
mature industrial economies bifurcated in the late 1970s and 1980s as manufacturing growth 
faltered and the country was unable to emerge from economic recession. Foreign investors 
took flight as the manufacturing sector could not cope with international competition, and 
growing unemployment for Africans (estimated at close to 30 percent) fuelled political 
turmoil in the mid 1980s (Beinart 2001: 258-259). The apartheid economy’s failure has been 
explained differently: liberals view the racist policies as market failures -  the economy was 
condemned to an unskilled labour force and thus low productivity; whereas for the left the 
apartheid economy only functioned profitably when “resistance and the costs associated were 
sufficiently contained” (Fine and Rustomjee 1996: 6).
As apartheid was dismantled, South Africa experienced a miraculous transition to non-racial, 
multiparty democracy as opposed to revolution. Negotiations, elections and reconstruction 
unleashed a new politics in 1994 (Beinart 2001: 289). A remarkable achievement as the 
African National Congress (ANC), allied with the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
and the South African Communist Party, assumed rule with the consent and support of the 
majority of South Africans, which brought a decline in political violence and important steps 
towards deracialisation and developing effective economic management (Beinart 2001: 289- 
290). Political and moral leaders such as President Nelson Mandela and Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu articulated a philosophy of “reconciliation and of cultural pluralism in the ‘rainbow 
nation’” (Beinart 2001: 289). Of interest in this study is how transnational capital in the oil 
and gas sector both engaged and has been shaped by the ‘transformation’ of South Africa’s 
economic, social and environmental institutions.
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For some this promised transformation has not been sufficiently quick as the “legacy of 
apartheid remains too vivid” (Beinart 2001: 290). Economists cite an array of statistics to 
demonstrate that, after a decade since apartheid, poverty has grown among the poorest and 
unemployment remains high; although inequality between races diminished, inequality within 
races increased (Bond 2004; Republic of South Africa 2007; Pauw and Mncube 2007; Gelb 
2003; Koelble 2004).9 Perhaps more telling is South Africa’s Human Development Index 
(HDI) downward trend since 1995 (0.745 in 1995, 0.707 in 2000 and 0.674 in 2005) (HDI 
2008). Indeed, sub-Saharan Africa is the exception to increasing HDI trends in virtually all 
other global regions since the mid-1970s. Economic stagnation and the catastrophic impacts 
of HIV/AIDS on decreased life expectancy appear to be the cause (HDI 2008). However, as 
South Africa’s African Peer Review Mechanism report highlights, five legacies of the 
apartheid era have persisted: “a dualistic polity, poverty, unemployment, the inequitable 
distribution of wealth and income, and a high incidence of crime” (APRM 2007: 5). Figure
1.2 demonstrates South Africa’s legacy of racial inequality, and how in post-apartheid South 
Africa incomes of the Indian and white populations have increased more rapidly than those of 
the African and Coloured populations.
9 However since 2004 GDP growth has averaged over 4.5 percent, which is straining the economy in new ways, 
with shortages of materials and skilled labour (Republic of South Africa 2007: 5)
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Environmental analysts warned early on that there may be trade-offs between protecting the 
environment and enhancing social and economic development in post-apartheid South Africa 
(Cock and Koch 1991; UNDP 2003: 128). Yet the RDP highlighted the links between poverty 
and the environment as issues related to human rights, equity and devolution of resource 
management appeared to be embedded within ANC policy at that time (ANC 2004: section 
2.10.2). Two years later the government introduced the macroeconomic GEAR framework to 
inspire growth. The environment was not integral to the policy recommendations, as industrial 
development and economic growth are prioritised over environmental concerns (UNDP 2003: 
128; GEAR 1996: appendix 11).
One of the original GEAR architects, Stephen Gelb, claims that GEAR’S reforms to restore 
and maintain macroeconomic stability were originally present and actually put in process 
during the RDP’s period (Gelb 2003; 2006: 2).10 He posits that the reason for GEAR’S 
underperformance comes down to two factors: first, policy is not only about formulation but 
also about implementation, i.e. that because ‘populist’ principles and positions were unclear, 
GEAR policy was a ‘risky strategy’; and second, major policy initiatives need the backing of 
class alliances (Gelb 2006: 5). Gelb notes that the new Accelerated and Shared Growth 
Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), which was initiated in 2004, seeks to reduce poverty 
and inequality through very different politics than GEAR: “The ASGISA process aims to 
produce policy stability and certainty by building broad-based support” (Gelb 2006: 5). Thus 
Gelb’s overall thesis is that achieving macroeconomic policy goals rely more upon process 
rather than substance (Gelb 2006).
ASGISA may indeed be delivering upon its promises. Real incomes have increased on 
average by about four percent; more than 500,000 jobs have been created annually since 2004 
(although still less than the ASGISA target); and in 2006 investment had grown at a rate of 19 
percent, well ahead of ASGISA’s ten percent annual target (Republic of South Africa 2007). 
Poverty has begun to decline as a result of a large expansion of social grants; one very 
promising indicator is that child hunger has halved in just four years since 2004 (Van der 
Berg et al. 2007: 41). However, some social outcomes such as health and education show
10 Gelb suggests that progressives in the ANC alliance (with COSATU and SACP) highlighted the differences 
between RDP and GEAR because they were marginalised in the process through which the GEAR policy was 
formulated (Gelb 2006: 1).
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signs of little improvement, with severe problems in social delivery. Although poverty will 
probably continue to decline, inequality will remain high (Van der Berg et al. 2007: 41).
1.5.3 Foundations and fragmentation of environmental protection
In section 1.3 multiple environmental governance pathways were discussed from global to 
local, this section narrows the discussion to consider the regulatory context within which the 
fuel oil industry operated in post-apartheid South Africa. Alternative governance channels, i.e. 
community-driven governance and/or international efforts, are addressed in the empirical 
chapters (Chapters 4 through 7). Given the apartheid legacy and the prioritisation of economic 
growth and social delivery, opportunities for environmental protection may appear to be 
limited in the new South Africa. It can be argued that formulation and implementation of 
environmental policy initiatives are fragmented and contested due to conflicting government 
priorities and weak institutional and organisational capacity. Indeed, in the late 1990s the field 
of environmental and air pollution management lacked formal authority, given that the air 
pollution laws were based upon 1965 legislation and that government regulators lacked 
capacity to enforce existing permits. As consultants from the US summarised (Lents and 
Nikkila 2000: 4):
There are a number of similarities between South Africa’s current air pollution 
control efforts and those of the US in the 1969 to 1975 timeframe. South Africa 
now has the opportunity to take advantage of the knowledge gained over the last 
thirty years by the US and air pollution management agencies throughout the 
world.
Foundations for environmental protection
The foundation for path-breaking environmental regulation, local level governance and citizen 
participation in environmental decision-making was enshrined in the 1996 South African 
Constitution. New political space was created for the previously excluded majority (Wiley et 
al. 2002). On the environment, section 24a of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights guarantees a 
citizen’s “right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being”, and 
section 24b states that everyone has the right “to have the environment protected, for the 
benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures 
that: prevent pollution and ecological degradation; promote conservation; and secure 
ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development” (Republic of South Africa 1996: 1251-52). The stage was
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set for South Africa’s industrial development priorities to be contested through an 
environmental rights-based frame.
On local level governance, there is a chapter in the Constitution on co-operative governance, 
which states that South Africa’s government “ is constituted as national, provincial and local 
spheres of government which are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated” (Republic of 
South Africa 1996: 1267). This progressive move away from a hierarchical, tiered top-down 
governance structure empowers local government to include communities in environmental 
decision-making (Republic of South Africa 1996: 1331). To what degree municipalities have 
autonomy in delivering these objectives depends on criteria in the Constitution and further 
national legislation. A key space for the contestation of environmental management and 
industrial pollution control is at the level of municipality by-laws: “A municipality may make 
and administer by-laws for the effective administration of the matters which it has the right to 
administer” (Republic of South Africa 1996: 1331). What is interesting is how this new South 
African environmental legislation has ascribed a degree of authority to local level/bottom-up 
governance processes. The Constitution’s Bill of Rights also guaranteed citizen access to 
information (Republic of South Africa 1996: 1257). Thus the foundation was set to dismantle 
the veil of secrecy under which industry operated during apartheid.
The democratisation of environmental governance in South Africa began with the 
establishment of the Consultative National Environmental Policy Process (CONNEPP) 
launched in 1995 (SA DEAT 2004). This multi-stakeholder participatory policy development 
process resulted in a framework for sustainable environmental management, which was 
guided by the environmental rights enshrined in the Constitution. CONNEPP’s blueprint for 
environmental governance was adopted by Parliament in the form of the White Paper on 
Environmental Management in 1997 (SA DEAT 2004: 58). The implementation of the 
environmental management policy was enabled by the promulgation of the National 
Environmental Management Act in 1998 (NEMA), which provides the framework legislation 
for environmental governance in South Africa. NEMA establishes decision-making 
principles, institutions and procedures for cooperative governance (Republic of South Africa 
1998). It translates the rights and provisions of the Constitution into legislation. The central 
pillars of NEMA are: quality in environmental decision-making; cooperative governance in 
the environmental sector; facilitating the role of civil society in environmental governance;
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the Constitutional imperative to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the environmental rights 
in the Bill of Rights (SA DEAT 2004: 59-60).
NEMA is a highly progressive document that includes a number of legally binding principles 
(UNDP 2003: 129), including numerous factors related to sustainable development, the 
pursuit of environmental justice so that environmental impacts are not distributed unfairly, the 
promotion of participation of all interested and affected parties in environmental governance, 
and the polluter-pays principle, i.e. the costs of remedying, controlling, or minimising 
pollution, environmental damage or adverse health affects fall upon those responsible for 
harming the environment (Republic of South Africa 1998). NEMA also provided provisions 
for the different spheres of government to enter into environmental management co-operation 
agreements (EMCAs) with “any person or community” in order to promote compliance with 
the Act’s principles (Republic of South Africa 1998: 56). Essentially EMCAs are a form of 
voluntary commitment, which becomes legally binding. As is discussed in section 4.1.2., 
attempts to establish EMCAs within South Africa provide insight into the power and politics 
of environmental decision-making in an emerging economy. In addition, NEMA enables 
interested parties to enforce environmental laws through private prosecution, enabling civil 
society actors to prosecute firms and company directors. Although this places increasing 
responsibility for monitoring and policing environmental transgressions on civil society, little 
legal action has been taken because although “NEMA provides a broad framework for 
environmental governance, specific laws remain weak and fragmentary” (SDCEA-DN 2003: 
50).
Efforts have been made to develop a coherent body of environmental laws related to 
environmental management in the fuel oil industry: A White Paper on Integrated Pollution 
Control and Waste Management was published in 2000; NEMA was amended to allow for 
environmental management inspectors to enforce legislation in 2003; the Air Quality 
Management Act (AQMA) promulgated in 2005; amendments in 2003 to the Environmental 
Conservation Act allow for improved control of pollution and waste; and a Waste 
Management Bill was tabled for discussion in 2006 (SA DEAT 2004: 60-61; SA Treasury 
2007). Also, an environmental management inspectorate (known as the ‘Green Scorpions’) 
was created in 2003 to enforce environmental legislation, and new environmental impact 
assessment (ELA) regulations were introduced in 2006 to streamline processing of ELA 
applications, which had resulted in serious backlogs.
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Figure 1.3 outlines how South Africa’s legislative framework for environmental protection is 
tiered. Informed by the Constitution, NEMA sets out the framework for a variety o f national 
environmental management legislation. The laws falling under the remit of Environmental 
Quality and Protection programme are the most relevant for the fuel oil industry. Provincial 
and local/municipal government spheres of government also have responsibilities for creating 
laws as per the Constitution and implementing national legislation.
Figure 1.3: Legislative Framework for Environmental Protection
International and Regional Law
28 international and regional Conventions, Protocols and Treaties, ratified or acceded to 
33 signed country-to-country bilateral agreements
6 international and regional tourism institutional and/or promotional agreements 
4 signed country-to-country Trans-Frontier Conservation Area agreements
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996)
National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) and Amendments (1998, 2003)
Other National Laws
Environmental Quality and 
Protection
Atmospheric Pollution Prevention 
Act (1965)
White Paper on Environmental 
Management (1997) 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment regulations (1997, 
2006)
White Paper on Integrated 
Pollution and Waste Management 
(2000)
Durban Multi-Point Plan (2001) 
Plastic Bag regulations (2002) 
National Environmental 
Management: Air Quality 
Management Act (2005)
Marine and Coastal 
Management
Sea-shore Act (1935)
Sea Birds and Seals 
Protection Act (1973) 
Dumping at Sea Control Act 
(1980)
Marine Pollution Act (1981) 
Antarctica Treaties Act (1996) 
Marine Fisheries White Paper 
(1997)
Marine Living Resources Act 
and Amendments (1998, 
2000 )
White Paper on Sustainable 
Coastal Development (2000)
Tourism
White Paper on Tourism 
Development and Promotion 
(1996)
Tourism in GEAR  
Second Tourism 
Amendment Act (2000)
Biodiversity and 
Conservation
Environmental Conservation Act 
and Amendments (1998, 2003) 
White Paper on Conservation 
and Sustainable Use of 
Biological Diversity (1997)
World Heritage Convention Act 
(1999)
National Environmental 
Management: Protected Areas 
Act (2004)
National Environmental 
Management: Biodiversity Act 
(2004)
Provincial Legislation
(Pollution control function in terms of Constitution)
Local Government Laws
(Sewage Disposal/Trade Effluent Bylaws, Scheduled Trade Bylaws etc.) 
(Source: adapted from Acutt 2003b; SA DEAT 2004, 2006)
Fragmented environmental protection
Environmental protection is faced with a number of challenges in South Africa. As previously 
discussed the government has conflicting priorities as demonstrated by its emphasis on 
economic development. In relation to the fuel oil refining sector, the conflict between 
environment and development is exemplified by the resistance to EIA regulation from 
national and provincial politicians, which resulted in the streamlining of EIA regulations in
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2006. In August 2006, President Mbeki said that green laws were contributing to development 
delays and contributing to “a quite considerable slowing down of economic activity”, and the 
Minister of Housing, Lindiwe Sisulu, launched a scathing attack on environmental regulation 
noting that housing delivery would no longer be “held hostage by butterfly eggs” (Macleod 
2006: para 1 & 3). In addition to the environment versus development dichotomy, the 
juxtaposition of green versus brown and red issues in South African environmental 
management discourse is clearly represented by these statements. As a KwaZulu-Natal 
provincial government employee summed up, “we have been charged to do developmental 
environmental management” (PGov4 2006).
In addition, previous work has suggested that environmental protection has been underfunded 
in the new South Africa. For example, environmental protection budgets were cut (Acutt et al. 
2004: 305), and in 2002 the National Department for Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
(DEAT) prioritised its funds for tourism over pollution control (Lund-Thomsen 2005: 625). 
After consulting South Africa’s national treasury budgets there is a somewhat more nuanced 
story. From 1996 to 2006 DEAT’s overall budget has in fact increased every year by an 
average of 20 percent. Within DEAT, the tourism budget is prioritised over other DEAT 
branches.11 The core environmental management and pollution control programmes -  air 
quality management, environmental impact management, pollution and waste management, 
and regulatory compliance -  make up less than four percent of DEAT’s overall 2006/07 
budget. With the 2010 football World Cup fast approaching it is perhaps understandable that 
tourism’s budget has been given such precedence (SA Treasury 2007).12 Biodiversity and 
conservation interests need to be managed carefully in order to sustain the tourism industry 
which contributed 8.3 percent to South Africa’s GDP in 2007 (SA DEAT 2008). However, 
within national government, at least from a financial resource perspective, the priority is 
clearly given to green over brown and red environmental issues.
In addition to evidence of limited financial capacity to manage the environmental impacts of 
industrial development, South Africa is in the process of regulatory reform. As of 2006, much
11 In addition to tourism, other DEAT branches include sector services and international relations, marine and 
coastal management, biodiversity and conservation, environmental quality and protection, and administration (in 
descending order of fiscal priority)
12 In addition, tourism has been identified as an immediate priority area under ASGISA.
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environmental management legislation was still being developed and implemented. Although 
the environmental inspectorate (the Green Scorpions) was established in 2003, until laws have 
been promulgated and implemented there will be a lack of strong sanctions to enforce 
compliance. For example, in 2006 there were few incentives for managers to comply with the 
guidelines set down by the AQMA, but by 2008 sweeping changes were made to 
environmental laws, which included large fines and jail terms for directors and managers who 
contravened the AQMA (Camie 2008: 3).
Under apartheid environmental protection had become fragmented, outdated and a weakly 
enforced. For example, mining waste was the responsibility of the Department of Minerals 
and Energy, contamination of groundwater by waste fell within the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry, and the mitigation of air pollution was managed by the Department of 
Health before becoming under the responsibility of DEAT, albeit under the outdated 1965 
Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act (APPA) (SA DEAT 2004: 57). The legacy of 
fragmented regulatory responsibility under apartheid has been difficult to overcome. The 
Department of Minerals and Energy, which promotes mining and cheaper energy, is also 
responsible for regulating the mining sector to minimise its environmental impacts (SA 
Treasury 2008b: 625; Lund-Thomsen 2005), and the Department of Agriculture supports 
maximum growth and industrialisation of the industry, but is also charged with improving the 
sustainable management of agriculture and ecological systems in South Africa (SA Treasury 
2008a).
Figure 1.4 illustrates the multiple actors responsible for air quality management in South 
Africa as deemed by the 2007 National Framework for Air Quality Management (SA DEAT 
2007a). Although DEAT is the lead national agent for environmental management and 
implementation of the AQMA, 11 other national departments have responsibilities for 
managing atmospheric emissions within their jurisdictions. Similarly, although the 2007 draft 
National Framework document does not allude to this (SA DEAT 2007a: 17-22), a multitude 
of provincial and municipal departments share responsibility for air quality management 
(LGov4c 2006). The draft document also includes industry, labour and the ‘general public’ as 
important actors in the governance of air quality, emphasising the opportunities for these 
actors to participate in the development of the regulatory framework. Finally, the National 
Framework designates, in terms of the AQMA, specific responsibilities for industry mostly 
around compliance with relevant laws and regulations. In sum, since the AQMA promulgated
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in 2005, progress has been made towards coordinating efforts to govern air quality in South 
Africa; however, with such a wide range of actors both within and outside of government 
tasked with some aspect of air quality management, it will be no small task to coordinate 
these efforts.
Figure 1.4: The multiple actors responsible for air quality management in South Africa
National Government
Red = national departments with responsibilities 
for air quality management
DEAT, in bold, is the lead department
Social services
- Arts and Culture 
-Education 
-Health 
-Labour 
-Social Development 
-Sport and Recreation 
South Africa
Central Government 
Administration
-Presidency 
-Parliament 
-Foreign Affairs 
-Home Affairs 
-Public Works
Justice and protection 
Services
-Correctional Services 
-Defence 
-Independent Complaints 
Directorate 
-Justice and Constitutional 
Development 
- Safety and Security
Financial and 
administration services
-Government Communication 
and Information Systems 
-National Treasury 
-Pubic Administration Leadership 
and Management Academy 
-Public Service and Administration 
-Public Service Commission 
-Statistics South Africa
Economic services 
and infrastructure
-Agriculture 
-Communications 
-Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism
-Housing 
-Land Affairs 
-Minerals and Energy 
-Provincial and 
Local Government 
-Public Enterprises 
-Science and Technology 
-Trade and Industry 
-T ransport 
-Water Affairs and Forestry
Provincial Government
Municipalities 
Industry, Labour and the General Public
(Adapted from: SA DEAT 2007a)
In addition, institutional and technical capacity remained weak during the timeframe of this 
study. The rapid regulatory reform process was challenged by a lack of technical expertise 
and institutional memory within DEAT’s staff. For example, the 2005 to 2010 strategic plans 
have an objective “to develop and train a representative and performing team” (SA DEAT 
2006: 43). With 1561 total approved posts at DEAT, the 2005 baseline for improving 
employee retention is 25 percent turnover and for reducing vacancy rates is 28 percent, with a 
target for 2009/10 of 12 percent for both (SA DEAT 2006: 43). As discussed in Chapter’s 5 
through 7, the rapidly changing environmental protection institutional structures stretched the 
ability of national, provincial and local authorities to adequately regulate the fuel oil industry.
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Although it has made noteworthy strides, South Africa had significant organisational, 
material, political and institutional hurdles to overcome in its efforts to manage the impacts of 
industrial development. Within the national sphere of government, particularly related to the 
Environmental Quality and Protection programme, DEAT, during the time period of this 
study from 1994 to 2006, appeared to be under-resourced and understaffed. Politicians 
focused on meeting economic growth targets streamlined environmental regulations to 
facilitate approval of development proposals. The environmental legislative framework is 
underpinned by path breaking foundations, but was struggling to transform a fragmented 
environmental protection history and balance environmental protection with achieving 
economic development goals. Although South Africa’s apartheid, environmental and 
industrial history is unique, the lessons from this analysis (as discussed in Chapter 9) are to 
some degree generalisable to other developing/middle income country contexts that are 
encountering periods of profound institutional and organisational change.
1.6 Chapter summary
The environmental governance of multinational corporations in developing countries is a 
relatively understudied area. Much of the existing work on the greening of industry focuses on 
one scale of governance (international, national or local), without adequately accounting for 
the socio-spatial complexities, either external or internal to the firm, which influence the take 
up and implementation of corporate environmentalism at the site level. This study seeks to fill 
these gaps by rigorously explaining changes in environmental behaviour of MNC subsidiaries 
at the site level in a developing country context. This thesis explores how and why corporate 
environmentalism has evolved in three South African fuel oil refineries (two in Durban, one 
in Cape Town) between 1994 and 2006. South Africa provides an interesting opportunity to 
study the greening of industry, as it is a newly democratised developing country which is 
undergoing a tremendous period of change.
In addition to exploring the drivers and spatialities of corporate environmentalism, Chapter 1 
has highlighted how the importance of contextual factors in influencing South Africa’s 
governance processes and outcomes, which include: the impact of the racist policies of the 
colonial and apartheid past on rural and urban environments; the Government’s prioritisation 
of liberal economic policies; and the foundations and fragmentation of environmental 
protection in South Africa. In order to investigate the overarching research question of how 
and why corporate environmentalism has evolved in post-apartheid South Africa, the
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changing environmental performance at three South African oil refineries is explored. To 
address this question the study seeks to answer two secondary questions:
1. How has the environmental performance of the Sapref, Enref and Calref oil refineries 
evolved since democratisation in South Africa?
2. How and why has each refinery’s environmental performance differed?
Secondary research question one, the subject of the study, is evaluated in Chapter 4 by 
interpreting indicators of environmental performance that assess how internal and external 
processes and outcomes have evolved at each refinery since democratisation (Ilinitch et al. 
1998). Secondary research question two, the explanatory factors of the study, is explored in 
Chapters 5 through 7.
The framework of multi-scale, multi-actor governance (see Figure 1.1) is a useful heuristic to 
conceptualise how multiple external pressures may influence MNC behaviour, yet MNCs are 
also actors within this complex governance web. The challenge is to identify which actors and 
‘soft’ and ‘hard’ governance structures emerge to influence the environmental performance of 
South Africa’s fuel oil refineries. To help explain how this complex mix of internal and 
external factors influences corporate behaviour, institutional and organisational theory is 
drawn upon in Chapter 2.
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2 ANALYSING INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE
The multi-scale, multi-actor governance framework presented in section 1.4.2 is a useful 
heuristic, but to explore answers to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions of this study a more 
theoretically informed approach is needed. As Ostrom (1999) notes, if the specification of 
factors within a framework helps to generate questions of inquiry, then the use of theory 
enables the analyst to determine which factors are relevant to the research questions, and to 
make working assumptions about these factors.
In order to answer secondary research question two - how and why each refinery’s 
environmental performance has differed - some key questions need to be addressed. For 
example, how do multiple actors at multiple scales shape and constrain corporate behaviour? 
How do modes of governance emerge, persist and change over time? What is the interaction 
between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ governance structures? How do firms interact with their external 
‘governing’ environments? To explain how this complex mix of internal and external factors 
influences corporate behaviour, the theoretical lenses of institutional and organisational theory 
are used.
The chapter begins by exploring how various approaches, which fall under the wide-ranging 
umbrella of institutional and organisational theory, can be incorporated into an analytical 
framework to study the governance of corporate environmentalism. An analytical framework 
is established which seeks to unpack the complexity of changing drivers of corporate 
environmentalism at and between the macro and micro levels of analysis. At the macro level, 
the concept of the organisational field is adopted to identify convergence or heterogeneity in 
external pressures and the ‘engine’ of field level structuration is revealed through the study of 
changing institutional actors, institutional logics and governance structures; and at the micro 
level, firm legitimacy and characteristics are explored in order to explain corporate 
environmental performance similarities and differences.
2.1 Institutional and organisational theory
A wide range of analytical approaches falling under the heading of ‘new institutionalism’ 
have developed primarily in response to the behavioural emphasis of political studies in the
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1950s and 1960s, i.e. agency without structure, and can be categorised into three ‘schools’:
historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism and organisational (or sociological)
institutionalism (Campbell 2004; Hall and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998; Thelen and Steinmo 
1 ^1992). In common, they all hold the primacy of institutions in influencing and potentially 
determining social, political and economic outcomes.
New institutionalism is a mid-range theoretical approach that works between the macro and 
micro -  it can illuminate how different factors are linked in complex social environments as 
opposed to being limited by single variable explanations (e.g. Marxism: class, or pluralism: 
interest groups) (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). However, there are marked differences between 
the approaches. As a starting point they each define institutions slightly differently. As 
Campbell (2004: 4) elaborates, rational choice institutionalists may view institutions as either 
an equilibrium point between bargaining, utility maximizing actors, or they may define 
institutions as formal and informal ‘rules of the game’ and compliance procedures to reduce 
transaction costs among competing actors (see Bates et al. 1998; North 1990). New 
institutionalism in organisational analysis takes a broad perspective, drawn both from 
organisational sociology and institutional theory, and views institutions both as formal and 
informal rules and as embedded cultural norms, ideologies and beliefs (Jepperson 1991; 
Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Historical institutionalists borrow from both approaches, but in 
general they see institutions as formal and informal rules that follow self-reinforcing historical 
paths which provide the structures and context that shape actors’ behaviour (see Steinmo et al. 
1992). The degree to which these approaches adequately account for the relationship between 
institutions and behaviour, and institutional origins and change is subject to wide debate.
New institutionalism is often criticised for not adequately accounting for the origins of 
institutions, the way institutions change and the causes of institutional change (see Campbell 
2004; Gorges 2001; Hall and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998). The critics highlight that rational 
choice institutionalism in particular tends to fall into functionalist accounts of human 
behaviour (i.e. the problem of institutional outcomes being explained by their consequences)
13 There is a potential fourth school, the ‘new institutionalism’ in economics, which overlaps significantly with 
the typology of rational choice institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996: 936), and a potential fifth school, 
‘discursive’ institutionalism, which builds on the sociological and organisational traditions to elaborate the role 
of ideas and discourse in shaping institutional outcomes (Schmidt 2008).
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(Campbell 2004; Pierson 2000; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). The problem of functionalism 
leads to the related structure/agency dilemma aptly characterised by Hall and Taylor (1996: 
939): “The problem is to capture simultaneously the voluntary and determinative character of 
institutions”. However, the weaknesses of functionalist accounts have been demonstrated 
through sociological and constructivist approaches (e.g. through the noninstrumental 
behaviour of actors), and some rational choice theorists (e.g. North’s use of mental models 
and the notion of ‘bounded rationality’). Immergut (1998: 25) highlights that institutional 
contexts operate as the ‘black box’ between human action and social-political outcomes. This 
‘black box’ can in fact be viewed as the common research project that unites the schools of 
new institutionalism -  the study of institutional change and institutionalisation.
New institutionalism has also been criticised for giving preference to factors external 
(structure) to organisations as opposed to internal (agency). Hirsch and Loundsbury (1997: 
412) criticise DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991a) treatment of old institutionalism as being 
overly static and based on values and norms at the organisational level, as opposed to 
recognising the role of organisational “leadership and agency in shaping institutions”. They 
highlight DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991a) preference for structuralism and higher levels of 
abstraction evident in new institutionalism in organisational analysis. Indeed, DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991a: 13) point out that in the old institutionalism organisations were conceptualised 
as embedded in their local communities whereas the new institutionalism abstracts to a higher 
level and focuses on how organisations are embedded within the field, sector or society. Even 
within the so-called ‘new institutionalism’ Hirsch and Loundsbury (1997: 414) highlight the 
bifurcation between approaches: “Institutional explanations that involve the building up of 
structures by individual actors (Jepperson 1991; Zucker 1977) are at odds with explanations 
that rely on action as determined by institutional structures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 
and Meyer 1991).”
The distinction between macro (structure) and micro (agency) levels of analysis provides a 
hurdle to overcome in the study of corporate environmental behaviour at the site level. Yet 
some organisational sociology scholars have suggested that the distinction between the so- 
called ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutionalism is not clear cut, that in fact they should be viewed as 
complementary (Hirsch and Loundsbury 1997; Selznick 1996). Hirsch and Loundsbury 
(1997: 409) call for a “reconciliation between the new and the old that...will allow for more 
complete institutional theorising of both action and structure.” To unlock the ‘black boxes’ of
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institutional and organisational theory a rigorous analytical and methodological approach is 
needed, which pays close attention to both structure and agency in institutional processes. 
Indeed, one of the primary interests in this study is the relationship between the macro and the 
micro levels of analysis, i.e. how social structures and processes influence organisational 
behaviour and how organisations in turn affect their structural environment. Yet this study is 
‘problem-driven’ as opposed to ‘theory-driven’; the study does not flow out of theoretical 
problems but seeks to find explanations for social and environmental issues in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Institutional and organisational theory is well suited for this task (Davis and 
Marquis 2005: 333). This study develops an analytical approach that is novel and apposite for 
the examination of changing corporate environmentalism at the industrial facility level in 
developing countries.14 It draws primarily on the work of organisational institutionalism and 
organisational theory and to a lesser degree historical institutionalism. Insights from the 
discussion on the governance and spatialities of corporate environmentalism are incorporated 
into this analytical approach.
2.2 Macro: Organisational fields
At the macro level organisational fields are discursive spaces where all relevant actors 
partake in the contestation of an issue area (Hoffman and Ventresca 2002b; Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991). Organisational fields can be strictly defined as “a community of 
organisations that partake of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more 
frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field” (Scott 1995: 56). 
Organisational field approaches are not new.15 DiMaggio and Powell in their seminal paper 
(1983: 147), referring to Weber, discuss how bureaucratisation and organisational change is 
driven today less by competition and the need for efficiency and more by the ‘structuration’ 
(Giddens 1979) of organisational fields. They posit that highly structured organisational fields 
often lead to homogeneity of “firm structure, culture, and output” (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991b: 64). DiMaggio and Powell apply Giddens’ concept of structuration to explain the 
production and reproduction (i.e. institutionalisation) of organisational outcomes, and 
Bourdieu’s concept of the ‘field’ (see e.g. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) to provide analytical 
rigour to the analysis of institutionalisation processes of ‘local social orders’ (Fligstein 2001).
14 This theoretical approach is not exclusive to the study of organisational behaviour in developing countries; it 
can be applied within studies of parent-subsidiary relations in advanced industrialised contexts.
15 See DiMaggio and Powell 1991, Powell and DiMaggio 1991, and Scott 2001 for excellent overviews.
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As DiMaggio (1979: 1462-1463) explains: “‘Field’ is a critical metaphor in Bourdieu's 
work...field refers to both the totality of actors and organizations involved in an arena of 
social or cultural production and the dynamic relationships among them.”
Much of the early organisational literature aimed to explain variation and diversity of 
organisational forms (Hannan and Freeman 1977). A turn in the 1980s to the analysis of 
organisational fields demonstrated that once a field becomes established, the homogenisation 
of field participants and new entrants occurs (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b: 64). An advantage 
of the field level approach is that it allows for the analysis of the ‘totality of relevant actors’ 
whereas previous approaches directed analysis to competing firms or the interaction between 
them (ibid: 65). For example, the population ecology approach of Hannah and Freeman
(1977) and the interorganisational network approach of Laumann, Galaskiewicz, and Marsden
(1978) illustrates this. More recent approaches to field level analysis adopt an expanded view 
that conceptualise fields as centred on issue areas and domains of contestation, rather than on 
common technology and markets that comprise domains of stability (Hoffman and Ventresca 
2002a: 9; Hoffman 1999; Levy 2008). Organisational fields have been conceptualised as 
arenas of power dynamics where actors may engage in forms of discursive contestation or 
“institutional war” when contesting particularly volatile issue areas such as industrial 
pollution (Hoffman 1999). In the context o f  this study, fields are discursive spaces within 
which actors compete to construct meanings o f legitimate corporate environmental practice 
in post-apartheid South Africa.
2.2.1 Organisational field dynamics
In order to develop analytical insight into the process of institutionalisation and institutional 
and organisational change (Greenwood and Hinings 1996: 1023), an analytical framework is 
established (Figure 2.1) which represents the complex interaction between actors, institutional 
logics and governance structures within an organisational field (Delmas and Toffel 2004; 
Hoffman 2001b; McAdam and Scott 2005; Scott 2008; Scott et al. 2000). A similar 
framework was developed by Scott and colleagues’ to analyse changes in US health care 
systems’ institutional environments over time (McAdam and Scott 2005: 15; Scott et al. 2000: 
20-21). They were able to identify three distinct eras of health care governance (the era of 
professional dominance, 1945-65; the era of federal involvement, 1966-82; and the era of 
managerial control to market mechanisms, 1983 to present) during which “a predominant 
logic prevailed and different types of actors were privileged within the healthcare field” (Scott
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et al. 2000: 21-22). This study seeks to identify governance trends related to the issue area of 
corporate environmentalism in post-apartheid South Africa. It is posited that organisational 
field dynamics, moderated by parent company and subsidiary legitimation strategies and 
characteristics, will influence a plant’s corporate environmental performance (see e.g. Delmas 
and Toffel 2004). As Hoffman summarises: “By connecting institutional and organizational- 
level analysis, new and more complex models of change can explain the genesis and alteration 
of legitimate corporate practice” (Hoffman 2001b: 150).
Figure 2.1: Organisational field dynamics
Macro: Organisational field
Actors
Micro: Firm
Institutional
logics
Governance
structures
However, a degree of spatial complexity is absent from Figure 2.1; it does not specify 
distinctions between host, home and international fields that exist for MNCs. Indeed, studying 
the complexity of the organisational field can be difficult. As Davis and Marquis (2005: 341) 
highlight one of the problems in studying fields is that the “empirical properties of fields are 
somewhat limited”. In addition, determining the boundaries of the organisational field, 
particularly within the context of the MNC which operates across national boundaries, is 
problematic (Westney 1993). In the context of environmental management, MNCs participate 
in several organisational fields. Westney (1993: 66-74) identifies three key issues that MNCs 
face through contradictory sets of isomorphic pulls: the problem of standardisation versus 
local tailoring of corporate structures and processes; the challenge of organisational learning 
across boundaries; and the relationship between host countries and the MNC. Field level
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analysis then can be highly complex and difficult to manage. The methodological challenge 
for this study is to determine which field level structures and processes impact most 
significantly a subsidiary’s corporate environmental performance in host countries.
2.2.2 MNC complexity and spatialities of field dynamics
From an MNC perspective, a distinction can be drawn between home and host country 
operations. For example, Shell considers itself a ‘Group’ of companies, which operate in more 
than 140 countries worldwide. MNCs can adopt a range of organisational patterns, from 
globally integrated and standardised to locally adapted and responsive to host country markets 
and contexts (Bartlett and Goshal 1989; Prahalad and Doz 1987; Westney 1993). Indeed, 
section 1.3.2 identified how the diffusion of corporate environmental policies and practices is 
an increasing trend, but there is unevenness in the take up and implementation of these 
measures. Yet how corporate level policies and practices impact on site level processes and 
outcomes (Gouldson and Sullivan 2007), and how MNCs operate in multiple and sometimes 
conflicting organisational fields (Westney 1993) are understudied areas.
International management scholars often seek to contextualise MNC operating complexity in 
multiple host countries (Delmas and Toffel 2004; Hillman and Wan 2005; Kostova and 
Zaheer 1999). Kostova and Zaheer (1999) explore complexity in external host country 
institutional environments, in internal parent-subsidiary relations, and in the process of 
legitimation, or how well an entity fits its legitimating environment (see section 2.4 for a 
discussion of how the concept of organisational legitimacy is used within this study). Kostova 
and Roth (2002) more specifically examine MNC subsidiary host country and parent 
company relations, what they term ‘institutional duality’, noting a variety of factors that 
influence how practices become institutionalised within MNC subsidiaries. This concept of 
institutional duality highlights how institutionalisation processes are not monolithic; they are 
contextually sensitive to factors both internal and external to firms.
Providing useful insight into the institutional processes within subsidiaries, Delmas and Toffel 
(2004) develop a model that explains how institutional pressures that seek to influence 
corporate environmental performance are moderated by MNC parent and subsidiary plant 
characteristics. Their approach complements this study’s research aims -  to investigate 
external and internal drivers of corporate environmentalism at the facility level -  but their 
proposed empirical measures suggest positivist hypothesis testing that would only provide
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insight into environmental performance within a snapshot in time. Little understanding would 
be gained into how and why institutional processes influence environmental performance -  
i.e. how institutions emerge and change over time. In addition, the focus on stakeholder 
pressures within a firm’s institutional environment tends to underspecify processes and 
mechanisms of institutional change. This study seeks to rectify this limitation as it focus on 
actors, institutional logics and governance structures that make-up processes of organisational 
field structuration.
Figure 2.2 demonstrates MNC complexity in managing the relationships between parent- 
subsidiaries and multiple organisational fields. Obviously the diagram simplifies MNC 
operating complexity, as large firms will operate in dozens of countries. Not explicit in the 
framework is the distinction between internal and external legitimacy. A subsidiary will have 
the pressure to maintain internal legitimacy within the MNC and external legitimacy within 
their host institutional environment (Kostova and Zaheer 1999) (as discussed further in 
section 2.4.1 on organisation legitimacy). However, the diagram does represent the spatialities 
of organisational field dynamics. There is clearly interaction and relationships between fields 
at multiple scales. Rarely do studies aim to unpack the complexity of these socio-spatial 
processes. The recognition of a politics of scale and networks is often absent from the 
corporate environmental literature. Indeed, the study of how corporate environmentalism 
emerges differentially in time and space is a novel contribution to this field.16 Often studies 
will focus on one category of analysis such as actors or stakeholder pressures (Delmas and 
Toffel 2004), governance structures (Kagan et al. 2003), institutional logics (Loundsbury et 
al. 2003), or internal legitimation strategies and organisational characteristics (Prakash 2000) 
instead of seeking to explore the interaction and dynamics between these factors. By paying 
close attention to these internal and external factors it is expected that mechanisms of 
institutional and organisational change will be identified.
16 See e.g. Jones (2008) for an approach used to explain complexity in the production of economic outcomes.
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Figure 2.2: A framework of MNC complexity and organisational field dynamics
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2.3 Analysing field structuration
Ultimately this study aims to shed light on the process of fie ld  structuration. Structuration 
processes can be viewed as synonymous with the ‘black box’ of new institutionalism 
discussed in section 2.1. By identifying the interaction between actors, institutional logics and 
governance structures as analytic units of analysis it is expected that the coproduction of 
structure and agency within field level dynamics can be rigorously analysed. The theoretical 
concept of structuration (Giddens 1979, 1984) highlights “that structures only exist to the 
extent that ongoing activities produce and reproduce them” (Scott 2008: 190). DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) apply the concept of structuration to organisational fields more narrowly “to 
refer to the degree of interaction and the nature of the interorganizational structure that arises 
at the field level” (ibid: 190). Indeed, most studies of field structuration have focused on the 
extent to which social structure becomes more ordered over time, yet processes of 
fragmentation (or destructuration), where patterns of behaviour, belief systems and 
governance structures are destabilised and disrupted, and (re)structuration, where attempts by 
new field level actors to contest and construct new logics and governance systems (Scott et al.
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2000: 26-27), are highly relevant to this study given South Africa’s period of radical 
institutional change.
Indeed it is important to recognise how external events can destabilise organisational fields 
and provide the opportunity for new field level actors to enter these discursive spaces. Events 
such as accidents/incidents and political, social, economic and technological change, can 
provide ‘windows of opportunity’ for new actors to enter fields, utilise new discursive frames, 
and influence institutional change (Kingdon 1995). Historical institutionalists have 
documented how the institutionalisation of rules and norms often goes through processes of 
punctuated equilibrium (or punctuated evolution) over time (Campbell 2004). Organisational 
institutionalists have also identified the impact of events. Hoffman’s work on the evolution of 
corporate environmentalism in the petrochemical industry in the United States identified the 
significance of events in (re)structuring organisational fields (Hoffman 2001a). Scott and 
colleagues (Scott et al. 2000) also noted how destabilising events and processes “paved the 
way for disruptive change” within the health care delivery system in the San Francisco Bay 
area of the United States (McAdam and Scott 2005: 21).
From this discussion, fields, when viewed as issue areas, are not always homogeneous; they 
can in fact exist on a spectrum from fragmented to structured. The impetus for organisational 
and institutional change can be technical, social, political or regulatory. These types of events 
can destabilise field level institutionalisation processes through the introduction of uncertainty 
and ambiguity. In the case of industrial pollution in the South African petrochemical industry, 
numerous environmental incidents continued to occur with potential negative human health 
impacts, which has led to greater scrutiny by civil society groups, NGOs and the media 
(SDCEA-DN 2003). Within the context of this study, it is expected that refinery incidents and 
accidents and perhaps other external events17 provide windows of opportunity for civil society 
to mobilise against transnational capital in South Africa.
In ‘traditional’ organisational institutionalism processes of field structuration should be 
analytically detectable through the observation of: (1) increasing interaction between field
17 For example, global awareness and attention towards industrial environmental performance in developing 
countries can be heightened after significant events such as accidents (e.g. Bhopal) and global conferences (e.g. 
Rio 1992).
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level actors; (2) well-defined interorganisational relationships that result in patterns of 
domination or coalition; (3) an increase in the information load that the organisations must 
contend with; and (4) a mutual awareness that they are involved in a common debate 
(Hoffman 1999: 352; DiMaggio and Powell 1991b: 65). Hoffman and Ventresca (2002a: 6-7) 
expand this perspective suggesting that field level analysis must pay attention to three aspects: 
(1) roles, or the “changing role and authority of actors who struggle, negotiate, and redefine 
the terms of policy issues”; (2) meaning systems, or “shifts in ideologies and cultural logics 
that specify conditions of feasibility and what is imaginable”; and (3) the dominant 
“governance arrangements that establish regulatory possibilities and implementation” in these 
fields. Hoffman and Ventresca’s field level analytical focus is very similar to Scott et al’s 
framework discussed in section 2.2. Thus, combining insights from DiMaggio and Powell, 
Hoffman and Ventresca and Scott et al (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a; DiMaggio and Powell 
1983; Hoffman and Ventresca 2002a; Scott et al. 2000), Table 2.1 summarises the detectable 
units of analysis which may indicate varying degrees of field structuration within this study.
Table 2.1: Field structuration: detectable units of analysis
ACTORS
1. Increasing interaction between field level actors
2. Well-defined interorganisational relationships that result in patterns of coercion or 
cooperation, i.e. power relations______________________________________________
3. Changing role and authority of field level actors who struggle to redefine 
environmental issue areas
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS
4. Shifts in meaning systems, beliefs and ideologies of what is feasible or imaginable
5. The identification of dominant logics representing consensus of powerful actors 
and secondary logics representing other subordinated or emergent interests_________
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
6 . The dominant governance arrangements that shape and constrain corporate 
environmental behaviour, which can be formal and informal, public and private, and 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive institutional dimensions______________
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Hoffman 1999; Hoffman and Ventresca 2002a; McAdam and 
Scott 2005: 15; Scott et al. 2000: 173)
Given the influence of external events and environmental policy processes in South Africa (as 
per section 1.5.3), it is expected that a variety and increasing number of actors at multiple 
scales will participate in the field of corporate environmental performance. Methodological 
rigour is needed to analytically detect the changing social interaction patterns. Hoffman 
argues that “conceptualizing a field as centered around issues rather than networks reveals
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greater complexity in field formation and evolution” (Hoffman 1999: 352). Yet Powell and 
colleagues (2005: 1134) highlight that the “linkage between network dynamics and the 
evolving structure of fields needs to be made in order to make progress in explaining how the 
behaviour of actors or organizations of one kind influence the actions of organizations of 
another kind.”
Thus to explore fields in terms of their network and relational properties is particularly 
apposite in developing country contexts where MNCs may operate in areas with weak and 
fragmented regulatory frameworks such as in South Africa. The distinction between state and 
non-state actors is often blurred and new forms of governance emerge within non-hierarchical 
spaces. Here exchange relationships and networks are established as multiple-actors at 
multiple-scales compete for power (Lange 2003: 414). It follows that a field, from a 
theoretical perspective, may be focused around an issue, however methodologically network 
analysis may be a useful tool to analyse the social interaction within the field. As will be 
discussed in section 3.2 and 3.3, social network analysis is one of the methodologies 
employed to identify changing field level patterns over time.
2.3.1 Actors and power
As discussed in section 1.3, a variety of external actors may influence corporate 
environmental performance. As per previous studies (Delmas and Toffel 2004: 213; Hoffman 
2001b; Lober 1996), the most dominant actors are likely to be governments, customers, 
competitors, community and environmental activists, industry associations and shareholders. 
Given the expanded interpretation of the production and reproduction of field structuration, 
i.e. that actors with unique strategies, resources and interests contest legitimate corporate 
environmental practice using discursive strategies, power becomes central to the analysis o f  
field level processes. Some organisational theorists have highlighted how organisational 
institutionalism lost its focus on power because it highlighted the more macro aspects of 
institutionalism: “...DiMaggio and Powell left out power by concentrating on mimetic 
isomorphism whilst downplaying the coercive and normative” (Clegg et al. 2006: 11). 
Institutional and organisational theorists such as DiMaggio and Powell have utilised Giddens’ 
theory of structuration to explain isomorphic institutional pressures within organisational
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1 8fields. As discussed, new institutionalism has favoured structure over organisational agency; 
in line with this theme, Giddens’ work on the ‘duality’ of power and structure has been 
critiqued for favouring consensual forms of power over conflictual (e.g. structure over 
agency) (Haugaard 2002: 150).
To better account for the processes of institutionalisation and institutional change 
organisational theorists have recently called for a (re)focus on agency and power (Clegg et al. 
2006). Often these approaches identify how institutional entrepreneurs use context-specific 
strategies to influence institutional processes during times of stability and change (DiMaggio 
1988; Fligstein 2001; Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Greenwood et al. 2002; Greenwood and 
Hinings 2006; Lawrence 1999; Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Scott 2008). These 
entrepreneurs may drive processes of de/re-institutionalisation and radical organisational 
change. Relevant to this study, Fligstein (2001) identifies how institutional entrepreneurs 
influence institutional processes by getting dissimilar groups to cooperate in both the 
reproduction of fields and their transformation during times of crisis or change. Fligstein 
saliently points out that actors use different types of ‘social skills’ during times of stability 
and change. Given South Africa began a period of radical transition in 1994, it is expected 
that there is a significant opportunity for institutional entrepreneurs (which could be civil 
society, industry or government actors) to influence the structuration of the field.
Although this recent work in organisation and institutional theory highlights the role of 
agency and power, it is not specific about how power can be conceptualised within field level 
processes. Indeed, as Reed (2006: 29) highlights: “Power remains the most overused and least 
understood concept in organizational analysis”. This study adopts a framework developed to 
analyse power within policy practices by Arts and Van Tatenhove (2004). They aim to bring 
power back into current policy analysis and combine insights from Giddens, Clegg, Lukes and 
others to establish a ‘multi-layered’ approach (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004). They engage 
clearly and concisely with the structure-agency debate that runs through institutional and 
organisation theory:
.. .actors do have and exercise power, but are always embedded within historically
and socially constructed structures, e.g. in terms of institutions and discourses.
18 Giddens is concerned with the ‘duality’ of power and structure, that “power is generated by structural 
reproduction which takes place in the moment of agency” (Haugaard 2002: 149).
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These to a substantial degree constitute their identities as well as enable and 
constrain certain types of behaviour more than others. (Arts and Van Tatenhove 
2004: 347)
Building on Lukes’ three dimensions of power, Giddens’ conception of power within 
structuration theory, and Clegg’s three circuits of power,19 Arts and Van Tatenhove define 
power as:
Power is the organisational and discursive capacity of agencies, either in 
competition with one another or jointly, to achieve outcomes in social practices, a 
capacity which is however co-determined by the structural power of those social 
institutions in which these agencies are embedded. (Arts and Van Tatenhove 
2004: 347)
The linkage between the micro and macro levels of analysis is one of the key challenges of
this study, and Arts and Van Tatenhove’s framework provides a useful avenue through which
to explore three types or ‘layers’ of power:
(1) relational power linked to agencies-in-interaction at the level of policy 
innovation, either in its transitive form (zero-sum power games) or intransitive 
form (power games in joint practices); (2) dispositional power linked to 
organisational rules and resources at the level of policy arrangements; and (3) 
structural power linked to order of signification, legitimisation and domination at 
the level of political modernisation. (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004: 353)
Table 2.2 highlights how these modes of power can be applied within this study. Relational
power exists on a continuum from coercive to cooperational. The interaction between field
level actors structures the possibility of institutional and organisational change. Dispositional
power, such as rules, resources and ideologies, shapes the actors’ capacities and interests to
act. Structural power within this context highlights how social orders, within which actors are
embedded, vary in terms of signification, domination and legitimisation (Arts and Van
Tatenhove 2004: 351). Arts and Van Tatenhove (2004: 351) point out that this form of power
is more related to Giddens’ structuration theory rather than Clegg’s third facilitative circuit
(which draws theoretical inspiration from Foucault), as these orders or structures are
‘materialised’ in discourses as well as in political, legal and economic institutions (Giddens
1984). Actors are enabled and constrained by these discourses and institutions (Arts and Van
Tatenhove 2004: 351).
19 They feel Clegg is overly Foucauldian, Giddens is too meta-theoretical with the duality o f structure, and that 
Lukes’ Marxist heritage (i.e. Lukes’ third dimension of power) and the decision/non-decision debate (Lukes’ 
first and second dimensions of power) are outdated. They discard Clegg’s circuits of power model because they 
feel a Foucauldian concept of power limits the possibility of agency: “the knowledgeability and capability of 
human agencies to intervene in social systems -  an important premise for any meaningful policy analysis -  will 
be too easily denied” (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004: 349).
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Table 2.2: Three modes of power
Type of power Focus
Relational (coercive & 
cooperational)
Structuration of organisational 
and institutional change by 
interaction between field level 
actors
Dispositional Positioning of actors in field 
dynamics mediated by rules and 
resources
Structural Structuring of social orders 
mediated in orders of 
signification, domination and 
legitimisation
(Source: adapted from Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004: 350)
This typology helps to identify modes of power of specific interest to institutional and
organisational theory, i.e. the dual-direction of influence between the field and the firm.
However, multiple actors may be engaged in field level debate. Of keen interest to this study
is the politics of relational modes of power.20 In the spirit of Lukes’ first and second
dimensions of power, actors using coercive or cooperational strategies may get others to do
what they would not otherwise do, or they may attempt to set agendas and shape issues in
order to covertly or overtly mould preferences of various field level constituencies often
resulting in a ‘qualified’ consensus (Carter 2007; Lukes 2005). In an insightful typology,
Litfin conceptualises a spectrum of power relations:
At one end, we would find force , where a powerful actor removed the effective 
choice to act otherwise. Following force might be coercion, where one actor 
threatens another; then authority, where an actor is recognized as having either a 
legal or a moral right to impose decisions. Finally, the knowledge-based power of 
persuasion relies upon evidence and argumentation. (Litfin 1994: 18)
Litfin’s discursive conception of knowledge-based power resonates here: “Knowledge
structures the field of power relations through linguistic and interpretive practices, through
organizational strategies, and through the contingencies of particular contexts” (1994: 23).
The study of field level processes illuminates how relationships between actors produce and
reproduce discursive frames related to specific issue areas. This is a form of relational power
in the spirit of Foucault but still recognising the role of agency, i.e. that power does not reside
20 Indeed scholars have argued that a relational conception o f  power is useful to better understand “the complex 
relationships between industries, institutions and social relations that exist in the contemporary global economy” 
(Jones and Search 2009: 810).
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in a specific institution, but in the relationships between actors who produce and reproduce 
discourses that define institutions (see Hajer 1995: 49). Therefore, power lies in the relative 
strength of the field level constituencies and their subsequent institutional channels, as 
opposed to the scientific validity of their claims. Given the lack of strong regulation and 
enforcement mechanisms in South Africa between 1994 and 2006, it is expected that 
relational and knowledge-based power, rather than material or dispositional power, will be the 
primary driver of field structuration.
2.3.2 Institutional logics
The characteristics of the relationships and interactions between field level actors should 
illuminate how ‘meaning systems’ within a particular issue area emerge and evolve over time. 
Scott and colleagues (2000: 170) define institutional logics as the “belief systems and 
associated practices that predominate in an organizational field.” Institutional logics emerge 
in the field and their take up by field level actors may vary in breadth and depth (Scott 2008: 
187). As MacAdam and Scott (2005: 15) highlight: “It is possible and useful to identify 
dominant logics that reflect the consensus of powerful actors as well as secondary and/or 
repressed logics representing other, subordinated or emergent interests.” The construction of 
institutional logics is very similar to the process of ‘framing’, which “denotes an active, 
processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality 
construction” (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). The processes of strategic framing which 
actively seeks to construct shared understanding around issues and viable courses of action 
has been studied in depth by social movement scholars (Benford and Snow 2000; Campbell 
2005: 49). A process of strategic framing may actively seek to construct shared understanding 
around issues and viable courses of action (Campbell 2005: 49). ‘Collective action frames’ 
are the resultant products of meaning construction (or framing) undertaken by social 
movement organizations or movement activists (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). As Scott 
(2008: 188) highlights, the concept of a cultural frame is very similar to an institutional logic: 
“Issues of how things are interpreted and represented connects fairly seamlessly to 
considerations how things are to be done.” There are some excellent studies in the literature 
on the emergence and influence of field level dynamics and institutional logics on governance 
outcomes (e.g. Loundsbury et al. 2003 on recycling in the US; e.g. Scott et al. 2000 on health 
care in the US), however there is a gap in the empirical understanding of changing corporate 
environmentalism at the site level.
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This study intends to identify how field level framing processes emerge (or not) into 
institutional logics. As discussed in section 3.3.2, discourse analysis is an appropriate 
methodology to explore how these discursive processes originate, diffuse and persist within 
and between organisational fields.
2.3.3 Governance structures
Fields are discursive spaces within which actors compete to construct meanings of legitimate 
corporate environmental practice. When field level discursive frames gain shared 
understanding then the possibility exists for these frames to emerge into institutional logics, 
which in turn affects the realm of possible governance outcomes. Within the context of this 
study governance structures are the formal and informal rules that shape and constrain 
corporate behaviour (Scott 2001). These governance structures are observable through 
changing regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive institutions (ibid). Institutions originate 
within the firm’s business, economic, political and social networks that constitute its 
organisational field (Hoffman and Ventresca 2002b). Within this study institutions are defined 
broadly as governance mechanisms which include formal and informal rules, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms, and the more sociological aspects o f norms, ideologies, and beliefs 
(see Hall and Taylor 1996; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Campbell 2004; North 1990). The 
distinction that North (1990) makes between institutions as ‘rules of the game’ and 
organisations as the ‘players of the game’ is adopted here. Thus, the terms governance 
structures and institutional dimensions are used synonymously throughout the thesis.
Scott (2008: 51) highlights how different institutional logics underpin each of the three 
institutional dimensions which may put isomorphic pressure on organisations: regulative 
institutions are coercive mechanisms such as rules, laws and sanctions underpinned by the 
logic of instrumentality; normative institutions are societal norms and values based upon the 
logic of social appropriateness; and cultural-cognitive institutions are beliefs and shared 
understandings supported by the logic of orthodoxy (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott
912001). New spaces of governance are characterised by a complex mix between regulative,
21 Scott’s approach is similar to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991b) seminal typology; that there are three main 
pressures that lead to isomorphism (i.e. organisations to be more homogeneous): coercive, normative and 
mimetic.
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normative and cultural-cognitive institutional dimensions that both constrain and enable 
organisational behaviour and activity (Hoffman and Ventresca 2002b).
This study seeks to identify how different institutional dimensions emerge, evolve and 
influence organisational behaviour over time. Table 2.3 is from Scott’s (2008: 51) seminal 
text on institutional and organisational theory. The table compares how theorists 
conceptualise each of the three institutional dimensions (he calls them ‘pillars’). Different 
disciplines will often emphasise one dimension over the other. For example, economists and 
rational choice political scientists may emphasise regulatory perspectives (e.g. North), 
sociologists and political scientists may embrace normative conceptions of institutions (e.g. 
Parsons, Selznick, March and Olsen), and anthropologists, sociologists and organisational 
scholars (e.g. Geertz, Douglas, Berger, Gofftnan, Meyer, DiMaggio, Powell and Scott) may 
stress the culture-cognitive elements of institutions (Scott 2008: 50-59). However, as 
Campbell (2004: 40) highlights: “ ...if  we want to determine which pattern of institutional 
change best characterizes a particular empirical episode, we need to identify and examine 
over time all the relevant institutional dimensions.”
As highlighted in Table 2.3, a variety of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
institutions may influence corporate environmentalism in the oil refining sector in South 
Africa. From a regulative perspective, emerging rules, laws and potential sanctions in the 
newly democratised South Africa could coerce firms to ‘green’ their operations. Indeed, 
section 1.5.3 discussed how South Africa’s emerging environmental management legislation, 
based on its new constitution, was setting the foundation for an effective environmental 
regulatory regime. However, emerging win-win business and environment rhetoric may 
influence voluntary regulatory pressures such as the pursuit of GNAs with host communities. 
Normative institutional pressures might include health studies, educational material produced 
by NGOs, the adoption industry norms and standards such as ISO 14001 environmental 
management certification (also a form of self-regulation), and the influence of industry 
associations. A cultural-cognitive institutional perspective may find disjunctures between 
community and company accepted beliefs. For example, within industry the flaring of gas at 
an oil refinery may be culturally supported as a safety issue, but community understanding 
may frame the issue as an environmental or social issue. If the refineries begin to put 
additional controls on flaring activity then it is possible that ‘taken for granted beliefs’ within 
the industry are changing to conform more closely with societal expectations.
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Table 2.3: Three pillars of institutions
Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive
Basis o f  
compliance
Expedience Social obligation Taken-for-
grantedness
Basis o f  order Regulative rules Binding
expectations
Constitutive schema
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy
Indicators Rules; laws; 
sanctions
Certification;
accreditation
Shared logics of 
action; isomorphism
Affect Fear
guilt/innocence
Shame/honour Certainty/confusion
Basis o f  
legitimacy
Legally sanctioned Morally governed Comprehensible; 
recognisable; 
culturally supported
(Source: Scott 2008: 51)
It follows from the above discussion that there may be overlaps and influences between the 
three institutional pillars. International environmental norms may influence the take up of host 
country regulations and stakeholders’ conceptions of social reality. Whereas environmental 
regulations, such as ambient air quality standards, may at first be introduced as ‘binding 
expectations’, but as sanctions and enforcement mechanisms are put in place, they may 
become ‘taken-for-granted’ by the regulated. In addition, environmental justice activists may 
have very different beliefs than industry and/or government representatives over what 
constitutes legitimate environmental behaviour. Cultural-cognitive understandings within host 
communities may significantly influence the evolution of environmental normative and 
regulative institutional dimensions. How actors, institutional logics and governance structures 
are produced and reproduced within and between each refinery’s organisational fields are 
results of complex socio-spatial processes. However, how organisational field dynamics 
subsequently influence corporate environmentalism is mediated by firm legitimacy and 
characteristics, as will be discussed next.
2.4 Micro: Firm legitimacy and characteristics
At the micro level organisational legitimacy and characteristics determine how well a firm 
fits its legitimating environment and by what means and strategies it seeks to do so. An 
organisation’s legitimation strategies and characteristics, can explain how it reacts and 
interacts with field level demands (Bazerman and Hoffman 1999; Suchman 1995). As
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discussed above in section 2.1, linkages between the macro and micro (i.e. social structure 
and organisational agency) are often under-theorised within explanations of changing 
organisational behaviour (Hoffman 2001b). As Hoffman and Ventresca (2002a: 9) 
underscore, often the perspective is taken that the field has unidirectional isomorphic impacts 
on the firm, whereas in an expanded analytical view there can be a dual-direction of influence 
between the field and the organisation.
2.4.1 Organisational legitimacy
When a firm begins to actively engage in the field, what techniques and discursive strategies 
it uses to gain and maintain its legitimacy are examples of the type of questions that need to 
be evaluated within this study. As outlined in section 2.2.1 and Figure 2.2, MNCs have 
internal and external legitimacy demands (Kostova and Roth 2002). Subsidiaries operating 
overseas must respond to demands from the parent company as well as the host country 
organisational field. How and why MNCs seek to manage these various legitimacy risks 
should shed light on how and why each firms’ environmental performance and field level 
interaction differs. In addition, organisational characteristics such as firm resources and 
culture may reveal an organisation’s strategy and motivations for pursuing certain 
legitimation strategies.
To begin with, the construct of legitimacy is useful to examine how an organisation reacts and 
interacts within field level institutionalisation processes. Scholars have examined legitimacy 
at the level of classes of organisations (Meyer and Rowan 1977) and at the organisational 
level (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Suchman 1995). Here 
organisational legitimacy is explored at the MNC subsidiary level (Kostova and Zaheer 1999: 
65). Legitimacy can be defined broadly as “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574). Organisational 
legitimacy can be evaluated as how well an entity fits its external and internal legitimating 
environment. For example, fuel oil refineries in South Africa must maintain external 
legitimacy at the local, provincial, national and international levels, and internal legitimacy 
must be maintained with local employees and the headquarters of parent companies. In the 
case of Shell Nigeria scholars have identified competing pressures between the external and 
internal legitimacy demands, as well as lack of consistency between home country corporate
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leadership and strategy to host country local leadership and operational behaviour (Wheeler et 
al. 2002: 312).
Suchman (1995) identifies two broad categories of legitimacy -  institutional and strategic. In 
the former the legitimation process is virtually synonymous with the institutionalisation 
process where external institutions shape and constrain organisational behaviour, but in the 
latter the organisation’s legitimation is “purposeful, calculated, and frequently oppositional” 
(ibid: 576). Highlighting organisational agency, Suchman (1995: 600) identifies legitimation 
strategies to gain, maintain and repair organisational legitimacy. Within each of these goals 
he breaks down how organisations may employ strategies to conform, select or manipulate 
their legitimating environment.
Indeed some scholars have been critical of how business seeks to accommodate stakeholder 
concern in order to legitimise their positions of power in society (Hamann and Acutt 2003; 
Levy and Newell 2002; Utting 2000). In order to explore the black box of the 
institutionalisation process, this study takes a middle range approach that seeks to incorporate 
firm agency and power into the analysis of field level dynamics. As Suchman summarises: 
“Because real-world organisations face both strategic operational challenges and institutional 
constitutive pressures, it is important to incorporate this duality into a larger picture that 
highlights both the ways in which legitimacy acts like a manipulable resource and the ways in 
which it acts like a taken-for-granted belief system” (1995: 577).
How a firm seeks to strategically maintain its legitimacy and maximise its competitive 
interests becomes increasingly complex within a fragmented organisational field. How to 
configure internal resources to external institutional uncertainty provides an MNC with a 
seemingly irreconcilable problem. Indeed many international business operating contexts 
provide such challenges: for example, Nike’s child labour and supply chain issues; Shell’s 
environmental and human rights issues in Nigeria; and Coca Cola’s water extraction issues in 
India (ChristianAid 2004). Each one of these examples represents a contested and fragmented 
organisational field where corporate strategy plays a significant role in the ongoing struggle to 
maintain organisational legitimacy. As Meyer and Rowan (1977: 358) hypothesised: the more 
that organisations incorporated ‘institutionalised myths’ into their structure, the more that 
internal and external legitimacy would be maintained. If institutions set the ‘rules of the 
game’ and organisations are the ‘players of the game’ (North 1990) then organisations have
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opportunities to both influence the institutional logics of the field and to make substantive 
changes in environmental performance (Christmann and Taylor 2006). Organisational 
legitimation strategies are investigated within this study to give balanced attention to an 
organisation’s agency within its institutional environment, but how and why firms may or 
may not adopt environmental performance improvements can be further explained by 
organisational characteristics such as resources and culture.
2.4.2 Firm characteristics
Organisational behaviour can vary from firms that make substantive improvements to their 
environmental performance to those which resist pro-environmental isomorphic trends. The 
leaders may differentiate themselves from the laggards by strategically influencing 
institutional change through their field level engagement strategies. Variation in legitimation 
strategies can be explored by comparing firms’ organisational characteristics such as 
resources and culture.
The literature on the resource-based view o f the firm (RBV) is a useful starting point. The 
RBV literature highlights that an organisation’s resources can be tangible assets, such as its 
physical and financial capital; intangible assets, such as reputation or intellectual capital; and 
personnel-based assets, such as human resources and organisational capabilities (Bansal 2005; 
Barney 1991; Grant 1991; Hart 1995; Russo and Fouts 1997: 537). RBV argues that these 
resources are capable of leading the firm to sustained competitive advantage if they are 
unique and valuable; and if the firm is able to protect against imitation, substitution or transfer 
(Barney 1991). Thus management has to strategically identify, develop and deploy key 
resources to maximise their interests. Traditionally the RBV evaluates the connection between 
firm resources and sustained competitive advantage in terms of associating abnormal rents 
with unique resource capabilities. Hart (1995) incorporates the constraints of the natural 
environment into the RBV and develops a theoretical framework to link sustained competitive 
advantage to three strategies: pollution prevention, product stewardship and sustainable 
development. Within this framework he specifies how these strategies may move from 
internal competitive processes to external legitimacy-based activities, thus recognising the 
importance of external stakeholders. The analysis pays attention to how resource capabilities 
may explain how firms gain and maintain competitive advantage and organisational 
legitimacy through environmental performance improvements.
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Another avenue for exploring/explaining organisational legitimacy is through the analysis of 
organisational culture. Bazerman and Hoffman (1999: 51-58) discuss organisational 
environmental practice using a three level framework developed by Schein (1992; 1990). The 
three levels of organisational culture include: 1) artefacts, the visible and apparent structures 
and processes of the organisation; 2) espoused values, the embedded norms within an 
organisation manifest through corporate missions, strategies and values; and 3) basic 
underlying assumptions, the most basic level of organisational culture represented through 
beliefs, behaviour, and cognitive processes. Breaking down organisational culture into 
structures/processes, norms and beliefs is a very similar typology to the tripartite distinction 
made within institutional dimensions (Hoffman 2001b; Scott 2001). It follows that the most 
apparent and easy level to research are visible organisational artefacts, then with increasing 
level of difficulty are espoused values, and finally the most challenging research level and the 
most fundamental to understanding processes of institutional change are the organisation’s 
underlying assumptions (Hoffman 2001b).
Thus organisational behaviour is not completely constrained by the isomorphic characteristics 
of its institutional environment (Hoffman 2001b). Hoffman ties the field to the organisational 
level through the communication channels with field level participants. Hoffman summarises: 
“The organizational response is as much a reflection of the institutional pressures that emerge 
from the outside the organization as it is the form of organizational structure and culture that 
exist inside the organization” (2001b: 137). Where there are clear field level pressures there 
can be clear organisational responses (ibid: 146). Field level actors will make culturally 
framed forms of demands on corporate environmental practice, and how firms respond to 
those demands will depend upon its functional experience and organisational culture (ibid: 
136). In practice resistance to field level change can occur through organisational structure 
and cultural barriers (ibid: 147).
In sum, an organisation will respond to field level demands more quickly when it has the 
appropriate functional experience and when the cultural-cognitive logics of the demands are 
‘in sync’ with those of the organisation. As superior corporate environmental performance 
becomes orthodoxy, one would expect to find that more of the responsibility for carrying out 
corporate environmental activities will fall to core functions of the firm (Hoffman 2001a: 15). 
This analysis pays close attention to how Enref, Sapref and Calref respond to field level 
demands in relation to legitimate corporate environmental practice.
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2.5 Chapter summary
This chapter has argued that institutional and organisational theory, with insights from the 
literature on spatialities of corporate greening, is apposite for the study of how and why 
corporate environmentalism is evolving within South Africa’s oil refining sector. As Chapter 
1 demonstrated, much of the existing work on the greening of industry focuses on one scale of 
governance (international, national or local), without adequately accounting for the socio- 
spatial complexities, either external or internal to the firm, which influence the take up and 
implementation of corporate environmentalism. As discussed in section 2.2.1, this study 
posits that organisational field dynamics, moderated by parent company and subsidiary 
legitimation strategies and characteristics, will influence a facility’s corporate environmental 
performance.
The novel theoretical framework utilised within this study combines insight from macro and 
micro levels of analyses. The macro structure of the organisational field provides the 
theoretical starting point for this study, and a framework is developed that explores how field 
structuration is influenced by the interaction between institutional actors, institutional logics 
and governance structures. At the micro level firm legitimacy and legitimation strategies and 
firm characteristics such as resources and culture are explored to highlight how heterogeneity 
in corporate environmental performance may be explained. This framework seeks to shed 
light on the ‘black box’ of new institutionalism -  the processes and mechanisms of 
institutional and organisational change -  by rectifying a bias in new institutionalism for the 
study of structure over agency. As McAdam and Scott highlight (McAdam and Scott 2005: 
9):
...the vast majority of organizational studies works up to the present focus on 
structure...organizational studies scholars have emphasized organizations over 
organizing, structure over process.
As discussed in the following chapter, these units of analysis are theoretically linked but
methodologically distinct.
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3 LINKING THEORY AND METHOD
The way we think the world is (ontology) influences: what we think can be known 
about it (epistemology); how we think it can be investigated (methodology and 
research techniques); the kinds of theories we think can be constructed about it; 
and the political and policy stances we are prepared to take. (Fleetwood 2005:
197)
An analytical framework drawing from the work of institutional and organisational theorists, 
with insights from the literature on spatialities of corporate greening, was established in 
Chapter 2 in order to provide a ‘blueprint’ for what data is collected and how it is analysed 
(Yin 2003: 28-29). Theory is used to guide a reflexive research process that is not purely 
deductive hypothesis testing, or inductive ‘grounded’ theory building (Strauss and Corbin 
1997; Esterberg 2002). Although this study’s starting point is problem-driven, the research 
process evolves iteratively as cycles of theory building and refinement emerges between the 
explanatory units of analysis and qualitative data (Eisenhardt 1989; Esterberg 2002). Indeed, 
earlier iterations of this study began with the problematisation of multi-scale, multi-actor 
governance and then incorporated institutional and organisational theory, parent-subsidiary 
complexity and finally spatialities of corporate environmentalism into the analysis (for an 
evolution of the author's theoretical approach see e.g. Van Alstine 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a; 
Van Alstine 2009b; Van Alstine 2009c, 2009d). This theoretical refinement establishes a 
more rigorous framework for the identification of processes and mechanisms of institutional 
and organisational change.
Fleetwood’s quote at the beginning of this chapter exemplifies how best practice social 
science research design makes explicit how its ontological and epistemological approach links 
to theory, methodology and data collection methods (see also Crotty 2003). This chapter 
begins with a discussion of the study’s ontological and epistemological underpinnings, and 
then defines its analytical and observational units of analysis derived from the theoretical 
framework established in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.2). Next, the comparative case study 
research design is presented, including specific methods for collecting and analysing the data. 
The chapter concludes with reflections upon the study’s public accountability, and defines 
best practice qualitative research indicators for the project.
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3.1 Starting points
To clarify how this study’s knowledge interests and research design is cohesively linked, 
Figure 3.1 illustrates one way of thinking about a nesting of research questions to methods of 
data elicitation. It is important to recognise that this may not be a top-down linear process, as 
often research design and a study’s knowledge interests evolve iteratively.
Figure 3.1: Linking research questions to methods
Research
questionsL _  "
Ontology/
epistemology
Theoretical approach
Methodology
Methods
(Source: adapted from Crotty 2003: 4)
To investigate this study’s overarching research question, how and why corporate 
environmentalism has evolved in post-apartheid South Africa, a ‘moderate’ social 
constructivist approach is adopted (see e.g. Fleetwood 2005; Jones 2002). The thesis 
documents and explains how and why environmental performance has changed at three oil 
refineries in South Africa. Although the subject-object is in some sense co-constructed -  i.e. 
the air emissions of the refineries are the product of human actions -  there is still an object 
that is being studied, i.e. changing corporate environmental performance.22 As Jones (2002: 
250) argues:
22 Although this study takes it roots from social constructivist ontology and epistemology, it is not anti-realist. It 
does not take the postmodem-deconstructivist stance that all knowledge is discursively created.
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...by adopting an ontologically realist yet epistemologically relativist position, the 
naivety of ‘pure’ realism is avoided and the impracticality and absurdity of ‘pure’ 
relativism averted. This paves the way for the negotiation and reconciliation of 
environmental problems exhibiting a high degree of constructedness.
Regarding the study’s theoretical approach, as discussed in Chapter 2, a macro and micro 
level framework is developed informed by institutional and organisational theory and the 
spatialities of environmental governance. The theoretical framework is particularly apposite 
given this study’s knowledge interests in the social construction of issues and action within 
field structuration processes. Ultimately this study is interested in improvements in the 
‘material’ reality of air quality (Fleetwood 2005: 201), but in order to explore how and why 
refineries have or have not improved their environmental performance, the study focuses on 
the social and discursive internal and external realities which co-construct the firms’ corporate 
environmental performance. Triangulated qualitative methods are used to collect and interpret 
the data, which is well suited for exploratory moderate constructivist research where the goal 
is in-depth understanding in ‘open systems’ characterised by complexity (Crotty 2003; Yeung 
1997; Esterberg 2002).
3.2 Units of analysis
In order to unpack the complexity represented in Figure 2.2 this study employs multiple units 
of analysis (Yin 2003: 40). A distinction is made between analytical and observational units 
of analysis. Ragin (1987: 7) notes that units of analysis are often underspecified within 
comparative research as they are used in reference to both data and theoretical categories. He 
makes a useful distinction between an observational unit, “the unit used in data collection and 
data analysis”; and an explanatory unit, “the unit used to account for the pattern of results 
obtained” (Ragin 1987: 8-9). Table 3.1 identifies this study’s analytical units, observational 
units, methods and data collection techniques.
In this study three analytical units of analysis are specified: first is corporate environmental 
performance, which is the subject of the study; and the other two are the study’s explanatory 
factors -  organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy and characteristics. At the macro 
level organisational field dynamics, as indicated in section 2.2, are complex discursive spaces 
where actors compete to define meaning related to issues areas such as legitimate corporate 
environmental practice. At the field level, the analysis focuses on the interaction between 
three sub-analytical units: institutional actors, institutional logics and governance structures.
87
The observational units of analysis for the organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy 
and characteristics include the detectable units of analysis of field structuration (as indicated 
in Table 2.1) and firm legitimation strategies, resources and culture.
These units of analysis are theoretically linked but methodologically distinct. Corporate 
environmental performance is analysed using longitudinal comparative data analysis, 
organisational field dynamics with social network analysis, discourse analysis, longitudinal 
comparative case study analysis and thick description, and firm legitimacy and characteristics 
also with longitudinal comparative analysis and thick description. Although methodological 
pluralism is used, the study has common ‘moderate’ social constructivist origins. It follows, 
epistemologically, that the world as humans know and experience it is constituted in 
communication processes. Therefore, two modes of social data can be distinguished: formal 
and informal communication (Gill 2000). This study uses formal and informal text to analyse 
how discursive spaces construct, contest and are negotiated into present realities. Formal text 
sources include newspapers, policy documents, press releases and corporate reports, and 
informal texts sources include key informant semi-structured interviews and participant 
observation at public meetings.
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Table 3.1: Units of analysis
Study subject Explanatory factors
Analytical units Corporate
environmental
performance
Macro: Organisational field dynamics Micro: firm
legitimacy
and
character­
istics
Institutional
actors
Institutional
logics
Governance
structures
Observational
units
Indicators o f  
internal and 
external 
processes and 
outcomes
-Increasing 
interaction 
between 
field level 
actors 
-Relational 
patterns o f  
domination 
or coalition 
-Changing 
role and 
authority o f  
field actors
-Shifts in
meaning
systems,
beliefs and
ideologies
-Identification
o f  dominant
and/or
secondary
logics
Changes in 
and emergence 
o f  the 
dominant 
governance 
structures 
which can be:
- formal and 
informal;
- public and 
private; and
- regulative, 
normative and 
cultural- 
cognitive 
institutions
-Changing 
firm strategies 
which seek to 
gain, maintain 
or repair host 
community 
legitimacy 
-Firm
characteristics 
such as a 
resources and 
culture
Methodologies Longitudinal 
comparative data 
analysis
-Social network analysis 
-Discourse analysis
-Longitudinal comparative case study analysis 
-Thick description
-Longitudinal 
comparative 
analysis o f  
firm strategies 
and
characteristics
-Thick
description
M ethods to 
collect data
Written and spoken formal and informal texts:
-Formal texts: Document analysis o f  NGO, industry, government, and newspaper text 
-Informal texts: Semi-structured interviews with key informants
3.3 From theory to method
The different types of methods employed in this study are linked to the analytical units of 
analysis illustrated in Table 3.1. For example, as discussed in section 2.2, organisational fields 
from a theoretical perspective may be focused around an issue; however, methodologically 
network analysis is a useful tool to analyse the social interaction, discursive framing and 
spatialities within the field. In addition, discourse analysis is the appropriate method to 
identify how discursive processes may or may not emerge into institutional logics.
Analysing firm characteristics, such as organisational culture, poses challenges to the 
researcher. Without preferred access to actors and activities within the firm through some sort 
of participatory action research, getting access to primary data can be difficult. It follows that, 
methodologically, firm level legitimacy and characteristics are analysed through spoken and
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written, formal and informal texts. Culture is inferred both through primary data, i.e. 
interviews with corporate managers, and through the patterns that emerge in the case study 
data over time. For example, when a company responds to demands of the field level issue 
area, the measures they take and how these measures change should reveal aspects of 
embedded organisational culture such as beliefs.
Thick description is also incorporated as a methodology within this study to tease out the 
relationships and interaction between the macro and micro levels of analysis. As Adger and 
colleagues (2003) argue, interdisciplinary approaches are needed to explore the processes and 
outcomes of environmental decision-making through ‘thick description’ (in the tradition of 
Geertz) in order to shed light on the ‘specificity of environmental decisions.’ They suggest 
that “institutions, scale and context” need to be analysed “simultaneously and interactively” 
(ibid: 1100-1102), and that this type of ‘thick’ understanding would better inform global to 
local integrated policy processes (ibid: 1107). Indeed, this study seeks to contribute to the 
literature by pursuing a ‘thick’ analysis of the evolution of corporate environmentalism in 
post-apartheid South Africa. As highlighted in sections 1.3 and 1.4, this approach differs from 
most previous studies, which have focused on one scale of analysis (global, national or local), 
have adopted narrow definitions of corporate environmentalism (e.g. take up environmental 
policies or environmental efficiency improvements), and have tested hypotheses using large- 
N datasets and statistical techniques. It is hoped that a more complex understanding of the 
processes and mechanisms of institutional and organisational change are achieved through 
this ‘thick’ case study analysis.
This following discussion provides more detail of how social network and discourse analysis 
are used within this study.
3.3.1 Field structuration and social network analysis
Within this study social network analysis is one of the methodologies employed to identify 
changing field level patterns over time. The methodological strength of social network 
analysis is that it can be used to explore both social structure and organisational agency (Scott 
2000). A network can be defined as a set of actors or nodes, connected by a specific type of 
relation or ties; the structure of the network is then interpreted through the patterns of ties 
between the nodes (Diani 2002: 175). As Borzel (1997: 2) notes there is often a divide 
between quantitative and qualitative network analysis: quantitative approaches consider
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network analysis to be a method of social structure analysis investigating the relations 
between actors in terms of their “cohesion, structural equivalence, and spatial representation”; 
whereas qualitative approaches use methods such as in-depth interviews and discourse 
analysis focusing “less on the mere structure of interaction between actors but rather on the 
content of these interactions”.
The use of network analysis is well suited for analysing complex social phenomena, such as 
how and why firms engage in corporate environmentalism, but lacks explanatory power as a 
stand-alone theoretical approach (Borzel 1997; Mol 1995). Here social network analysis is 
used in an exploratory way combining both quantitative and qualitative approaches. In other 
words, hypotheses are not tested using statistical techniques, but both the structure and 
content of the interaction between actors at multiple scales that populate the organisational 
field are explored in order to identify relevant patterns.
Network ties are often investigated in terms of ‘one-mode’ networks, where all the actors 
come from one set of relational data (Scott 2000; Wasserman and Faust 1994), but there are 
other types of relational data where two sets of actors or a set of actors and events are 
represented. This is known as a ‘two-mode’ or affiliation network, where one set of actors has 
ties to actors or events in another set (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 30). The concept of 
affiliation networks is adopted, but instead of noting actors and events, actors’ participation in 
various issue areas was coded.24 These issue areas then comprise the larger organisational 
field. A total of 809 newspaper articles published between 1994 to 2006, were analysed and 
selected by keyword searches pertaining to Sapref, Enref and Calref (see Appendix A for 
detailed information). Chapters 5 through 7 examine which issues are more and less central 
in the discursive space, and the dynamics of how issues and actors connect and are perceived 
over time (Anheier and Katz 2004: 216). This visual form of newspaper content analysis will 
detect to what degree the field of corporate environmentalism has become structured or
23 See Borzel 1997 for excellent overview of the extensive policy network literature.
24 Per newspaper article, the relationship between actors engaging in issue areas were captured. Often multiple 
actors were engaging in one or two different issue areas per article.
25 Searches were made on the following keywords: Sapref, “Engen refinery”, Enref, Genref, “Engen and 
Durban”, Calref, Caltex refinery, “Chevron refinery”, Chevron, “Oil refinery and air”, and “Air pollution”. A 
variety of local, national and international newspaper article and news portal online sources were consulted, 
including: Sabinet; the Mail & Guardian; Business Day; Independent Online; and LexisNexis’ all English 
language news search engine. 809 articles were coded that were published within the time period of 1994 - 2006.
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fragmented within the communities of Durban and Cape Town, as per the detectable units of 
analysis in Table 3.1 (see e.g. Van Alstine 2009b).
It is important to recognise the potential weaknesses of using newspaper data. First, possible 
bias is introduced through purposeful sampling strategies (Earl et al. 2004; Barranco and 
Wisler 1999). However, this was guarded against as all of the articles found through keyword 
searches were used in the analysis. It is possible, however, that relevant articles framed in 
unusual ways were missed by this technique. Second, it is difficult to get around the selection 
and description bias of news agencies (Earl et al. 2004: 72; Barranco and Wisler 1999). 
Indeed, there is a reliance upon what the press deems as “newsworthy” and how the “who, 
why, what, when, where” of issues is reported. By picking a variety of daily, weekly, local, 
national and international news sources, it is intended that this bias be mitigated. Within the 
context of South Africa’s post-apartheid media reform (Barnett 2003), it is expected that the 
newspapers will report on the issues of greatest social concern. However, it is possible that 
Durban has more proactive investigative journalism than other South African communities 
such as Cape Town, and thus is more supportive of community activists. It is also possible 
that the refineries have media strategies and thus have diverging levels of negative publicity 
because of regular media interaction. To guard against these biases the newspaper data is 
triangulated with data from semi-structured interviews. Key events are highlighted in the 
historical analysis from 1994 to 2006. The pattern of issue areas and events found from the 
analysis of newspaper data using social network analysis is compared to that of the coded key 
informant interviews. In sum, newspaper data is one of the few sources of event and issue 
area longitudinal data, and although flawed it remains a useful data source (Earl et al. 2004: 
77).
Social network analysis and the use of network diagrams facilitate the exploration of how 
field level interaction has changed over time. The use of network diagrams or spatial maps to 
visualise relational data in two-dimensional space is an active research area that strives for 
more rigorous approaches that “retain the mathematical properties of the graph and allow new 
features to be discovered” (Scott 2000: 148). For example, the mathematical approach of 
multidimensional scaling (MDS) uses the concepts of closeness and distance to map relational 
data so that nodes that are more “similar” are represented as closer together. Though there are 
many different definitions of what it means for nodes to be “similar” within MDS and other 
scaling tools, these techniques can provide considerable insight when employed in
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exploratory research (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). In the context of this study using a spatial 
map to visualise the connection between issues and actors requires the reproduction of 
distances between issues, between actors, and between issues and actors in two-dimensions.
The network analysis software Ucinet and Netdraw are used to analyse the data and render the 
network diagrams (Borgatti et al. 2002). The network diagrams are generated using Netdraw’s 
‘spring embedding’ algorithm, which generates a graphic that is easier to read because it 
separates nodes that are “too close” to visualise and draws together nodes that are “too far” 
using regular MDS. Nodes and ties are considered as a system of forces where nodes sharing 
a tie are represented as an attractive force and nodes without a shared tie are pushed apart 
based upon predefined constraints. The algorithm then calculates the network iteratively until 
the nodes are located so that the smallest path lengths to one another are closest in the graph 
(Hanneman and Riddle 2005). The location of actors and issue areas are to some degree 
interpretable but their distances and directions are somewhat arbitrary. Hanneman et al (2005: 
chapt 4, para 12) explains: “the result is a graph that preserves many of the features of the 
dimensional scaling approach (distances are still somewhat interpretable; directions are often 
interpretable), but is usually easier to read -- particularly if it matters which specific nodes are 
where (rather than node types of clusters)”.26
Within this study the “closeness” or “distance” between issues and actors is explored: two 
issues are close if they have many actors in common; two actors are close if they are 
connected to many of the same issues; and an actor and an issue are close if that actor is 
frequently cited in discussion of that issue. To make the data more accessible, hypergraphs, or 
contours around actors participating in the different issue areas, are used to show how 
different categories of issues have evolved (Wasserman and Faust 1994). The contours are 
colour-coded to denote the types of categories: red signifies incidents; green is civil society 
activism; grey indicates industry or market initiatives; olive represents industry environmental 
upgrades; yellow shows health issues; and blue represents government initiatives or action. In 
addition, ties are weighted by strength, i.e. how many times an actor referred to an issue area, 
and nodes are by shape and colour. Red circles are actors and blue squares are issue areas. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 combine the use of network diagrams and qualitative narrative to present
26 See Chapter 4: Chapter 4: http://faculty.ucr.edU/~hanneman/nettext/C4_netdraw.html#location
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the contestation of the organisational field as it relates to industrial pollution and the three fuel 
oil refineries’ environmental performance in Durban and Cape Town.
It is important to point out that although social network analysis is employed within this 
study, it does not follow that this study adopts an actor-network theoretical approach. In other 
words, this is not an application of Latour’s actor-network theory (Latour 1999; Law 1992). 
Social network analysis is used here as a methodology not as a theory. Latour’s notion that 
‘networks’ of natural and social entities (actants) co-construct reality is not adopted here 
(Mason 2006). Social network analysis is used to demonstrate a visual content analysis -  how 
issues and actors evolve over time -  in order to illuminate the process of field level change. 
This is a novel approach within the study of organisational and institutional change that has 
made a contribution within the academy (Van Alstine 2009b; Van Alstine 2009c).
3.3.2 Institutional logics and discourse analysis
Implicit within the discussion in section 2.3, competing discourses and ideas emerge within 
the field (which may or may not evolve into institutional logics). The relationship between 
ideas, institutionalisation and discursive processes is not new (Campbell 2004; Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992); however, the role that ideas play in influencing or being influenced by an 
organisation’s interests is relevant to field level analysis (Holm 1998). Indeed, Campbell 
(2004) has highlighted how organisational institutional theorists have given little attention to 
how actors operate in different ‘ideational realms’. For example, as discussed in section 2.3.1, 
a variety of actors might engage as institutional entrepreneurs within the organisational field, 
but they may come with different understandings, beliefs and ideas of what constitutes 
legitimate corporate environmental performance. In fact, these entrepreneurs may apply 
discursive strategies and various ‘institutional logics’ for strategic use (Powell 1991; Fligstein 
1997; Troast et al. 2002).
From the newspaper data, a longitudinal qualitative narrative, using thick description, is 
constructed in Chapters 5 through 7, which is compared and supplemented with data from key 
informant interviews. One of the key objectives is to identify emerging discourses within each 
refinery’s organisational field. As discussed in section 2.2 and 2.3, organisational field 
processes may or may not be structured in ways that elicit homogeneous organisational 
responses. One of the key observational units of analysis is to indentify dominant and/or
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secondary institutional logics. These logics are discursively constituted social processes, thus 
discourse analysis is an appropriate methodology to analyse how institutions arise and evolve.
Indeed there has been a broad ‘discursive turn’ within the social sciences in which discourses 
have been given a new significance (Rydin 2003: 16). As Hajer (1995: 43) discusses, social 
constructivist ideas are now widely accepted especially due to the influence of authors like 
Berger and Luckmann (1967), Kuhn (1970), Douglas (1987) and Giddens (1979). Rydin 
(2003: 16) summarises these influences on the environmental field: “The basic premises of 
the social constructivist approach to the environment is that social and cultural process shape 
our perceptions of the environment and the ways in which we represent it through image and 
word.” However, how discursively constituted social processes shape, constrain and enable 
human behaviour is the subject of much debate.
Hajer (1995: 44) defines discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and 
categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices 
and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities.” Whereas Dryzek (1997: 
8) defines discourse as a “shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it 
enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them together into 
coherent stories or accounts.” Dryzek goes on to emphasise the enabling potential of 
discourse, whereas Hajer uses discourse to critically examine how human activity is shaped 
and constrained.27 Discourses are not coherent; they arise from a variety of disciplines. The 
environmental field pulls together a multitude of actors with their own legitimate 
perspectives, and modes of talking or engaging in an issue (Hajer 1995: 46).
One of the key questions is how do dominant or secondary institutional logics emerge from an 
inter-discursive field marked by competing interests and knowledge claims? Hajer’s (1995) 
use of discourse to explain the construction of institutional processes and outcomes is adopted 
here. Hajer considers how discourse becomes institutionalised and how it produces and 
reproduces the rules, norms and beliefs that constitute social order. He concludes that 
“institutions (and the practices that constitute them) need discursive ‘software’ to operate and 
produce effects” (1995: 60).
27 For a comprehensive overview of discursive approaches within the field of environmental planning, 
specifically related to the work of Hajer and Dryzek, see Rydin 2003: 24-37.
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Hajer employs a dual methodological approach using the concepts of story lines and discourse
9Rcoalitions. Story lines are narratives on social reality that play essential roles in the 
“clustering of knowledge, positioning of actors, and ultimately, in the creation of coalitions
9Qamongst the actors of a given domain” (Hajer 1995: 63). Discourse coalitions then are 
defined as “ensembles of (1) a set of story-lines; (2) the actors who utter these story-lines; and 
(3) the practices in which this discursive activity is based (ibid: 65).” Hajer’s dual 
methodological approach is not dissimilar to the organisational field and institutional 
approach adopted within this study. Story lines, actors and discursive practices define an 
organisational field just as they do discourse coalitions. Both are critical approaches which 
seek to explain how ‘discursive orders get maintained or transformed’. Hajer identifies how 
story lines can become ‘institutionalised’, and notes that it is necessary to evaluate the 
institutional environment within which competing discourses are embedded as this “co- 
determines what can be said meaningfully” (Hajer 1995: 2). Therefore, the analysis of 
institutional logics and institutional dimensions occurs at both the observable (i.e. descriptive) 
and discursive levels.
Hajer’s work underscores the importance of discourse in the study of institutional change and 
institutionalisation. Drawing from this approach, the study pays close attention to whether or 
not authoritative narratives, collective action frames and/or institutional logics emerge in the 
field of corporate environmentalism. As discussed in section 2.3 indicators of these emerging 
institutional logics and governance structures are identified over time. Given that this study’s 
timeframe is a period of transition within South Africa’s history it is expected that, as the 
previously excluded majority begin to exercise their rights under the new constitution, these 
discursive processes by community activists will strongly influence the realm of institutional 
possibilities. Indeed, recent efforts by leading scholars within organisational institutionalism 
and social movement theory have addressed synergies between the two fields of study (Davis 
et al. 2005). The advantage of incorporating the concept of discourse into the analysis of
28 Additionally, in the formation of his research design, Hajer introduces the concept of a hegemonic discourse if 
two conditions are met: (1) the condition of discourse structuration, “if the credibility of actors in a given domain 
requires them to draw on the ideas, concepts, and categories of a given discourse...” (1995:61); and (2) the 
condition of discourse institutionalisation, “if a given discourse is translated into institutional arrangements” 
(ibid).
29 This is very similar to the collective action frames discussed in Morrill and Owen-Smith (2002, chapt. 4 of 
Hoffman and Ventresca).
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institutional and organisational change is that it highlights agency and contention within the 
structuration process (McAdam and Scott 2005).
3.4 Research design
3.4.1 A comparative case study analysis
This study utilises an ‘explanatory’ multiple-case study research strategy to explain how and 
why corporate environmentalism has evolved at three oil refineries in South Africa (Yin 
2003). An explanatory case study approach is appropriate when: ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions 
lead the inquiry; the researcher cannot influence behaviour directly; and contemporary 
evidence can be gathered (i.e. persons involved in the events can be interviewed) (ibid: 3). By 
comparing changing explanatory units of analysis between the cases (organisational field 
dynamics and firm legitimacy and characteristics), insight can be given into the relative 
importance of internal and external corporate environmentalism drivers. Within case study 
analysis, theory takes on the role of ‘analytic generalisation’ (generalising from case to 
theory) as opposed to ‘statistical generalisation’ (an inference made about a population) (Yin 
2003). By pursuing a multiple-case design over a single-case design it is expected that the 
results will yield not only analytical generalisations but also a degree of external validity 
leading to more explanatory power (ibid). Therefore, the faults of ‘false uniqueness’ and 
‘false universalism’ are guarded against (Rose 1991). Nonetheless, there is a danger that with 
comparative analysis over-generalisation is made because the cases were too dissimilar, or 
that the research design (e.g. time and scale) was not suitably defined.
In order to infer explanations about changing corporate environmental performance, the 
project researches a relatively generic category of industrial installations, namely oil 
refineries. Although oil refineries operate relatively similarly around the world, which 
facilitates comparison, their environmental performance varies due to a variety of factors 
including their level of complexity, year built, date of last major upgrade, type of crude oil 
refined and geographical location (Leffler 2000). Thus drivers of corporate environmental 
behaviour for three out of the four oil refineries in South Africa are compared: Shell’s Sapref
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refinery and Petronas’ Enref refinery, both located in Durban, and Chevron’s Calref refinery 
located in Cape Town.30 All three of these refineries are coastal and of similar complexity.
Table 3.2: A comparative case study analysis
Sapref Enref Calref
50/50 joint venture 
between Shell and BP; 
Shell is the operator
80% owned by Petronas; 
20% owned by Worldwide 
African Investment 
Holdings Ltd
75% owned by Chevron; 
23% owned by African 
Legends Investment 
Holdings Limited, The 
South African National 
Taxi Council, Lithemba 
Investments and Ditikeni 
Investment Company 
Limited; 2% owned by an 
Employee Share Trust
120.000 bpd (1992),
165.000 bpd (1997),
180.000 bpd (2006); 
complex; commissioned in 
1963
70.000 bpd (1992),
105.000 bpd (1997),
135.0000 bpd (2006); 
complex; commissioned in 
1954
100,000 bpd (1992, 1997, 
2006); complex; 
commissioned in 1966
Located in Durban, coastal 
refinery
Located in Durban, coastal 
refinery
Located in Cape Town, 
coastal refinery
(Sources: Mbendi 2007; Engen 2006; Oil & Gas Journal 2003; OGJ 2003; Sapia 
2005)
South Africa is chosen for a variety of reasons; including the author’s previous research 
experience,31 ease of access to state and non-state actors, variety of oil refinery ownership and 
lack of language barriers. A growing body of academic and NGO research has been pursued 
within the field of corporate environmentalism, sustainable development, and the oil and gas 
sector within South Africa, paving the way for this study (see e.g. Wiley et al. 2002; SDCEA- 
DN 2003; Lund-Thomsen 2005; Barnett and Scott 2007; Patel 2000; Acutt 2003a; Acutt et al. 
2004; Groundwork 2006; Nurick and Johnson 1998).
30 The fourth South African refinery, Natref, is not included in the research design given time and resource 
constraints. Natref is also an inland refinery, so has different operating constraints than the Calref, Sapref and 
Enref, the three coastal refineries.
31 In September 2004, working as research assistant with Dr. Andrew Gouldson, the author conducted 
exploratory research in Durban, South Africa on the CSR policies o f  the Sapref and Engen refineries. This study 
originally planned to research three o f  Shell’s oil refineries in three different country contexts, but after speaking 
with Shell I realised that getting internal access to the refineries would be very difficult. The costs for a multi­
country study were also prohibitive, thus the focus on South Africa’s fuel oil industry.
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In addition, the comparative research design needs to be sensitive to the ‘event’ or ‘episode’ 
that it seeks to study and explain. Determining the boundaries of the study has critical ‘time’ 
and ‘scale’ considerations (Barzelay and Gallego 2004). Not everything is comparable, 
therefore identifying similarities and differences among the cases and justifying one’s 
research frame or ‘corpus’ based upon these factors is critical (Bauer and Gaskell 2000). 
Indeed, critiques of new institutionalism suggest that a ‘genuine’ historical approach should 
be taken that highlights an ‘intertemporal’ view of social-political processes and outcomes, as 
opposed to taking a snapshot view of them (Pierson 2000: 494; Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 
13).
Within a multi firm study about evolving corporate environmentalism the specific time period 
and scope needs to be specified in order to determine factors endogenous and exogenous to 
the study. The timeframe considered in the study is from South Africa’s democratisation in 
1994 to 2006. This period is appropriate because it constitutes a period of rapid institutional 
change with a definitive starting point, democracy in 1994, and end, the implementation of 
new air quality legislation in 2006. In sum, by holding constant the industrial facility, country, 
corporate environmental performance indicators and the units of analysis, the investigation 
can focus on how and why the environmental performance outcomes may have occurred over 
time (Yin 2003: 52).
3.4.2 Data collection methods
As previously discussed in section 3.2 the study uses multiple explanatory and observational 
units of analysis at multiple scales. Regarding data collection and sampling methods, Bauer 
and Aarts (2000: 20) make a useful distinction between statistical random sampling, which is 
formalised in quantitative research and “describes the distribution of already known attributes 
in social space”; and ‘corpus construction’, which seeks to rectify selection of evidence in 
qualitative research as not a deficient form of sampling but as a functional equivalent that 
“typifies unknown attributes”. The basic guidelines of corpus selection were followed in this 
study: the choice of social evidence was done iteratively; representations of the topic were 
maximised by considering the multitude of social strata and functions represented in social 
space; and the study sought to find the saturation point in evidence gathering (Bauer and Aarts 
2000).
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The methods used to collect data were written and spoken formal and informal texts. Formal 
texts included: NGO reports and newsletters; industry documents such as stakeholder, 
sustainability, and annual reports and internal newsletters; government documents such as 
departmental reports at national, provincial, and local levels; and newspaper articles. These 
documents functioned in some cases as both primary and secondary data. For example the 
newspaper articles coded for social network analysis were clearly primary data, but the 
articles were also used as secondary sources to cross-reference accounts of interviewees. The 
texts were read literally, to identify the narrative of events, and interpretatively, to highlight 
and compare variance in accounts and perspectives related to the field of corporate 
environmentalism in South Africa. Primary data was thematically coded and categorised in 
order to identify patterns. Theory informed the process of data collection and analysis; for 
example, corporate environmental performance data was distilled from corporate reports and 
documents according to the typology of internal and external processes and outcomes 
discussed in section 1.2.1.
For informal textual sources, semi-structured open question interviews were used with ‘key 
informants’ (Foddy 1993; Esterberg 2002; Gaskell 2000; Blee and Taylor 2002). The 
qualitative interview provides “the basic data for the development of an understanding of the 
relations between social actors and their situation” (Gaskell 2000: 39). A qualitative, semi­
structured interview approach fits well within this study’s research interests. First, it allows 
for adaptability in the framing of questions and the probing of answers -  providing a depth of 
interviewee responses that would most likely be absent in more rigid quantitative methods. 
Second, the overarching research question necessitates a flexible approach to allow for fine- 
tuning of the topics discussed and their scope. Third, there was a core group of key actors 
willing to be interviewed -  this provided a wide range of differing and well-informed 
perspectives.
However, given the high subjectivity of this research technique there is the potential for bias 
to creep into the process. Interviewees may want to give the ‘right’ response to a question, 
and the interviewer may influence the research process by revealing their opinions and beliefs 
(Esterberg 2002). Given that co-construction of the research process through action or 
participatory research was not the intention of this study, a degree of distance was maintained 
between the interviewer and interviewees. Yet every effort was made to mitigate the 
‘rationalisation of inequity’ between the interviewer and interviewee (ibid). Trust and rapport
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was built as an agreeable style was adopted with all parties in order to elucidate their 
perspectives and not cause conflict. The author also attended and took detailed notes at 
community, local government and academic meetings related to the discussion of corporate 
environmentalism in South Africa.
Interviews followed a protocol that covered consistent themes related to the contestation of 
the organisational field over time, key events and turning points, changing institutional 
dimensions at multiple scales, and firm characteristics such as legitimation strategies and 
environmental performance (see Appendix B for a copy of the interview topic guide). 
Respondents were chosen based upon exploratory research in 2004. A ‘snowballing effect’ 
occurred so that new key informants were located through interviewee and other 
recommendations. In addition, a saturation point was sought where no new interpretations or 
versions of reality were found from the interviewee responses (Gaskell 2000: 43). Interviews 
were recorded, transcribed, then coded and categorised using the computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis software package QSR NVivo 7 so that theoretically informed 
relationships and results could be inferred (see the enclosed CD for examples of transcriptions 
and Appendix D for the coding frame).
Field work was undertaken during a two week exploratory research trip in 2004 and then two 
months of intensive follow up in 2006. A total of 60 ‘unique’ individuals were interviewed 
in 65 semi-structured interviews (some individuals were interviewed twice). In 2004, 19 
exploratory interviews were conducted with 23 individuals (some were group meetings), 
mostly related to the Durban case. In 2006, 46 in-depth interviews were conducted with 52 
individuals related to both the Durban and Cape Town cases (there is some overlap between 
individuals interviewed in 2004 and 2006).
On Enref and Sapref s environmental performance in Durban a wide range of actors were 
interviewed, including: individuals from the parent and subsidiary company and other 
industry representatives (n = 15); local and provincial government (n = 14); local NGOs, 
international NGOs, and communities (n = 18); and media and academics (n = 7). On Calref s 
environmental performance in Cape Town, interviewees included: industry representatives (n
32 One month in March/April in 2006 (primarily focusing on Durban) and another in September 2006 (primarily 
focusing on Cape Town).
101
= 4); local and provincial government (n = 6); and local NGOs and communities (n = 4). 
Some interviewees were knowledgeable of both contexts, including: industry representatives 
(n=2); national government (n=l); national NGO representatives (n=4); and academics (n=l). 
See Appendix C for an interviewee list.
Table 3.3: Individuals interviewed
Exploratory interviews 2004 In-depth interviews 2006
Community Durban: 6 Durban: 6 
Cape Town: 2
NGO Durban: 1 
Both: 2
Durban: 5 
Both: 2 
Cape Town: 2
Academic Durban: 5 Durban: 1 
Both: 1
Media Durban: 1
Local government Durban: 4 Durban: 6 
Cape Town: 4
Provincial
government
Durban: 2 Durban: 2 
Cape Town: 2
National government Both: 1
Industry Durban: 3 Durban: 11 (1 in 2007) 
Both: 2 
Cape Town: 4
3.5 Reflections on confidence and relevance of study
Having discussed this study’s comparative case study research design, units of analysis and 
data collection techniques it is important to reflect on how the rigour (i.e. confidence) and 
relevance of the study’s research results are ensured. Qualitative research has often been 
criticised for under-specifying best practice for evidence interpretation (Gaskell and Bauer 
2000; Esterberg 2002; Yin 2003). Quantitative analysis has codified these measures of 
reliability, validity and inference, but qualitative analysis has not come to consensus on them. 
Reliability here concerns the consistency of measurement and validity is the extent to which 
the instrument captures what it is designed to measure. Inference is the extent to which the
sample studied is representative of the wider context.
Different arguments emerge from the literature with regards to approaches to resolving the
debate (Gaskell and Bauer 2000: 342-344). First, some believe that indicators of reliability,
validity and inference should be determined as strictly as with quantitative research. Of course 
given that there are no numerical measures for qualitative indicators it is irrelevant to this
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inquiry, which is interested in meanings and interpretation, not numbers. Second, some 
outright reject the ‘positivist’ project to codify these indicators for qualitative research. 
Finally, a third position supports developing indicators of reliability, validity and inference for 
qualitative research but believe that the criteria should be unique to qualitative tradition. As 
do Gaskell and Bauer (2000), this study supports the latter ‘middle way’, and adopts a mix of 
best practice indicators uniquely suited to qualitative research.
These criteria fall within the larger concern of public accountability of research methods. 
They can be divided into the broad categories of confidence and relevance (Gaskell and Bauer 
2000: 345-348). Confidence indicators allow the reader and receiver of research to be 
confident that the results of the research represent ‘reality’ and are not just a product of the 
researcher’s imagination. For quantitative research confidence indicators include reliability of 
measures, internal validity and sample size. For qualitative research confidence is indicated 
by triangulation of methods and reflexive understanding through inconsistencies, procedural 
clarity, corpus construction and thick description. Relevance indicators refer to the extent to 
which the research is linked to theory ‘internally’ or is a surprise to some external common 
sense understanding. For quantitative research, criteria include representative sampling, 
external validity and validity of measures. For qualitative research, relevance is indicated by 
corpus construction, thick description, surprise value and in some cases by communicative 
validation (i.e. discussing interpretation with sources of text or interview data). Table 3.4 
outlines how confidence and relevance are addressed within this study.
To begin with, confidence and relevance are both addressed in the study by constructing a 
corpus related to the environmental performance of Sapref, Enref and Calref. As discussed in 
section 3.4.2, the sampling strategies focused on written and spoken formal and informal 
texts. A snowballing process was used to reach a saturation point where little new information 
was found in Durban and Cape Town using semi-structured interviews. In addition, a visual 
longitudinal content analysis was completed (using social network analysis software) which 
included all the newspaper articles identified in the key word searches. Also, the data is 
interpreted using thick description', social network diagrams, interview data, corporate reports 
and environmental performance data, government documents, NGO reports, and historical 
analysis of the issue areas all contribute to a robust narrative.
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Specific indicators o f confidence include triangulation of methodologies and data sources, 
reflexive understanding, and procedural clarity. Using formal and informal texts 
methodologies and data sources are triangulated: historical data analysis of each refinery’s 
environmental performance, longitudinal social network analysis to identify how and why 
organisational field processes have evolved, discourse and historical comparative analysis to 
interpret changing institutional outcomes, and longitudinal comparative analysis of refinery 
host communities and firm characteristics is conducted. Reflexive understanding is 
demonstrated by identifying inconsistencies and confirmations of sequence and relative 
importance of events, highlighting differing perspectives of actors, and illustrating how the 
issue area and corporate environmental performance has changed over time. Procedural 
clarity is assured through the use of clearly defined research questions, theoretical grounding, 
and explanatory and observational units of analysis with associated methodologies and data 
collection methods. In addition, the research ‘episode’ occurs within a defined time period, 
interviews follow a topic guide, and data is interpreted and coded using best practice 
qualitative research techniques.
Indicators o f  relevance include surprise value and communicative validation. The study seeks 
to identify patterns and potential surprise value by comparing the environmental performance 
of the three refineries and exploring how and why their corporate greening differed over time. 
As discussed in Chapter 8, each refinery responded and interacted with field dynamics and 
emerging institutional logics differently, but the refinery with the most home country pressure 
and subsequently parent company intervention (Sapref and Shell), made the most strides in 
repairing its host community legitimacy by 2006. There is an element of ‘surprise’ in this 
finding, particularly related to the importance of parent company oversight in host country 
and community contexts, which can be characterised by relatively weak, fragmented or 
transitioning governance structures.
In addition, the study seeks to ensure relevance through the process of communicative 
validation by presenting the research results to both academic and practitioner audiences. 
Saprefis results have already been published in the internationally peer-reviewed journal 
Business, Strategy and the Environment (Van Alstine 2009b). In addition, a book chapter was 
published through the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, which 
compares and contrasts Enref and Sapref s changing corporate environmental performance 
over time (Van Alstine 2009d). Some interviewees and academic peers have also been asked
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to comment on draft papers. Although there will be more academic outputs from this study, 
communicative validity within and beyond the academy is well underway. In sum, this 
study’s research design is constructed to ensure both rigorous and relevant research results.
Table 3.4: Confidence and relevance indicators within the study
Confidence indicators and examples of how the study addresses them___________
Triangulation o f methodologies:
• Historical data analysis to interpret the refineries’ environmental performance
• Longitudinal social network analysis to identify how and why organisational 
field processes have evolved
• Discourse and historical analysis to interpret changing institutional outcomes
• Longitudinal comparative analysis of refinery host communities and firm 
characteristics__________________________________________________________
Triangulation o f data sources:
• Formal texts such as government documents, corporate reports, NGO reports, and 
newspaper articles
• Informal texts such as transcribed semi-structured interviews and notes from 
public meetings_________________________________________________________
Reflexive understanding:
• Inconsistencies and confirmations of sequence and relative importance of events 
are gained through triangulating the data
• Differing perspectives of actors are captured through interview analysis
• Longitudinal analysis of newspaper articles and corporate reports reveals both 
how the issue area and corporate environmental performance has changed over 
time___________________________________________________________________
Procedural clarity:
• Clearly defined research questions, theoretical grounding, and explanatory and 
observational units of analysis with associated methodologies and data collection 
methods
• The research ‘episode’ occurs within a defined time period
• Interviews follow a topic guide
• Data is interpreted and coded using best practice qualitative research techniques 
Confidence and relevance indicators and examples of how the study addresses 
them_____________________________________________________________________
Corpus construction:
• Interviewees are determined using ‘snowballing’
• Saturation points are reached where little new information was found within each 
host locality
• All newspaper articles identified using key word searches of media search 
engines are coded and analysed using social network analysis software__________
Thick description:
• Interpretation of data is discussed using social network diagrams, interview data, 
corporate reports and environmental performance data, government documents,
NGO reports, and historical analysis of the issue area_________________________
Relevance indicators and examples of how the study addresses them____________
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Surprise value:
• Patterns are identified by triangulating methodologies and data related to the 
explanatory units of analysis
• Patterns are identified by comparing the environmental performance data at the 
three refineries and by comparing the internal and external drivers of changing 
organisational behaviour over a defined time period_________________________
Communicative validation:
•  The research has been presented at numerous academic conferences, published in 
conference proceedings, and published in a peer-reviewed article and book 
chapter
• Some interviewees and other experts have been contacted for comments on draft 
articles
3.6 Chapter summary
As illustrated in Figure 3.1 this chapter has established an integrated research design from 
research questions to ontology, epistemology, theoretical approach, triangulated 
methodologies and data collection methods, and finally to best practice qualitative research 
criteria. Figure 3.2 demonstrates each of the research design’s components. Linking these 
aspects of the research approach makes the qualitative researcher’s choices explicit, thus 
protecting against the problems of best practice research design and evidence interpretation in 
qualitative research. For example, when choosing the appropriate methodological approach, 
the danger is that a researcher becomes inclined to use the same approach for every research 
project. This is what Gaskell and Bauer (2000) term the ‘hammer and nail mentality’ -  the 
researcher needs to use the right tool for the job, not just attack every research problem with 
the same approach. Having chosen the right qualitative ‘tool’ for the job, the researcher 
confronts problems of ‘best practice’. It is intended that through a theoretically informed 
longitudinal comparative case study research design using methodological triangulation, that 
both confidence and relevance best practice guidelines are adhered to within this study.
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Figure 3.2: An integrated research design: from research questions to best practice 
indicators
Primary research question:
How and why has corporate environmentalism evolved in post-apartheid South Africa? 
Secondary research questions:
1. How has the environmental performance of the Sapref, Enref and Calref oil refineries 
evolved since democratisation in South Africa?
2. How and why has each refinery’s corporate environmental performance differed?
V
V
Ontology: M oderate constructivist 
Epistemology: Moderate constructivist
Theoretical perspective: Institutional and organisational theory
Methodologies:
Corporate environmental performance: longitudinal comparative data analysis 
Organisational field dynamics: social network analysis, discourse analysis, longitudinal 
comparative case study analysis and thick description
Firm legitimacy and characteristics: longitudinal comparative case study analysis of firm 
legitimacy and characteristics, and thick description
Data collection methods:
Formal texts: Document analysis of N G O , industry, government, and newspaper text 
Informal texts: Semi-structured interviews with key informants
Best practice qualitative research criteria:
Indicators of confidence: triangulation, reflexivity, and procedural clarity 
Indicators of confidence and relevance: corpus construction, thick description 
Indicators of relevance: surprise value, communicative validation
Chapter 4 highlights the historical context of South Africa’s fuel oil industry, and then 
explores and details the subject of the study -  the comparison of how the environmental 
performance and parent/subsidiary relations of Sapref, Enref and Calref have changed since 
democratisation. This sets the stage for the analysis of how the interaction between field level 
dynamics and firm level legitimacy and characteristics influences each refinery’s 
environmental performance over time in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
V
IV
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4 GOVERNING THE SOUTH AFRICAN FUEL OIL INDUSTRY
Past policy on oil supplies was directed at self sufficiency, self protection and 
secrecy. South Africa now fortunately has new priorities - based on reconstruction 
and development, and attracting new investments. Within this miraculous change, 
the petroleum industry as a whole must undergo its own transformation. (Sapia 
1996: 11)
The South African liquid fuels industry was in a process of transition from an industry that 
served the apartheid era to one that is more closely in line with the democratic and economic 
needs of South Africa. The above quote from the South African Petroleum Industry 
Association’s (Sapia) 1996 Annual Report highlights these profound changes. The history of 
the fuel oil industry sets the context for its post-apartheid environmental legitimacy 
challenges.
The refineries were built over 40 years ago and have had a complex past. The apartheid 
government gave primacy to Sasol, the now privatised but formerly state-owned oil company, 
and the synthetic fuels industry in order to ensure energy security under trade sanctions. The 
downstream oil and gas sector in South Africa has survived by a complex set of government 
incentives and regulations that, since democratisation, have slowly moved towards market 
liberalisation. Prescribing the mix of incentives needed to change industry’s environmental 
behaviour has not been straightforward. Post-apartheid South Africa has chosen an economic 
growth development model, thus the fuel oil industry has played a critical role as a key source 
of tax revenue, foreign exchange, jobs and human resource development, yet the capital stock 
in manufacturing is generally quite old (Whyte 1995). Investment in new capital equipment 
was needed, along with the incorporation of environmental upgrades (ibid).
This chapter analyses Research Question 1: how the environmental performance of Enref, 
Sapref and Calref s environmental performance has evolved since democratisation in South 
Africa. The discussion begins by reflecting upon pre-1994 and post-1994 developments that 
have influenced the extent to which the South African liquid fuels industry has in fact 
transformed its relationship with society. A framework for evaluating the corporate
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environmental performance of the fuel oil refineries is discussed, then the environmental 
performance and subsidiary oversight of the parent companies Petronas, Shell and Chevron is 
analysed, followed by a discussion of environmental performance at the three fuel oil 
refineries. A comparative analysis highlights key differences in both parent-subsidiary 
relations and refinery environmental performance.
4.1 The liquid fuels industry
A 1995 Financial Times article also underscores the importance of South Africa’s transition
to democracy and its impacts on corporate structures:
The year 1994 was one in which the operations of European oil giants in South 
Africa have been reintegrated into the international fold of their multinational 
parents in much the same way the country has regained international acceptance 
(FT 1995c: 4).
1994 was a moment in time that would affect radical institutional and organisational change 
in South Africa’s fuel oil refining sector.
4.1.1 Pre-1994
The oil industry was established in South Africa in 1884 when the first oil company was 
founded in Cape Town to import refined products (Mbendi 2007). In the first decade after 
World War II (WWII) the demand for fuel products increased to such a point where the 
development of a refining industry became viable. Prior to 1954 all liquid fuels consumed in 
South Africa were imported by one of the four Majors - BP, Shell, Mobil and Caltex -  who 
were operating as wholesale marketers at the time (DME 1998). Given the apartheid regime’s 
aim of self-sufficiency “the early reliance upon imports set the basis for subsidization and 
support for locally refined or manufactured liquid fuels” (SA 2006: 41). Four fuel oil 
refineries were established within two decades: Genref in 1954 by Mobil in South Durban, 
which is now operated by Engen (referred to as Enref); Sapref in 1964 by Shell and BP also in 
South Durban; Calref in 1966 by Caltex in the northern suburbs of Cape Town, which is now 
operated by Chevron; and Natref in 1971/72 by Sasol and Total in Sasolburg (see Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1: Overview of South African Oil Refining Industry
Company Refinery Location Type
BP Southern Africa Sapref Durban/eThekwini33 Crude oil
Shell South Africa Sapref Durban/eThekwini Crude oil
Engen Enref Durban/eThekwini Crude oil
Chevron Calref Cape Town Crude oil
Sasol Natref Sasolburg Crude oil
Sasol Secunda Secunda Coal to liquids
PetroSA PetroSA Refinery Mossel Bay Gas to liquids
Total Natref Sasolburg Crude oil
(Sources: Sapia 2005, 2006)
The history of the liquid fuels industry in South Africa is intertwined with that of the synthetic 
fuel programme. South Africa has abundant and relatively cheap supplies of coal but, until 
recently, lacked natural oil. Given trade sanctions and a policy of economic nationalism, the 
apartheid government sought energy security through the development of a synthetic fuel 
programme using technology from pre-WWII Germany (Beinart 2001: 176). The parastatal 
company Sasol was launched in 1951 and in 1954 Sasol I was established to convert coal into 
synthetic fuel (DME 1998: 65; Beinart 2001). After the OPEC oil embargo in 1973, the 
United Nations oil embargo against South Africa in 1977 and a similar move by Iran in 1979, 
a massive expansion of Sasol was planned in Secunda in the eastern Transvaal (now the 
province of Mpumalanga) (ibid). Sasol II was commissioned in 1982 and Sasol III in 1983. 
Finally the state-owned Mossgas, established in 1987 to convert natural gas to synthetic fuels, 
and Soekor, created in 1965 to pursue on and offshore oil and gas exploration, were 
consolidated in 2001 to form the state-owned PetroSA (SA 2006).
During the apartheid era the veil of secrecy over industry was strong. The National Key 
Points Act (Act No. 102 of 1980) regulated safety measures for places or areas of critical 
national concern. Refineries were (and still are) listed as Key Points given their national 
strategic interest and vulnerability to sabotage, and thus were afforded high levels of 
security.34 They were also sited to prevent clustering and thus the potential of supply 
disruption (SA 2006: 42).
33 Durban is the municipality’s colonial name; eThekwini is its Zulu name.
34 Oil refineries, sites o f  key strategic capital, were targeted for attack by the A NC’s military wing. One o f  the 
most famous ANC military attacks was on the Sasol oil refinery in Secunda in 1980.
110
Exacerbating the lack of refinery investment was the pressure to disinvest from South Africa 
in the late 1970s and 1980s. It is claimed that this political and economic uncertainty led to 
inadequate investment by the oil companies in refinery maintenance (SA 2006: 43). In 
addition, market demand drove capacity expansion in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which 
led to technical problems (SA 2006: 43). Due to laws enacted by the US Congress, Mobil 
sold its Southern African assets to Gencor in 1989, and these were consolidated by Gencor to 
form Engen (SA 2006; Kreisler 1989). In contrast, Shell, BP, Caltex and Total did not 
withdraw during the apartheid era. Despite shareholder and activist protest, MNCs often 
defended their presence in apartheid South Africa as a progressive force for change, noting 
their equal opportunity labour policies (Mangaliso 1997).
This history provides important context for today’s liquid fuels industry; as a result of 
political and economic influences, it is marked by a unique regulatory framework and a 
significant degree of government involvement (DME 1998). It also hints at why 
underinvestment at the crude oil refineries persisted, and why, in some cases, communities 
living in close proximity to the refineries may seek to aggressively protect their environmental 
rights. It is a complex legacy of government intervention, sabotage threats, a veil of secrecy, 
competition with parastatal companies, new environmental rights but limited environmental 
regulation and enforcement, and post-1994, a slow liberalisation of the liquid fuels industry.
Using the language of this study’s theoretical framework, the organisational fields related to 
the environmental performance of the refineries were structured and stable leading up to the 
early 1990s. Just as South Africa’s refineries existed within a context of economic 
nationalism and trade sanctions under apartheid, pressure and innovation for superior 
environmental performance in line with international best practice was stymied. Given the 
country’s relative international isolation, few civil society actors, from local to internationally 
networked NGOs, demanded government and industry to improve corporate environmental 
performance (Cock and Koch 1991). In fact, as discussed in section 1.5.3, up until 2005 when 
the AQMA promulgated, air pollution regulation was based upon 1965 laws.
4.1.2 Post-1994
The veil of economic secrecy was lifted in the early 1990s. In 1993 the Liquid Fuels Industry 
Task Force introduced daily reporting of pricing in newspapers (SA 2006: 47). As the 
Minister of Finance’s 2006 Task Force report pointed out, in 2006 there were few if any
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aspects of the liquid fuel industry’s regulation that were kept secret, because since 1996 the 
consultation process and consensus building were widened to include other stakeholders 
beyond industry, e.g. the consultations on the Green Paper and then White Paper on Energy 
Policy in 1998 (SA 2006: 47). Although consultation is a prominent feature in these 
processes, a weakness in this approach is the ability of the “poorly organised and poorly 
resourced.. .to take up the opportunity to express their opinions” (SA 2006: 47).
Sapia was founded in 1994, which aims to “promote understanding of the industry’s 
contribution to economic and social progress and also acts as a voice for systematic and stable 
transition of the national industry in an era of transformation” (Sapia 2003: 1). The 
independent oil companies were founding members: Sasol became a member in 2001, 
Mossgas in 2001, and then with the formation of PetroSA replacing Mossgas in 2002.35 Sapia 
succeeded in bringing South Africa’s diverse refining and marketing industry under one 
umbrella, and sought to promote cooperation without inhibiting competition among its 
members.
Sapia was quick to point out the strategic importance of the oil industry: the total oil 
industry’s turnover in 2005 was R109 billion with total assets of R57 billion; and indirect 
taxes collected amounted to R25 billion (Sapia 2005: 42). However, a point of contention 
between communities, government and industry has been the mandate for economic growth 
and thus refinery capacity expansion. Table 4.2 demonstrates how, since the early 1990s, the 
conventional refineries (Enref, Sapref, Calref and Natref) have restored formerly disused 
capacity and/or added new capacity. This drive for industry expansion provides important 
context for the industry’s post-apartheid social and environmental legitimacy crises.
35 The founding members include BP Southern Africa, Chevron South Africa, Engen Petroleum, Shell South 
Africa, Total South Africa, and Zenex Oil (now part of Engen)
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Table 4.2: Capacity of South African Refineries
Refineries Capacity (bbl/day)
1992 1997 2006
Enref 70,000 105,000 135,000
Sapref 120,000 165,000 180,000
Calref 50,000 100,000 100,000
Natref 78,000 86,000 108,000
Sasol 150,000* 150,000* 150,000*
PetroSA36 45,000* 45,000* 45,000*
TOTAL 513,000 651,000 708,000
*Crude equivalent
(Source: Sapia 2006: 68; Engen 2006)
As discussed in section 1.5.2, South Africa’s drive for economic growth and its adoption of 
neoliberal policies set the stage for conflicting environmental protection and developmental 
goals. As will be discussed in the analytical narrative in Chapters 5 to 7, the expansion 
strategies of the refineries in the mid 1990s and particularly for Enref in the 2000s, sparked 
civil society concern about air quality and the health impacts of industrial air pollution. This 
structural context sets the stage for changing organisational field dynamics.
As discussed in section 1.3, industry associations can be quite influential in setting 
environmental performance norms, standards and guidelines for its members. Although 
Sapia’s primary objective was to assist industry, it claims to articulate social and 
environmental policy within the South African fuel oil industry. On its website Sapia says that 
it “encourages consultation among members, government and other organisations on matters 
of mutual and public interest such as health, safety and the protection of the environment” 
acting as a voice for the industry as a whole (Sapia 2007). However, the evidence does little to 
support Sapia’s claim to be the conduit through which environmental decisions are made 
within the fuel oil industry.
Sapia’s 2005 Annual Report explores issues related to sustainable development under the 
economic and social domains. It notes that the South African oil industry, although highly 
competitive in its production and marketing operations, has a more cooperative approach to 
environmental protection and management, citing examples of how the industry has worked
36 PetroSA came on stream in the 4th quarter 1992.
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together to develop common environmental standards (Sapia 2005: 60). The 2005 Annual 
Report also includes some health, safety and environmental performance indicators in the 
appendix, but exclude refinery data. It can be inferred that either consensus on reporting key 
performance indicators is difficult to achieve in practice, or consensus on the environmental 
performance of refineries is represented in other forums.
Specifically mentioned in Sapia’s 2005 Annual Report is the Refinery Managers’ 
Environmental Forum (RMEF), a subcommittee of the South African Refinery Managers’ 
Committee that was formed in 2000. Chaired by a refinery general manager it has functioned 
primarily to provide input into emerging legislation as requested by the Government. Initially 
DEAT sought industry’s participation in the development of EMC As, although these 
voluntary initiatives failed to be implemented given lack of trust between stakeholders, and 
industry’s concern that new air quality standards needed to be in place before commitments 
could be made over and above regulation (RMEF 2007; Acutt 2003a). The liquid fuels 
industry actively participated in organised industry learning visits to Europe and the US, and 
has invited experts from the US to advise the South African fuel oil industry in terms of what 
has and has not worked regarding the regulation of environmental performance (RMEF 2007). 
However, the RMEF appears to now be inactive given few updates have been posted on the 
website since 2003 and as one community activist highlighted, the RMEF numbers and 
members were falling short in the mid 2000s because government lobbying was no longer 
needed after the AQMA promulgated in 2005 (RMEF 2007; NG09 2006).
With regard to the RMEF process, NGOs were invited to open meetings but there was little 
consistent representation. One local government employee felt that environmental justice 
activists, after initially attending, perceived it was a way for industry to “keep tabs” on their 
behaviour -  a form of indirect control -  thus NGO representation tapered off over time 
(LGovlO 2006). In addition, some industry representatives felt that the RMEF had served its 
purpose -  to increase cooperation among refinery environmental managers and to provide 
input into the rapidly changing regulatory environment (Indl3a 2006). Yet others questioned 
whether the RMEF could ever be a vehicle for change given that key industry champions with 
a passion for the environment had left the process (LGovlO 2006). More cynically, as one 
industry representative highlighted: given the cultural chasm between Sasol and the coastal oil 
refineries (Chevron, Engen and Sapref), the RMEF functioned to legitimate the laggards (e.g. 
Sasol), and offered little benefit to the coastal refineries that had already endured sustained
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community pressure to improve environmental performance (e.g. Engen and Sapref) (Indl3a 
2006). This brief discussion provides evidence of little voluntary consensus within the fuel oil 
industry on uniform environmental management and performance indicators or approaches. 
From this evidence, it can be expected that each of the refineries will have unique responses 
and strategies for changing field level pressures in a newly democratic and liberalised South 
Africa.
4.2 Evaluating MNC environmental performance
Society’s expectations regarding what constitutes legitimate organisational behaviour in post­
apartheid South Africa evolved in context specific ways. Shell’s Social Performance Review 
of Sapref in 2002 summarised the challenges (Shell 2002b: 12): “The major implication for 
South African industrial facilities such as Sapref is that they can no longer rely on their pre- 
1994 relationship with government for their license to operate, but must instead proactively 
engage with a range of other stakeholders.” Within this dynamic host country and community 
context, Enref, Sapref and Calref made efforts to improve their environmental performance. 
As discussed in section 1.2.1, in order to explain how the environmental performance of the 
oil refineries has evolved, the different dimensions of corporate environmental performance, 
and how they can be measured and analysed, need to be specified.
A typology from Ilinitch and colleagues (1998) is adapted for use in this study (see Table 
1.1). Criteria for evaluating corporate environmental performance are divided into processes 
and outcomes both internal and external to the company. Examples of the types of 
environmental performance indicators the study might find include: internal organisational 
processes and structures, such as the implementation of health, safety and environmental 
(HSE) management systems and clear lines of responsibility up to the senior management 
team for corporate social and environmental performance; internal outcomes, for instance 
compliance with laws and regulations and the implementation and achievement of HSE 
internal targets; external processes, such as corporate social responsibility and community 
engagement initiatives and the publication of corporate environmental reports; and external 
outcomes, for instance changes in actual emissions levels and environmental upsets or 
incidents. What is of interest here is not only what the indicators of corporate environmental 
performance are, but also how and why they evolved over time. In order to explain these how 
and why questions, Chapter 8 compares the environmental performance trends found in the
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current chapter with the detailed narrative that explores the changing organisational field 
dynamics for each refinery in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
As discussed in section 1.2.1, this typology has its limitations, as there may be interaction 
between the internal categories and external drivers. For example, the reduction of actual 
emissions may be influenced by the implementation of internal processes such as 
environmental management systems and the introduction of internal environmental emissions 
targets. The threat of government regulation and/or parent company oversight may also put 
pressure on the refineries to reduce emissions ‘voluntarily’. By comparing how these trends 
evolve over time (i.e. the interplay between internal and external factors), the study seeks to 
identify patterns in the data that identify mechanisms of institutional and organisational 
change.
4.3 Parent company characteristics and environmental performance
The environmental performance categories in Table 1.1 are useful to guide investigation and 
to categorise patterns that emerge from the analysis of environmental performance. Yet 
MNCs are highly complex entities with myriad policies, structures and practices that exist and 
interact between the parent and subsidiary company levels. As discussed in section 2.2.2, 
MNCs are faced with simultaneous pressures for global integration and local responsiveness 
(Goshal and Westney 1993: 4). Organisational fields overlap and Enref, Sapref and Calref 
may encounter various internal parent company legitimacy pressures (Kostova and Roth 
2002). Strength and style of parent-subsidiary oversight may be a significant factor in 
influencing refinery environmental performance (Rosenzweig and Singh 1991). In order to 
infer potential differences in parent-subsidiary relations the following discussion considers the 
parent company characteristics and environmental performance. Table 4.3 summarises the 
findings into six categories: history, ownership and operations; social and environmental 
legitimacy; internal processes and structures; internal outcomes; external processes; and 
external outcomes.
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Table 4.3: Parent company characteristics and environmental performance
Petronas Shell Chevron
History,
ownership
and
operations
- Founded in 1974
- Malaysian state-owned 
company
- Operates in over 30 
countries
- 2007: ranked 121st in 
Fortune Global 500
- Operates four refineries
- Founded in 1907
- Headquartered in UK and the 
Netherlands, public company
- Operates in over 110 countries
- 2007: ranked 3rd in Fortune 
Global 500
- Operates 40 refineries
- Origins date back to 
1879
- Headquartered in US
- Operates in over 180 
countries
- 2007: ranked 7th in 
Fortune Global 500
- Operates 18 refineries
Social and
environmental
legitimacy
- Less home country and 
international activist 
pressure than western 
companies
- Organised home country and 
international activist campaigns 
seeking to influence corporate 
environmentalism/ 
accountability in specific host 
country contexts
- Ongoing complaints, 
lawsuits and shareholder 
resolutions relating to its 
environmental impacts 
in various host country 
contexts
Internal
processes
- Pre-2002: began 
implementing HSE 
management system to 
have refineries become 
ISO 14001 certified
- 2005: Established 
Guidelines for Business 
Conduct and a Corporate 
Sustainability Framework
- Has single control framework 
that includes:
o  Shell’s General Business 
Principles 
o  Code o f  Conduct 
(established 2006) 
o  HSSE standards
- Organisational processes 
include:
o  HSE standards and targets 
o  I SO 14001 certification for 
all major installations 
o  Regular internal HSE 
system audits 
o  Environmental, health and 
social impact assessments 
o  Site level Stakeholder 
Engagement Plans, Social 
Performance Plans and 
Social Performance Reviews
- Internal structures include: 
o  2002: Established Social
Performance Management 
Unit
o  Board level Social
Responsibility Committee 
o  CEO has management 
responsibility for sustainable 
development 
o  Sustainable development 
performance counts 20% in 
determining staff bonuses
- Comprehensive set o f  
business and 
management systems, 
which include:
o  Corporate 
Governance 
Guidelines 
o  Business Conduct and 
Ethics Code 
o  Operational 
Excellence 
Management System  
(OEMS) (established 
in 2001)
- Ongoing process o f  
aligning OEMS with 
ISO 14001
- 2006: released 
Environmental, Social 
and Health Impact 
assessment (ESHIA) 
process
Internal
outcomes
- Little public information 
available on internal 
minimum standards or 
regulatory compliance
- Commits to being in 
compliance with all relevant 
laws and regulations
- Sets internal improvement 
targets for key safety and 
environmental indicators
- Has public targets for flaring 
and GHG emissions
- Decisions on site-specific 
standards are devolved to local 
level
- Does not publish 
internal targets, but does 
publish aggregate health 
and safety fines and 
settlements
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Petronas Shell Chevron
External
processes
- 2007: Published its first 
Group Sustainability 
Report
- Does not mention 
participation in any 
international corporate 
responsibility norm- 
making initiatives (e.g. 
the EITI or the Global 
Compact)
- 1995: began corporate 
responsibility
- Reports in accordance with 
GRI and seeks external 
verification o f  reports
- Has some specific issue and 
location reports
o  Early 2000s: began hotspot 
reporting
- Has external perception survey
- Has site level external panels 
and observers in some contexts
- Supports:
o  Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative 
(EITI); 
o  Global Compact; 
o  OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises; 
and
o  the Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights.
- 1994: Began reporting 
on corporate 
responsibility
- Reports in accordance 
with GRI
- 2007: began to seek 
external verification o f  
reports
- 2007: began investing 
substantially in 
community engagement 
initiatives globally
- Supports:
o  the EITI; 
o  Global Sullivan 
Principles; and 
o  recognises the 
‘relevant ideals’ 
expressed in the UN  
Declaration o f  Human 
Rights.
External
outcomes
- Reported on effluent 
discharge incidents, 
emissions to air 
incidences, and waste 
management incidences
- Reports aggregate data for: 
o  GHG emissions; 
o  methane;
o  carbon dioxide (C 0 2);
flaring; 
o  sulphur dioxide (S 0 2);
nitrogen oxide (NOx); 
o  chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs); 
o  volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs); 
o  spills;
o  oil in effluent to surface 
environment; 
o  fresh water use; 
o  waste;
o  energy intensity, in
refineries, chemical plants, 
oil sands business, and 
exploration and production; 
and
o  external perception o f  
environmental performance.
- Reports aggregate data 
for:
o  quantity and volume 
o f petroleum spills; 
o  VOC emissions; 
o  SOx; NOx; 
o  number o f  HSE fines 
and settlements; 
o  GHGs;
o  GHGs from flaring 
and venting; 
o  energy efficiency 
performance; and 
o  air emissions for 
downstream, 
upstream and other, 
and US refining.
(Sources include: Amnesty International 2005; Amnesty International USA 2008; Chen 2007; 
Chevron 2006, 2007b, 2007a; ChevronTexaco 2002; CNNMoney.com 2008; Context 2006; 
Co-op America 2008; FOEI 2006; Greene 1985; Ind2 2006; Jaffe and Soligo 2007; Oil & Gas 
Journal 2001; Petronas 2002, 2005, 2007a, 2007b; Shell 1997, 2002a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006a, 
2007a, 2007b; Von Der Mehden and Troner 2007; Wheeler et al. 2002)
4.3.1 Parent company characteristics
Clearly there are wide differences between Petronas, Shell and Chevron; for instance Figure
4.1 demonstrates the geographic relations of parent to subsidiary. Petronas was incorporated
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in 1974, is wholly-owned by the Malaysian government, and owns and controls all of the 
petroleum resources in Malaysia. From 1974 to 1991 Petronas was primarily interested in 
domestic upstream resource extraction as it was going through the process of learning the oil 
business (Von Der Mehden and Troner 2007). Since 1991 the company has transformed into 
an integrated global oil and gas company with upstream and downstream operations in over 
30 countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Europe and Australia. In 2007 Petronas ranked 
121 among the Fortune Global 500 largest corporations in the world with revenues of US$51 
billion (CNNMoney.com 2008). It operated four oil refineries producing more than 465 
thousand barrels per day (bpd) (Petronas 2007a).37
Shell on the other hand was founded in 1907: it is a publicly traded company headquartered in 
the Netherlands, and considers itself a ‘Group’ of companies, which operate in more than 
110 countries worldwide. Shell was structured as a partnership between Royal Dutch and
<30
Shell Transport and Trading until 2005 when one company was created, Royal Dutch Shell.
It is one of the ‘supermajor’ vertically integrated international oil companies (Jaffe and Soligo 
2007: 8),40 and in the 2007 Fortune Global 500 Shell ranked third with US$318.8 billion in 
revenues (CNNMoney.com 2008). Shell had interests in more than 40 refineries worldwide, 
which processed almost 3.5 million bpd of crude oil in 2007 (Shell 2007a: 47-49).
37 Petronas has three domestic refineries in Malaysia, which processed an average o f 362,500 bpd in 2007, and 
the Engen refinery in Durban, which processed an average of 102,500 bpd in 2007.
38 In 2005 Shell’s official headquarters moved to The Hague, although Shell Centre continues to operate in 
London.
39 The term Shell will be used synonymously with Royal Dutch Shell and the Shell Group throughout the paper.
40 The supermajors include BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Total and ENI.
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Figure 4.1: Parent -  subsidiary relationships
Physical Map of the World, lune 2003
Chevron can trace its origins back to 1879 when the Pacific Coast Oil Company was founded, 
which then became the Standard Oil Company of California, or Socal. In 1984 Socal merged 
with Gulf Oil, and became the Chevron Corporation. In 2001, after its merger with Texaco, 
Chevron rebranded as ChevronTexaco, but changed the name back to Chevron Corporation in 
2005. Chevron, like Shell, is a publicly traded company and is considered one of the 
international oil company supermajors. It is headquartered in San Ramon, California and 
operates in over 180 countries worldwide. Chevron ranked 7th in the 2007 Fortune Global 500 
with US$200.6 billion in revenues (CNNMoney.com 2008). The restructured ChevronTexaco 
Corporation, post 2001, combined the Caltex’s nine Asian and African refineries with 
Chevron and Texaco’s 14 US and two Western European refineries under one corporate entity 
(Oil & Gas Journal 2001). In 2007, Chevron had interests in 18 refineries worldwide, which 
processed approximately 1.8 million bpd of crude oil (Chevron 2007b: 3).
Petronas, Shell and Chevron have different histories, ownership structures and home country 
stakeholders. There is a wide range of revenues and refining experience. Shell has the most 
downstream experience with 40 refineries worldwide. Chevron, which has given primacy to 
its upstream business in the past (Greene 1985: 180), has 18, and Petronas has only four, with 
Enref its only international refinery. From a resource-based view of the firm (see section
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2.4.2), it would appear that access to tangible assets such as physical and financial capital, 
intangible assets such as reputation or intellectual capital, and personnel-based assets such as 
organisational capabilities would be more readily available within Shell or Chevron than 
Petronas. Thus internal factors could be an explanatory factor if the environmental 
performance of Sapref or Calref is superior to that of Enref.
As discussed in section 2.4.2, corporate culture is another way to infer how firms tackle 
environmental challenges. Although corporate culture, particularly beliefs and underlying 
assumptions within a firm, are difficult to understand without doing ethnographic or action- 
based research internal to the firm, some observations about structures, practices and values 
can be made from primary and secondary sources. Petronas has been characterised as a 
“generally well-run company with leadership that has developed a good reputation for 
administrative and financial accountability” (Von Der Mehden and Troner 2007: 34). 
Although it is a national oil company, it is relatively free from corruption, has little 
government interference in its day-to-day operations, and profit-making is one of its core 
objectives (ibid). Yet Petronas enters so-called pariah states not usually emphasised by the 
majors, such as Myanmar, Sudan and Iran, and it has supported state-led Malaysian mega­
projects outside its core interests such as the construction of the Petronas Twin Towers in 
Kuala Lumpur (ibid).
When operating internationally, Petronas has considerably less home country and 
international pressure than western companies to participate in corporate responsibility 
initiatives, particularly in the human rights domain. For example, when the Sudan-based 
consortium the Great Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), which produces most of 
the country’s oil, was put under pressure from then consortium member Talisman, a Canadian 
oil and gas firm, to sign a corporate code of conduct, GNPOC members China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Petronas declined to sign individually (Chen 2007: 61). 
Talisman divested in 2002 after coming under intense criticism from human rights and 
religious activists, who claimed oil profits helped to sustain the central government’s war in 
southern Sudan. In the context of this study, it is likely that Petronas will come under less 
stakeholder pressure to improve its subsidiary’s environmental performance than Shell and 
Chevron.
121
Shell has had a unique evolution in the world of the oil majors. In a mid-1980s analysis of the 
major oil companies’ strategies, Greene (1985: 212) notes that Shell has a competitive 
advantage in host country legitimacy: “Its diplomatic style of management and the 
indigenousness of its local subsidiaries are greater strategic investments in political 
acceptability, if lower in profitability, than other Majors have chosen to make.” However, the 
last decade has proved challenging for both Shell’s public image and competitive position, 
particularly in relation to its social and environmental performance .
The North Sea Brent Spar incident in 1995, ongoing human rights record and environmental 
performance in Nigeria, radical restructures in 1998-99, the reserve crisis in 2004, and more 
recently the 2006 loss of its majority shareholder position to Gazprom in the Sakhalin II 
project all exemplify Shell’s ongoing struggle to maintain organisational legitimacy. Within 
this context, fenceline communities in both developed and developing countries have 
organised to campaign against Shell’s perceived unjust social and environmental performance 
(FOEI 2006). This has led some to highlight how the decentralisation of the Shell Group 
resulted in lack of consistency between home country corporate leadership and strategy to 
host country local leadership and operational behaviour (Wheeler et al. 2002: 312). This study 
will pay close attention to how Shell corporate seeks to influence (or not) Sapref s 
environmental performance improvement strategy.
Chevron (then Socal) is known for discovering oil in Saudi Arabia in the 1930s. It has been 
characterised as a conservative, engineering, and exploration-oriented company (Greene 
1985), and Texaco, which merged with Chevron in 2001, has been called a “legalistic, 
autocratically and centrally administered company” (ibid : 203). Caltex, the former parent 
company of Calref, was founded in 1936 as a 50/50 joint venture between Socal and Texaco. 
Socal could provide Middle East oil to Texaco’s marketing outlets in Africa, Asia and 
Australasia (Caltex 2008). Caltex was fully acquired by Chevron in 2001, and in 2005, when 
ChevronTexaco rebranded to Chevron Corporation, the name of the company in South Africa 
changed from Caltex Oil South Africa Pty to Chevron South Africa Pty, although Caltex still 
continues as the brand for Chevron in South Africa (Caltex 2008). It can be inferred that 
Caltex Oil South Africa operated with a wide degree of autonomy given both its 
independence from Chevron and Texaco and that Caltex was structured around geographical 
rather than functional lines up until the late 1990s (Caltex 2008).
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Regarding social and environmental legitimacy, Chevron has been the target of numerous 
complaints, legal disputes and shareholder resolutions regarding its record on the 
environment, human rights and transparency. Most notably, related to Texaco’s legacy in the 
Ecuadorian rain forest, an ongoing lawsuit was filed in 1993 on behalf of more than 30,000 
Ecuadorian jungle settlers and Amazon Indians for environmental destruction (Amnesty 
International USA 2008). A 2006 shareholder resolution called on the Chevron Board of 
Directors to release information regarding expenditures related to the Ecuador sites including 
legal fees, public relations/media fees, lobbying, and remediation costs (ibid). Chevron has 
also been targeted for alleged human rights abuses in Nigeria and in the Chad-Cameroon 
Pipeline (along with Petronas) (Co-op America 2008; Amnesty International 2005; Amnesty 
International USA 2008). From this brief analysis it is expected that Calref will have less 
parent company oversight than Sapref, particularly up until 2001 when Caltex was fully 
acquired by Chevron.
As the discussion above highlights, each of the parent companies has unique histories, culture 
and characteristics. From a resource-based view of the firm, it appears that Shell and Chevron 
might have superior environmental performance to Petronas given the size and breadth of 
their refinery operations. In addition, each parent company has a unique history, which may 
inform how it interacts with its subsidiaries, and in turn how Sapref, Enref and Calref seek to 
engage in South Africa’s emerging environmental protection field. It is expected that Sapref 
will have more parent company pressure than Calref and Enref. This internal context may 
provide insight into corporate environmental performance trends, parent-subsidiary 
interaction and firm agency within a process of field structuration.
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4.3.2 Internal processes and outcomes 
Petronas41,42
Regarding Petronas’ organisational processes (as summarised in Table 4.3), it has been 
implementing an HSE management system since before 2002 to meet the requirements of 
becoming ISO 14001 certified (Petronas 2007b: 5; 2002).43 In addition, Petronas established 
Guidelines for Business Conduct and a Corporate Sustainability Framework in 2005 (Petronas
2005). Petronas’ Malaysian refineries were ISO14001 certified prior to 2002 (Petronas 2002: 
36), but Enref was still in the certification process as of 2006 (Petronas 2007a). The Corporate 
Sustainability Framework encapsulates seven key result areas for group-wide implementation, 
which include shareholder value, natural resource use, HSE, product stewardship, societal 
needs, climate change and biodiversity (Petronas 2007b). No statements could be found in 
Petronas’ publicly accessible information specifying its HSE influence on subsidiaries and 
joint ventures or on its adherence to internal minimum standards or regulatory compliance.
Shell
Shell’s organisational processes which are designed to influence its environmental 
performance are quite sophisticated. It has a single control framework that describes how it is 
organised and managed. The control framework includes Shell’s General Business Principles, 
which were established in 1976 and revised in 1997 to include reference to human rights and 
sustainable development principles, its Code of Conduct established in 2006, and its Health, 
Safety, Security and Environment (HSSE) standards (Shell 2007b: 34; 1997). Shell recognises 
that environmental performance varies from site to site, but in order to implement corporate 
policies throughout the organisation it uses a variety of policies and practices. These include 
HSE standards and targets, ISO 14001 certification for all major installations, regular internal 
HSE system audits, and environmental, health and social impact assessments prior to any new 
project or significant modification of an existing one. In addition to implementing staff
41 Internal processes within the context o f this study, as per sections 1.2.1 and 4.2 and Ilinitch et al (1998: 389), 
are organisational processes and structures designed to improve environmental performance. Internal outcomes 
refers to the degree to which firms set and meet internal targets and are in compliance with legal minimum 
standards.
42 The comparison of parent company environmental performance in sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 is primarily 
distilled from corporate documents, such as annual reports, sustainability reports and corporate websites. As will 
be discussed in section 4.5 this provides useful insight into parent-company relationships, which adds an 
important dimension for the comparison of corporate environmentalism.
43 Petronas’ publicly available reports do not specify when it began working towards ISO 14001 certification.
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training and education, sustainable development performance counts 20 percent in 
determining staff bonuses (Shell 2006a, 2007b).
On the social side, Shell requires all of its businesses to establish and implement a 
Stakeholder Engagement Plan, a Social Performance Plan and Social Performance Reviews 
(Shell 2006b). In its downstream business, Shell trains local staff to carry out social 
performance reviews for operations in their country or region (Shell 2007b: 35). In addition, 
Shell created a Social Performance Management Unit (SPMU) in 2002 that works with 
business units to mitigate their adverse impacts on communities and society. The SPMU has 
moved from capturing best practice and producing guidelines to intervening and building 
capacity at so-called “hotspot” sites (Ind2 2006). Shell began “qualitative hotspot reporting” 
in the early 2000s to give a “meaningful picture” of its environmental performance; hotspot 
reporting involved “in-depth case studies on some of the most important issues or site level 
challenges” the company faced (Shell 2002a: 11). Sapref is one of Shell’s designated 
hotspots; so there has been pressure from the parent company to find a “practical fix” for the 
reputational risk in Durban (Ind2 2006).
Shell has significant organisational structures in place to manage corporate environmental 
performance. One of the four committees of the Board of Royal Dutch Shell is the Social 
Responsibility Committee, which assesses and advises the Board on its policies and 
performance with respect to its Business Principles, Code of Conduct, HSSE and major issues 
of public concern. The Chief Executive has management responsibility for sustainable 
development, and he chairs Shell’s Sustainable Development and HSSE Executive Group. 
Other corporate functions that support the business units include the SPMU, HSSE and issues 
management staff (Shell 2007b: 35).
Regarding regulatory compliance, Shell commits to be in compliance with all relevant laws 
and regulations, sets internal improvement targets for its key safety and environmental 
indicators and has public targets for eliminating the disposal of gas by continuous flaring, and 
for managing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from its operations (Shell 2007b: 34). All of 
its sites contribute to corporate aspirations and targets, but decisions on site-specific standards 
are devolved to the local level. These commitments apply to any Shell company and joint 
ventures under its control. Shell seeks to promote these commitments in other ventures, and
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contractors are required to operate in line with Shell’s HSSE management systems (Shell 
2007b: 34).
Chevron
In 2002, Chevron (then ChevronTexaco) was engaging in a comprehensive post-merger
integration process. Its 2002 corporate responsibility report summarises its approach:
As a decentralized company whose operations span the globe, we have found it 
effective to do a great deal of listening, learning and dialoguing directly at the 
local level. As we work to develop a more integrated approach to corporate 
responsibility, we also are looking at ways to be more systematic in engaging our 
stakeholders and others. We aim to build better processes to transfer learning from 
the local level throughout the company so that we can better understand and 
respond to emerging issues. At the corporate level, we are focusing on being more 
proactive in engaging on important, global issues that cut across our operations. 
(ChevronTexaco 2002: 6)
Implied in this statement are the challenges of integrating corporate responsibility throughout
a decentralised corporate structure. As a consequence of both Caltex and more recently
Chevron’s ‘hands-off approach to managing subsidiaries, Calref has had limited internal
parent company legitimacy risk to contend with. The key question here though is to what
extent this may influence corporate environmental performance.
Regarding its organisational processes, Chevron, like Shell, has a comprehensive set of 
business and management systems, which include Corporate Governance Guidelines, 
Business Conduct and Ethics Code, and Operational Excellence Management System 
(OEMS) (Chevron 2006: 4). Chevron’s OEMS was first published in 2001 after its merger 
with Texaco, to bring together and provide a common set of expectations for Chevron’s 
businesses, and is designed to conform to ISO14001 (ChevronTexaco 2002: 6). The process 
of aligning its OEMS with ISO 14001 companywide is ongoing (Chevron 2006: 9). In 
addition, Chevron has recently released an Environmental, Social and Health Impact 
assessment (ESHIA) process to be applied to new capital projects across its worldwide 
operations (Chevron 2006: 6). Absent from Chevron’s corporate annual and responsibility 
reports is the mention of operational oversight of joint ventures and subsidiaries.44 Chevron
44 For a discussion of how subsidiaries report within Chevron’s structures, see Note 8, p. 64, Chevron 
Corporation Annual Report 2007. (Chevron 2007a)
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does not publish internal targets, but regarding regulatory compliance it does publish 
aggregate health and safety fines and settlements.
4.3.3 External processes and outcomes 
Petronas45
Regarding stakeholder relations and environmental impacts, Petronas published its first 
Group Sustainability Report in 2007, where it reported on total sickness absence, group lost 
time injury frequency, effluent discharge incidents, emissions to air incidences, and waste 
management incidences (Petronas 2007b). Petronas reported that its air emissions incidents 
jumped from two in 2006 to 196 in 2007, which the report explains “was largely due to the 
introduction of more stringent air quality regulations in Durban, South Africa where our 
refinery is located” (Petronas 2007b: 5). From this statement, it can be inferred that Petronas 
is focused on compliance, and either does not mandate internal targets/standards for 
subsidiaries, or has targets but does not report on them.46
Petronas’ Sustainability Report is only 12 pages long, and has very limited information on 
environmental and social performance. Even with Petronas’ increased efforts to provide HSE 
and sustainability performance information relevant to stakeholders, it is difficult to find this 
information on its website. There are no country level reports, nor is there direct discussion of 
social and environmental risks and challenges, especially related to operating abroad.47 Given 
Engen’s experience with sustainability reporting since 2003, it appears that Petronas could 
learn from its subsidiary. Finally, Petronas does not mention participation in any international 
corporate responsibility norm-making initiatives, such as the EITI or the Global Compact.
Shell
Shell’s stakeholder relations are quite extensive. It began reporting on corporate 
responsibility in 1995 and then switched to sustainability in 1997, reports in accordance with 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and seeks external verification of its reports (Context
45 As per sections 1.2.1 and 4.2, External processes are evaluated through various indicator such as stakeholder 
relations, CSR initiatives and corporate environmental reports, and external outcomes are assessed through 
environmental impacts, i.e. changes in actual emissions levels and environmental upsets or incidents.
46 Prior to 2007 the Engen refinery would presumably be operating similarly, so we can assume that what were 
incidences in 2007 would also have taken place in prior years. What changed was the regulation, not the 
environmental performance o f the refinery.
47 As of May 2008
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2006). Shell’s specific issue and location reports are chosen on the basis of having the highest 
impact on their reputation and financial performance (Shell 2006c). Therefore, not all of 
Shell’s companies and joint ventures report at the site level. Shell does extensive stakeholder 
engagement both at the global and local levels. One of its key global performance indicators, 
the Reputation Tracker survey conducted by the market research agency MORI, provides 
external perception of environmental performance (Shell 2007b: 36) At the site level, Shell 
has, in some cases, external panels and observers, including community panels, to help 
monitor environmental and social performance (Shell 2007b: 35).
Not surprisingly, Shell participates in or pledges support for international corporate 
responsibility norm-making initiatives, which Petronas does not, such as: the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI); the Global Compact; the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises; and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. 
Regarding disclosure of its environmental impacts, Shell reports aggregate data for: GHG 
emissions; methane; carbon dioxide (CO2); flaring; sulphur dioxide (SO2); nitrogen oxide 
(NOx); chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs); volatile organic compounds (VOCs); spills; oil in 
effluent to surface environment; fresh water use; waste; energy intensity, in refineries, 
chemical plants, oil sands business, and exploration and production; and external perception 
of environmental performance. It appears that although Shell subsidiaries may traditionally 
have had substantial autonomy (Greene 1985), with its increasing legitimacy risks since the 
mid-1990s, Shell has improved oversight of its subsidiaries’ social and environmental 
performance.
Chevron
Regarding Chevron’s stakeholder relations, it began reporting on corporate responsibility in 
1994, reports in accordance with the GRI, and began seeking external verification of its 
reports in 2007 (Context 2006; Chevron 2007b). In 2007 Chevron invested US$119 million in 
community engagement initiatives globally (Chevron 2007b: 4). Its 2007 Corporate 
Responsibility report uses case studies to demonstrate its commitment to community 
engagement initiatives. The report identifies that partnerships are at the heart of its 
community engagement initiatives and, in 2007, the company introduced a community 
engagement tool kit for staff (Chevron 2007b: 27). Regarding support of international 
corporate responsibility norm-making initiatives, Chevron supports: the EITI; Global Sullivan 
Principles; and recognises the ‘relevant ideals’ expressed in the UN Declaration of Human
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Rights. Noticeably missing is Chevron’s support for the Global Compact and the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
On disclosing environmental impacts, Chevron reports a number of aggregate environmental 
indicators, including: quantity and volume of petroleum spills; VOC emissions; SOx; NOx; 
number of HSE fines and settlements; GHGs; GHGs from flaring and venting; and energy 
efficiency performance. In addition, Chevron disaggregates and publishes air emissions for 
downstream, upstream and other, and US refining. No air emissions or HSE indicators for 
South Africa are publicly available, yet as noted in Chevron’s 2007 Corporate Responsibility 
report: “Global SOx emissions decreased by 22% compared with 2006 in part due to 
improvements at a US refinery and the Cape Town Refinery in South Africa, and because of 
changes in crude feedstock for the Cape Town Refinery...” (Chevron 2007b: 37). It is 
difficult to search the footnotes of Chevron’s corporate reports to find this site specific 
information, and, not having separately reported refinery data in South Africa, sets it apart 
from Enref and Sapref.
Before comparing and contrasting corporate environmentalism between the three companies, 
the characteristics and environmental performance of their respective South African fuel oil 
refinery subsidiaries are considered.
4.4 Refinery characteristics and environmental performance
4.4.1 Refinery characteristics
Enref and Sapref are both located in South Durban: Enref 10km south of Durban in the suburb 
of Wentworth, and Sapref 14km south of Durban in the suburb of Prospecton. Calref is 
located approximately 20km northeast of Cape Town in the suburb of Milnerton. Enref is 
operated by Engen Petroleum Ltd, which is 80 percent owned by Petronas, and 20 percent 
owned by Worldwide African Investment Holdings Ltd, a South African Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) firm, whereas Sapref is a 50/50 joint venture between Shell South 
Africa and BP Southern Africa, which are subsidiaries of parent companies Shell and BP 
respectively, and Shell is the operator of the refinery. Calref is owned and operated by
48 While Shell and BP jointly own Sapref, Shell is the operator; consequently, this analysis will focus more 
specifically on Shell’s corporate policies and practices.
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Chevron South Africa Pty Limited (Chevron SA), a subsidiary of Chevron. Shareholding 
interest in Chevron SA is 75 percent held by Chevron, together with 23 percent held by a 
consortium of South African BEE partners and 2 percent by an employee share trust.
Figure 4.2: South African coastal fuel oil refineries
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Commissioned in 1954, Enref is the oldest fuel oil refinery in South Africa, whereas Sapref, 
commissioned in 1963, is the largest crude oil refinery in southern Africa with 35 percent of 
South Africa’s refining capacity (Sapref 2007). Calref was commissioned in 1966. All three 
refineries are highly complex with output capacities in 2006 of 135,000 barrels of crude oil 
per day (bpd) for Enref, 180,000 bpd for Sapref and 100,000 bpd for Calref. Enref has about 
500 permanent staff, Sapref about 620, and Calref about 350, however these numbers may 
double or even triple when contractors are included (TradelnvestSA 2008; KwaZulu-Natal 
Business 2008).
Enref s facilities consist of the refinery and a lubricating oils blend plant, and its products 
include petrol, diesel, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), cleaning solvents like benzene, jet fuel, 
paraffin, lubricants and grease, bitumen and fuel oil. Enrefs target markets are Engen’s 
retailing division and the motoring public. Sapref s operations consist of the refinery, a single 
buoy mooring, where 80 percent of South Africa’s crude oil imports are offloaded from 
tankers, the Island View harbour storage facility, joint bunkering services, and seven product
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transfer pipelines that run 12 kilometres between the refinery and the storage facility (Sapref
2007). Sapref s products include petrol, diesel, jet fuel, lubricating oil, LPG, paraffin, 
solvents, bitumen, marine fuel oil and chemical feed stocks. Sapref s refined crude oil is 
distributed to the retail networks of its owners Shell SA and BP SA.
Calref s facilities consist of the refinery and the Killamey Tank Farm, where crude oil and 
refined products are stored. The crude is transferred to the refinery by underground pipeline 
from Saldanha Bay, which is 110km north, while three underground pipelines transfer both 
crude and refined product between the refinery and the Cape Town harbour, which is 14km 
south (TradelnvestSA 2008). The Chevron Refinery manufactures a range of petroleum 
products including petrol, diesel, jet fuel, paraffin, LPG, sulphur, bunker fuel oil and bitumen. 
Calref supplies the Western Cape market and also exports fuel to countries in East and West 
Africa (TradelnvestSA 2008).
Although the size of the refineries differ, other aspects of their characteristics facilitate 
comparison: they are all coastal refineries that were constructed within twelve years of each 
other, are of similar complexity and thus are designed to refine similar types of crude oil.
4.4.2 Internal processes and outcomes
Similar to the analysis of parent company environmental performance, how and why each 
refinery’s progress has differed can be investigated by breaking environmental performance 
criteria down into processes and outcomes that are both internal and external to the firm. 
Table 4.4 details Enref, Sapref and Calref s changing environmental performance over time 
with a focus on air emission reductions. The timing and substance of these initiatives are 
significant.
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Table 4.4: Refinery environmental performance49
Internal
processes
Enref Sapref Calref
1999 - DuPont STOP safety system  
introduced
2000 - ISO 14001 certified, R im
- Performance incentive 
scheme
- Implemented best practice 
incident reporting system
2001 - Incident reporting via 
SiteSafe
- Implementation o f  quality 
management and training 
programme, Chevron’s 
project management 
programme
2002 - Shell Performance Review
- Enlarged HSE department
- ChevronTexaco becomes 
75% owner o f  Caltex South 
Africa along with some BEE 
groups
- Implementation o f  
behavioural safety training 
programme at refinery
2003 - IS 09000 certified
2004 - Implementing integrated 
health, safety, environment 
and product quality 
management system that can 
be ISO9001 and 14001 
accredited
- Near miss and learning event 
reporting
- Hearts and Mind behavioural 
safety approach
- Tip-offs initiative
- First aid case reporting
- Calref focuses on 
implementing ‘Operational 
Excellence’
- ISO9001: 2000 certification
2005 - ‘Great Days’ programme -  
staff incentives tied to 
refinery performance
- Employees trained in 
DuPont’s “STOP for the 
environment” system
- Transfer line risk 
management system
- Hazards and effects 
management process
- Spills prevention team
- Develop a transfer line risk 
management system
- Calref GM stresses reliability 
focus and implementation o f  
Operational Excellence
2006 - Implementing ISO 14001
- Implementing Global 
Reliability System, based on 
ExxonMobil's GRS system
- Implementing Process Safety 
Management
- Business Improvement 
Review
Internal
outcomes
Enref Sapref Calref
49 Much o f  this data is self-reported by refineries, but their corporate reports (when available) have been verified 
by external consultants. The self-reported refinery data is also scrutinised by local NGOs and journalists so the 
trends found by categorising the data are believed to be reliable. An indicative list o f  sources, which includes 
corporate reports, interviewees and newspaper articles is included below the table. If a year is not included or left 
empty it is because no recorded initiatives or events were found in the data.
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1997 - Calref and Kynoch were 
pinpointed as the source o f  
S 0 2 exceedances o f  the 
WHO guidelines for 10- 
minute, one-hour and one- 
day averages. It was the first 
time since October 1994, 
when continuous monitoring 
began, that these guidelines 
had been exceeded
1998 - Committed to GNA with 
communities
- Voluntary implementation o f  
GNA
2000 - Voluntarily undertook 
reductions to se lf imposed 
limit o f  37t/day versus 
permitted 50t/d
2001 - 2001 onwards: HSE 
performance targets 
(published)
2003 - Refinery safety record, 
2,800,000 man hours without 
accident
- Engen is awarded Petronas 
group HSE Merit Award for 
improvements in safety 
performance programme
- Alan Munn won the South 
Durban Industrial Basin 
Business Personality award 
o f  the year
- Using Multi-Point Plan 
(MPP) data to assess its own 
environmental impacts
2004 - Cathodic protection system  
o f  pipelines fallen behind 
international best practice 
and needs immediate upgrade
- Stayed below self-imposed 
limit o f  20t/day yearly 
average.
- One short-term exceedance 
o f WHO guideline o f  191 
parts/billion over 10 minute 
average
2005 - Acquired 5-year schedule 
trade permit from local 
government
- Fined R10,000 for S 0 2 
exceedances
- Reduction o f  maintenance 
staff because o f  increased 
refinery reliability
- Three S 0 2 exceedances o f  
Atmospheric Pollution 
Prevention Act (APPA) 
permit, 25t/d
- Implement first Capital 
Stewardship and 
Organisational Capability 
Gold Standard Assessment, 
score 70%, will continue 
process until achieve 90% o f  
Gold Standard
- City o f  Cape Town served 
Calref an abatement notice to 
install a passive VOC 
monitoring system
2006 - Acquired 5-year schedule 
trade permit from local 
government
- Fine levied by Cape Town 
for contravention o f  notice 
service on Calref in Feb 05
- Served notice by DEAT o f  
an intention to issue a 
directive after reoccurrence 
o f pollution incidents
External
processes
Enref Sapref Calref
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Pre-1994 - 1985: Introduces 
environmental information 
programme
- Early 1990s: annual 
meetings with residents
1994 - Attempted to get CAER 
committee together
- Formation o f  Milnerton Air 
Quality Project (MAQP), 
R im
- Caltex Chairman promises to 
reduce S 0 2 emissions by 
80%
1995 - Engaged proactively with 
communities
- GNA process began, but 
failed in the end
1997 - Calref GM reneges on S 0 2 
reduction promise
1998 - Established GNA with 
communities
- Voluntary implementation o f  
GNA
1999 - Public meetings held on 
refinery risk assessment
2001 - Began publishing 
stakeholder reports
2002 - Stakeholder assessment, 
conducted by external 
consultant
- Hires two new external 
affairs staff
2003 - Began publishing 
Sustainability Report
- Stakeholder engagement plan
- Began publishing online 
emissions data
- Community Liaison Forum 
established
- Community survey
- Steve Woodward, GM, 
engages more openly with 
communities in press and in 
person
2004 - Began reporting in 
accordance with the GRI
- Community Liaison Forum 
established
- Began reporting according to 
King 2 Report Guidelines
- Corporate sponsor o f  
National Business Trust 
Barometer survey, Engen 
rated ‘average’
- Increased refinery visits
- Began reporting in 
accordance with the Global 
Reporting Initiative
2005 - Conducted a social impact 
study
External
outcomes
Enref Sapref Calref
Pre-1994 - 1993: New sulphur recovery 
complex commissioned
- Since 1990: Tank seals, 
R6m; smell/VOC
- Since 1993: Reduction o f  
S 0 2 by 79%
1995 - Since 1995: Reduction o f  
S 0 2 by 60%
- Since 1995: Tank seals, 
Rlm/yr, VOCs
1996 - 1996/97: Electrostatic 
precipitators, R40m, dust and 
S 0 2
1997 - S 0 2 reductions, R30m
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1998 - Since 1998: Reduction o f  
S 0 2 by 65%
- Since 1998: Have reduced 
waste by 50%
- Conversion from heavy fuel 
oil to fuel gas, R3m, S 0 2, 
NOx, Pm 10
- New boiler, R28m, dust, 
S 0 2, NOx and smoke
1999 - Since 1999: Reduction o f  
VOCs by 67%
- Conducted VOC survey
- Since 1999: Reduction o f  
VOCs by almost 35%
2000 - Tailgas treating unit;
R71 million; S 0 2 reductions
2001 - Switch from heavy fuel oil to 
gas for S 0 2 reductions
2002 - S 0 2 and VOC reduction 
upgrade, R109m
- S 0 2 reduction upgrade, 
R350m, SRU4/SCOT unit
- FCCU cyclones, R27m, 
PM10
- Flare pilots, R5m, GHGs
- CO boiler, R52m, GHGs
- Storm water unit, R20m, 
soil/water
- Sulphur pastillation plant, 
S 0 2
2004 - NOx and particulates 
reduction projects, R125m
- Upgrade to storm water 
containment ponds, R18m
- Emissions abatement 
programme; R40m; smell
2005 - Implement initiatives to 
overcome nuisance issues
- Clean fuels project, R 210m
- Revamp FCCU
- VOC leak detection 
programme initiated
- Implemented cleaner fuels 
programme, R700m
- Power reliability (Eskom), 
R12.4m, VOCs and Smoke
- Clean fuels project, R200m, 
S 0 2 reductions
- Water conservation & 
recycling project
- 2005-07: Effluent 
improvement initiative, 
R57m, VOCs reduction
2006 - Agreed to replace 7 product 
transfer pipelines, R340m
(Sources include: Beverley 1996; Bramdaw 2000; Business Day 1997; Caltex 2008; Cape
Argus 2006; Cape Times 1994a, 1994b; Camie 200Id, 2002f, 2006c; Challenor 1999; Dreyer 
2004a; Dube 2000; Engen 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b; Gosling 2005a; Ind4 2006; Ind9 
2006; Indl3b 2006; IOL 2001; Jenvey 2003, 2005; Jones 2001a; NG05 2006; N G09 2006; 
NGovl 2006; Nhlapo 200 lg, 200 le, 2001c; Pather 2000; Peek 2002; Peters 2005a, 2005b; 
Peters and Steenkamp 2005; Planting 2004; Sapref 2004, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Shell 
2002b; Smith 1997; Smith 2003b; Sookha and Naidoo 2005; Steenkamp 1994, 1995; Thiel
2004)
Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 represent Enref, Sapref and Calrefs environmental performance over 
time. On a scale o f negative five to plus five, ratings were assigned per year for categories of 
environmental performance as discussed above. These include internal processes (off-white), 
external processes (light green), internal outcomes (pink); and external outcomes (light blue). 
Incidents (red) are also included. The indicators were derived iteratively from the analysis of
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the media and interview data. For example, in 1998 Enref received a plus five on external 
processes for establishing a GNA and a three on internal outcomes for setting targets for 
emissions reductions based upon the GNA. Environmental performance indicators deemed 
negative, such as E nref s fine in 2005 and Calref s directives in 2005 and 2006, are also 
represented below the x-axis as negative internal outcomes (in pink) (see Excel file titled 
env_perf_data.xls in the enclosed CD). Although specific incidents are not discussed in this 
chapter, which are included in the graphs are covered extensively in the media and interviews 
and will be highlighted in Chapters 5 through 7.
Figure 4.3: E n ref s corporate environmental performance
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
-2 
-4 
-6 
-8
Enref
On organisational processes, although Enref began to improve its safety systems in the late 
1990s, it did not begin to externally accredit its environmental management system until 
2004. In 2005, Enref also increased efforts to improve staff HSE performance by linking staff 
incentive structures to refinery performance and training employees in DuPont’s “STOP for 
the environment” system, and in 2006, Enref initiated systems to improve reliability and 
process safety of the refinery. It appears Enref was a relatively late mover in improving its 
internal environmental processes.
Regarding regulatory compliance, Enref led the way in South Durban by committing to a 
five-year GNA with local communities in 1998. The agreement specified a number of
.in
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Mb to o ! 0 0  i ! 0 0 i  i
□  Internal processes □  Internal outcomes □  External processes □  External outcomes ■  Incidents
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environmental improvements to be achieved by 2002 , including: major reductions in SO2, 
particulates and nitrous oxides NOx emissions, noise reductions; improvements to flares and 
visual impact; the establishment of a community awareness and emergency response (CAER) 
programme; and improved reporting of emissions data (Engen 2005: 32). Enref notes in its 
2005 report that the majority of the GNA commitments were met, although there were some 
technical difficulties achieving the particulate emissions target that still needed to be resolved. 
Enref also pointed out that the CAER programme was not successful due to a number of 
reasons, including lack of community support. Both the GNA and attempts to establish a 
CAER programme are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Other internal outcomes reflect Enref s focus on safety policies and procedures. In 2003 the 
refinery set a safety record for 2,800,000 man hours without accident safety record and it 
received a Petronas group HSE merit award for improved safety performance. However, a 
study commissioned by the municipality revealed that Enref s pipeline protections systems 
had fallen behind international best practice. It was difficult to verify if Enref works towards 
environmental performance targets (Engen 2006: 21), because the yearly goals are not always 
reported. Yet Enref received its 5-year schedule trade permit from the municipality in 2005, 
but was fined R 10,000 for SO2 exceedances that same year. Overall Enref s internal 
environmental outcomes are mixed.
F igure 4.4: S a p r e f  s en v iron m en ta l p erform an ce
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Sapref
Regarding Sapref s organisational processes, the refinery became recognised as a hotspot 
area by Shell in the early 2000s, and through parent company pressure, Sapref became 
ISO14001 certified in 2000 and underwent a Shell Performance Review in 2002. To change 
employee behaviour, Sapref linked staff incentives to refinery HSE performance in 2000. 
Sapref also introduced a behavioural change programme and ‘near miss’ reporting in 2004 to 
transform the safety culture at the refinery (Sapref 2004). The refinery’s increase in safety and 
reliability management processes coincided with the arrival of a new managing director, 
Wayne Pearce, in 2004.50
Sapref responded differently to community pressure than Enref. Regarding regulatory 
compliance, the refinery chose not to engage in a GNA, but voluntarily undertook SO2 
reductions. From 2001 onwards, HSE performance targets were published within its 
stakeholder reports. Also, from 2003, Sapref began using air emissions data supplied by the 
municipality to assess its performance. In 2004, Sapref stayed below its self-imposed SO2 
limit of 20 tonnes per day yearly average and reported one short-term exceedance of World 
Health Organization (WHO) guidelines of 191 parts/billion over a 10 minute average. In 
2005, Sapref noted three SO2 exceedances of its APPA permit of 25 tonnes per day, and 2006 
the refinery acquired its five-year schedule trade permit from eThekwini municipality.
50 Wayne Pearce left the refinery in November 2007, and has been replaced by Bart Voet. Wayne Pearce moved 
to The Hague to become Global Manager Process Safety Assurance, and Bart Voet was Shell Vice President 
Wind Energy. http://www.sapref.com/news/8Nov07.htm
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Figure 4.5: Calrefs environmental performance
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Calref
Calref began to improve its organisational processes in the early 2000s as it began to 
implement quality and safety management programmes (Schulze-Hulbe 2001), and with the 
ChevronTexaco acquisition of Caltex South Africa in 2002, it began to implement Chevron’s 
‘Operational Excellence’ management system (Abrahams 2004). As Calrefs general manager 
reiterated in 2005, Chevron’s corporate vision for Operational Excellence, as articulated by 
Chairman and CEO David O ’Reilly is “to be recognised and admired by industry and the 
communities in which we operate as world-class in safety, health, environment, reliability and 
efficiency” (Woodruff 2005: 6). In 2004, Calref became ISO9001 certified and in 2005 the 
general manager stressed the need to focus on operational reliability (Woodruff 2005). Absent 
from C alrefs internal processes, based upon corporate interviews and review of their limited 
publicly available information, is an explicit focus on improving its environmental 
management systems.
Regarding regulatory compliance, Calref made attempts to establish a GNA with its 
surrounding communities in the mid 1990s, however this process broke down and the refinery 
chose to voluntarily implement the draft agreement in 1998. Chapter 5 discusses the 
contestation of Calrefs proposed GNA in detail. There is very little mention of internal 
targets in Calrefs internal newsletter until 2005, when the refinery initiated its first internal 
benchmarking exercise, a Capital Stewardship and Organisational Capability Gold Standard
199^ 1995 1996 199: 1998 I99S 200( 200 2002
JZL
2003 20CU 200 ' 200*
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Assessment (Oosthuizen 2005). Yet the general manager, in a 2005 presentation, noted that 
there had been a number of ground level SO2 concentration exceedances between 2000 and 
2005 (Woodruff 2005).
Also in 2005, Calref came under regulatory compliance pressure from the city of Cape Town 
when it was served an abatement notice to install a passive VOC monitoring system, and the 
refinery was subsequently fined in 2006 for breach of this notice. In 2006, Calref was served 
notice of an intention to issue a directive after having been found to have failed “to take 
reasonable measures to prevent significant pollution or degradation of the environment from 
occurring, continuing or recurring”, in breach of Section 28(1) of NEMA (LGov9 2006). Yet 
Calrefs general manager stated that the refinery’s mission from 2005 to 2007 would be zero 
injuries, zero incidents, 84.5 percent plant utilisation, and 100 percent engagement with 
employees and external stakeholders (Woodruff 2005).
4.4.3 External processes and outcomes 
Enref
Regarding stakeholder engagement, Enref and Sapref differ significantly. From the mid 
1990s, Enref engaged proactively with local stakeholders and established the landmark GNA 
with the surrounding communities in 1998. Enref s efforts to renew its GNA in 2003 failed 
and the legacy of mistrust persisted, although its external reporting efforts did increase in the 
early 2000s. Enref had a stakeholder assessment conducted in 2002 and Engen began 
publishing sustainability reports in 2003, which reported Enref s environmental performance. 
In 2004, Enref established a Community Liaison Forum (CLF), Engen began reporting 
according to external guidelines such as the GRI, and, in 2005, Enref conducted a social 
impact study.
On environmental impacts, Enref has made substantive reductions to some emissions. Since 
1998, the refinery has reduced SO2 by 65 percent, waste by 50 percent, and, since 1999, 
VOCs by 67 percent. Enref began making reductions to SO2 when it commissioned a new 
sulphur recovery complex in 1993. A VOC survey was instigated in 1999, and a major SO2 
and VOC reduction upgrade, for R109million was installed in 2002. In 2004, Enref initiated 
projects, at R125million, to reduce NOx and particulates emissions. More recently, in 2005, it 
implemented projects to overcome nuisance issues, such as a “kill the stink” initiative,
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revamped the fluid catalytic cracking unit (FCCU) to further reduce SO2 emissions, and 
invested R210million to upgrade the plant to meet the 2006 clean fuel regulations.
Figure 4.6: Enref s emissions
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Sapref
Sapref did not openly engage with community stakeholders in the South Durban Basin until 
2000. The refinery became more strategic with its stakeholder engagement from 2001 to 
2004. It began publishing stakeholder reports in 2001 and hired two new external affairs staff 
in 2002. In 2003, it established a stakeholder management plan and a CLF, conducted a 
community survey, and started publishing emissions data online. In 2004, Sapref further lifted 
the veil of secrecy by opening the refinery up to public visits and began reporting according to 
GRI guidelines.
Sapref has invested over R450 million since 1993 in plant environmental upgrades; as a 
result, Sapref has made substantive improvements to its environmental impacts: SO2 
emissions have been reduced by over 60 percent since 1995, and VOCs have been reduced by 
almost 35 percent since 1999. Sapref initiated VOC reduction projects in 1995 by replacing 
tank seals, and in 1998, Sapref s conversion from heavy fuel oil to fuel gas reduced SO2, 
NOx, and particulate matter less than 10 micrometers (PM 10) emissions. In 2002 Sapref
141
implemented a significant SO2 reduction upgrade when it installed a new sulphur recover unit. 
Other emission reductions in 2002 included a particulates reduction upgrade, new flare pilots, 
new carbon monoxide (CO) boiler, and FCCU cyclones to reduce PM 10s. In 2005, Sapref 
initiated a comprehensive VOC leak detection programme, and implemented its cleaner fuels 
programme for R700 million (Sapref 2005). Also in 2005 Sapref chose to replace seven 
product transfer pipelines for R340 million, which was an important ‘win’ for community 
activists as discussed in Chapter 7.
Figure 4.7: Sapref s emissions
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Calref
Stakeholder engagement appears to have begun much earlier in Cape Town than in Durban. 
Calref introduced an environmental information programme in 1985, and began engaging 
with local residents on a regular basis after an incident in 1991 (NG09 2006).51 Responding 
to community pressure, Calref funded SO2 monitors in the area, and funded the Milnerton Air 
Quality Project (MAQP) in 1994, which sought to explore sources and impacts of primary air 
pollutants (Ind9 2006). Also in 1994, Caltex’s chairman made a verbal commitment to
51 This is not surprising given, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, Calref was surrounded by predominantly 
middle-class white communities, whereas Enref and Sapref were surrounded by Coloured, Indian and African 
communities.
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substantively reduce all emissions. As discussed in Chapter 5, this commitment became the 
fault line for community-company controversy. Calref reported that the MAQP found no 
health risks from the refinery’s pollutants in 1996, but these results were contested by local 
residents, who felt that air quality monitoring was inadequate in the area (Cape Times 1996).
In 1995 Calref and local residents began discussions to establish a GNA, following on the 
model that Enref established. As a result of the MAQP the Northern Communities Air 
Monitoring Task Group (NCAMTG) was formed in 1996. In 1997 Calref held a public 
meeting to explain why all of the 1994 goals were not achievable, however it chose to 
voluntarily implement the GNA, and in 1999, held public meetings on a refinery risk 
assessment (Ind9 2006). In 2005, Calrefs general manager noted that the refinery would 
partner with environmental groups and air quality authorities to implement fenceline VOC 
monitoring, and would make efforts “to introduce neighbours” to the refinery (Woodruff
2005).
In contrast to the refineries in Durban, Calref has published no stakeholder reports or 
emissions data. However, regarding environmental impacts, Calref has invested over R250 
million to reduce environmental emissions since 1990 and claims to have reduced SO2  
emissions by 79 percent (Woodruff 2005). In 1990 the refinery began introducing seals on its 
oil storage tanks to reduce smells and VOCs. In 1994, Calref installed low NOx burners to 
reduce NOx and smoke. Electrostatic precipitators were implemented in 1996/97 to reduce 
dust and SO2 , and further SO2 reductions were made in 1997. In 1998, a new boiler was 
installed to reduce dust, SO2 , NOx and smoke. In 1998, after public concern, Calref agreed to 
fund extra air quality monitoring stations (Ind9 2006). In 1999, a public safety risk assessment 
found that the refinery met local and international standards, and thus posed no significant 
risk to public or residents. Yet this report, as discussed in Chapter 5, was contested by local 
residents because it did not assess environmental emissions.
In 2000, Calref implemented power failure mitigation, fugitive emission, and tailgas treating 
unit projects to reduce smoke, smells and SO2 . In 2002, Calref implemented a sulphur 
pastillation plant to reduce SO2 emissions, and in 2003 and 2005 it implemented further power 
reliability projects for VOCs and smoke reductions. Also in 2005, the refinery implemented 
its clean fuels project for R200 million and an effluent improvement initiative for reducing 
VOCs. Figure 4.8 illustrates, from a general manager’s presentation in 2005, Calrefs SO2
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reductions over time. The refinery, distinct from Enref and Sapref, does not publish 
stakeholder reports or environmental performance data, and the refinery’s environmental 
managers would not provide more than SO2 data, thus other emission trends are not available.
Figure 4.8: Calrefs SO2 emissions
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4.5 Comparing corporate environmentalism
Table 4.5 summarises the findings of the refineries’ environmental performance. This table is 
derived from the data and discussion in sections 4.3 and 4.4. The weak (red), mixed (yellow) 
and strong (green) categories are qualitative and based upon the degree to which internal and 
external processes and outcomes are implemented at each of the firms. For example, a 
company that is ISO 14001 certified will mostly likely get a ‘strong’ internal process rating, 
whereas a company that does not have or does not disclose its environmental management 
system will most likely be rated ‘weak’, and a company that has an ‘in-house’ but not 
externally accredited environmental management system will most likely be rated ‘mixed’. In 
addition, it is important to recognise that this analysis is not exhaustive. The data is distilled 
primarily from corporate reports, semi-structured interviews and newspaper articles, so there 
may be more examples of environmental performance activities that the analysis does not 
capture. However, the objective here is to identify patterns and trends in the data to facilitate
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comparison between the refineries as opposed to quantify each refinery’s environmental 
performance.
From the parent company perspective, Shell clearly has stronger environmental performance 
than Petronas and Chevron. However, an important caveat must be stressed, this parent 
company analysis was largely conducted from publicly accessible documents and data. Given 
that Shell’s reporting is superior to Petronas and Chevron’s, there is a bias implicit in the 
results. Yet, the results are still relevant because they raise the issue that Petronas is less 
transparent than Shell and Chevron, and Chevron does not provide as much detail on policies 
and practices as Shell. In fact, the results are further supported by a recent Transparency 
International report evaluating the upstream revenue transparency of 42 leading national and 
international oil and gas companies. Although revenue transparency is distinct from 
environmental performance, the report found that Shell was a high performer, Chevron a 
middle and Petronas a low performer abroad (Transparency International 2008).
One of the key differences separating Shell from Chevron and Petronas is that Shell specifies 
its policies with regards to influencing environmental behaviour within joint ventures and 
subsidiaries, whereas Chevron and Petronas do not.52 However, Chevron, like Shell, does 
achieve strong environmental outcomes. Yet, as discussed in the refinery case studies, an 
important finding is that Petronas and Chevron, and formerly Caltex, exerted less parent 
company pressure on subsidiaries to improve environmental performance than Shell. A key 
question that remains is why this has occurred; is it because of internal strategy, access to 
resources or corporate culture, or because of differences in external home and host country 
pressures? How the interplay of internal and external legitimacy challenges has played out in 
practice, in relation to the three parent-subsidiaries, is discussed in detail in Chapter’s 5 
through 8.
52 However Shell could do more in its sustainability reports to demonstrate how they influence social and 
environmental outcomes in practice in its subsidiaries and joint ventures, particularly those it does not have 
operating control over.
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Table 4.5: Comparing corporate environmental performance
Petronas Shell Cal tex/Chevron
1998-
1999
2000-
2003
2004-
2006
1994-
1999
2000-
2003
2004-
2006
1994-
2000
2000-
2003
2004-
2006
Internal
processes
weak mixed mixed mixed strong strong weak mixed strong
Internal
outcomes
weak weak weak mixed strong strong weak mixed mixed
External
processes
weak weak mixed mixed strong strong weak mixed mixed
External
outcomes
weak weak mixed mixed strong strong mixed mixed strong
Enref Sapref Calref
1994-
1999
2000-
2003
2004-
2006
1994-
1999
2000-
2003
2004-
2006
1994-
1999
2000-
2003
2004-
2006
Internal
processes
weak weak strong weak strong strong weak mixed mixed
Internal
outcomes
mixed strong mixed weak strong strong weak weak weak
External
processes
strong mixed mixed weak strong mixed mixed mixed weak
External
outcomes
weak strong mixed mixed strong strong mixed mixed mixed
Regarding each refinery’s environmental performance over time, Saprefs environmental 
performance improvements appear to be more substantive than those at Enref or Calref. In 
addition, by comparing Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 it is visually obvious that Sapref and Enref s 
environmental performance is more closely linked (i.e. they both have improved more 
consistently from 2000 onward) than with the environmental performance trends of Calref. 
This is a tantalizing clew to the potential influence of host community field level impacts. It 
appears that environmental performance has been more clearly institutionalised within 
industry in Durban, but not in Cape Town. The analysis will revisit this comparative 
discussion in Chapter 8.
To summarise the trends and justify the refinery environmental performance categories in 
Table 4.5, on internal processes (i.e. organisational systems), all three of the refineries 
appeared to do little in the late 1990s to improve environmental management systems; 
however, Sapref became ISO 14001 certified in 2001, whereas Enref and Calref continue to 
work towards that goal. On internal outcomes (i.e. regulatory compliance), in the late 1990s 
Enref led the way with commitments made in its GNA. Calrefs general manager made verbal 
commitments but could not deliver and Sapref chose not to make any voluntary commitments 
during this time period. From 2001 onward, Sapref made the most consistent progress
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succeeding in meeting internal targets and external compliance, whereas Enref was fined in 
2005 for SO2 exceedances and Calref was fined and served a directive in 2005 and 2006.
On external processes (i.e. stakeholder engagement), Enref started out strongest in the mid 
1990s, followed by Calref. Both refineries actively engaged with local communities to 
attempt establishing GNAs, with Enref being successful. From 2000 to 2006, Sapref improved 
its external outcomes and thus relationship with local communities, whereas Enref found it 
difficult to improve upon the optimism of the late 1990s. Calref, without publishing any data 
on refinery environmental performance, has not kept up with best practice.
On external outcomes (i.e. environmental impacts), from 1994 to 1999 all three refineries 
exhibited weak environmental performance. Substantive environmental upgrades and 
emissions reductions, in particular SO2 and VOC emissions (although Calref does not publish 
its VOC reductions), were not made until the early 2000s. Figure 4.9 is particularly revealing. 
SO2 intensities were determined by dividing aggregate emissions per year by refinery 
capacity. Enref clearly took the lead in the early 2000s as it substantially reduced its relative 
SO2 emissions. However, Saprefs steady environmental improvement progress overtook 
Enref s by 2004. Calref, on the other hand, appears to be the laggard. This analysis of SO2 
emission intensities reinforces the qualitative trends identified in Table 4.5.
Figure 4.9: Comparing S 0 2 intensity
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Even though the refineries have made significant emissions reductions, their external 
outcomes remain mixed or weak because they have continued to have a steady rate of fires 
and spills since 2001 (Engen 2006; Woodruff 2005; Sapref 2006b). Though most of these 
incidents are considered minor, some have potential health impacts and are highly visible to 
local communities, exacerbating lack of trust in plant integrity and management. These 
ongoing incidents to some degree are related to the apartheid legacy of poor plant 
maintenance, limited upgrades, the knock on effects of needing to refine suboptimal crude 
under trade sanctions and the drive for increased refining capacity since the early 1990s. Yet 
the refineries are making efforts to change their environmental performance and repair their 
internal (e.g. parent company) and external (e.g. host community) legitimacy. This 
legitimation process, or the interplay between the refineries and the multiple actors engaged in 
the field of environmental improvement, is discussed in Chapters 5 through 7.
4.6 Chapter summary
The democratisation of South Africa in the mid-1990s exposed its fuel oil industry to 
changing societal expectations. Industry’s ‘transformation’ however has been mixed. Each 
refinery has made some substantive environmental performance improvements. Sapref, the 
refinery with the most parent-company pressure, has made the greatest overall improvement, 
but Enref is not far behind. Calref appears to be the clear laggard. This is an interesting 
finding, and counterintuitive given Calref is the subsidiary of a Western multinational and 
Enref of a national oil company. It highlights the potential power of field level dynamics to 
institutionalise norms, rules and beliefs regarding legitimate corporate environmental practice. 
Chapter 4 has answered secondary research one: How has the environmental performance of 
Sapref, Enref and Calref evolved since democratisation in South Africa?
Questions remain whether the dominant factors influencing refinery environmental 
performance are internal or external, and to what extent the internal and external factors 
interact to influence corporate environmental behaviour. Chapters 5 through 7 seek to clarify 
understanding through in depth qualitative analysis and by answering secondary research 
question two: How and why has each refinery’s environmental performance differed?
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5 1994-1999: THE POLLUTION STRUGGLE EMERGES
South Africa's international isolation is at an end, with next month's polls (in April 
1994) set to usher in a new political era and also pave the way for the 
restructuring of the country's energy industry -- once the most secretive in the 
world. (Spicer 1994: para 1, italics by author)
The oil and petrochemical industry would not escape the metamorphosis that lay 
ahead. In a future democratic South Africa, the comfortable position that the oil 
industry had been in would rapidly disappear. (Engen 2007b: 75)
As the above quotes highlight, the veil of secrecy began to slowly come down around South 
Africa’s fuel oil industry as South Africa became a constitutional democracy in 1994. 
Industry could no longer rely upon its pre-1994 relationship with government for its ‘license 
to operate’. The ANC’s coalition party was elected into power in April 1994 under an interim 
constitution, and after two years of negotiations and settlements, the constitution was signed 
into law by President Nelson Mandela in December 1996. South Africa, in the early 1990s 
moved from confrontation to negotiation.
Chapter 4 analysed secondary research question one: how the environmental performance of 
Enref, Sapref and Calref evolved from 1994 to 2006. To explain secondary research question 
two, how and why each refinery’s environmental performance has differed, Chapters 5 
through 7 broaden the discussion to consider the mix of external and internal factors to the 
firm that may influence corporate environmental behaviour. What is of interest here is to 
indentify how field level dynamics and firm legitimation strategies and characteristics 
influences refinery’s environmental performance trends identified in Chapter 4.
Multiple methodologies are employed. The use of social network diagrams, distilled from 
newspaper article analysis, illustrates how actors and issues interact and how relational 
patterns evolve over time. The accompanying ‘thick’ qualitative narrative provides insight 
into the contestation and structuration of the organisational fields, i.e. the interaction between 
field level actors at multiple scales and the coproduction of institutional logics and 
governance structures. Attention is given to how the discursive strategies and power dynamics
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influence institutional logics, and particularly how each refinery employs strategies to gain, 
maintain and/or repair its social and environmental legitimacy. A longitudinal comparative 
analysis is employed to consider how the organisational field of industrial air pollution is 
structured as related to three fuel oil refineries in two localities: Durban and Cape Town. This 
chronological approach facilitates the analysis of processes and mechanisms of institutional 
and organisational change. Between 1994 and 1999 a post-apartheid pollution struggled 
emerges in both of these host communities.
This chapter first compares and contrasts the host community contexts, i.e. Durban and Cape 
Town, it then explores on a yearly basis from 1994 to 1999 field dynamics and firm 
legitimation strategies in Durban and Cape Town. The analysis explores the evidence 
regarding field structuration and firm legitimacy in order to illuminate processes and 
mechanisms of institutional and organisational change.
5.1 Contrasting host community contexts
This study is ultimately concerned with corporate environmental performance at the site level. 
As discussed in section 1.3.3, host communities may put pressure on industrial facilities to 
improve their environmental performance through various modes of community-driven 
governance. The similarities and differences between each refinery’s host community is a 
relevant factor to consider within this study. As Scott (2008: 69) highlights: “Social action is 
always grounded in social contexts that specify valued ends and appropriate means; action 
acquires its very reasonableness from taking into account these social rules and guidelines for 
behaviour”. The local characteristics that are compared include the history, people, place and 
economy of Durban and Cape Town, with a particular focus on the South Durban Basin and 
Cape Town’s northern suburbs.
The history of the refineries within the host communities is highly relevant particularly given 
South Africa’s apartheid past. How corporate environmental performance has evolved may 
indeed be related to how historical perceptions of corporate behaviour (i.e. lack of 
transparency, accountability etc) have been reproduced over time (Pettigrew 1997: 341). The 
study is longitudinal; it compares and contrasts how internal and external contexts have 
evolved between the three refineries from 1994 to 2006. The different types of people and 
communities living adjacent to the refineries are compared. Here socio-economic indicators, 
such as population, per capita income, unemployment and race are used for comparison
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between the two different ‘places’ (i.e. the South Durban Basin and Cape Town’s northern 
suburbs) and three different refineries (Enref, Sapref and Calref). Categorising and comparing 
fenceline community socio-economic status and race is standard methodology for the study of 
environmental justice issues, i.e. communities disproportionately affected by the 
‘environmental bads’ of industrial development or, in this case, point polluters.
The concept of ‘place’, broadly speaking, is the study of the co-production of physical and
human environments. Places, from a human geography perspective, can be defined as:
...bounded settings in which social relations and identity are constituted...Such 
places may be officially recognized geographical entities or more informally 
organized sites of intersecting social relations, meanings and collective memory.
The concept of place, the uniqueness of particular places and place-based 
identities are hotly contested concepts in the contemporary context of increasing 
globalization and the perceived threat of growing placelessness. (Johnston et al.
2000:582)
This study is not only interested in comparing and contrasting the physical and human
contexts of the refinery host communities, but also how their identities are constituted within
these different places. As Escobar highlights: “Place is, of course, constituted by sedimented
social structures and cultural practices” (2001: 143). It is important to give attention to this
cultural aspect of places, particularly to inform the co-construction of field level processes
and institutional outcomes. Escobar raises a pertinent point for this study (2001: 141):
Not only are scholars and activists in environmental studies confronted with social 
movements that commonly maintain a strong reference to place and territory, but 
faced with the growing realization that any alternative course of action must take 
into account place-based models of nature, culture, and politics.
In the analysis of how and why the corporate environmental performance of each refinery
differs, it is important to pay attention to how host community place-based contexts influence
processes and outcomes.
Finally, how the economy, or market-based factors, influence refinery environmental 
performance is also highly relevant. Pressures for economic growth and oil production 
expansion are relevant factors to investigate given the potential human and environment 
impacts of refinery pollution. More generally, the changing patterns and impacts of industrial 
development over time in the South Durban Basin and northern Cape Town suburbs are 
important processes to consider, again, given the potential human and environmental impacts. 
The following sections on the history, people, place and economy of the South Durban Basin 
and Cape Town’s northern suburbs provide relevant detail for the in depth discussion of how
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and why actors and issues evolved over time related to Sapref, Enref and Calref s 
environmental performance.
5.1.1 The South Durban Basin
The South Durban Basin is bordered by two high-lying ridges, south of the port city of 
Durban. South Durban is the second largest industrial area in South Africa, and as the 
economic hub of KwaZulu-Natal, contributes approximately eight percent of the gross 
national product (CitiesNetwork 2008). Enref and Sapref are both highly complex refineries, 
which maintain approximately 60 percent of South Africa's liquid fuel oil refining capacity. 
Also located in this relatively small area are Africa’s largest chemical storage facility, a 
Mondi paper mill, an international airport, a sewage treatment plant, a busy freeway and over 
180 smokestack industries (Wiley et al. 2002). In addition the flight paths for the airport limit 
the smokestack heights, preventing the proper dispersion of emissions from the refineries. It is 
not surprising that the Basin is recognised as one of the country’s pollution hotspots.
The legacy of plant underinvestment and unjust urban planning has made South Durban a test 
case for environmental protection (Wiley et al. 2002). Many of the issues relating to the 
contestation of corporate environmental performance in South Durban’s industrial district are 
a direct consequence of the apartheid-planning regime. In the 1950s, land was made available 
for industrial development and the refineries were built. Under the apartheid government’s 
Group Areas Act, land adjacent to the refineries was subsequently set aside for residential 
developments to house African, Coloured and Asian populations. By locating relatively 
deprived communities next to the refineries, apartheid planning provided a basis for many of 
the issues relating to perceived environmental injustices that are apparent in the area today. 
Under the apartheid regime, opportunities for local community members to access 
information, to participate in decision-making or even to express dissent were almost entirely 
absent.
Yet the current governmental priority given to economic growth and international 
competitiveness has set up a potential conflict between environment and development. How 
Enref and Sapref have responded to changing societal expectations is interrelated. The two 
refineries are located a few kilometres apart, but Enref has closer proximity to communities 
such as Austerville and Wentworth, which are predominantly Coloured, and Merebank, which 
is Indian.
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Figure 5.1: Industry and communities in the South Durban Basin
Brighton
Beach/4
i t  pingo
r » 4j+ i.; £  
M«bSni ' v
rni s^lTfal ’ . ^
W entworth
. ** J
Lam ontville, .
M erebank
Austerville Treasure
M erebank
JEnref
Lmlazi  41 £  .
- /  . 
4
urban . 
(national
El . . .  Airport
\  * *.*•
Isipingo
v* 4
i  -T
R r fa p S to ^  / >
Industrial^ ^
- S /  ' Isipingo 
I f  > i L * C  Beach
M erebank
Sapref
(Adapted from: Google Earth 2008)
Table 5.1 highlights the socioeconomic characteristics of the communities adjacent to Enref 
and Sapref. Enref is bordered by communities on all sides, whereas Sapref has communities 
directly bordering the plant on only two sides. Austerville/Wentworth are the most deprived 
communities bordering Enref, whereas Merebank may be the worst situated given its 
proximity to Enref, Sapref and Mondi. Enref also has neighbouring white communities in 
Brighton Beach or what is commonly known as the Bluff area, given its prime location on a 
ridgeline overlooking the Indian Ocean.
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Table 5.1: Enref and Sapref s adjacent communities
Community Population Racial composition (in %) Unemployed
(in %)
Average income
(per annum)
African Coloured Indian White
Austerville/
Wentworth
24344 5 92 1 1 14 R19201 -  
R38400
Brighton
Beach
5353 12 11 10 67 4 R76801 -  
R153600
Isipingo 9554 37 1 62 0 11 R38401 -  
R76800
Isipingo Beach 3634 20 1 78 1 9 R38401 -  
R76800
Lamontville 29880 99 0 1 0 28 R9601 -  R9200
Merebank 19679 5 7 87 0 9 R38401 -  
R76800
Treasure
Beach
1697 11 75 9 5 5 R76801 -  
R153600
Umlazi 31124 100 0 0 0 33 R4801 -  R9600
Wentworth/
Brighton
Beach
5008 18 11 11 60 6 R38401 -  
R76800
(Durban 2008)
The history, people, place and economy of the South Durban Basin differs significantly with 
that of Cape Town’s northern suburbs, as is discussed below.
5.1.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
In contrast to Enref and Sapref, Calref is situated in a relatively flat area, 15 km north of Cape 
Town. It is located next to a protected wetland called the Rietvlei Wetland Reserve. Cape 
Town is famous for its tourism and services industry and although it contributes 
approximately 14 percent to South Africa’s GDP, its manufacturing sector is significantly 
smaller than Durban’s (CitiesNetwork 2006). Cape Town’s northern suburbs differ from 
South Durban in that they are not in the midst of a strategic industrial development area. 
However, there is a concentration of industry with Calref and the chemical fertiliser plant 
Kynoch adjacent to each other and Calref is a strategic industry in the region given it supplies 
the majority of petrol, diesel and jet fuel to the Western Cape market. When the refinery shuts 
down unexpectedly, the region risks fuel shortages.
Also unlike the refineries in South Durban, Calref pre-dates the predominantly white 
middleclass communities the have populated Cape Town’s northern suburbs. The refinery 
was built on a greenfield site in the 1960s, and as communities expanded out of Cape Town’s
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city centre in the 1970s and 1980s, residents moved adjacent to the refinery attracted by the 
natural landscapes of the wetlands and coastal beach environments. Table View’s beaches in 
the Atlantic Ocean provide one of the world’s best kite surfing locations.
Figure 5.2: Industry and Cape Town’s northern suburbs
(Adapted from: Google Earth 2008)
Table 5.2 details the socioeconomic characteristics of Calrefs surrounding communities. 
They are all predominantly white except for Du Noon, which is an extremely deprived 
African township to the north of Calref. Bothasig is slightly less affluent than Milnerton, 
Richwood and Tableview; otherwise, Calrefs surrounding communities are quite 
homogenous.
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Table 5.2: C alrefs adjacent communities
Community Population Racial composition (in %) Unemployed
(in %)
Average income
(per annum)
African Coloured Indian W hite
Bothasig 12502 1.74 8.27 0.86 89.13 5.80 R19201
R76800
Du Noon 9036 89.65 10.08 0.07 0.20 53.37 0 -  R19200
Milnerton 7153 4.28 7.66 2.03 86.02 4.67 R76801
R307200
Richwood 2844 0.95 9.28 0.42 89.31 2.62 R76801
R307200
Table View 23455 2.88 3.37 1.27 92.48 4.56 R76801
R307200
(Cape Town 2008)
Intuitively, given Calref is located next to middle-class white communities, one might expect 
Calrefs environmental performance to be superior to that of Enref and Saprefs, however 
Chapter 4 demonstrates that this is not the case. Chapters 5 through 7 pays close attention to 
how discursive strategies differed between the communities in the South Durban Basin versus 
northern Cape Town in order to assess to what extent host community context and 
organisational field dynamics are relevant factors in explaining divergent refinery corporate 
environmental performance. Cape Town’s northern suburbs and the South Durban Basin are 
very different in terms of history, people, place and economy.
5.2 1994: The beginning of a new politics
This analysis begins in 1994, a paradigm-shifting year that set into motion the space for 
radical institutional and organisational change within the South African oil refining sector. As 
discussed in section 3.3.1, social network analysis is used to explore how field level 
interaction changed over time. The connection between issues and actors is visualised using a 
two-dimensional spatial map or network diagram. In Figure 5.3 the complete network of 
issues and actors is displayed in the upper left, but to identify the dominant issues and actors 
the network ties or the connection between actors and issues have been reduced by one tie. 
The actors are then identified in the callout box to the right titled “Network: minus 1 tie”. 
Issue areas in the simplified graph are identified in the callout box below titled “Dominant 
issues”. Hypergraphs, or colour-coded contours, are placed around the actors participating in
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the different issue areas. Using newspaper articles as data (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1 and 
Appendix A for detailed information); the results identify how the relationship between issues 
and actors changes over time. The use of network diagrams and hypergraphs results in a 
visual content analysis, which can then be analysed to identify patterns in the data.
Figure 5.3 highlights how the field was dominated by pollution and environmental health 
issues related to Calref and Cape Town. Health studies (in yellow) and refinery incidents (in 
red) catalysed community concerns in Cape Town’s northern suburbs. In response, Calref 
proposed a variety of environmental upgrades (in olive) to mitigate community impacts. 
Although issues associated with Enref s financial performance and the overall expansion of 
refinery capacity and market deregulation did get some media coverage (in grey), it is 
interesting to note that, related to pollution, Cape Town received the most early attention in 
the press. The dominant actors within this network diagram include those engaged in the issue 
areas of environmental health, air pollution and refinery upgrades, such as (unsurprisingly) 
Calref, the South African Medical Research Council (MRC), and the Milnerton Residents 
Association Committee.
53 The contours are colour-coded to denote the types of categories: red signifies incidents; green is civil society 
activism; grey indicates industry or market initiatives; olive represents industry environmental upgrades; yellow 
shows health issues; and blue represents government initiatives or action. In addition, ties are weighted by 
strength, i.e. how many times an actor referred to an issue area, and nodes are by shape and colour. Red circles 
are actors and blue squares are issue areas.
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5.2.1 South Durban Basin
There was little discussion of Enref and Sapref in the press in 1994. Drawing some attention
was Engen’s financial performance; its net income for the year dropped by 13 percent (Rissik
1994a). In 1994, Enref was unique compared to the other fuel oil refineries. In 1990, Gencor,
which owned Enref after Mobil divested in 1989, listed the company on the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange (JSE) as Trek Holdings.54 Enref s financial performance was under more
public scrutiny, as the other fuel oil refineries were not required to publish financial
statements. As the Engen’s historical volume A History o f  Success notes:
As a listed company, Engen was the only player in the oil industry compelled to 
divulge information. While this removed much of our competitive advantage it 
did give Engen the opportunity to talk about what it was doing. (Engen 2007b: 83)
Sapref, Calref and Natref were to some degree cushioned to the economic shocks related to
local market prices and international refining margins by their world-wide exploration and
production capabilities as their parent companies were integrated energy companies (Rissik
1994b). This also led Engen to seek foreign investors, which explains the prolonged courtship
with Petronas. Engen’s A History o f Success highlights the company’s vulnerability in the
early 1990s:
Engen was completely on its own, like a lone fish swimming in a big ocean. In 
order to survive in the long term, it had to have the backing of a large company. 
Independence would have to be sacrificed in order to ensure continued growth and 
the ability to stay competitive. The search for a potential multinational partner was 
underway. (Engen 2007b: 84)
This level of transparency and independence was unique and may help explain Enref s
relatively early start with host community engagement as will be discussed in section 2.3.1.
5.2.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
In 1994, the MRC announced the completion of a study into the effects of Calrefs pollution 
on local residents. Calref took this study very seriously, as it was slow reviewing the report 
before it was made public, which raised community concern. The MRC noted in a local 
newspaper: “Although the council was willing to release the details of the report, it was 
prevented from doing so because of a stipulation by Caltex preventing this” (Steenkamp 1994: 
8). The refinery had increased its production by 70 percent in 1993, but Calref maintained that
54 Engen was listed on the JSE from 1990 until 1998 when it became a wholly owned subsidiary o f Petronas, 
which is when it was delisted from the JSE.
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after an initial increase in SO2 emissions the levels had been reduced to the same levels before 
the production increases (Steenkamp 1994). The report found that existing data could not 
determine if air pollution in the area constituted seriously health risks or was just a nuisance, 
that air monitoring in the area was inadequate and that continuous monitoring for a variety of 
pollutants, including SO2 was necessary (Yeld 1994a).
A new initiative was developed out of the MRC study, called the MAQP, which sought to 
monitor air pollutants in the vicinity of Calref and the fertiliser plant Kynoch. The project cost 
R1 million, was co-funded by industry, and in its first year aimed “to state categorically what 
the levels of pollution are... and whether or not there was a health hazard from Calref* (Cape 
Times 1994a: 7). Here the juxtaposition between technocratic approaches to science and 
community perceptions of health risks is evident. The chairman of the Milnerton Residents’ 
Association said:
We are glad that at least there is going to be public participation in a committee to 
monitor air pollution. In the past they never disclosed figures, hiding behind 
government legislation concerning their kind of industry. I gather that is now 
going to change. (Cape Times 1994b: 3)
Air pollution in Cape Town’s northern suburbs was not the only concern, the city of Cape
Town’s air pollution issue, known as “brown haze”, also came under scrutiny. Brown haze
occurs over Cape Town during certain months of the year caused by temperature inversion
which traps pollutants near the ground, the haze was projected to increase by 48 percent over
the following ten years given projected vehicle, population and industrial growth (Business
Day 1997). The University of Cape Town’s (UCT) Energy Research Institute began a
comprehensive study into the issue.
Calref stoked community concern after a power failure led to the plant bellowing smoke and
flares. This incident spurred a local paper, The Cape Times, to question Calrefs long-term
viability in the area (Cape Times 1994c: 4). Calrefs initial response was to deny that the
smoke was a health hazard, which was actively challenged by community members (Yeld
1994c). Eventually Calref, under growing pressure by the local media and residents,
responded to the increasing concern by taking out a full page advertisement in a local paper
promising to reduce its SO2 emissions by 80 percent over the next five years. Mike
Rademeyer, Caltex Chairman and Calref Managing Director, signed the advert noting:
To reside in a pollution-free environment is indeed a right which is accorded to 
citizens in terms of the Constitution...while there are numerous causes of poor air
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quality -  for example, car exhaust emissions, industries and household fires, we 
accept that our control programme needs to be accelerated and enhanced. Caltex 
does care about our environment. You have my personal word, commitment and 
pledge on it. (Yeld 1994b: 7; Cape Times 1994b: 3)
As discussed in section 5.5, Calrefs over-optimistic promise would eventually undermine its
legitimacy within the surrounding communities and with regulators. More peripheral within
the media were issues related to economic growth and market logics such as deregulation,
refinery margins and industry expansion. Upgrading and “de-mothballing” fuel oil refinery
capacity at Calref, Enref and Sapref was well-underway in 1994 (Spicer 1994).
It is interesting to note how the politics of pollution began in earnest in Cape Town, where, as 
discussed in the following section, it began in Durban a year later. Initiated by health studies 
and then driven by media and community pressure, Calref actually took the initiative and 
actively engaged with local stakeholders. The dominant ‘logic’ driving Cape Town’s 
governance process was a technocratic industry-driven scientific approach. Given the 
scientific uncertainty of the MRC study, and the potential ramifications of alarmist 
conclusions, Calref exerted its authority and power by delaying the release of the study until it 
was certain of the results. However, local media and residents began to assert more public 
pressure on Calref. By highlighting the uncertainty of the MRC study’s findings a new 
governance process emerged -  the MAQP. Media and civil society actors within the host 
community exerted coercive power to influence field structuration. An emergent ‘logic’ 
within this field is that of ‘participation’. The Milnerton spokesperson was optimistic that the 
formerly ‘closed’ environmental governance processes would now become more open to civil 
society participation. Thus the MAQP is evidence of normative institutional change, and the 
Calref general manager’s public acknowledgement that communities have a right to a clean 
and healthy environment as per the constitution is evidence of cultural change within the firm. 
From a scalar perspective, there is little articulation beyond the host locality organisational 
field at this point in time.
5.3 1995: From confrontation to negotiation
Figure 5.4 demonstrates how, in 1995, pollution in Durban and Cape Town and economic 
concerns were the primary issues within the field. Mandela’s visit to Enref and the rise of 
South Durban communities and local government as actors engaged in the pollution debate 
are identified in Figure 5.4. However, as indicted by the large grey contour in the network
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diagram, an economic growth discourse dominated the field and linked Durban and Cape 
Town. Concerns about deregulation, economic growth and infrastructure in the fuel oil sector 
were prevalent in the media. In line with the pro-economic growth logic supported by GEAR, 
President Mandela reaffirmed government’s commitment to reducing uncertainty on the 
question of deregulation and tariff protection through cooperation with all industry and 
societal sectors (Sherrocks 1995). He also emphasised that Enref s investment would 
strengthen foreign confidence and attract much needed foreign investment (Sherrocks 1995).
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5.3.1 South Durban Basin
In South Durban, the post-apartheid pollution struggle emerged in 1995, however its trigger
can be found in late 1994 when Enref called upon local communities to engage in a CAER
committee as part of the Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Initiative (NG05 2006). As
community activist and NGO director Bobby Peek summarised:
The Wentworth folk start emerging in this debate in 1994 and it was precipitated 
or catalysed by Engen coming to the community and saying we want to develop 
with you a CAER System which is based upon the Responsible Care initiative by 
the industry which of course is based upon the outcomes of the complete mess up 
they made in Bhopal. Of course this was a greenwash response to all this. This 
starts in late 1994. Unbeknown to us the reason why they are starting this at the 
Engen oil refinery is in March 1995 Mandela is coming to the oil refinery, they 
want to make sure that they, before Mandela’s arrival, get all the people that 
possibly could be trouble makers, or, alternatively just get people on board to 
show Mandela that they were speaking to the community. There were no trouble 
makers yet for the oil refinery, not yet, but they opened the door, and people 
started saying oh well fine, so this is what you have. (NG05 2006)
The red contour labelled ‘Enref pollution’ indicates media coverage of a nascent 
environmental pollution protest in the Basin. On reducing Enref s industrial pollution, Enref 
and the community activists failed to agree on refinery performance improvements, so when 
President Mandela arrived at Enref in March 1995 to open a R1.5 billion expansion, he was 
met by protesters (Sherrocks 1995). President Mandela called upon the Deputy Minister of 
Environment Affairs and Tourism, Bantu Holomisa, to address the environmental concern. In 
an example of nascent regulative pressure, he organised a series of meetings that included 
stakeholders such as national, regional and local government representatives, community- 
based organisations, industry and trade union groups (Leader 1995). Solutions to the 
environmental problems in South Durban were discussed, and it was agreed that a 
participatory and integrated approach would be taken with commitment by industry for a 
pollution reduction programme that would serve as an environmental management model for 
other metro, provincial and national contexts (Leader 1995). Here it is evident how 
commitment from the highest level of government spurred action at the local level.
Enref was the focal point of community activism during this time. As Alan Munn, Enref s
sustainability manager, described:
You cannot divorce the refinery from the community. The majority of people who 
work here live around it. So in the mid 1990s a lot of pressure came from within
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the company about our environmental performance. The Groundworks (an 
environmental justice NGO) of the world, the Bobby Peeks of the world, I get 
along well with Bobby, like to take the credit for the changes. They deserve a lot 
of credit, but I think within the company the employees were seeing that there 
were problems. Some of us who had technical knowledge, being brought up in the 
UK and educated there, realised we could actually do better. So I think that, in 
1995/96, we were putting pressure on management to change. (Ind4 2006)
The refinery began to realise the need to repair its host community legitimacy, and the
pressure from internal environmental performance ‘champions’ was significant. President
Mandela’s visit started a long process of negotiations between Enref and the communities that
catalysed the South Durban communities into an organised pressure group. During apartheid
most environmental activism in the Basin came from representatives of the Merebank
Ratepayers Association (MRA) (LGovla 2004; NG05 2006). However, President Mandela’s
visit marked the rise of Wentworth post-apartheid activism (Chari 2005; Sparks 2006). Here
two community leaders from Wentworth emerged: Bobby Peek, a master’s student at the
time, and Desmond D’Sa, a trade unionist and community advocate.
The expansion of refinery capacity was also discussed in the media. BP noted that it would 
look to expand capacity at Sapref (SAPA 1995). Yet the aging and outdated infrastructure in 
Durban received attention in November 1995 when an article was published on the financial 
impacts of disrupted power supplies in the Basin (Jenvey 1995). In light of Engen’s 
precarious position in the market, a discussion emerged in the media on the proposed Engen- 
Sasol Oil merger (FT 1995b). The tension between societal concern for public health, 
economic growth and aging capital became apparent.
5.3.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
In 1995, there was also some mention of air pollution related to Calref, although not with 
nearly as much frequency as in 1994. Calref announced it would expand production to start 
producing jet fuel, and Kynoch, the adjacent chemical fertiliser plant, announced that they 
would expand existing plant to process 2,000 tonnes of lime in the area (Steenkamp 1995). 
These potential production increases stoked community concern. The only other media 
mention of Calref was when Rejoice Mabudafhasi, ANC MP at the time, cited Calref and 
Enref as refineries of major concern (Sawyer 1995). She noted that she would have the DEAT 
Minister Dawie de Villiers check whether regulation was adequate and if DEAT approved of 
Calrefs emissions discharges. She said: “We want you (Calref and Enref) to comply with 
Milnerton and Wentworth residents’ standards, satisfy them or move the refineries” (Sawyer
165
1995: 12). This is a very strong statement coming from an MP, which not only targeted 
industrial polluters, but also legitimised the community grievances in Durban and Cape Town. 
It is evidence that a degree of normative and cognitive change in the host communities 
spurred regulative pressure. Finally, BEE emerged as an issue within Calrefs organisational 
field as Caltex was first of the large oil companies to do a BEE deal (FT 1995a).
What is interesting about 1995 was how the South Durban Basin began to move in a unique 
trajectory: Mandela’s intervention sparked a participatory process, which Enref pursued 
voluntarily, to reduce refinery emissions in the Basin. Wentworth activism began to emerge, 
as did Enref s internal environmental champions. Calref similarly sought to reduce emissions 
voluntary, but received comparatively little pressure from government to make these 
improvements. Particularly in Durban, scalar politics influenced local action. Enref, driven by 
international norms and a distinctly South African corporate culture, attempted to implement 
the self-regulatory Responsible Care Initiative. Through the process of establishing a CAER 
committee, Wentworth activism was instigated. By attempting to be a ‘good neighbour’ 
through institutionalising the norms of transparency, participation and accountability, Enref 
opened itself up to host community scrutiny. Of course, as discussed above, Enref s proactive 
approach was partially driven by Mandela’s visit. Thus there is a complex interplay between 
host community, home country (at this point South Africa is Enref s home country as 
Petronas has not become majority shareholder yet) and international field dynamics.
Enref s attempt to establish a CAER committee can be interpreted, as one community activist 
suggested, as a way to accommodate community concern, shape the issues in the Basin and 
legitimise industrial expansion/pollution (NG05 2006). Akin to Lukes’ second dimension of 
power, from this perspective Enref can be viewed as seeking to set the discursive agenda in 
the Basin and shape community preferences. However, Enref s consensual approach 
backfired. Community activists were sceptical of Enref s motives and countered with protest 
activism -  a form of coercive and overt power, akin to Lukes’ first dimension. After the 
conflict boiled over, Mandela and the environment minister’s intervention established a 
participatory and multistakeholder governance process to seek consensus on these divisive 
issues. Here an emergent logic of participation and reconciliation in Durban’s organisational 
field is evident. In Durban there is the beginning of normative institutional change driven by a 
process contestation between industry-driven international norms and local level cultural 
understandings and ideologies. There is evidence of cognitive change within community
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groups and perhaps even regulatory change as Enref considers forms of voluntary regulation 
and national government steps in to facilitate community-company relations. In Cape Town, 
normative pressure for Calref to improve its environmental performance continues as the 
MAQP develops.
5.4 1996: Building capacity and understanding
Figure 5.5 illustrates a fragmented organisational field. After one network tie is removed the 
field is reduced to three issue clusters: environmental pollution and health issues in Cape 
Town; environmental health in Durban; and a Petronas-Engen investment deal.
5.4.1 South Durban Basin
In South Durban, a community milestone occurred in 1996, under the leadership of Bobby 
Peek, white, African, Coloured and Indian communities came together to form the South 
Durban Community Environmental Alliance (SDCEA). SDCEA used the rhetoric of 
environmental justice to fight industrial polluters (NG05 2006). Also in 1996, the profile of 
environmental health concerns was raised in Durban and KwaZulu-Natal. Although not 
specifically related to health concerns in the Basin, a collaborative study between the 
University of Natal medical school’s department of community health and the University of 
Michigan’s school of public health found high lead levels in the blood of disadvantaged 
children living in and around Durban. Utilising this finding to influence government, Dr 
Rajen Naidoo, of the University of Natal medical school, publicly called upon both Durban 
and KwaZulu-Natal health officials to take action to detect and treat lead poisoning (Jackman 
1996).
Economic and market-based discourse entered the field as Petronas surprised the South 
African fuel oil industry by making a 30 percent investment in Engen (Ashurst 1996). 
Although screened out of the network diagram after one tie was reduced, Sapref was also 
eyeing expansion opportunities. Peter Fransen, Sapref s general manager, announced that 
Sapref had begun a R200 million upgrade to electronically control production to increase 
efficiency, output, environmental performance and the ability to refine high-value products. 
He also noted that Sapref had completed a study that could lead to a R250-350 million 
expansion as early as 1998 (Beverley 1996).
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Community members expressed dismay, given they had been reassured that the refinery had
no plans to increase size (Beverley 1996). Bobby Peek, speaking on behalf of the Wentworth
Development Forum, expressed community sentiment at Sapref s strategy of going to the
press first with the expansion announcement:
This is a dirty tactic and we are disgusted with Sapref, Shell and BP, who claim to 
be transparent. We’re calling for more transparency from government and 
industry in the area. Sapref is a signatory of the Responsible Care Charter and a 
member of the Chemical and Allied Industrial Association which calls for 
transparent and responsible management. However, it is operating contrary to its 
commitments. (Jones 1996: 1)
Here the interplay between international norms and standards with local community-based
activism is apparent. This cross-scale interaction is relevant: community leaders in Durban
were reframing and contextualising the implementation of global norms and industry
standards. However, there was no mention of expansion plans at Calref in 1996. The
economic growth, industrial development discursive frame was more prevalent in the South
Durban Basin than in the northern suburbs of Cape Town.
5.4.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
In Cape Town, there was discussion of the MAQP, the health study commissioned in 1994 by 
the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and City Council. In 1996 the 
Project released its final report and found that, inter alia: SO2 released in isolated incidents at 
Calref was an acute health risk to sensitive individuals, but were not a chronic risk to the 
community; high levels of benzene were an “unacceptable health risk”; the odour limit of 
hydrogen sulphides had been exceeded several times in Table View; and fungal spore levels 
were high enough from time to time to cause allergic reactions in sensitive individuals (Cape 
Times 1996). As part of the MAQP, Calref funded the implementation of three air monitoring 
stations in the area. Nazeema Abraham, Calrefs HSE manager, said the study demonstrated 
that the refinery was not a chronic risk to the community and that it highlighted the impact of 
motor vehicle emissions and fungal spores on community members’ health. She noted that the 
report recommended the continuation of air pollution monitoring indefinitely (Ind9 2006).
However, the local media felt that Calref and the Kynoch fertiliser plant were responsible for 
the pollution (Cape Times 1996), and Andy Birkinshaw, Chairman of the Table View 
Residents Association (TVRA), reiterated his distrust of the study. Discussing the study’s 
findings he said: “They (Calref) told blatant lies. They cannot measure emissions from the 
refinery two kilometres away, but that is what they said...” (NGO 11 2006). These conflicting
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perceptions would provide the impetus for community groups to continue building normative 
understandings through further health studies.
Although the field was relatively fragmented in 1996, refinery pollution and environmental 
health issues received media attention in both localities. As discussed in Chapter 6, Durban’s 
early environmental health study set the precedent for future University of KwaZulu-Natal 
and University of Michigan research collaboration. This cross-scale academic interaction 
helped to build international networks with the aim of impacting normative institutional 
change in Durban. Also in Durban, an environmental rights-based logic emerged as the 
community group SDCEA came together to fight industrial pollution. Sapref exerted a form 
of dispositional power by moving forward with expansion plans without consulting 
communities, and Bobby Peek countered with coercive power as he openly attacked Sapref s 
plans in the press. In Cape Town, the mixed results of the MAQP highlighted the contested 
process of normative institution building. Industry agreed and praised the results of the 
MAQP, whereas community members did not trust the results. This emergent logic of 
managerial environmentalism (i.e. get the science ‘right’ first) was, on the surface, 
cooperational, but in fact differing perceptions, resources and knowledge imbalances 
simmered just below the surface.
Enref attempts to gain legitimacy by negotiating with local stakeholders, but Sapref loses 
legitimacy over its expansion plans. In Cape Town, Calrefs legitimacy appeared to be in the 
balance as the health study proved inconclusive. As a result, the normative institutional 
dimensions in Calref were contested, but in Durban they continued to become better defined, 
particularly related to Enref s environmental practices.
5.5 1997: Falling profits and broken promises
The organisational field in 1997 was structured by the contestation of Calrefs broken 
promise, the opportunities for industry expansion and the Asian Crisis’ impact on refinery 
profit margins. After one network tie is reduced, Figure 5.6 illustrates how issues related to 
activism (in green), environmental health (in yellow) and pollution (in red) in Cape Town 
form a tightly knit cluster of actors and issues. As indicated by a number of the grey issue 
areas, industry was poised to significantly expand production capacity. A proposal for a new 
refinery was even discussed by the Department of Minerals and Energy. However, the conflict
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between demands for growth and environmental protection was well articulated by a US and
Foreign Commercial Service report:
Industry, represented by Sapia members, has sent a clear message to government 
that additional private investment is not economic under current regulations and is 
lobbying aggressively for greater certainty on the direction of government policy 
and plans for restructuring state assets, particularly oil pipelines...Growing 
environmental lobbies from communities near refineries are also affecting 
expansion plans which must now be accompanied by costly reductions in 
emission levels. With South Africa facing shortages of between 600 million and
1.6 billion litres of gasoline a year by 2000, refinery expansion is essential... 
(US&FCS 1997: para 2)
Here Sapia, as discussed in section 4.1.2, appears to be lobbying much more on behalf of the
fuel oil industry’s growth as opposed to its environmental innovation. The quote also
highlights how community activists had gained authority within the organisational field.
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5.5.1 South Durban Basin
In Durban the communities appeared to keep a low profile in 1997, as only two citations were 
found in the articles reviewed where communities raised concern about refinery 
environmental performance and more generally industry expansion. However, in 1997 local 
government attempted to respond to community concerns and undertook a Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) aimed to guide future development of the South Durban 
Basin according to sustainable development criteria (Nurick and Johnson 1998; Roberts and 
Diederichs 2002). The SEA is an indicator of a degree of normative and regulative 
institutional change, but, as discussed below, the SEA provided the tinderbox for an 
adversarial community campaign aimed at both government and industry.
5.5.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
1997 was a pivotal year for Calrefs host community legitimacy. Calref was scrutinised on a 
number of different fronts. The dominant issues in Figure 5.6 highlight a concentration of 
environmental health, pollution and industry expansion issues related to the Cape Town 
refinery. The two-year “brown haze” air pollution study was completed in 1997. The study 
found that exhaust emissions were responsible for 65 percent of the brown haze air pollution 
problem, and the report recommended that air pollution control capacity of the municipal 
government should be upgraded (Business Day 1997). Calref and Kynoch were pinpointed as 
the source of SO2 exceedances of the WHO guidelines for 10-minute, one-hour and one-day 
averages. It was the first time since October 1994, when continuous monitoring began, that 
these guidelines had been exceeded.
The NCAMTG approached the firms to explain and propose what mitigating measures would 
be put in place to prevent future exceedances (Yeld 1997). The NCAMTG formed around 
1995; it grew out of the community forum that was created to participate in the MAQP (Indl 1 
2006; NG09 2006). Interesting debate ensued. The NCAMTG threatened to ask the 
Environmental Affairs Minister Pallo Jordan to intervene and re-assess Calrefs permit. This 
exchange highlights how international norms and standards, in this case a WHO air quality 
guideline, helped create space for institutional change at the local level.
Calrefs environmental legitimacy began to be seriously questioned by civil society actors. As 
previously discussed, in August 1994 Calref pledged to reduce SO2 emissions by 80 percent,
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and since mid-1996 had been negotiating a GNA with the Anti-Pollution Alliance (Weiss 
1997b), which formed in 1994 when Calref was seeking to expand its operations (NG09 
2006). The GNA was looking to set targets for NOx, particulates, VOCs and SO2 . In 
September 1997, Calref wrote to residents admitting that it would not meet its target of 
cutting SO2 emissions by 80 percent (Weiss 1997a: 1). The Anti-Pollution Alliance said that 
Calref s announcement would set back negotiations on a GNA that they were discussing 
(Weiss 1997a: 1). Calref s explanation included that margins in the refinery industry had 
come under severe downward pressure, which had impact on its ability to generate the 
“considerable investment and operating expense funds necessary to support the original 
programme as scheduled” (Weiss 1997b: 12). The Anti-Pollution Alliance called on Calref to 
address why it could not meet its publicised goals in a public meeting, and some local 
residents called on Calref to relocate (Weiss 1997b). Normative contestation and a degree of 
community cognitive change exemplifies this issue/event.
Calref countered the public outcry by writing a letter to the editor of a local newspaper, 
claiming it was doing the best it could to clean up the environment, and noting it spent R200 
million over the previous few years on improved environmental quality (Cape Argus 1997: 9). 
Calref reiterated that it expected to achieve a 60 percent S02 emissions reduction by 1998, 
albeit not an 80 percent reduction. It took offence to the charge they were “reneging” on a 
promise, and pointed out that the brown haze study demonstrated that almost two thirds of 
Cape Town’s haze is caused by vehicle emissions, with only 20 percent originating from 
industry (Cape Argus 1997). A public meeting was eventually held to discuss Calref s 
emission reduction plan and “anger boiled over” when Calref said it could not stick to its 
1994 pledge to reduce S02 emissions by 80 percent (Steenkamp 1997: 18). Members of the 
Anti-Pollution Alliance interrupted Calref s managing director, Mike Rademeyer, while he 
was speaking and called for Calref to relocate.
The Alliance chair, William Barker, said that Calref had always balked at having a proper 
medical study done in the area, to establish beyond all doubt whether sulphur emissions affect 
the health of people living in the area (Steenkamp 1997: 18). The goodwill Calref had 
attempted to establish in 1994 through initiating the 80 percent emissions reduction pledge, 
the MAQP and continuous air quality monitoring in the area, appeared to evaporate in 1997. 
The economic realities of the Asian Crisis were beginning to impact refinery margins. Not 
surprisingly, economic factors trumped environmental performance goals. Calref learned the
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lesson to not over promise and under deliver; a lesson that Enref was going to learn in the 
early 2000s.
Durban’s SEA is an indicator of a degree of normative and regulative institutional change. In 
Cape Town, normative change was contested as Calref reneged on its pollution reduction 
promise, and host community engagement strategies became more confrontational as Calref s 
legitimacy was vociferously contested. The structural power of the Asian crisis significantly 
impacted Calref s financial ability to implement environmental upgrades and Calref s 
exceedance of WHO guidelines is another interesting example of cross-scale governance 
structures impacting refinery environmental legitimacy. Institutional logics in both Durban 
and Cape Town appeared to be relatively undefined in 1997.
5.6 1998: Economic downturn and refinery incidents
Figure 5.7 illustrates that in 1998, after one network tie is removed from the graph, the field is 
quite fragmented. What remains are unconnected issues related to pollution in the South 
Durban Basin, Sapref incidents and expansion plans, BEE in the fuel oil industry, fuel 
shortages and labour disputes in Cape Town.
5.6.1 South Durban Basin
In 1998 the CSIR produced a report on air pollution in the Basin, which outlined the 
industries responsible for SO2 pollution, but did not comment on the health implications of the 
pollution (Peters 1998b; Daily News 1998). Given the publicity of the report, a variety of 
local actors entered the pollution debate in South Durban and raised concern. For example Dr 
Mark Colvin, from the MRC and a member of SDCEA, noted the frequency of severe asthma 
in the Basin, and a residential doctor highlighted that “besides the high amount of sulphur 
dioxide pollution, there is a ‘cocktail’ of chemicals in the air those people breath” (Peters 
1998b: 2). Desmond D’Sa, representing the Wentworth Development Forum, voiced his 
frustration: “The people have lived with this problem for far too long. Meetings have been 
held, tests have been done, but no answers are forthcoming, and no changes take place” 
(Peters 1998b: 2).
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This research was commissioned by the Durban Metro Council as part of its R2 million SEA 
study into the competing pressures between environment and development in the Basin. The 
air quality report was just one of five strategic areas being studied to assess the short and long 
term planning for the Basin; the others were: living environments, waste generation, the 
contribution to the local economy, and institutional frameworks (Daily News 1998). The SEA 
provided the tinderbox within which the conflict between environment and development 
would come to a head. As the SEA project leader John Marshall commented on the CSIR 
health study: “These findings should be viewed against the backdrop of the study aiming to 
create both a healthier environment for people as well as clear development parameters which 
would encourage and attract future industrial investments to South Durban” (Daily News 
1998: 10).
If communities in the Basin could ‘prove’ that industrial pollution negatively impacted their 
health, then perhaps further industrial expansion and pollution would be mitigated. Yet in 
1998, industry acknowledged its impact on the environment, but “claim there is no scientific 
evidence to prove damage to health” (Peters 1998b: 2). The contestation of science would 
continue as the Durban health department allocated R1.7 million to conduct a health research 
project in the region, to explore the impacts of air pollution on the communities living in the 
Basin (Peters 1998b; Daily News 1998). This example of changing normative logics set the 
stage for future conflict between communities and industry.
Bobby Peek, SDCEA’s founder, brought international recognition and authority to the new
post-apartheid pollution struggle by winning the prestigious Goldman Environmental Prize in
1998. Previous winners included the late Nigerian Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was executed as a
result of his environmental justice campaigns, a significant connection as both Saro-Wiwa and
Peek gained international recognition through their campaigns aimed at Shell. In a newspaper
interview, Peek remarked:
This award is another victory for South Africa in our ongoing transition towards 
democracy. In South Durban, the communities are struggling to make that 
democracy real by ending the pollution there that the apartheid government 
created.. .One of our rights guarantees that citizens have the right not to be harmed 
by their environment. Herein lies the challenge to our industries, our government 
and our local authorities to make that right a reality in every community. (Peters 
1998a: 2)
The community-led articulation of a rights based discursive frame is clear and powerful. 
Particularly in 1998, the precedence for community activism in the South Durban Basin was
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fuelled by refinery incidents. Sapref had two incidents in 1998 that were noted in the press, 
first was an oil spill in January and second was a fire and explosion in May, which triggered a 
refinery manager’s review and apparently marked the start of an internal transformation 
process (Indl3c 2006).
Economic and labour concerns also populated the field. Sapref, along with other 
petrochemical industry players, had to put its planned expansion on hold due to the Asian 
economic crisis, and the South African government announced it would scrap its plans to 
build a new refinery. This period of low margins and market uncertainty may have slowed 
development of the petrochemical industry in the Basin and allowed civil society’s capacity to 
articulate its concern about environmental health related issues to develop. As is apparent in 
future years, the issues of environmental and human health and industry expansion become 
intertwined in Durban.
5.6.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
In Cape Town, after a tumultuous end to 1997, there was little mention of Calref in the press 
in 1998. The Asian Crisis, as with Sapref and Enref, squeezed Calref s margins and forced job 
cuts. Labour issues preoccupied the industry: Enref workers went on strike after it was alleged 
that American workers were hired at a higher hourly rate; and the Chemical Workers' 
Industrial Union (CWIU) went on an industry-wide strike over wages, which caused national 
fuel shortages (Barnes 1998). In response to the CWIU strike, there was a run on petroleum in 
the Western Cape as drivers feared price increases and fuel shortages. After two weeks the 
strike was resolved.
BEE in the fuel oil industry also made headlines as Caltex was in discussion about a BEE deal 
with Afric Oil, and Shell South Africa spearheaded a BEE deal through a Sapref production 
sharing deal with Tepco Petroleum, an emerging integrated oil sector empowerment player 
(Sharpe 1998). Finally, talk re-emerged in the press of a Sasol-Engen merger, as Petronas 
upped its stake in Engen to 61.5 percent. In sum, 1998 was dominated by economic downturn, 
which coincided with industrial action. Durban’s civil society continued to stir in relation to 
refinery pollution, whereas Cape Town’s went silent.
Community activists in Durban began to contest the results of the SEA and thus opportunities 
for normative and potentially regulative institutional change. The environment versus
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development, environmental justice and contested science issue areas rose in prominence as 
key actors, such as Bobby Peek, gained field level power as he became an internationally 
recognised (and networked) community leader. The interplay between field level actors, 
power relations and institutional logics is significant: Durban’s community activists had 
constructed an environmental justice logic, which sought to counter the logic of managerial 
environmentalism that the SEA process symbolised. In Cape Town, there was little evidence 
of institutional change or contestation, as issues related to the economic downturn dominated 
the field. The logic of managerial environmentalism, driven by Calref and community groups, 
came to a head in 1997 and it was unclear in 1998 how the debate would be taken forward 
into the new millennium.
5.7 1999: Negotiation and confrontation
In 1999 the field became more structured, as indicated in Figure 5.8, the issues and actors 
were more interconnected than in previous years. After reducing one tie, a cluster of 
connected issues and actors remain, which include: Calref s environmental upgrades (in 
olive); activism by Calref s neighbouring communities (in green); pollution at Calref (in red); 
constitutional rhetoric by the environment minister Valli Moosa (in blue); activism against 
industry expansion in South Durban (in green); and Enref s GNA (in olive). A variety of 
community actors, both in Durban and Cape Town, increasingly leveraged the local media to 
publicly register the perceived injustice of industry expansion and pollution.
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5.7.1 South Durban Basin
In 1999, the tension between a history of injustice and the post-apartheid government’s drive
for economic growth culminated in South Durban with the unveiling of the CSIR report,
which, as part of the SEA process, suggested the best development option for the Basin would
be to build a new container port and expand the petrochemical industry (Jenvey 1999).
Growing tension between municipal government and local communities undermined the
impact of the study (Roberts and Diederichs 2002). After the study’s recommendations were
announced, thousands of South Durban community members met to voice their opposition
(IOL 1999). Bobby Peek in an article in a local newspaper highlighted the injustices of the
past, stresses a community versus industry dichotomy and begins to focus criticism on
government (Peek 1999: 19). This backlash highlights the tension and disjuncture between
conflicting institutional logics: the managerial environmentalism of industry and local
authorities and environmental justice rhetoric of community activists. Peek goes on to
highlight the conflict between environment and development in the Basin:
Through another expensive and time-consuming process, the SEA fails to make 
definitive proposals to this end, and the document says little new on the state of 
the environment in South Durban. In effect it is a thinly disguised public relations 
exercise for the expansion of toxic industry with little more than lip service paid 
to the fact that industry needs to clean up. (Peek 1999: 19)
The government intervention after Mandela’s visit in 1995 culminated in the SEA; however,
given its ambiguous outcomes, alternative or ‘hybrid’ forms of environmental governance
would be pursued.
Yet, a milestone was achieved in 1999 when a voluntary agreement was reached between 
Enref and SDCEA. Enref committed to a five year environmental improvement programme, 
i.e. GNA, with SDCEA, thus securing a historic ‘win’ for the communities. This apparently 
was the first voluntary agreement between industry and civil society within the ‘spirit’ of 
NEMA (Challenor 1999). It was agreed in the environmental improvement programme that 
Enref would reduce SO2 emissions from 72 tons a day to 25 tons a day, and make reductions 
of smoke, dust, smells and storage tank emissions among other projects (Challenor 1999). 
Peek, noted that community members “agreed to mutual co-existence rather than polarised 
relocation”, and that bottom up community pressure locally, nationally and internationally got 
Enref “to the table” (Challenor 1999: 11). At first communities had been adversarial and 
demanded that industry relocate, but a more consensual approach was chosen in the end. Here
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the logic of managerial environmentalism is apparent -  SDCEA chose discursive strategies 
strategically -  i.e. whether to engage cooperatively with industry and government or 
coercively employing rights-based rhetoric. Also important to the success of the voluntary 
initiative was the degree of openness and transparency of Enref. As SDCEA’s technical 
advisor Dr Eugene Caimcross commented, Enref s engineers were willing to share ideas and 
technical information, which helped to build trust between the firm and community 
stakeholders (Challenor 1999).
The South Durban model of community activism built new civil society capacity in 1999, as 
Peek founded Groundwork, a South African NGO dedicated to environmental justice 
struggles, based in Pietermaritzburg, the capital of KwaZulu-Natal. Desmond D’Sa then 
became Chairman of SDCEA. SDCEA and Groundwork often campaigned with a dual­
pronged strategy -  SDCEA at the local municipality level, and Groundwork at a national and 
provincial level to build community capacity and impact government legislation. The South 
Durban communities had found their voice and were becoming powerfully articulated within 
local, regional and national networks.
5.7.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
A key feature in the 1999 network graph (Figure 5.8) is the linkage between Durban and Cape 
Town. This was done at the national government level within the issue area of industrial 
pollution and enforcing the rights guaranteed in the constitution. The connection between 
refinery pollution in Durban and Cape Town was made in Valli Moosa’s public statements. 
Moosa, in an address to the Cape Town Press Club, noted that the government would get 
tough on industrial polluters such as Calref (Yeld 1999; Streek 1999). Thus Calref was 
making it on the national spotlight as were the Durban refineries. It appears as though the 
local residents reorganised and reinvigorated their campaign against Calref and Kynoch in
1999. In fact, the community activists in Durban and Cape Town began to link up during this 
time (NG09 2006).
Communities close to Calref for the first time (given the evidence collected for this study) 
used a rights-based discourse with the aim to impact government and refinery behaviour. 
Andy Birkinshaw, Chairman of the Table View Residents’ Association, stressed the impacts 
of SO2 on the health of the community (Halim 1999). Local residents made the headlines in 
1999 by taking Calref and Kynoch, a chemical fertiliser plant, to South Africa’s Human
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Rights Commission for depriving them of their right to clean air (Steenkamp 1999). 
Birkinshaw noted that Calref had failed to deliver its promise to reduce its SO2 emissions 
from 28 tons a day to 8 tons a day by July 1999. Birkinshaw applauded Kynoch’s imminent 
closure in November 1999 and noted his hope that Calref would follow suit (Steenkamp 
1999). However, Calref said it had no plans to do so, given its strategic importance.
An editorial in a local Cape Town newspaper supported the residents’ demand for their 
constitutional right to clean air, thus demonstrating the media’s support for activism. The 
editorial stressed that the usual excuses such as financial constraints, a disputed assertion that 
SO2 was not a health hazard, competitive impacts, and the “we were here first” argument 
would most likely not be on the refinery’s side when in front of the Human Rights 
Commission (Saturday Argus 1999). The editorial stressed that “if they (Calref) are to stay, 
they must be forced to clean up their act” (Saturday Argus 1999: 20). In fact Calref began 
constructing a new tailgas treating unit in July 1999 to reduce SO2 emissions, which aimed to 
start operation in June 2000. In 1999 community activism structured the organisational field 
by scaling up local issues to the national level.
On economic issues, given that low margins still prevailed, there was little talk of refinery 
expansion; however, as indicated by the grey contour disconnected from the others in Figure 
5.8, Engen and Sasol signed a memorandum of understanding regarding their merger 
intentions confirming the rumours of previous years. Also spotlighted in the press were 
articles on how the fuel oil industry was going to fulfil its 25 percent BEE target (West 1999).
For the first time in this analysis, the issue of refinery pollution in Durban and Cape Town 
was linked by rhetoric from national government. It is also apparent in 1999 that both Calref 
and Enref were actively working with communities to repair and maintain their legitimacy, 
but the communities in both localities adopted an environmental justice discursive frame and 
were becoming more proactive and sophisticated in their engagement strategies. Although 
industry consolidation and supply-related issues gained attention, the discussion of industry 
expansion was muted due to unfavourable market conditions. There was voluntary regulative 
change in Durban with the establishment of Enref s GNA, this put normative pressure on 
other industrial facilities in the Basin, including Sapref, to adopt voluntary emissions 
improvement programmes. In Cape Town, there was normative and cognitive institutional
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change within the host communities, as an environmental justice rhetoric was adopted and 
action from the highest levels of government was sought.
The spatialities of environmental governance, particularly in Durban, transcended host 
community boundaries as the Enref-SDCEA GNA was based upon models in the UK and US. 
In fact it was a US academic (David Wiley at Michigan State University) that encouraged 
Bobby Peek in the mid 1990s to explore conciliatory engagement strategies with industry in 
the Basin (Com9a 2006). In addition, the idea for the SEA process was ‘learned’ from 
environmental management strategies in the UK and Europe. In Durban the logic of 
managerial environmentalism clearly clashed with the logic of environmental justice as the 
SEA process stalled, but the GNA process was, at least in 1999, a successful managerial 
environmental outcome. In Cape Town there was little discussion of formal environmental 
governance processes, although a reinvigorated community effort adopted the rhetoric of 
environmental justice to spur changes in organisational field dynamics.
5.8 Analysing organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
How and why has each refinery’s environmental performance differed? As discussed in 
sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 a model of MNC complexity and organisational field dynamics (see 
Figure 2.2) is introduced to unpack this complex interaction between structure and agency. At 
the macro level, organisational fields are spaces where actors discursively engage in 
producing and reproducing issue areas. These spaces of contestation and power dynamics can 
result in dominant discourses, which may channel the institutional logics that govern 
corporate environmental behaviour. The analysis highlights how the interaction between the 
macro (field processes) and micro (firm strategies) may influence environmental performance 
processes and outcomes.
5.8.1 Macro level: field structuration
At the macro level one of the key areas of interest is if the field became more structured from 
1994 to 1999. Table 2.1 highlights ‘detectable units of analysis’ to identify if field 
structuration has occurred, which include:
• Field level actors:
- Increasing interaction between field level actors
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- Well-defined interorganisational relationships that result in patterns of 
coercion or cooperation, i.e. power relations
- Changing role and authority of field level actors who struggle to redefine 
environmental issue areas
• Institutional logics:
Shifts in meaning systems, beliefs and ideologies of what is feasible or 
imaginable
- The identification of dominant logics representing consensus of powerful 
actors and secondary logics representing other subordinated or emergent 
interests
• Governance structures
The dominant governance arrangements that shape and constrain corporate 
environmental behaviour, which can be formal and informal, public and 
private, and regulative, normative and cultural/cognitive institutional 
dimensions
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 distil the macro and micro levels of analysis from 1994 to 1999. In 
Durban and Cape Town the changing organisational field dynamics, firm legitimacy and 
institutional dimensions are highlighted. As indicated by the network diagrams and Table 5.3 
there is little increase in interaction between actors. Some years, such as 1994 and 1997, have 
more citations, but there does not appear to be a strong trend of increasing interaction between 
actors or a more densely structured organisational field. It follows that there are no clear 
patterns of domination or coalition, although in 1999 the profile of civil society activism was 
heightened. A mix of power relations, from coercive to cooperational, are evident.
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Figure 5.9: Analysing structure and agency 1994 to 1996
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managerial environmentalism
Durban: Logic o f economic 
growth, logic o f env. justice
Cape Town: Logic o f  managerial 
environmentalism
1 UIIIItllMlHIS---  -----  -----------------
Durban: beginning o f normative 
change and regulative change; 
cognitive change within 
community
Cape Town: evidence of 
normative change
Durban: normative dimensions 
continue to evolve
Cape Town: normative dimensions 
contested
Micro: firm legitimacy
Durban: Enref under shareholder 
scrutiny, Sapref no action
Cape Town: Calref engages with 
community and makes emissions 
reduction commitment, cultural 
change within Calref
Durban: Enref proactively engages 
community; Sapref no action
Cape Town: Calref attempts to 
implement 1994 commitment and 
continues to engage with local 
stakeholders
Durban: Enref negotiates with 
communities; Sapref loses 
legitimacy over expansion plans
Cape Town: Calref legitimacy in 
balance after inconclusive health 
study
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Figure 5.10: Analysing structure and agency 1997 to 1999
Macro: field level processes
1997 1998 1999
Asian crisis
Calref broken promise
Events
Key Actors ...... ........................ .......
Durban: Engen, Petronas and SA 
government
Cape Town: Calref, CPT 
communities, NCAMTG, CPT 
muni, Caltex, Kynoch and APA
Issue areas
Sapref explosion
SDB SEA
 [ .........
Durban: Sapref, British 
Petroleum, B. Peek, Durban 
muni and SDB industry
Cape Town: Calref and 
Chemical Workers’ Industrial 
union
V. Moosa rhetoric
Groundwork 
Enref GNA founded
Durban: B. Peek, SDB 
communities, Enref and V. 
Moosa-DEAT
Cape Town: Table View  
residents, A. Birkinshaw, 
Calref and P. Buley-Calref
Durban: economic growth, 
industry investment
Cape Town: economic growth, 
environmental health, industrial 
pollution and industry distrust
Durban: environmental justice, 
environment vs. development, 
economic downturn and techno- 
bureaucratic science
Cape Town: economic downturn 
and industrial action
Institutional logics
Durban: environmental justice, 
environment vs. development, 
economic downturn and 
constitutional rights
Cape Town: environmental 
justice, constitutional rights 
and economic downturn
Durban: Logic o f  managerial 
environmentalism
Cape Town: In flux
Governance structures/institutional
Durban: some local government 
normative and regulative action 
through commissioning SEA
Cape Town: normative 
contestation, cognitive change 
within community
Durban: Logic o f  environmental 
justice, logic o f  managerial 
environmentalism
Cape Town: In flux
Durban: Logic o f  environmental 
justice, logic o f  managerial 
environmentalism
Cape Town: Logic o f  
environmental justice
dimensions ..................................
Durban: normative contestation 
through debating SEA results
Cape Town: little evidence o f  
change
Durban: normative and 
voluntary regulative change with 
Enref GNA
Cape Town: normative change 
as community members 
approach SA Human Rights 
Commission
Micro: firm legitimacy
Durban: Enref negotiates with 
communities; Sapref no action
Cape Town: Calref loses 
legitimacy as reneges on 
emissions reduction commitment
Durban: Enref negotiates with 
communities; Sapref loses 
legitimacy because o f  incidents
Cape Town: Calref attempts to 
negotiate with communities
Durban: Enref gains legitimacy 
through GNA; Sapref no action
Cape Town: Calref continues to 
lose legitimacy as community 
activism grows
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Table 5.3: Type of actors and frequency of citations 1994 - 1999
Type Subcategory Citations
199^ 1995 1996 1997 199*i 1999
Dur Cpt Oth Dur Cpt Oth Dur Cpt Oth Dur Cpt Oth Dur Cpt Oth Dur Cpt Oth
Academic Academic 0 1 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Civil
Society
CBO 0 10 0 4 3 0 4 5 0 2 22 0 6 0 0 7 21 0
NGO 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
INGO 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other civ soc 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Labour 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 10 0 0 0
Govern­
ment
Local Gov 0 3 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 5 0 4 4 0 1 1 0
Prov Gov 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nat Gov 0 9 8 4 1 0 0 2 0 2 3 4 0 0 3 2 3 1
Inti Gov 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Industry
Enref/Engen 11 0 0 4 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 10 0 0
Sapref/Shell/
BP
0 2 0 7 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 14 0 0 0 0 0
Calref/Caltex 0 27 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 47 0 0 9 0 0 11 0
Other
industry
0 3 7 5 1 9 0 2 2 3 5 9 0 11 2 1 7
Media Media 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Subtotal 11 63 15 26 9 9 21 14 2 12 84 16 38 13 24 24 37 8
Total 89 44 37 112 75 69
From 1994 until 1997 the logic of managerial environmentalism dominated the field in Cape 
Town. Community leaders were engaging proactively with Calref to ‘get the science right’. A 
technocratic, science-driven approach was characteristic of these early days. Calref sought to 
proactively engage with local community groups and work, in good faith, towards a voluntary 
governance structure, a GNA. It appeared that consensus was building around the findings of 
the MAQP; however, community-company trust was negatively impacted when profit 
margins undermined Calref s intentions. The Asian Crisis set community-company relations 
and the GNA negotiations into a tailspin. The logic of economic growth and profit 
maximisation trumped the promised environmental upgrades.
From 1997 to 1999 the organisational field related to Calref s environmental performance was 
in flux. No dominant discourses or logics emerged. Normative and cultural/cognitive 
institutional change appeared to have occurred as community leaders got frustrated with 
Calref s inaction. Community leadership in the northern Cape Town suburbs was in a process 
of reorganisation and Birkinshaw emerged in 1999 to engage more confrontationally with 
Calref. 1999 was in fact the first year that an environmental rights discourse was employed in 
Calref s organisational field. National government occasionally threatened Calref after 
significant incidents but there was little consistent regulatory pressure exerted.
In Durban, after an event sparked community-company conflict, the win/win logic of 
managerial environmentalism underpinned community-company engagement in the mid- 
1990s. Mandela’s visit to Enref in 1995 was clearly the starting point for South Durban’s 
‘pollution struggle’. Given the structural logic of economic growth (both Sapref and Enref 
were expanding refining capacity) and the democratic norms and environmental rights set out 
in South Africa’s constitution, national government spearheaded a cooperational process 
through which win/win community-company outcomes would be sought, thus influencing 
Enref s organisational field significantly in the 1990s.
Through cycles of coercion and cooperation, SDCEA and Enref achieved South Africa’s first 
GNA in 1999. This voluntary regulatory governance structure was an outcome of the logic of 
managerial environmentalism that dominated the field in the 1990s. However, an increasingly 
dominant environmental justice logic populated the field as SDCEA was founded, Peek 
received the Goldman Prize and Groundwork was founded. This is representative of the
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changing role and authority of SDCEA and Peek in the South Durban field. There appeared to 
be a shift in ideologies towards the end of the 1990s as SDCEA and Peek vociferously 
engaged against the SEA outcomes. In fact the pattern of interorganisational relationships 
expanded to include community-govemment pressure in addition to that of community- 
company pressure.
Regarding changing institutional dimensions, it is apparent how cultural/cognitive change 
occurred within South Durban and Northern Cape Town’s community leaders. In South 
Durban a traditionally marginalised community found voice and power by exercising its 
newfound rights; whereas in Northern Cape Town, a middle-class white community began to 
question the logic of South African industrial development and residential planning. 
Community activists drew on the precedence set by international norms and standards (e.g. 
Responsible Care, WHO standards and Human Rights) to influence managerial environmental 
processes. Normative pressure began to take shape in both Calref and Enref s case because of 
a complex mix of community-based institutional entrepreneurs, internal company champions 
and cross-scale governance.
However, the outcomes are patchy. In Durban, Mandela’s visit begins a lengthy process of 
government engagement. The failed SEA represents the naivety of local government 
representatives in underestimating the power of the logic of environmental justice. Moosa’s 
strong rights-based rhetoric in 1999 adheres more closely to the discourse of community- 
based activists. Enref s successfully negotiated GNA in 1998 represents an early success for 
managerial environmentalism, i.e. conciliatory and consensus-seeking governance outcome. 
This is something the government was unable to achieve through the SEA process.
In Cape Town communities vociferously engaged with Calref in 1994, 1997 and 1999. 
Community leaders exhibited a degree of cognitive change, as they changed their way of 
thinking and engaging with the refineries during that time (NG09 2006). International and 
national norms such as WHO standards and the SA Human Rights Commission were 
strategically incorporated into discursive frames to coercively influence Calref s 
environmental practices. The logic of environmental justice is more clearly articulated in 1999 
than it was in 1994 and 1997. Moosa responded to community activists by targeting Calref s 
poor environmental performance in 1999. Although the refinery did not agree to any formal 
pollution reduction commitments, it appeared to be engaging in the issue area (Ind9 2006).
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Thus, a degree of normative change was occurring in Cape Town. In sum, although the field 
remained fragmented from 1995 to 1999, with no authoritative institutions emerging, a degree 
voluntary regulative change occurs in Durban and some normative change occurs in both 
Durban and Cape Town.
At this point it can be concluded that field structuration had not occurred to a significant 
degree, i.e. enough to institutionalise superior corporate environmental performance within 
the South African fuel oil industry. There appears to be momentum building that may result in 
a more structured field in later years.
5.8.2 Micro level: firm legitimation strategies
At the micro level firms engage in the organisational field to both gain and maintain 
legitimacy and to influence field structuration. In the early 1990s Calref proactively engaged 
with community members and local government to develop evidence-based solutions to 
manage the environmental impacts. Calref s broken pollution reduction promise in 1997 
significantly damaged its legitimacy. This event catalysed community activism, reinforced 
community-company distrust and limited the opportunity for a GNA to be established 
between Calref and its surrounding communities (NG09 2006). However, in an attempt to 
maintain its legitimacy, Calref said it went on to adopt the commitments set out in the GNA 
into its environmental improvement programme anyway (Ind9 2006).
In Durban, Enref was the first major industrial actor to recognise the relevance of community 
stakeholders, particularly in relation to maintaining organisational legitimacy within its host 
community. In 1995 Enref attempted to set up a Responsible Care CAER committee. In this 
respect international industry norms and self-regulatory efforts influenced organisational 
behaviour at the local level. A form of cross-scale environmental governance enabled the 
issue of industrial pollution to enter the organisational field in 1995. Yet, the adoption of 
conciliatory strategies did not legitimate Enref s environmental performance. Activists from 
the adjacent communities of Austerville and Wentworth felt the CAER committee was a form 
of ‘greenwash’ and protested on the day Mandela arrived. Enref, driven by the leadership of 
internal champions, began a process of negotiation with its host communities to repair its 
legitimacy, which resulted in its landmark GNA in 1998/1999.
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Refinery upsets and incidents continued to negatively impact internal and external legitimacy. 
For example Sapref s fire and explosion in 1998 spurred internal oversight and external 
government and community attention. Thus In the late 1990s Calref and to a lesser degree 
Sapref were using reactive strategies to repair host community legitimacy, whereas Enref 
modelled proactive behaviour. Enref s closer proximity to communities can help explain why 
Sapref did not take a more proactive external engagement strategy in the 1990s.
5.9 Chapter summary
A new democratic politics was unleashed in 1994. With the 1996 Constitution guaranteeing a 
citizen’s right to a clean and healthy environment, the stage was set for a post-apartheid 
pollution struggle. A shift from the ‘green’ to so-called ‘brown’ and ‘red’ issues was marked 
by a new focus on the health impacts of industrial pollution, human rights, social justice and 
equity. As discussed in Chapter 1, the history of racist policies on rural and urban 
environments, the new ANC Government’s prioritisation of economic growth, and a 
fragmented and weakly enforced environmental management legislative framework put the 
dual goals of environmental protection and socioeconomic development on a collision course.
After analysing organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy strategies, it is apparent 
that Enref, Sapref and Calref s environmental performance differed because of a variety of 
external and internal factors between 1994 and 1999. Enref s closer proximity to 
communities, which made it an obvious target for community-based activists, its status as a 
publicly traded South African company, and the influence of ‘sustainability champions’ 
within the firm, all influenced its decision to engage proactively with its local stakeholders in 
the mid-1990s. Sapref was farther from communities, was owned by MNCs based in Europe 
and was primarily focused on increasing production during this time. It did comparatively 
little to improve its environmental performance. Calref, in Northern Cape Town, is a very 
different case. Calref was owned by an American MNC, was located next to white 
middleclass communities and had a history of engaging with its highly educated neighbours 
on pollution concerns dating back two decades (LGov9 2006). Similar to Enref, Calref was 
impelled to engage more substantively with its surrounding communities in the early 1990s.
In sum, the complex interaction between actors’ discursive strategies, power relations, and the 
construction of institutional logics significantly influences the possible governance 
arrangements within an organisational field. Underpinned by the logics of environmental
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justice and managerial environmentalism, normative and a degree of voluntary regulative 
institutional change took hold in Durban, although with Enref not Sapref. Negotiation 
succeeded with Enref s GNA, but Sapref continued to approach environmental issues 
reactively. In Cape Town, the logic of managerial environmentalism drove Calref s attempt to 
reduce emissions by 80 percent. However, after the Asian crisis hit, the logic of profit 
maximisation took hold, and attempts to reach voluntary regulative institutional change failed. 
As the century ended, civil society actors in both Durban and Cape Town had adopted 
environmental rights-based discursive strategies, and firm legitimacy in both localities was 
contested.
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6 2000-2003: SPACES OF CONTESTATION
As long as children in south Durban suffer the highest levels of asthma in medical 
literature, chemical industries are capital intensive and provide few employment 
opportunities and a pall of pollution continues to cover the south Durban basin, 
local residents will oppose the development of further dirty industry. (Krige 2002: 
para 5)
For decades people living around the Caltex oil refinery in Milnerton have 
claimed that airborne toxins from the plant are injurious to their health. It would 
appear from the results of a study by the University of Cape Town Lung Institute 
that their concerns are legitimate.. .(Cape Times 2003: 8)
tliAt the end of the 20 century, civil society had begun to wield discursive power in the South 
Durban Basin and Cape Town’s northern suburbs. Community leaders in both Durban and 
Cape Town engaged with industry and government using rights-based rhetoric. By 2000 little 
shared understanding at the field level had occurred. Interaction between actors and the issue 
areas of industrial pollution and environmental health was increasing but fragmented. The 
government and industry-driven logic of managerial environmentalism became in conflict 
with the community-driven logic of environmental justice. In 1999 Enref, Sapref and Calref s 
host community legitimacy differed quite significantly: Enref had engaged in a voluntary 
GNA with its fenceline communities; Sapref had yet to openly engage with its neighbours; 
and Calref was seeking to repair its host community legitimacy after failing to achieve its 
stated plan of 80 percent emission reductions by 1997. Here a range of relational power from 
consensual (e.g. Enref s GNA) to conflictual (e.g. SDCEA’s protest against the SEA results 
and Northern Cape Town community leaders’ hostility to Calref s ‘broken promise’) existed 
as did forms of structural power (e.g. the Asian crisis). The norms of what constituted socially 
appropriate corporate environmental performance were being contested differently in relation 
to each refinery. This helps to explain why each of the refineries pursued unique legitimation 
strategies.
The nascent normative institutional dimensions constructed in the late 1990s would be tested 
in the early 2000s as community activists, particularly in Durban, moved away from
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cooperation to confrontation with Enref and Sapref. Pressure was directed at both industry 
and government to sort out perceived environmental injustices. As the quotes framing this 
chapter illustrate, community-driven science and a discursive frame of environmental health 
helped to drive the structuration of the organisational field and significantly impact normative 
understandings. The spheres of government would be challenged to meet the demands of all 
‘interested and affected’ stakeholders.
The following discussion explores the field level dynamics between 2000 and 2003 
highlighting how actors constructed the issue areas related to Enref, Sapref and Calref. For 
each year the network diagrams are discussed first, followed by a detailed narrative of the 
field dynamics in the South Durban Basin and Cape Town’s northern suburbs. Insights from 
primary and secondary data sources such as newspaper articles and interviews are 
incorporated.
6.1 2000: Constructing knowledge and repairing legitimacy
The network diagram in Figure 6.1 illustrates how the organisational field had become much 
more structured around pollution and environmental health issues than it had been in the late 
1990s. By visually comparing the complete network of Figure 6.1 to that of Figure 5.8 (the 
network diagram for 1999) it is apparent that many more actors and issues participated in the 
field. After reducing the network ties until all issues and actors had at least two ties, two more 
densely structured spaces or fields become apparent. One related to issues in South Durban 
and the other to issues in Cape Town. The central issue in South Durban is air pollution; other 
issues marked with red contours include refinery incidents and Sapref underreporting SO2  
emissions. The issue area sparked by a cancer study is marked in yellow and the issues related 
to a training centre, Enref s environmental upgrade and labour agreement is in olive.
The large green contour indicates the Bucket Brigades, which is a community air sampling 
technique. The Bucket Brigade issue area links the South Durban and Cape Town related 
fields. In Cape Town the dominant issue is Calref s sulphur disposal problem. Other red 
contours include Calref s air pollution and a 1995 fire at a sulphur processing plant. The blue 
contour marks a government threat to Calref to clean up its act. The following discussion 
explores the field level dynamics in both Durban and Cape Town.
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6.1.1 The South Durban Basin
The issue area of air pollution in the South Durban Basin is central to the upper part of the 
network diagram. Catalysing increased air pollution concerns were a variety of different 
factors. In the late 1990s Enref took the lead engaging with communities. However, in 2000, 
Richard Parkes, Sapref s managing director, appeared to have a “road to Damascus” moment 
when he realised the need to talk to community stakeholders (Ind3 2006). This was perhaps a 
decade too late, as a setting of mistrust existed. In January 2000 Sapref admitted to 
underreporting SO2 emissions by up to 12 tons per day, 29 instead of 41 tons, since 1995 
(Dube 2000). Sapref also announced that it would be introducing new environmental 
measures to reduce daily emissions from 41 to 37 tons per day. This was its first announced 
emissions reduction plan. Although local government and some media congratulated Sapref 
for its honesty, the error undermined trust with community stakeholders and gained the 
attention of environmental justice activists. Sapref s environmental legitimacy had begun to 
be publicly challenged.
Shortly after Sapref s disclosure Rejoice Mabudafhasi, the national deputy minister for 
environment and tourism, met with members of the oil industry and South Durban community 
stakeholders on a fact finding mission (Bisetty 2000). She singled out Calref, Enref and 
Sapref, and vowed “zero tolerance” towards polluters (Loxton 2000). One area of concern 
was that a collaborative partnership did not exist between Sapref and the community to 
resolve the pollution problems (Bisetty 2000). In fact, the community groups failed to 
establish a GNA with Sapref. As an academic explained demonstrating cultural differences 
between the refineries, Sapref was the least willing to talk and provide the information 
necessary for negotiation (Acad6 2006).
The pressure from communities, spurred by ongoing incidents such as Sapref s
underreporting of SO2 emissions, encouraged government into action at least symbolically if
not substantively. It is also interesting to see Sapref taking a much more proactive external
communications strategy, directly responding to criticisms in the press. Parkes summarised
the fuel oil industry’s position:
Describing us as major polluters tends to polarise the situation, encouraging the 
community to see us as opponents rather than contributors to the economy. We 
feel this is unhelpful...oil refining is a relatively small player in environmental 
damage in South Africa. We have no idea what government plans for other heavy
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industries and look forward to understanding their overall approach. (Steyn 2000:
13)
Coordinated by Groundwork, a variety of civil society organisations, including trade unions,
came together to put pressure on the government. Bobby Peek, Groundwork director, said:
We have been fighting this battle since 1994 and to date the government has not 
responded in an appropriate way. All we have is self-regulation. Self-regulation is 
like asking a bulldog not to eat a slice of beef you put in front of it. (Kirk 2000b: 
para 6)
The push was on to move beyond voluntary approaches towards direct regulation. In Figure
6.1 Peek is densely networked and centrally located within the graph. He wields significant 
discursive power as he overlaps into the issue areas of South Durban Basin air pollution, 
Enref s environmental upgrade and labour agreement, Sapref s SO2 underreporting and the 
Bucket Brigades.
Public perception was being formed by ‘civic science’, the “changing relationship between 
science, expert knowledge, and citizens in democratic societies” (Backstrand 2003: 24). In 
2000 Groundwork and SDCEA used ‘bucket’ air sampling methods (the Bucket Brigades), 
taught from environmental groups in the US, to highlight the presence of cancer causing 
VOCs such as benzene. Denny Larson, director of Communities for a Better Environment in 
San Francisco, called the Basin’s air quality a “toxic soup” noting that levels of levels of 
benzene were eight times the internationally accepted standard (Kirk 2000a).
Environmental health emerged as an influential issue in South Durban. Tony Camie, a local 
journalist, ran a series of articles in The Mercury, a Durban newspaper, in 2000 hypothesising 
the link between cancer and industrial pollution in the Basin (Camie 2000a). He found that 
the rate of leukaemia in young children in Merebank appeared to be 24 times higher than in 
other parts of the country (Camie 2000a). This investigation sparked much local and 
governmental concern and strongly influenced understandings and beliefs in the Basin. In 
September 2000 Narend Singh, the KwaZulu-Natal environmental minister, passed an urgent 
motion that called on national environment minister, Valli Moosa, to “reactivate a study on 
the impact of pollution in the area” (The Mercury 2000: para 5).
Spurred by community and provincial government pressure, Moosa proposed a number of 
measures with the aim to create a healthy living environment for community members,
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including: revising pollution standards; improving air pollution monitoring systems; 
conducting a health risk assessment and epidemiological study; and improving levels of 
enforcement and legal sanctions (Camie 2000b). Moosa called upon industry in South Durban 
to bear the primary responsibility for funding the implementation of his proposals. In response 
to this media and community pressure Sapref and Enref agreed to fund a health assessment at 
the Settlers Primary School in the Basin, which, given its location between Enref and Sapref, 
received high levels of air pollution daily (Khan 2000). This was the start of what came to be 
known as the Multi-Point Plan (MPP).
Towards the end of the year, Enref gained positive attention because, in an effort to make 
good on its GNA, it signed a gas supply agreement with a division of Sasol to purchase 
methane-rich gas in order to replace its refinery fuel oil. This switch from fuel oil to gas 
would result in significant reductions in SO2 emissions (Pather 2000).
6.1.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
There are two clear linkages between the organisational fields in Durban and Cape Town: the 
rhetoric of environment minister Moosa and deputy environment minister Mabudafhasi, and 
the work of the Bucket Brigades spearheaded by Groundwork. This linking between issue 
areas was driven by community-based activism in both localities. For example, Groundwork’s 
Bucket Brigade took tests adjacent to refineries in Durban, Cape Town and Sasolburg. The 
test results taken around Calref and Sasolburg, as in Durban, were significant: VOCs, such as 
benzene, were found in relatively high concentrations. The science was being constructed 
from the bottom up. Before the Bucket Brigades only SO2 was discussed; now the mitigation 
of fugitive emissions such as cancer-causing VOCs entered the discourse.
However, industry was not entirely content with the ‘facts’ reported in the press. In a letter to 
the editor, Paul Buley, Calref s general manager, noted a number of discrepancies in the 
results, questioned their usefulness and recommended that “additional samples should be 
taken on a scientific basis under the auspices of the independent air-monitoring task group in 
the area” (Mail & Guardian 2000: 27). Notwithstanding Buley’s claims, the impact of the 
Bucket Brigade air samples on the organisational field was significant. The national 
government took keen notice in community-driven science. Changing normative institutional 
dimensions appeared to influence changes in regulatory possibilities.
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While regulatory threats and civic science linked the fields in Durban and Cape Town, 
Calref s field became dominated by a sulphur disposal issue. The AECI chemical plant, 
located just south of Cape Town, processed Calref s excess sulphur, a by-product of oil 
refining which is used in the fertiliser industry. The plant had given Calref notice in 
December 1999 of its intentions to close the end of 2000. It surfaced in the press in August 
that Calref had not planned for an alternative way to dispose of the sulphur (Steenkamp 
2000b: 4). It was rumoured that the sulphur may be stock-piled at the refinery. This produced 
a strong outcry by community groups, the media and a significant provincial government 
response. Glen Adams, the Western Cape environmental minister, stepped in and, citing 
Section 28 of NEMA and the Constitutional right to a safe and clean environment, threatened 
to shut Calref down if it did not come up with an agreeable solution by the end of the year 
(Steenkamp 2000a). In the end, Calref did dispose of the sulphur at the hazardous waste site 
just north of the refinery. This gave Calref time to construct a sulphur processing unit onsite.
2000 was a pivotal year as community activists within Durban and Cape Town became linked 
up, and local knowledge related to environmental pollution and health was constructed. 
Cross-scale governance was evident in the introduction of the Bucket Brigades to South 
Africa by Groundwork via US activists. Power relations were evident as activists and 
journalists engaged in agenda setting and issue shaping activities, particularly in Durban, but 
also to a lesser extent in Cape Town. It was revealed that Sapref had in fact been 
underestimating emissions data 1990s, thus seeking to keep its relatively subpar 
environmental performance off of its stakeholders’ agendas. National government exerted 
pressure on industry to fund a health study in Durban and participate in a multistakeholder 
governance process. In Cape Town, Calref was coerced by provincial government to sort out 
its sulphur disposal issue. A form of knowledge-based politics driven by citizen science 
developed in both Durban and Cape Town.
The logic of information-based regulation proved effective, particularly in Durban, in 
influencing changing institutional dimensions. A logic of managerial environmentalism 
lingered in Durban as national government intervened with a public-private partnership 
approach to environmental governance. Provincial regulatory demands in Cape Town were 
more coercive, but were only directed at a single transitory issue (sulphur disposal), as 
opposed to a larger air quality management plan. Sapref s legitimacy was externally 
challenged as it began to engage with its local stakeholders; Enref continued to implement its
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GNA; and Calref, again, stumbles with local communities and regulators. Spurred by civic 
science, normative change continues in Durban and Cape Town and credible regulatory 
threats emerge.
6.2 2001: Incidents and environment versus development disputes
In Figure 6.2 Sapref and Enref s organisational field was densely structured around incident 
issue areas, such as Sapref s pipeline leak and Enref s labour dispute as indicated by the large 
red contours. Other related issues include activism against Enref s proposed expansion plans 
and the Bucket Brigades campaign both marked by green contours, environmental health 
concerns in yellow, market issues in grey and a fire at Natref in red. The Bucket Brigades 
again links the fields in Durban and Cape Town, however in 2001 there was noticeably less 
media attention given to Calref-related issues. In Cape Town issues related to air pollution, 
sulphur disposal and a fire at Calref all marked by red contours are briefly discussed.
6.2.1 The South Durban Basin
2001 began promisingly for Sapref, when it announced in February it would implement a 
sulphur recovery unit by October 2002 at a cost of R300million, thus reducing its SO2 
emissions by 46 percent (Jones 2001a).55 Narend Singh, the KwaZulu-Natal environmental 
minister, while speaking at Sapref s launch event, noted that provincial government would 
increase its capacity for pollution control and monitoring by appointing ten new staff across 
the province (SAPA 2001b). He also said: “The national economy relies absolutely on 
strategic industries. We do not have the option of relocating them or closing them down” 
(Jones 2001a: 1). Sapref appears to have had a significant behaviour change, while the 
provincial minister reinforced the strategic importance of the industry and the potential 
conflict between environment and development goals.
55 This environmental upgrade got screened out o f the field when nodes with only one tie were eliminated.
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Figure 6.2 : 2001 field dynamics
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In April 2001 Merebank community representatives waged a vociferous campaign against the 
construction of a Sasol gas pipeline to Enref that would pass through their neighbourhood. 
They filed an interdict, preventing Singh from approving the pipeline application until the 
community had further opportunity to voice objections. As John Mackey, Enref s general 
manager, said: "This means Engen will meet its 2003 emission target of 25 tons per day, as 
stipulated in its 1998 agreement with the community, about 18 months ahead of schedule” 
(Camie 2001c: para 13). Later that month a Durban High Court judge dismissed the interdict 
and the pipeline construction continued (SAPA 2001a). Enref changed the routing of the 
pipeline to increase its distance from the community to about 75 meters.
At the end of April 2001 more than 1000 contract workers went on strike at Enref at the start 
of the plant’s planned shut down for essential maintenance. Most importantly the striking 
workers wanted Enref to employ them directly and not be taxed for their temporary labour on 
the basis of 12 months. In mid-May ten people were injured in a “rampage” by roughly 200 
striking workers that brought the shutdown work to a halt, as Enref had to send 3000 workers 
home (Meyer 2001). In late May an agreement was reached between the temporary workers 
and Enref management (Jenvey 2001).
The labour dispute highlights the power of community sentiment and activism in the Basin. 
The temporary workers, many from Merebank, Austerville and Wentworth, obtain their skills 
from community training centres and felt a kinship to the jobs (Jenvey 2001). There was also 
overlap and merging with actors engaged with the environmental justice campaigns. Desmond 
D’Sa, Chairman of SDCEA and a former trade unionist and Enref employee, stepped in to 
help mediate the crisis (Ismail 2001c). Bobby Peek, after D’Sa became embroiled in the 
dispute, was asked to mediate after the tense stand-off mid-way through the shutdown (NG05 
2006). As Engen’s spokesperson Barbara Manson pointed out: “We have dared to engage the 
community and, in so doing, exposed our underbelly, making ourselves extremely vulnerable” 
(Jones 2001b: 43).
The winter of 2001 (June to August) was particularly volatile for the fuel oil refinery industry. 
As the strike was coming to an end at Enref one worker was killed and another critically 
injured when they were exposed to hydrofluoric acid. Two died of explosions at Natref. 
Quickly the focus of press activity moved away from the Enref strike and industry incidents to 
market issues related to fuel shortages. A fire at Natref in early June prolonged its annual
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shutdown and Enref s strike extended its shutdown. These factors caused fuel shortages 
throughout South Africa over the winter months.
Sapref s proactive work to repair its host community legitimacy had a serious set back, when, 
on 7 July 2001, a 4mm hole was discovered in one of its underground petrol pipes after 
Wentworth residents complained about the smell (Camie 200Id). The pipeline leak and 
remediation efforts received much media attention in 2001. 750,000 litres of petrol had leaked 
and was sitting above the water table at a depth of 5 metres (Camie 200Id), however this 
number was revised later in the year to about a million litres. Sapref s environmental 
manager, Lester Green, said that the clean up operation would cost about R2million and last 
three months (Ismail 2001a); six years later (in 2007) the clean up was ongoing.
The community held public meetings to raise awareness, and local newspapers published 
numerous articles highlighting community impacts with stories of the affected families. 
Community leaders called on Sapref to replace the pipeline, but Sapref ruled out replacement. 
As Margaret Rowe, Sapref spokesperson explained: “The decision to replace a pipeline must 
be based on the integrity of the line and not its age” (Nhlapo 200 If: 7); whereas Peek argued: 
“They cannot study the problem any more, they know what the problem is. If this is their 
attitude, then we have no choice but to support the community’s call for the refinery to be 
closed” (Nhlapo 200If: 7). Community-based activists in South Durban had begun to focus 
on Sapref in 2000, but the petrol leak galvanised action to engage with Shell at the highest 
level. As Desmond D’Sa, SDCEA chairman reiterated: “Poor environmental practices by 
Shell and BP refineries in Holland and Britain would not be tolerated. But the third world is 
different. Our lives are cheap" (Camie 2001a: para 13).
Singh, the KwaZulu-Natal minister for agriculture and environmental affairs, ordered an 
investigation, and at the beginning of October 2001 the provincial government issued Sapref a 
directive to address problems that had led to eight pollution incidents in the past three years 
(Nhlapo 200Id). Sapref took the incident seriously. It financially supported the temporary 
relocation of about five families and extended its outlook saying that extraction will be 
complete in about 18 months (Ismail 2001b). Parkes spoke directly to affected community 
members in a public meeting and apologised: “This may sound hollow to you in light of what 
has happened, but I can’t tell you just how much I regret having to stand here in front of
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you... because we really do care about our impacts on the environment and community” 
(Camie 2001b: para 7).
Parkes noted that the petrol leak and gas explosion in 1998 were the two most serious
incidents the refinery had ever experienced, and said that although that they cannot guarantee
no incidents in the future:
Our target is to benchmark ourselves against the best-run refineries international 
he world and not suffer any major incidents. Since the 1998 incident we have had 
three peer reviews, where teams from other refineries have come in and audited 
our operations. We have been progressively improving our systems and 
procedures based on their recommendations. (Nhlapo 200 le: 6)
In addition to remediation of the leak site, Sapref committed to meeting the governments
directive deadline and was conducting integrity surveys on seven underground pipelines and
was replacing about two kilometres of its marine fuel line, which leaked in August (Nhlapo
200 le).
The MPP that Moosa had announced in November 2000 to resolve pollution problems in the 
Basin got off to a contested start. Its R30million budget was intended to be co-funded by 
government and industry, but community and industry actors expressed concern that the 
forum was merely “consultative” without any real decision-making power (Nhlapo 2001c: 3). 
The supposedly participatory multi-stakeholder forum consisted of two members each from 
national government, provincial government, Durban Unicity, industry, communities and 
organised labour (Nhlapo 2001c).
Enref came under scrutiny by neighbouring communities after it announced its plans to 
expand production. In October 2001 Enref announced it would spend R120 million on 
environmental improvements and refinery upgrades in exchange for permission to increase 
production permanently by up to 43 percent, from 105,000 bpd, to 125,000 bpd and then to
150,000 bpd over the following three years (Nhlapo 2001b). Not surprisingly, given concern 
that increased production would lead to higher air pollution levels, community members 
halted Enref s first public meeting to explain its proposals and demanded that the refinery’s 
information was verified by an independent consultant at Enref s expense (Nhlapo 2001b). An 
intensive EIA study was undertaken by Enref as part of the production increase application 
process, and SDCEA was tasked with studying the complex documentation and representing 
the concerns of its constituents (Leader 2001).
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Following on from its success in 2000, Groundwork and refinery host communities launched 
a three-year air quality monitoring project in November 2001, a continuation of the success of 
the Bucket Brigades in 2000. As Ardiel Soeker, Groundwork’s air quality project coordinator, 
explained: “With the introduction of the bucket monitoring system communities will have test 
results that industry can no longer ignore” (Nhlapo 2001a: 7).
6.2.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
The organisational field related to Calref was comparatively quiet in 2001. As discussed, the 
Bucket Brigade linked the communities fighting refinery pollution in Cape Town to those in 
Durban. Because of the publicity of the air samples taken in 2000, the UCT Lung Institute 
agreed with the community groups to undertake a health study of respiratory problems of 
children in the neighbourhood, pending funding (Knight 2001).
Calref s disposal of its sulphur still made headlines in 2001. At the beginning of the year 
Calref began to transport molten sulphur to a hazardous waste site north of the refinery for 
temporary storage. Community groups called for the complete shut down of Calref, but the 
refinery responded by stressing its strategic importance in the Western Cape economy (Yeld
2001). Towards the end of the year, the Western Cape government made good on its threats 
from 2000, and prosecuted Calref for erecting the sulphur processing plant at the refinery 
without having completed a proper ELA (IOL 2001).
In sum, 2001 was a tumultuous year for both Sapref and Enref as incidents and disputes 
stirred civil society and government into action, while in Cape Town the organisational field 
related to Calref received considerably less media coverage. All three refineries lost 
legitimacy with their host communities and respective regulators. One of the key outcomes of 
Sapref s petrol leak with the instigation of an international campaign against Shell. As will be 
discussed, community activists in Durban became increasingly articulated with international 
activists after 2001. Also, Enref s plan for expansion, driven by the logic of economic growth, 
clashed with community expectations. SDCEA engaged in managerial environmentalism as it 
reviewed Enref s ELA proposal and participated in local planning processes. In Cape Town, 
the results of the air samples in 2000 inspired another health study, this time instigated by 
community leaders. In both contexts, the development of institutional dimensions is evident: 
in Durban a degree of cognitive, normative and regulative change is apparent given Sapref s
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incident and the community and regulatory response. In Cape Town, normative pressure 
continued to build with the instigation of the UCT health study and Calref was fined which 
demonstrated regulatory pressure.
6.3 2002: Local to global activism
The incidents and accidents of 2001, particularly related to Sapref s petrol leak, catalysed 
civil society and government into action. Figure 6.3 illustrates that the Sapref pipeline 
incident, marked by the large red contour, again dominated the field in 2002. Marked by 
green contours, and closely connected to Sapref s incident, was a community campaign 
against Enref s proposed expansion plans and media attention and activism related to the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) hosted in Johannesburg that August and 
September. The science related to environmental health in the Basin continued to be debated, 
as indicated by the yellow contour, and there was a noticeable change in the rise of media 
attention given to government regulation as indicated by the blue contours. The MPP, AQMA 
and newly proposed clean fuels regulations entered public discourse. Finally, other market 
and BEE issues are marked by the grey contours. Unique about 2002 is that, after reducing the 
network ties until all issues and actors had at least two ties, there are no issues related to 
Calref represented in the field. Durban eclipsed Cape Town in the field dynamics as 
international activists descended upon South Africa for the WSSD and took up a multi­
pronged international campaign against Shell’s corporate accountability record.
207
Dominant issues
Network ties > 2
\ i  \
Groundwork
\ i
Norwegians
\ \
W.H., E n r ef 1
Settlers sch. —|
health study
Figure 6.3: 2002 field dynamics
Complete network
Node key:
Circles = Actors 
Squares = Issues
Fuel oil industry
CM, Sapia
B.Peek, Groundwork
Env justice NGOs
WSSD
SDCEA
N.Singh, KZN
Durban muni
Greenpeace
R.Parkes, Sapref
208
6.3.1 The South Durban Basin
Demonstrating the role of the media in facilitating the campaigns of community activists, 
2001 began with a Daily News article by Bobby Peek that called upon government to hold 
Shell and BP to account for Sapref s string of incidents and environmental pollution (Peek 
2002: 6). This evoked a personal reaction from Sapref s managing director Richard Parkes, as 
he replied in a letter to the Daily News (Parkes 2002: 13). This level of public debate was 
extraordinary. It demonstrates the power of discursive practices, how a community activist, 
through sympathetic media channels, could both interact with and publicly condemn the 
subsidiary of one of the world’s largest MNCs.56 Peek’s reference to apartheid-era injustices 
with regards to the relocation of affected families because of the pipeline leak served to 
undermine Sapref s legitimacy and provoked Parkes’ public response.
Sapref s remediation effort was a highly volatile issue area. The refinery was continually 
under the spotlight in 2002, as Parkes announced in March that it would accelerate the petrol 
spill clean up through a vapour extraction process in addition to liquid extraction (Nhlapo
2002). It was also evident that its internal processes were being upgraded as Sapref announced 
it would develop a long-term management plan for “its ageing underground pipelines” 
(Nhlapo 2002: 5). SDCEA questioned the meaning of the indicators, how they were 
calculated and called on Sapref to replace, not repair, its pipelines (Nhlapo 2002). The 
contestation of Sapref s pipeline replacement plans dominated the field. After Sapref 
announced it had detected 264 “rust defects” on the company’s transfer pipes, D’Sa, 
SDCEA’s chairman, claimed that Sapref was simply “patching up” its pipelines and called for 
an independent investigation (Camie 2002c). An interesting power play occurred when City 
Health became more confrontational rather than conciliatory. When City Health suggested 
litigation against Sapref, Sapref threatened to cut-off its ties with Durban Muni; Durban Muni 
subsequently toned down its rhetoric, which highlights industry’s position of authority in the 
Basin (Camie 2002c).
Environmental health issues continued to be contested in the Basin. A health study at a local 
primary school was initiated in 2000 after the MPP was launched. In 2002 the Settler’s
56 The role of the media in influencing field structuration is touched on below and discussed in more detail in 
section 8.3.2.
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Primary School health study found poor air quality in Merebank. It demonstrated asthma rates 
four times the normal within pupils (Camie 2002b). The study team said that acute cases of 
asthma appeared to be linked to air pollutants such as SO2 emissions (Camie 2002b). As part 
of the MPP, the study was funded by Enref, Sapref, Durban City Health, the University of 
Natal, Technikon Natal and Groundwork (Camie 2002b: para 10). University of Michigan 
professors Tom Robbins and Stuart Batterman collaborated with fellow researchers from 
University of Natal medical school and Technikon Natal. Robbins cautioned that the results 
were interim findings, and that it was a relatively “inexpensive and fast study” (Camie 2002b: 
para 15).
Although industry took allegations of health impacts seriously, it questioned the efficacy of 
the study’s results (Ind4 2006). Enref s spokesperson Trevor Chom raised points of concerns 
about the Settlers School health study. Chom found it difficult to understand how Merebank 
children should show aggravated asthma symptoms when measured SO2 levels were below 
WHO guidelines, and he “feared the study was a ‘fishing expedition’ that might overlook 
confounding health issues such as smoking and indoor air pollution” (Sunday Tribune 2002a: 
7).
The media took a proactive role in structuring the organisational field around industrial 
pollution related issues in Durban. Throughout 2002 Tony Camie, a local journalist, kept the 
pressure on industry and government. Between 2001 and 2003 Camie authored at least 21 
articles which related to the industrial pollution in the Basin.57 As discussed in section 6.3.2 
and 8.3.2, there are clear journalistic differences between Durban and Cape Town. The 
CBO/NGOs in Durban (SDCEA and Groundwork) had excellent press contacts, in fact Bobby 
Peek’s wife worked for one of the newspapers (NG05 2006).
Enref s attempts to secure community support for its expansion plans failed, and the refinery 
expressed disappointment about poor communication and tmst between the company and 
community (Camie 2002e). Indicative of Enref s failed attempt to gain legitimacy with local 
communities was that negotiations for another GNA with community groups failed. Enref 
summarised: “In Engen’s view, the previous agreement was unbalanced, with Engen making
57 21 articles were identified in this study, there of course could be more.
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numerous commitments, and very little in the way of commitments from communities” 
(Camie 2002e: 7). Enref was unnerved by the tendency for community leaders to move from 
conciliatory to confrontational engagement tactics. As one refinery worker explained, 
community leaders would say one thing to the refinery and then go to the press with another 
(Ind4 2006).
The relationships and strategies of actors engaged in shared discourses can help explain how 
and why activism was catalysed in the Basin. Groundwork and SDCEA teamed up in multi­
pronged environmental justice campaign. Groundwork continued to pursue its Bucket Brigade 
campaign in pollution ‘hotspot’ communities around South Africa, with support from NGOs 
in the US, and SDCEA planned to publish monthly reports on air pollution and toxic releases 
in local papers to inform the community on health threats (Mail and Guardian 2002). This 
knowledge challenged old (mis)understandings in the field and provided windows of 
opportunity for new institutional possibilities.
The WSSD renewed focus on the environmental justice movement, brown versus green issues 
and corporate accountability (Fatah 2002). International actors descended on South Africa and 
Durban. International networks were being solidified, particularly in sparking a global 
campaign against Shell’s social and environmental performance. For example at a rally in 
Durban guest speakers included Shell fenceline community activists from the US and Nigeria 
(Ismail 2002a). Greenpeace stormed the Sapref refinery and hung an anti-pollution banner 
which read “Clean Energy Now” (Ismail 2002b). The WSSD highlighted the issues to a 
global audience. The UK current affairs programme ‘Newsnight’ even produced a piece on 
the Basin (Shell 2002b: 12). The WSSD also provided the opportunity to network South 
African NGOs internationally, for example Groundwork became the Friends of the Earth 
(FOE) South Africa chapter (NG05 2006).
Government attempted to respond to this public pressure. International networks were formed 
to assist local government in implementing the MPP. The Norwegian Institute for Air 
Research facilitated a workshop on air pollution with Durban Muni (Sunday Tribune 2002b). 
At the national level, clean fuel targets were set for 2006. South African refiners would be 
required to stop producing leaded petrol, and lower the sulphur content in diesel from 0.3% to 
0.05% (Business Day 2002). DEAT was working to develop new rules to regulate air 
pollution. More stringent guidelines to mitigate SO2 in pollution hotspots such as South
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Durban, the Vaal Triangle and in Cape Town were published (Camie 2002d). Noting the 
inadequacy of the 1965 APPA, the new SO2 guidelines were based on WHO guidelines, yet 
Durban Muni pollution officials said that the guidelines could not be enforced in their present 
form (Camie 2002d). Peek was encouraged by the new guidelines, but pointed out that they 
would be “meaningless” unless they were enforceable, and he highlighted the lack of capacity 
within DEAT’s air pollution office in Durban (Camie 2002d: 7).
Incidents continued to plague Sapref. In October Sapref had to shutdown so that surplus gases 
could be urgently flared off after a power failure, causing a plume of dense black smoke. 
Singh also noted that a leaking Engen storage tank at Island View in Durban harbour may be 
the cause of gaseous fumes on the Bluff and elsewhere in the area (Camie 2002a). Narend 
Singh, KwaZulu-Natal environmental minister, reflected: “I often wonder whether the 
haphazard planning of the past is now combining with obsolescence of plant and pipeline 
infrastructure to create new risks as the infrastructure starts crumbling” (Camie 2002a: 9). It is 
not surprising that given Sapref s continued incidents and lack of trust with the community 
representatives, Sapref s announcement of the near completion of its R350million sulphur 
recovery unit project that would almost halve its SO2 emissions, received little praise in the 
press.
Also visible on the periphery of the field in Figure 6.3 are the grey contours which include 
market and BEE issues. Reforming the downstream refining sector was under challenge: 
“South Africa’s efforts to liberalise its almost 500,000 barrel per day oil sector, promote 
lower fuel prices and cleaner products, and transfer more assets to citizens disadvantaged 
under apartheid has put the country’s refiners on edge” (Petroleum Intelligence Weekly 2002: 
para 1). Although these economic issues were certainly relevant, the organisational field in 
2002 was primarily structured around industrial pollution related issues. 2002 marked perhaps 
the most polarised year between industry and civil society in the Basin covered in this 
analysis.
6.3.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
In contrast to the South Durban Basin, the organisational field in Cape Town was very quiet 
in 2002. After analysis of primary and secondary data there were no obvious changes in 
Calref s host community legitimacy or institutional pressures. The community leaders in
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northern Cape Town were not organised like the Durban environmental justice organisations 
with fulltime staffs dedicated to engaging with the media and publicising industrial pollution.
Sapref and Enref s host community legitimacy were perhaps at all time lows in 2002. Many 
actors at multiple scales engaged in Sapref and Enref s field. A sort of ‘cognitive bifurcation’ 
occurred between communities and companies in the Basin. Trust between community 
leaders and Sapref and Enref appeared to bottom out. Peek and D’Sa exerted much coercive 
pressure, catalysed by the media, in reaction to Sapref s pipeline incident and Enref s 
expansion plans. The logics of environmental justice and corporate accountability rose in 
prominence as the WSSD attracted international activist and media attention to the Basin. 
Groundwork became a Friends of the Earth chapter and thus embedded within international 
activist networks campaigning jointly for corporate accountability. Community 
understandings of what constitutes appropriate environmental performance appeared to be 
changing as Enref and SDCEA failed to sign another GNA, and Bobby Peek and Sapref s 
general manager, Richard Parkes, publicly debated corporate responsibility. A degree of 
regulative change was under negotiation as the MPP took shape and new air quality 
guidelines began to be discussed.
6.4 2003: Struggling to repair host community legitimacy
In 2003 Sapref and Enref s organisational field in Durban was again connected with Calref s 
in Cape Town. Figure 6.4 demonstrates that Enref and Shell were the actors which linked the 
two discursive spaces, as both were the target of activism in Durban and environmental health 
claims in Cape Town. The lower half of the 2003 network diagram represents issues in the 
Basin. The large green contour encompasses a variety of different issue types related to the 
activism of civil society and government stakeholders. Community-based activism in the 
Basin was fuelled by incidents at both Sapref and Enref illustrated by the red contours. Also 
populating the field in Durban was the launch of Sapref s sulphur processing plant in olive, 
and the ongoing efforts to implement the MPP and negotiate the AQMA in blue. After a very 
quiet year in 2002, the field for Calref became active again after the UCT health study was 
published marked by yellow contours. Issues related to Calref s air pollution marked in red 
became active in the press, as did coverage of a fuel shortage in Western Cape in grey.
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6.4.1 The South Durban Basin
The string of incidents continued in 2003 when a thunderstorm in January brought torrential 
rain and triggered a leak into the nearby canal causing diesel fumes to impact Merebank 
residents. SDCEA called Enref and local government to account (SDCEA 2003). Both Enref 
and Sapref denied being the cause of the incident, and Narend Singh, the environmental 
minister for KZN, was forced to set up a committee of enquiry into the alleged Enref 
pollution (Langry 2003).
Not surprisingly, the controversy over Enref s expansion plans continued. Durban’s City 
Health chief Umi Sankar voiced major concerns about Enref s plans to expand production 
capacity to 150,000 bpd given the results of the Settler’s Primary School health study 
(Weaver 2003). However, Enref argued that it could not reduce pollution further unless it was 
allowed to increase production (Weaver 2003). City Health forwarded a letter outlining its
CO
concerns to the KwaZulu-Natal ELA department along with SDCEA’s written opposition.
The lack of trust between Enref and SDCEA was building. SDCEA’s confrontational strategy
had resorted to legal means. After many months of controversy and intense discussions the
provincial government approved Enref s expansion plans in March 2003 (SAPA 2003). Enref
general manager Wayne Hartmann said:
We now have a sustainable way of going forward. We have long argued that 
emissions are a function of technology and not of production. Now, at last, we can 
commit the R150 million that we have set aside for increasing our production 
capacity without increasing our emissions. (SAPA 2003: para 2)
It is very interesting to note how Hartmann felt that the refinery’s increase in production
would actually reduce its total emissions. As discussed in Chapter 7, this would prove
difficult.
In another example of knowledge politics, SDCEA and a Danish NGO produced a 
comparison report of Statoil and Shell refineries in Denmark and Sapref and Enref in Durban 
(SDCEA-DN 2003). It highlighted the relatively poor performance of the Durban refineries 
and noted the lack of trust between government, industry and local communities in the Basin.
58 Within South Africa’s spheres of governance, the provincial government has decision-making authority when 
it comes to the approval of environmental impact assessments.
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The publication captured media attention and put Sapref on the back foot stating in reply that 
it was comparing “apples and pears” and noting 42 inaccuracies in the report (Sapref 2003). 
Enref also voiced concern that the report was irresponsible to draw conclusions from 
technically incorrect assumptions about such complex facilities and noted the report’s “many 
errors and inaccuracies” (Camie 2003a). The contestation of community-driven science was 
becoming commonplace.
Although the report may have had some inaccuracies, particularly about the refining process, 
its fundamental analysis -  that there appeared to be a First World refining standard and a 
Third World refining standard -  resonated with local stakeholders and influenced host 
community normative logics. Groundwork also kept the pressure on industry through the 
publication of yearly reports (Alberts 2003: 8; Hallowes and Butler 2003).
International activist networks, convened by Friends of the Earth International (FOEI), 
continued to keep the pressure on Shell. In 2003, Peek and D’Sa, with other FOE 
representatives from around the world, became shareholders of Shell so that they could travel 
to Europe, participate in Shell’s Annual General Meeting (AGM) and voice their concerns 
(Groundwork 2003). At the AGM FOE activists launched “The Other Shell Report”, which 
contained first hand testimonies of communities living on the fenceline of Shell industrial 
facilities (FOEI 2003). In addition, FOE Netherlands released a report in April 2003 
highlighting health, safety and environmental issues at Sapref in a report titled “Leaking 
Pipelines -  Shell in South Africa” (FOEI 2003). This strong interaction between local and 
international activist campaign strategies put pressure on the parent company within its home 
country and the subsidiary within its host community. A tactic highlighted as effective in 
Keck and Sikiink’s (1998) work on transnational advocacy networks.
National government also becomes more proactive in 2003. Deputy Environment Minister 
Rejoice Mabudafhasi on a visit to South Durban in March “read the riot act” to polluting 
industries: “We are tired of talking. The time has come to implement new pollution reduction 
plans and I am going to clamp down on all industries around the country, not just in South 
Durban” (Camie 2003b: 2). In 2003 the AQMA was released for public comment. The 
government’s approach was to establish ambient air standards, monitor transgressors, tighten 
vehicle emissions standards, expand monitoring systems, regulate industrial coal burning and 
set up environmental courts (Feris 2003). Concern was raised by Peek and others that the
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AQMA might encourage a more fragmented approach to implementing permits because it 
moved away from the current strategy of source-based emission control to one of ambient air 
quality control (Bennett 2003). Although minimum emission standards would be set 
nationally, each local authority would have the right to set its own emission-licensing system, 
which may require more stringent standards than the national requirements (Kahn 2003).
In an attempt to repair its host community legitimacy, Sapref sought to bring the refinery in 
line with impending environmental legislation and requirements. Sapref announced in May 
that Shell and BP together would contribute more than US$100 million for environmental 
improvements over the following five years (Jenvey 2003). Errol Marshall, Shell Southern 
Africa and Sapref chairman also announced that Sapref had officially commissioned its R350 
million sulphur recovery unit, which would further reduce SO2 emissions by 46 percent and 
would not boost refinery capacity (Jenvey 2003). Sapref s conciliatory gestures were noticed 
by the press: “Sapref has now taken the initiative. But the bridge of trust between the 
residents and refineries will easily fall away if the refinery does not keep up its side of the 
bargain” (Tribune Herald 2003: 4). Sapref yet again undermined attempts to repair its 
legitimacy at the end of the year as a mixture of about 75,000 litres of diesel and water were 
released into a storm canal.
6.4.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
Dominating the organisational field in Cape Town was the release of UCT’s Lung Institute 
health study. The NCAMTG commissioned the study in 2000. After examining school 
children living near Calref it found that there was scientific proof of an unacceptable high 
level of asthma among the children although the study could not provide conclusive evidence 
that the refinery was the cause of the higher prevalence of asthma (Smith 2003a: 3).
Calref s new general manager, Steve Woodruff, stressed that Calref “will most certainly take 
the information that we can obtain from this study and incorporate it into our future plans to 
achieve operational excellence” (Smetherham 2003a: 6). Woodruff said that Calref was 
working with authorities on the new Air Quality Management Bill, would fully support 
revised South African national air quality standards and was guided by and adhered to 
emission standards indicated by the WHO (Smith 2003a, p. 3). Woodruffs conciliatory 
response is in contrast to the more divisive dialogue between Buley, community 
representatives and the government which was reported in the press in 2000 and 2001. Buley
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was replaced as Calref s general manager in 2001 by Paul Allinson, and Woodruff took over 
in 2003. As discussed in Chapter 8, this rapid leadership succession served to undermine 
community trust. Also notable is Woodruffs reference to Chevron’s Operational Excellence 
management system. Caltex had been acquired by Chevron in 2002, and by 2003 changes to 
Calref s internal processes, as discussed in Chapter 4, were evident.
Birkinshaw, TVRA chairman, noted that the UCT study created the opportunity for class 
action lawsuits and stressed: “All we want is for the refinery to clean up its act, and there is 
technology to do this. If the refineries in California can do it, then so can these guys” 
(Smetherham 2003b: 5). Birkinshaw threatened legal action, but never pursue it during the 
research period (1994 to 2006). Although he highlights discrepancies between the 
environmental performance of refineries in South Africa and California, the TVRA did not 
wage an international campaign against Chevron, Calref s parent company.
The issues facing the South African fuel oil industry within the economic, environmental and 
public spheres were well summarised in a piece which ran in the Petroleum Intelligence 
Weekly, towards the end of 2003 (PIW 2003). The article highlighted the increasing costs of 
more stringent fuel specifications and emission controls, and the uncertainty caused by 
liberalisation of the retail market. It stressed that the “industry faces its biggest trial in the 
public arena”, highlighting the “fresh ammunition” community groups have been given in 
Durban and Cape Town by the results of recent health studies (PIW 2003: para 5).
In 2003, all three refineries were struggling to repair host community legitimacy. Although 
Enref s planning proposal was eventually approved, its host community legitimacy remained 
weak. The logic of economic growth and managerial environmentalism (win/win technocratic 
solutions) drove this governance outcome; however, the logic of environmental rights and 
corporate accountability still remained strong in the minds of host community activists and 
local media. Cross-scale, home-host country activism engulfed Sapref and Shell as Durban 
and other fence-line community activists filed complaints at Shell’s AGM in London 
facilitated by FOEI. Community activists in Cape Town utilised the UCT health study to put 
normative pressure on Calref, and Calref responded with a more conciliatory tone. In sum, the 
institutional dimensions continued to evolve in both Durban and Cape Town: Sapref and 
Calref appeared to respond to normative pressure with environmental upgrades and
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conciliatory rhetoric, and regulative change was under negotiation at the highest levels of 
government.
6.5 Analysing organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 distil the above narrative into categories of data that can be compared and 
contrasted at the macro and micro levels. As discussed in section 2.2.1, this study posits that 
organisational field dynamics, moderated by firm legitimation strategies and characteristics, 
will influence a facility’s corporate environmental performance. The following discussion 
will identify how, in Durban and Cape Town between 2000 and 2003, field structuration was 
influenced by the interaction between institutional actors, institutional logics and governance 
structures. How and why firms have acted and reacted to these changing field dynamics will 
help explain differences in corporate greening.
6.5.1 Macro level: field structuration
At the macro level, using the ‘detectable units of analysis’ summarised in section 2.3, the 
degree of field structuration can be analysed. As indicated by the network diagrams (Figures
6.1 -  6.4) and Figuress 6.5 and 6.6, there is significant increase in interaction between issues 
and actors from 2000 to 2003. When Table 6.1 is compared to Table 5.3, citations jumped 
from 69 in 1999 to 177 in 2000; with the majority in 2000 related to field dynamics in 
Durban. In 2001, there was a large increase in the interaction between actors and issues, with 
363 overall citations; 298 were specific to the issue areas in Durban. In 2002 Durban again 
dominated the field with 234 of the 278 total citations. Only 4 in 2002 were related to issues 
discussed in Cape Town’s newspapers. In 2003 the interaction between actors and issues was 
once more high with a total of 221 citations. Durban dominated with 134 citations, but issues 
related to Calref increased in the press with 71 citations specific to the field in Cape Town.
During this time period a well-defined pattern of interorganisational relationships emerged in 
Durban. The community-based organisation, SDCEA and the South African NGO, 
Groundwork, waged discursive war on the fuel oil industry. Through cross-scale linkages, 
they introduced the air sampling technique known as the Bucket Brigades to South Africa and 
established the logic of community-driven information-based regulation in the Basin. In 
addition, the investigative journalism by Camie in 2000 also catalysed field dynamics. 
Industry was mostly on the defensive during this time. Often Enref general manager Wayne
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Hartmann and Sapref managing director Richard Parkes directly responded in the press to the 
various environmental health and industrial pollution issues that arose. Densely networked 
clusters of issues and actors emerged. Desmond D’Sa, SDCEA chairman, and Bobby Peek, 
Groundwork director, were a sort of ‘double act’ in the press and affected field level change -  
increasingly, they held positions of power and authority within the organisational field.
Although Peek and D’Sa both employed the logic of environmental justice and corporate 
accountability to influence field level change, D’Sa more often recounted the injustices of the 
past and place-based or communitarian values very specific to ‘the poor’ of South Durban. 
D ’Sa’s approach was a simplistic dualism. His public statements most often recounted a 
victim versus villain dichotomy. D ’Sa, as representative of ‘the poor’, was represented as the 
victim, and multinational companies, in particular Shell, the villain. For example, in 2003, 
when Dumisani Makhaye replaced Narend Singh as environment minister in KwaZulu-Natal, 
Makhaye vowed to clamp down on polluting industry and appoint two new pollution control 
officers (Naidu 2003). D’Sa’s response was: "These multinationals have benefited financially 
on the backs of the poor communities in KwaZulu-Natal. The minister must now ensure that 
they are held accountable to the communities in which they are situated" (Naidu 2003: 15).
Peek, on the other hand, portrayed a far more complex story. Instead of using simplistic hero- 
villain narratives, Peek critiqued the larger structural and institutional infrastructure within 
which past and present injustices were embedded. He would engage at multiple levels, within 
community, provincial, national and international arenas, to seek environmental protection for 
all populations. For example, when Makhaye announced his plan to build regulatory capacity 
within KwaZulu-Natal, Peek commented: “Bringing in new staff is great, but unless they 
enforce regulations and make an example of someone, then it is meaningless” (Naidu 2003: 
para 14). Peek and D’Sa’s discursive strategies were complementary and effective.
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Figure 6.5: Analysing structure and
Macro: organisational field dynamics
2000
agency 2000 to 2001
2001
SDB cancer study CPT sulphur dspsl Sapref pipeline incident
Events
Bucket Brigades
Key A ctors..............................................
Durban: Sapref, R.P. Sapref, Enref,
B.P. Groundwork, Mercury. SDB 
comm., D.L. CBEUS, R.M. DEAT, 
V.M. DEAT
Cape Town: Calref, P.B. Calref, 
AECI, CPT comm., W.C. gov.,
R.M. DEAT, V.M. DEAT
Issue areas - -............... -
Durban: air pollution, 
environmental health, civic science 
refinery incidents, refinery distrust 
and regulatory threats
Cape Town: air pollution, refinery 
incidents and regulatory threats
Institutional logics- ---------------
Durban: Logic o f  information- 
based reg. and EJ; logic o f  
managerial environmentalism
Cape Town: Logic o f  info-based 
regulation and manag. env.
Governance structures/institutional d 
Durban: normative change 
influenced by health studies and 
civic science, national regulative 
threat
Cape Town: normative change 
spurred by civic science, local 
regulative threat 
Micro: organisational legitimacy —
Durban: Sapref engages with 
community stakeholders, Enref 
makes environmental upgrade
Cape Town: Calref loses legitimacy 
with communities and regulators
Enref labour dispute CPT sulphur dspsl
-  F —
Durban: D.D. SDCEA, B.P. 
Groundwork, R.N. MEAC, V.M. 
DEAT, R.P. Sapref, Durban Muni, 
Sapref, SDB comm., Enref, contract 
workers
Cape Town: Calref, A.B. TVRA, CPT 
comm., P.B. Calref
Durban: refinery incidents, environment 
vs. development, environmental health, 
refinery distrust, civic science, 
regulatory threats and workers’ rights
Cape Town: air pollution and refinery 
incidents
Durban: Logics o f  EJ, corp account, and 
info-based reg; logics o f  manag. env. and 
economic growth
Cape Town: Logic o f  managerial 
environmentalism
m ensions.................................................
Durban: Some cognitive and normative
change influenced by incidents, local
regulative change under negotiation
Cape Town: some normative change -  
call for Calref to relocate, local 
regulative change - Calref fined
Durban: Sapref loses legitimacy-  
pipeline incident, Enref loses legitimacy 
-  expansion plans and labour dispute
Cape Town: Calref loses legitimacy 
with communities and regulators
221
Figure 6.6: Analysing structure and agency 2002 to 2003
Macro: organisational field dynamics
2002 2003
Enref expansion Saprefppln. incid.
$IJB health s tu b  WSSD 
E ven ts -|...................  -|.................
Key A ctors .............. -.........................
Durban: R.P. Sapref, SDCEA, Sapref, 
M.R. Sapref, D.D. SDCEA, B.P. 
Groundwork, Groundwork, 
Greenpeace, Durban Muni, 
Norwegians, N.S. KZN, W.H. Enref, 
S.S. health study, C.M. Sapia
Cape Town: N/A
Issue areas
Durban: refinery incid., env health, 
env vs. dev, env justice, corp account, 
contested science, distrust, govt 
account., reg. press, and market liber.
Cape Town: N/A
Inst itut ional l o g i c s ---------------------------------
Durban: Logics o f  EJ, corp. account, 
info-based and comm-driven regulation; 
logics o f  manag. env., participation, 
partnership, and capacity building
Cape Town: No obvious change
Governance structures/institutional dime 
Durban: cognitive bifurcation -  
community vs. companies, normative 
change within host and home fields 
influenced by activism, health study and 
incident, regulative change under 
negotiation
Cape Town: No obvious change
Micro: organisational legitimacy---------
Durban: Sapref‘under siege’ but tries to
repair legitimacy through response to 
incident -  also parent company pressure 
on Sapref, Enref unable to maintain 
legitimacy with host communities e.g. 
GNA renewal fails
Cape Town: no obvious change
Shell activism UCT health study
Enref expansion
Durban: Sapref, R.P. Sapref, B.P. 
Groundwork, D.D. SDCEA, R.M. 
DEAT, SDCEA, W.H. Enref, Enref, 
Shell, Durban Muni, FOEI, SDB com.
Cape Town: Calref, A.B. TVRA, S.W. 
Calref, UCT health study, Cape Times,
C.M. Sapia
Durban: env vs. dev, contested science, 
env justice, intemat. activism, govt 
accountability and regulatory pressure
Cape Town: market issues, env health, 
regul. pressure, and corp. and govt, 
responsibility
Durban: Logic o f  EJ and corp. 
account; logic o f  manag. env., logic 
o f economic growth and industrial 
development
Cape Town: Logic o f  manag. env.
n s io n s ................................................................*
Durban: Normative institutions
contested; regulative institutions in
flux -  a credible regulatory threat
emerging
Cape Town: Normative change 
spurred by health study, regulative 
change under negotiation
Durban: Enref has low host comm, 
legit, but gains some reg. legit.; Sapref 
tries to repair legit., evidence o f  
cultural change; Shell loses legit.
Cape Town: Calref loses legit, but 
uses renewed conciliatory tone, 
possible Calref cultural change
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Table 6.1: Type of actors and frequency of citations 2000 - 2003
Type Subcategory Citations
200C 2001 2002 2003
Dur Cpt Oth Dur Cpt Oth Dur Cpt Oth Dur Cpt Oth
Academic Academic 3 2 0 3 0 0 14 0 0 0 9 0
Civil
Society
CBO 12 13 2 54 6 1 52 0 3 31 10 0
NGO 9 1 5 27 0 2 29 0 2 11 0 0
INGO 6 0 1 0 0 0 25 0 2 10 0 7
Other civ soc 0 0 0 4 0 0 6 0 1 6 5 0
Labour 2 0 0 34 1 0 1 0 0 7 0 0
Govern­
ment
Local Gov 2 0 0 18 1 0 10 0 0 14 2_ 0
Prov Gov 8 9 0 17 2 0 13 0 0 7 1 0
Nat Gov 7 4 4 12 1 10 1 0 13 8 0 1
Inti Gov 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0
Industry
Enref/Engen 20 0 0 82 0 0 25 0 0 17 1 0
Sapref/Shell/
BP
20 0 0 38 0 0 45 0 0 17 1 0
Calref/Caltex 0 17 0 0 10 0 0 4 0 0 29 0
Other
industry
5 12 3 5 8 22 7 0 19 5 8 7
Media Media 10 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 1 5 1
Subtotal 104 58 15 298 29 36 234 4 40 134 71 16
Total 177 363 278 2 2 1
Regulators utilised a mix of coercive and cooperational discursive strategies to influence 
polluters. For example Makhaye, reiterating his plan, said: "We are not going to tolerate those 
who do not comply, and that includes big business" (Naidu 2003: para 4). Moosa and 
Mabudafhasi, as discussed above, used similar rhetoric, highlighting the need to crack down 
on industrial polluters, at the national level. Yet regulators tended to juxtapose this 
confrontational style with the need for a cooperative approach to environmental governance, 
for example Makhaye added, after criticising big business, that: “The only way we can 
succeed in ensuring environmental sustainability is by engaging the broader public, watchdog 
organisations and business” (Naidu 2003: para 5).
In Durban, a variety of institutional logics emerged at multiple scales. For example, at the 
local level the logic of managerial environmentalism, participation and partnership began to 
gain collective action as the MPP got underway. However, the process of approving Enref s 
expansion ELA was contested. Here the logic of economic growth and industrial development, 
coupled with the logic of managerial environmentalism (i.e. seeking win-win environment 
and development outcomes), fell foul of community environmental justice activists. At the
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national level a logic of managerial environmentalism was also evident as the new air quality 
guidelines and clean fuels regulations were discussed. These discursive frames are indicative 
of field structuration coming into focus in Durban; however, there was still significant tension 
related to the dominant community-driven logic of environmental justice and the industry- 
and government-driven logics of managerial environmentalism and economic growth.
In contrast, interorganisational relationships were not well-defined in Cape Town. There were 
not clear patterns of domination or coalition. Andy Birkinshaw, TVRA chairman, had 
emerged as the community leader in the late 1990s that would carry the pollution struggle 
debate into the 21st century. He did not have the benefit of the sort of dual pronged attack that 
Peek and D’Sa waged in Durban, nor was activism his full-time job (NG09 2006).59 
Although networked with Groundwork and SDCEA, Birkinshaw used a mix of 
confrontational and conciliatory approaches to engage with Calref. He often defined the 
problem, suggested a solution and highlighted the inequity of the situation. Birkinshaw 
essentially provided both a critical and pragmatic analysis. The logic of managerial 
environmentalism continued to be present in Cape Town’s field as health study politics and 
coercive threats by regulators arose in a reactive and fragmented fashion.
These institutional logics influenced the realm of possible governance outcomes. In Durban, 
norms of socially acceptable environmental performance were increasingly contested, 
particularly given Saprefs pipeline leak and Enrefs expansion plans. This normative 
institutional change influenced the introduction of regulation at the local and national levels. 
The multistakeholder MPP process and consultations on national SO2 guidelines were 
accelerated because of field structuration in Durban. Here cross-scale field dynamics is 
apparent. It can be inferred that cultural/cognitive change also occurred in Durban, 
particularly as community activists engaged in knowledge politics and strongly shaped the 
pollution-related issue areas. In Cape Town, some normative change was spurred by civic 
science and health study politics, but this did not translate into a coordinated regulatory 
response.
59 Birkinshaw owned a small communications technology business in Table View.
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The field had clearly become more structured around industrial pollution in Durban than in 
Cape Town. Why might this be? Clearly the interaction between actors, institutional logics 
and governance structures are important, but to identify mechanisms of institutional change 
within this chronological narrative the role of events and scalar politics need to be considered. 
South Durban was impacted to a greater degree than Northern Cape Town by major events. In 
2000, Camie’s investigative journalism on cancer in the Basin caught the imagination of the 
press and public. Although Calref had a sulphur disposal issue in 2000 that generated 
significant media attention, the organisational field in South Durban was catalysed with 
Enref s labour dispute and Sapref s pipeline incident in 2001. Also, Enref s expansion plans 
in 2002 generated media attention and local opposition. Very significant in 2002 is the 
WSSD. This event acted as a lightning rod for local, national and international attention to the 
industrial pollution issues in the Basin. The pollution issues in northern Cape Town were 
barely discussed in the press that year.
Thus events, incidents and scalar politics were more influential in Durban than Cape Town. 
Groundwork and SDCEA became embedded within international environmental justice and 
corporate accountability networks and targeted Shell, whereas the TVRA waged a relatively 
local campaign in Cape Town, choosing not to engage directly with Chevron. What is similar 
between Durban and Cape Town is the role of civic science and health studies in structuring 
the field. These gain media attention and begin to change meaning systems and ideologies. In 
Durban however the Settler’s Primary School health study was funded by the MPP, but in 
Cape Town the UCT health study was funded by the NCAMTG. This contrast demonstrates 
the lack of commitment from local government in sorting out the issues in Cape Town.
6.5.2 Micro level: firm legitimation strategies
At the macro level, it can be concluded that field structuration occurred significantly in 
relation to Sapref and Enref during this time period but not Calref. How then did the refineries 
engage at the micro level to both gain and maintain legitimacy and to influence field 
structuration? In 2000 Sapref engaged proactively for the first time with local stakeholders, 
and Enref made good on its GNA with the implementation of an environmental upgrade. In 
Durban the refineries began the new century actively seeking to repair legitimacy. Calref 
however continued to lose legitimacy as it became embroiled with local communities and 
regulators over its sulphur disposal plans. Because of field level events, all of the refineries
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lost legitimacy in 2001: Sapref because of its pipeline incident, Enref because of its labour 
dispute and expansion plans, and Calref because of its sulphur disposal problem.
In 2002, Sapref was ‘under siege’ by local to global stakeholders after its pipeline leak. 
However, Sapref attempted to repair host community legitimacy by responding swiftly and 
apologising. Sapref s internal legitimacy came under challenge as the refinery began to 
undergo significant parent company scrutiny after this incident (Ind2 2006). The refinery had 
severe internal and external legitimacy pressures. Enref, given its expansion aspirations, lost 
the support and trust of community activists and was scrutinised by local regulators as it 
attempted to increase production. Its attempts to renew the GNA failed, demonstrating the 
degree to which its host community legitimacy had faltered. There was little mention of 
Calref in 2002. Calref was undergoing ownership and management change, so it appears it did 
little to engage proactively with local communities to repair legitimacy.
In 2003, Sapref tried to repair its legitimacy with the implementation of its sulphur recovery 
unit, but both Sapref and Shell were under considerable pressure from community and 
international activists. Enref had quite low host community legitimacy, but the logic of 
economic growth trumped that of environmental justice as the provincial government 
approved its EIA to expand production. The publication of the UCT health study impacted 
Calref s host community legitimacy, but the conciliatory tone that the new general manager, 
Steve Woodruff, used indicated perhaps a change in legitimation strategy and corporate 
culture.
6.6 Chapter summary
Between 2000 and 2003 the structuration of the fields in Durban and Cape Town diverged. 
An explosion of issues and actors occurred in Durban, with comparatively fewer in Cape 
Town. For example, the average frequency of citations between issues and actors in Cape 
Town went from 55 per year from 1994 to 1996 to 41 per year from 2000 to 2003. In Durban 
the average frequency of citations was only 22 per year from 1994 to 1996 and an 
extraordinary 193 per year from 2000 to 2003. This simple indicator highlights the divergence 
in field structuration.
From 2000 to 2003, a significant change had occurred in the degree to which community 
activism influenced the governance of corporate environmentalism in Durban. Community
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leaders had begun to more proactively wield discursive power by strategically employing the 
logics of environmental justice, corporate accountability and information-based regulation. 
Activism moved from being cooperative to coercive. Local NGOs built capabilities and 
capacities by networking with international NGOs. In Durban, the media provided the space 
for community-based opposition to industrial pollution, environmental health risks and 
industrial expansion plans to be publicly debated. Events such as the WSSD, refinery 
incidents and the publication of health studies catalysed the structuration of the field.
Sapref attempted to address its admittedly poor past behaviour and open up to local 
stakeholders and Enref attempted to renew its GNA, but both refineries were on the defensive 
having to repair host community legitimacy gaps. Sapref s pipeline leak and Enref s labour 
strike and attempt to expand production catalysed community distrust and outrage. Unlike the 
other refineries, Sapref s internal legitimacy began to be questioned as Shell, its parent 
company, took a strong interest in the refinery’s environmental performance. In Cape Town, 
Calref continued to get occasional pressure from local stakeholders and its legitimacy was 
called into question, but the refinery did not receive such vociferous, unified and sustained 
opposition.
The normative and regulative institutional dimensions started to take shape more 
substantively in Durban as the MPP got off the ground and community groups actively 
contested and (re)defmed the notion of ‘acceptable’ environmental behaviour. This helps to 
explain how and why Enref and Sapref s environmental performance began to improve more 
quickly than Calref s. In fact, both of the Durban refineries continued to make ‘beyond 
compliance’ environmental upgrades and environmental performance improvements, whereas 
Calref made comparably fewer. To unpack this continual process of institutional and 
organisational change, Chapter 7 explores how and why each of the three refinery’s 
environmental performance changed from 2004 to 2006, and in particular how new regulatory 
pressures emerged.
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7 2004 -  2006: DIVERGENT FIELDS
The petrochemical industry is changing at a staggering pace. We are committed to 
the production of more efficient and cleaner fuels and a safe environment. (Enref 
GM Wayne Hartmann in Russouw 2004: 4)
We haven’t done a great job in the past. If people can see us, smell us or hear us, 
we’re not doing enough. (Calref GM Steve Woodruff in Yeld 2005: 4)
In 2003 Enref and Sapref s organisational fields in Durban had begun to significantly diverge 
from Calref s in Cape Town. In Durban, normative institutions had been significantly 
impacted through entrepreneurial activism and proactive journalism, and innovative 
regulation was evolving quickly. Sapref s environmental performance had changed 
remarkably since 1999. The refinery was attempting to repair its legitimacy through making 
substantial environmental improvements, but was mired in conflict relating to its pipeline 
incident remediation and repair plans. Enref was also embroiled in conflict, it lost host 
community legitimacy after seeking to expand production in 2001 thus was under intense 
community and regulatory scrutiny as its expansion permit was approved in 2003. In Cape 
Town, community-driven science and health studies educated and influenced normative 
understandings of legitimate environmental performance but little had been done to put 
regulatory pressure on Calref.
The following discussion explores the field level dynamics between 2004 and 2006, the final 
time period that this study covers. Similar to Chapters 5 and 6, for each year the network 
diagrams are discussed first, followed by a detailed narrative of the field dynamics in the 
South Durban Basin and Cape Town’s northern suburbs. This thick description of how issues 
and actors change over time highlights the role of discursive strategies, institutional logics, 
governance structures, and firm legitimacy.
7.1 2004: Linking Durban and Cape Town through national level regulation
In Figure 7.1, after reducing the network ties until all issues and actors had at least two ties, 
two densely clustered issue areas become apparent, one related to the South Durban Basin and
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the other related to Cape Town. In 2004 the fields in Durban and Cape Town were connected 
because of issues to do with regulation. The AQMA and the new Environmental Management 
Inspectorate (the Green Scorpions), both marked by blue contours, were national issues that 
linked the two localities. This illustrates a new issue area emerging from the data, that of 
national level regulation. The MPP, also marked by a blue contour, was actively discussed in 
Durban. Civil society activism, although not related to one specific issue, but directed broadly 
at Enref and Sapref s environmental performance populated much of the discussion in the 
Basin, as indicated by the large green contour. Enref and Sapref both were dogged by 
incidents marked in red, but Sapref attempted to gain legitimacy by highlighting its clean 
fuels project, as indicated by the olive contour. Economic issues also linked the fields 
between Durban and Cape Town. The proposed Engen-Sasol merger and BEE initiatives 
related to Calref, Enref and Sapref are marked in grey. The field in Cape Town was densely 
structured around Calref s ‘oil rain’ incident, marked by the red contour, but activism, in 
green, and fuel shortages, in grey, also populated the field.
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Figure 7.1: 2004 field dynamics
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7.1.1 The South Durban Basin
The green contour labelled ‘SDB activism’ contains issues related to air pollution and 
activism in the Basin. The term ‘activism’ is used broadly as it encompasses activities related 
to a variety of discursive strategies. For example, although the public face of SDCEA was as 
an environmental watchdog, it also had a dual mandate, which was to educate and inform 
residents in the Basin. SDCEA helped build capacity at the local level, particularly within 
South Durban schools, by producing educational material (NG06 2006; NG07 2006).
SDCEA also continued to contest the public understanding of ‘good science’ in the Basin and 
put pressure on regulators. Durban’s health department noted how local operating permits 
would be informed by data from the air quality monitoring system (Enslin 2004a: 2). 
SDCEA’s D’Sa expressed support for the system but wanted to see it lead to results, i.e. 
“action against polluters” (Enslin 2004a: 2).60
SDCEA took an increasingly vociferous anti industrial development stance. It continued to
vigorously oppose Enref s project to import gas and improve a catalytic cracking unit to
increase production. The ideological battle was waged through the statutory EIA procedures
which underpinned the planning process (Jones 2004: 7). One newspaper reporter publicly
questioned SDCEA’s social mandate:
...according to one of the city’s top officials, it is difficult to know which version 
of the truth is being told. While it is easier to understand why companies may 
manipulate facts to protect profits, it is difficult do understand the precise mandate 
SDCEA has to represent the community, its decision not to defend those in 
“black” areas such as Lamontville and Umlazi and the reason it has even gone to 
the lengths of “staging” seemingly fictitious environmental accidents to draw 
attention to its “cause”. Saving South Durban from itself seems to have 
degenerated into a game of smoke and mirrors. (Jones 2004: 7)
SDCEA’s continued opposition to industrial development, even after corporate environmental
performance of the large point polluters had begun to improve, began to be questioned by
other community leaders (Com9a 2006; Com9b 2006).
60 The new R8million Norwegian-designed network gathered data from 11 monitoring stations and five weather 
data stations scattered around the city (Camie 2004a). One of the key issues was that the data was recorded in 
24-hour format so did not reflect short bursts of concentrated pollutants that residents frequently complained 
about (NG07 2006). Durban became the first city in South Africa to publish its air pollution in ‘real-time’ on the 
internet (Camie 2004a).
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Related to Enref, issues such as incidents, the clean fuels project and the Engen-Sasol merger 
dominated its field. A string of leaks and plant upsets at Enref in 2004 negatively affected 
local communities and the refinery’s legitimacy. In March, a gas leak near the Settlers 
Primary School in Merebank prompted children and teachers to be evacuated (indicated by 
red contour in Figure 7.1). In May SDCEA’s pollution hotline was inundated with calls after a 
heavy flaring incident at Enref (Natal Witness 2004), and in late June Enref had an upset in 
one of its units and had to shutdown a FCCU which caused a release of FCCU catalyst into 
the atmosphere, which appeared as a white dust and settled on property in the immediate 
vicinity (Liquid Africa 2004). The continued incidents undermined Enref s efforts to repair its 
legitimacy; it in fact catalysed ill sentiment in the Basin to an unprecedented level (Enslin 
2004b: 3).
Another relevant issue facing Enref was compliance with South Africa’s clean fuel legislation 
which stipulated removal of lead from petrol by 2006 and lowering sulphur levels in diesel, 
with further sulphur reductions in diesel in 2010 (Planting 2004). Hartmann, Enref s general 
manager, noted the refinery had successfully reduced emissions in line with the AQMA, but 
expressed concern about how the fuel oil industry would fund the clean fuel requirements 
(Planting 2004). It is interesting to note that Sapref or Calref did not complain to the press 
about the cost of these regulations.
Finally, it emerged in the press early in the year that Engen and Sasol were again in talks 
about a potential merger of their respective liquid fuels interests in South Africa (McNulty 
2004). A telling indicator is that analysts believed that “significant capital may be needed to 
upgrade the Engen refinery” (McNulty 2004, p. 54). Towards the end of 2004, Sasol and 
Engen signed a definitive merger agreement, which was subject to approval by competition 
authorities.
Compared to Enref, Sapref was much less prominent in the field in 2004. This was an 
indicator that Sapref made progress in repairing its legitimacy. However, towards the top of 
the network diagram in Figure 7.1, the red contour illustrates incidents related to a large flare 
and an oil leak (Enslin 2004a). Although the South Durban air monitoring network did not 
find an unusual increase in emissions levels during or after the Sapref flaring incident, Durban 
Muni reiterated that flaring was an issue that needed to be resolved (Enslin 2004a). In an
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effort to shape the issue area on flaring, SDCEA created an information brochure about flares 
and started a campaign on the issue (NG06 2006).
SDCEA put pressure on Sapref after the review of Durban’s underground pipelines was 
published in October. The report called for major repairs, perhaps costing R500million for 
Sapref and Enref (Camie 2004d). It is important that the consultants recommended repair not 
replacement, as, not surprisingly, SDCEA insisted the pipelines be replaced, which it 
estimated would cost twice as much as selective repair (Camie 2004d). SDCEA engaged in 
these technocratic debates to contest orthodox understandings.
Sapref s parent company Shell also came under scrutiny from multiple stakeholders. Shell 
was under pressure from fenceline community activists for its legacy of poor environmental 
performance and from institutional shareholders because of its miscalculated reserves crisis. 
The FOEI network voiced its complaints and published its “Behind the Shine” report to 
coincide with Shell’s AGM (IOD 2004). At the AGM, SDCEA’s Desmond D’Sa and 
Groundwork’s Ardiel Soeker achieved a desired result as Shell’s non-executive chairman, 
Lord Ronald Oxburgh, agreed to visit the plant in 2005 to investigate the grievances (Ryan
2004). This parent company activism is unique to Shell; Petronas and Chevron did not receive 
pressure from South African activists.
Also during 2004, Sapref began to be more strategic with its social investment and 
community engagement programme in the Basin (Indl3b 2006). Sapref got its Community 
Liaison Forum operating in earnest in 2004 (Indl3b 2006). However, SDCEA felt that it was 
a deliberative attempt to split the community and cause conflict (NG06 2006). Sapref also 
generated positive press when it announced it would invest R700million into its cleaner fuels 
project (Jenvey 2004). Sapref was quick to stress that the project would not increase capacity, 
which is what embroiled Enref in controversy, that its emissions would not increase, and that 
it would not use additives in the octane-boosting process (The Star 2004: para 10-12). This 
‘chemical free’ approach to its clean fuels differentiated itself from Enref and Calref. Sapref 
strategically used the clean fuels regulation to demonstrate its ability to deliver superior 
health, safety and environment outcomes.
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As indicated by the blue contour, Durban’s MPP was moving forward after its uncertain
beginnings (see section 6.2.1). Siva Chetty, the MPP programme manager, highlighted
industry’s role in financing the MPP:
It is the first time in the country that industry has come to the table to advance 
environmental plans. There is no legislation forcing industries to contribute but 
we are working on the principle that the polluter pays. Some businesses are 
reluctant to contribute because it affects the bottom line, but we are using 
persuasion and a spirit of cooperation to get them to contribute. (Enslin 2004a: 2)
The MPP initial funding amounted to R29.5 million which covered the capital expenditure of
monitoring stations, information technology, capacity building, two health studies and one
year of operational costs (Enslin 2004a).61 The industry contributions were determined by the
relevant weights of industry emissions. It was relatively easy to target big businesses, but the
more difficult and longer term problems were vehicles and small and medium sized
businesses (ibid).
The question remained whether or not the MPP would provide the catalyst to bring collective
action to the Basin. One component of the MPP, which garnered keen speculation and
expectation, was the epidemiological and health impact study, as Enref s sustainability
manager Alan Munn speculated:
My belief is that these studies will show that pollution has a lesser effect on 
population’s health than is the current perception. Finally we will be able to use 
good science to understand the problem and then take the right corrective action 
(Enslin 2004a: 2).
The clash between community and industry understandings of ‘good science’ has been 
evident since the 2002 Settlers School health study. The government needed to step in as 
mediator. In fact the Durban Muni secured a prize in the Mail and Guardian “Greening the 
Future Awards” for its proactive steps in bringing parties together to address the 
environmental issues in the Basin through the MPP (Nyathikazi 2004). One journalist 
concluded: “The MPP is making progress in addressing the high levels of pollution in 
Durban, but building trust between industry and the community is a slow process that requires 
commitment and honesty from both sides” (Enslin 2004a: 2). This interplay between 
normative, cultural/cognitive and regulative institutions is complex. Although stakeholders
61 Of the initial R29.5 million industry was expected to cover about a third of it; the city gave R8million, DEAT 
gave R6 million (although R4.5 million was a contribution from the Norwegian Development Agency). The 
national and provincial departments of health contributed R4.75m and the KZN provincial department of 
environment also planned to contribute.
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had access to information and a degree of participation in this process, in 2004 there was still 
the inability to hold industrial polluters to account through legal means.
7.1.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
Defining Calref s organisational field in 2004 was an incident, indicated by the large red 
contour towards the bottom of the network diagram in Figure 7.1. In July, when Calref was 
coming online after a planned maintenance, water accidentally mixed with hot crude oil. The 
subsequent increased pressure caused a safety valve to blow (Dreyer 2004a). A plume of 
steam sprayed oil over the property of residents in Table View, Bothasig and Richwood 
(Dreyer 2004a). This ‘oil rain’ incident catalysed the field with outcries from community 
members, the media and national regulators.
A Cape Argus editorial called for an explanation from Calref, and noted that polluting
factories could face steep fines and even closure under the new Air Quality Management Bill
(Cape Argus 2004: l l ) .62 Cape Town Muni called the incident more of a “health nuisance”
rather than a “health hazard”, and Woodruff, Calref s general manager, gave his full apology
(Cape Argus 2004: 11):
My apologies to the public for the inconvenience. I take full responsibility and 
will make it right. If people call us, we will make sure they are compensated for 
their damages. (Dreyer 2004a: 1)
Calref attempted to repair its legitimacy with a strong response to the incident. Calref offered
free car washing service for the hundreds of cards spotted with oil and sent letters of apology
to all households in the vicinity (Dreyer 2004a: 1). Nazeema Abrahams, Calref s EHS
manager, said: “We have accepted responsibility for the incident and we would like to see that
people remember how well we handled the aftermath” (Thiel 2004: 1). A degree of cultural
change does appear to have occurred within Calref under Woodruff.
The new environment minister Van Schalkwyk responded firmly, as indicated by the blue 
‘regulatory’ contours closely connected to the Calref issue areas in Figure 7.1. He demanded 
Calref submit a report on the incident within 14 days before regulators discussed renewal of
62 The tone of its editorial was not as confrontational as previous editorials, it was more measured. The threat of 
looming regulation seemed to diffuse some media sentiment. Perhaps this is evidence of the beginnings of 
collective action within the field.
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its operating permit (Dreyer 2004b: 5).63 Cape Town’s air monitoring network, the backbone 
of efforts to regulate air emissions, was also scrutinised (Zintl 2004). Out of the nine 
monitoring sites throughout Cape Town, only two had long-term data, neither of which were 
near the refinery, and only one of the stations could give readings for lead or benzene (Zintl
2004). Often readings were not available due to technical malfunctions, thus given lack of 
data it was difficult to get a clear picture of the extent of pollution or its effects in Cape Town 
(Zintl 2004).
Although Cape Town may have had South Africa’s oldest and most sophisticated air 
monitoring network for the previous three decades (LGov8 2006), it had not led to significant 
air quality improvements. Durban had eclipsed Cape Town as the country’s leading municipal 
monitor and regulator of air quality.
7.1.3 National level
As mentioned at the start of section 7.1, new issue areas related to national level regulation 
bridged the fields in Durban and Cape Town. At the beginning of 2004, the Parliament’s 
environmental affairs and tourism committee was considering the proposed Air Quality 
Management Bill. The proposed legislation would replace the outdated APPA of 1965 
(Groenewald 2004). The fundamental difference between the new bill and the old APPA was 
that it addressed “the adverse impacts of emissions into the environment and set stricter 
standards for ambient air” (Groenewald 2004: para 9). In addition, the new Air Quality Bill 
adopted the ‘polluter-pays principle’ and would require companies licensed under the bill to 
pay license fees to the government (Van Gass 2004).
Early in 2004, during the public comment period, civil society groups had successfully 
lobbied to have amendments added to the Bill which “would hold corporations accountable 
for what they released into the air” (Jenkins 2004: 4). Environmental NGOs and community 
groups, represented by the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), expressed their concerns. They felt 
that the bill allowed too much discretion for implementation by local regulators, and that it 
would not be implemented consistently (Business Day 2004a). Groundwork’s director, Bobby 
Peek, felt that the central flaw in the bill was that it was based on regulating ambient air,
63 Noticeably absent from the press is Andy Birkinshaw; he was away on holiday when the incident occurred 
(NG09 2006).
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rather than focusing on reducing pollutants at the source, e.g. through industry emission 
standards (Peek 2004). Andy Birkinshaw, TVRA’s chairman, also welcomed the bill’s new 
standards and penalties for non-compliance, but wanted to know more specifically how health 
concerns would be addressed (Steenkamp 2004: 17). The regulative institutional dimension 
was beginning to change for all refineries.
In addition to the AQMA two other regulatory issues took shape at the national level. It 
emerged as DEAT was considering “streamlining” ELA laws (Camie 2004b). Industry and 
developers had been complaining for years about delays and onerous bureaucracy, 
particularly in the South Durban Basin as discussed above. Also gaining public attention, as 
indicated by the blue contour in the Figure 7.1, was the formation of the Environmental 
Management Inspectorate, aka the “Green Scorpions”, in late 2003 (Camie 2004c: 5). The 
enforcement of environmental protection in South Africa was weak, therefore the formation 
of the Green Scorpions helped address that gap (Business Day 2004b). In order to build 
capacity within the inspectorate, its new hires would seek training in Britain and the US 
(Adams 2004). Cross-scale capacity building occurred within government as well as within 
industry and civil society organisations.
In 2004, incidents still dominated the fields in Durban and Cape Town; however, a new 
‘discursive space’ (i.e. field) opened up at the national level related to regulation and 
enforcement. Enref and Sapref s firm legitimacy appeared to be diverging, community 
activism sharpened against Enref and softened against Sapref. SDCEA increased discursive 
pressure on Enref and local government, and engaged in issue shaping as it sought to educate 
community members on flaring and air pollution impacts. Yet Sapref engaged in overt issue 
shaping as its CLF began in earnest. It can be inferred that Sapref exhibited a degree of 
cognitive change through the establishment of its CLF and its ‘chemical free’ approach to 
developing clean fuels. Sapref was beginning to repair its legitimacy, whereas Enref s was 
still quite low. Distinct institutional outcomes are evident in Durban as the MPP is 
implemented.64
64 Durban’s MPP (Multi-Point Plan) can be termed a form of ‘hybrid’ regulation given it is a mix o f formal and 
informal regulation. In other words, the MPP began as a multistakeholder initiative to build capacity and 
understanding in the Basin. An air quality monitoring system was put in place and a health study was 
undertaken. The refineries contributed funding to this process, and in turn adopted voluntary emissions 
reductions until their permits were renegotiated (in 2005 for Enref and 2006 for Sapref).
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In Cape Town, there is comparatively little community-company engagement, but Calref 
loses legitimacy with its ‘black rain’ incident and receives a strong regulatory threat from 
national government. At the national level, government engages in different regulatory 
initiatives that range from coercive (e.g. clean fuels regs and Green Scorpions) to 
cooperational (e.g. implementation of AQMA). This strategic approach to designing and 
implementing regulation was enabled through cross-scale interaction (e.g. capacity building 
activities by UK and US government agencies).
7.2 2005: The bifurcation of organisational fields
The network diagram in Figure 7.2 highlights how the fields in Durban and Cape Town 
differed. The field in Durban was dominated by issues related to the implementation of 
regulation and the field in Cape Town was structured around Calref incidents, in red, and fuel 
shortages, in grey. Connecting the two fields were issues related to refinery clean fuels 
projects, in olive, and nation wide fuel shortages, in grey. However, a third national level 
regulatory field can be distinguished as the issues related to the Green Scorpions and 
implementation of the AQMA, in blue, overlapped with regulatory issues in Durban, such as 
Enref s permit exceedances, its subsequent fine and the implementation of the MPP. Here the 
interaction between South Africa’s multiple spheres of government are evident as regulators 
from DEAT and Durban Muni populated the densely structured regulatory issue areas. Also in 
Durban, Enref drew further press attention because of ongoing incidents, marked in red, 
whereas Sapref maintained a relatively low profile. Sapref engaged in issue areas related to its 
clean fuels project, marked in olive, and the national fuel shortages, indicated by the grey 
contour. In yellow, health concerns were raised about the impact of the clean fuels projects, in 
particular how the refineries would replace lead in petrol -  either through chemical additives 
or further refining. To the left side of the diagram the Engen-Sasol merger still gained media 
attention as marked in grey.
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Figure 7.2: 2005 field dynamics
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7.2.1 The South Durban Basin
SDCEA spearheaded the discursive debate on environment and development in the South 
Durban Basin as Durban Muni unveiled its spatial development plan (LGov6 2006). The plan 
addressed the possibility of moving Durban International Airport to the north of the city, 
increasing industry at the airport site in the Basin, and altering road and traffic in the Basin. 
Peek felt the decision to publish the planning document was a major victory for communities 
that had been demanding clarity about the future plans for their area (Camie 2005a: 1); 
however, contestation over aspects of the spatial development plan did emerge in the Basin 
(Khan 2005:3).
Similar to 2004, the MPP received kudos in the press. In the run-up to full implementation of 
the AQMA in September 2005, national and local government figures hailed the South 
Durban Basin as a replicable model for air pollution control for South Africa, (Jones 2005: 
12). Leaders celebrated the 45 percent reduction in SO2 emissions since approval of MPP in 
October 2000 (Jones 2005: 12). The first permits were issued to Enref and Mondi in 2005, 
and Sapref and the Tongaat-Hulett sugar refinery permits were underway (Jones 2005: 12).
In Durban staff capacity was being built through cross-national learning. Durban Muni sent a 
team of four engineers, scientists and a senior instrument technician for a six week advanced 
training programme in Norway (Nyawo 2005: 4). Durban’s leadership in air quality 
management was recognised as the Muni’s Health Department was nominated for an 
Impumelelo award for its lead role in implementing the MPP in the Basin (Maphumulo
2005).65 Indeed, as discussed in section 7.1.2, Durban now had the most advanced air quality 
monitoring network in South Africa.
Durban’s Health Department used innovative pollution permitting processes as well. 
ISO 14001 requirements were incorporate into scheduled trade permits so industrial facilities 
had to strive towards continual environmental improvements. Durban’s Health Department 
developed their permitting process with Norwegian guidance, but as they put it “South
65 The Impumelelo Innovations Award Trust reward exceptional projects such as public - private partnerships 
and government initiatives that encourage pro-poor development. About R1 million is distributed annually to 
various award winners. (See: http://www.impumelelo.org.za/about fs.htm)
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Africanised” the requirements (LGov3 2006; LGov4a 2006; LGov4b 2006; LGov4c 2006). 
These innovative permit requirements may have “coerced” Enref into working towards 
ISO 14001 certification.
As indicated by the red contour in Figure 7.2, Enref was plagued by incidents in 2005. It 
began the year with two incidents, an oil spill and a fire. About 6000 litres of heavy fuel oil 
leaked into an adjacent canal, which impacted and upset local Merebank residents because of 
the smells (Camie 2005c: 4). An explosion occurred when cleaning solvent caught fire. 
Although the fire was extinguished quickly, it highlighted the need for a more organised 
disaster plan for the Basin, as community communication was not handled well (Newman
2005). These incidents demonstrate Enref s difficulty in introducing cultural change at the 
level of operational personnel, particularly because the oil spill was caused by human error. 
Yet the age and quality of plant infrastructure was an ongoing concern.
Dominating the field in Durban was Enref s SO2 permit exceedances (marked in blue given 
this is related to compliance with regulation). The refinery received a new pollution permit in 
2005, and it prescribed that Enref could only have 35 SO2 exceedances per annum. In one 
month the refinery exceeded permissible levels of SO2 64 times (Sookha and Naidoo 2005). 
D’Sa and community representatives put the pressure on Durban Muni to take action against 
Enref (Sookha and Naidoo 2005). Hartmann explained that the reasons for exceeding its 
permit limits in March and April 2005 were due to weather conditions and that he felt the 
company’s violation was blown out of proportion (Camie 2005d: 1; Daily News 2005). 
Groundwork’s Sizwe Khanyile replied that “blaming the weather is an age-old excuse used by 
industry” (Camie 2005d: 1). Siva Chetty, the MPP’s programme manager, said when asked 
about why not wait to prosecute Enref until after the AQMA came into force, that “engaging 
the oil refiner was more important than beating someone up” (Salgado 2005: 3). In the end, 
Enref was only fined R10,000 for violating Durban Muni’s by-laws (Citizen 2005). 
Regardless, this event was significant for the evolution of regulation in the Basin, local 
regulators could now enforce pollution permits.
Enref s frustration with the polarisation of the community in the Basin became increasingly 
evident. Hartmann was quoted in August lamenting that “some nongovernment groups 
refused to engage with them on environmental issues and that there was ‘resistance for 
resistance’s sake’” (Yeld 2005: 4) and he sometimes “despaired” at the amount of effort that
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went into trying to sort out disputes with the groups: “We’re a lovely pincushion, if you want, 
for people to take potshots at us -  it (the refinery) is a ready target to take out your 
frustrations on” (Yeld 2005: 4). Indeed, D’Sa and SDCEA had taken a hardline approach 
against Enref, and refused to participate in its attempts at establishing a community liaison 
forum, similar to that of Sapref s (NG06 2006).
Sapref s parent company Shell had become increasingly concerned and engaged with the 
issues in Durban. Shell non-executive chairman Lord Ronald Oxburgh visited Durban in 
March 2005 to “see for himself the problems caused by Sapref’ after SDCEA and 
Groundwork attended the Shell AGM in June 2004 (Bishop 2005: 5). The purpose of the 
meeting was to find a way forward for the community and oil refineries. Oxburgh admitted 
that the Sapref infrastructure was aging and needed attention: “The community health issue 
concerns us. We will do our best to find a solution that will be of benefit to both parties” 
(Premdev 2005b: 4). It is evident from this visit and increasing Shell concern that internal 
parent company pressure affected Sapref s environmental performance.
Sapref received positive press after hosting a media tour to demonstrate the success of its 
clean fuels project. Lora Rossler, Sapref s sustainability manager, discussed the refinery’s 
community-engagement activities including its CLF, annual stakeholder reports, and social 
and environmental performance initiatives (Premdev 2005a: 3). D’Sa and SDCEA continued 
to be confrontation with Sapref but conciliatory with its parent company Shell, refusing to 
engage with Sapref in its CLF (NG06 2006). D’Sa achieved a landmark goal the end of 2005, 
when he and other FOEI network fenceline groups met with Shell CEO Van de Veer face to 
face (FOEI 2005). This meeting between Shell’s CEO and the fenceline communities is 
symbolic of Shell’s internal struggle to maintain legitimacy with host communities. Shell’s 
SPMU Director was not pleased with the CEO’s direct response, given it may undermine or 
conflict with the SPMU’s approach; however, according to a Shell representative this 
SDCEA-Shell CEO linkage was not continued past 2005 (Indl6 2007).
7.2.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
Calref s run of incidents continued in 2005. The year began with another high pressure safety 
valve release which sprayed diesel fuel into the immediate vicinity of the refinery. A smaller 
scale incident than the ‘oil rain’ of the previous July, but enough to gain the ire of the 
communities and media (Salie 2005). After a fire broke out in February, Andy Birkinshaw,
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TVRA chairman, said he would set up a meeting with the refinery and local authorities to 
discuss safety and other concerns (Peters and Steenkamp 2005). Calref s general manager, 
Steve Woodruff, explained that the refinery was having an unusual amount of upsets because 
the refinery was shutting down various parts of the plant for maintenance, (Peters and 
Steenkamp 2005).
The fire was the fourth incident of the year, and the refinery’s legitimacy with local and 
national authorities was very low. The spokesperson for the Department of Minerals and 
Energy, Hendrik Schmidt commented: “It appears from information gathered during our visit 
that the steps taken by Caltex to make the refinery safer are inadequate” (Ndenze 2005: 3). 
Because of the fire Calref stayed closed for two extra weeks, and the knock on effect was 
significant fuel shortages in the Western Cape (Maposa 2005). Residents, Calref management 
and government representatives met to address the spate of incidents (Peters 2005a). Given 
the AQMA had yet to promulgate, government officials said they would review Calref s 
operating permit under APPA and would work closely with communities to discuss what 
needed to be put into place before Calref s permits were renewed (Peters 2005a). Regulatory 
pressure was building.
Yet community activists continued to highlight Calref s underperformance. Birkinshaw noted 
that Calref could not even adhere to the Cape Town Muni’s by-laws which demand that a 
total pollution count of 226 parts per million (ppm) was the max; noting that in the UK and 
Europe the standard is set at 50ppm (Cape Argus 2005: 5). Birkinshaw and Nicholas Lang, a 
Bothasig community activist, also said that the monitoring stations were not in the right 
places, which undermined the trustworthiness of the readings (Cape Argus 2005: 5). 
Birkinshaw highlighted, using an environmental justice frame, that the areas most affected by 
the Calref s air pollution included the very poor settlements such as the Du Noon informal 
settlement (Cape Argus 2005: 5).
It is relevant to note that not all community representatives agreed with Birkinshaw and the 
TVRA’s demand that Calref either clean up or move away. In a letter to the editor of the Cape 
Argus, Michael Longden-Thurgood, a retired nuclear engineer, discussed the consequences to 
the economy and environment if Calref closed without first relocating (Longden-Thurgood 
2005: 13). He noted the extra pollution that would be imposed on residents in Durban and 
Secunda because of increased throughput from other refineries and the increased fuel prices in
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the Western Cape (Longden-Thurgood 2005: 13). A difference between the community 
groups in Durban and Cape Town was apparent. There did not appear to be such strong 
support for Birkinshaw’s more confrontational approach (Coml3 2006); whereas D’Sa and 
Peek’s strong rhetoric appears to have been supported by the majority of the local community 
(Com9a 2006).
The local kitesurfers also engaged with Calref about fall-out from the refinery’s pipeline 
which discharged effluent into the sea off Table View (Gosling 2005b). Calref eventually 
chose to upgrade its effluent treatment plant, which would bring Calref in line with Chevron’s 
in-house and international standards (Gosling 2005b: 4). Here Calref engaged more 
strategically with its local stakeholders; the refinery was able to repair legitimacy through this 
proactive response.
At a parliamentary Environmental Affairs and Tourism Portfolio Committee meeting, 
Woodruff highlighted Calref s environmental performance improvements over the decades 
(Yeld 2005), but his ‘expert’ scientific bias was evident as he called the UCT health study 
‘unscientific’ (Cape Times 2005: 7). However, Woodruff concluded: “ ...if  the refinery was 
thought to be ‘aggravating asthma people near the refinery’, then it was up to him to change 
such impressions” (Cape Times 2005: 7). Here Woodruff acknowledged the importance of 
community perceptions and understandings, yet this conception of lay understandings of 
refinery environmental performance is clearly in conflict with his personal biases towards 
expert understandings of the issues.
After only two years, it was announced in August that Steve Woodruff would be replaced 
towards the end of 2005 (Yeld 2005). His tenure apparently cut short by the spate of incidents 
in 2004 and 2005 (NGOll 2006). Chevron brought in a new Calref manager, Gordon Smith, 
in November 2005. Towards the end of 2005 major fuel shortages were caused because of 
refinery shutdowns as the clean fuels deadline loomed on 1 January 2006 (Marud 2005). 
Because Calref blended a batch of jet fuel incorrectly, Cape Town International Airport ran 
out of fuel which caused chaos and fuel shortages in Gauteng (Quintal 2005).
7.2.3 National level
In Figure 7.2 the clean fuels projects, subsequent environmental health concerns of the clean 
fuel regulations and fuel shortages link the fields in Durban and Cape Town. South Africa’s
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approach to air quality regulation was criticised as being “uncoordinated” and “piecemeal” 
(Holmes 2005). As mentioned in the section above, towards the end of the year fuel shortages 
hit the country, particularly so in the Western Cape. The Energy Minister Lindiwe Hendricks 
blamed the fuel oil industry for not maintaining the necessary reserve levels and 
underestimating the time necessary to convert to cleaner fuels by 1 January 2006. Hendricks 
supported an investigation into why the fuel shortage was caused, what could be done to 
prevent a similar scenario in the future, and whether consumers would be compensated for 
hardship suffered during the shortage (Business Day 2005: para 10; Hunter 2005). There was 
a strong argument that South Africa’s efforts to introduce clean fuels standards was poorly 
conceived and implemented.
As indicated by the tightly clustered blue contours, issues related to the Green Scorpions and 
AQMA dominated Durban’s field. This intuitively makes sense given the process of 
constructing Enref s pollution permit would form the model for implementation of the 
AQMA. In July Peter Lukey, head of Air Quality Management, was set to name the ‘filthy 
fifty’, a priority list of polluting facilities (Camie 2005b). This exercise was more than a 
“naming and shaming” exercise, it was a pragmatic way to rank, review and rewrite the air 
pollution permits of the greatest air polluting industries (Camie 2005b). Van Schalkwyk, the 
environment minister, noted that 40 prosecutors attended a course on the prosecution of 
environmental crimes (Njobeni 2005). DEAT organised the workshop with co-sponsorship 
from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and US justice department of 
environmental crime (Njobeni 2005).
In 2005 the focus at the national level was clearly on implementation and capacity building. 
Lukey intended to eventually regulate companies on a sector by sector basis but outlined that 
the new AQMA would be implemented in phases, starting in September 2005 (Camie 2005b). 
In the interim, the APPA would still remain on the books. The new regulation could not be 
implemented quickly because new staff had to be recmited and trained (Camie 2005b). Van 
Schalkwyk outlined that DEAT would train and make use of at least 30 air quality licensing 
officers in each province (Van Gass 2005). The new AQMA was signed into law on 11 
September 2005. An article in the Natal Witness praised civil society’s role in drafting the 
legislation: “The act has been hailed as an indication of the growing momentum and influence 
of community support groups and non-governmental organisations in the country” (Melville 
2005: 7).
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Peek and Lukey highlighted that capacity at the municipal level to implement the air quality 
management legislation would be problematic, that it would take time train the air pollution 
officers (Melville 2005: 7). Predicting the potential future contestation of ambient air quality 
standards, Lukey made an interesting observation. He noted that the level at which the 
standards would be eventually set would be a political decision, not just a scientific one; they 
might be higher or lower than that which science would stipulate (Melville 2005, p. 7). Thus 
both government and industry recognised this tension or interplay between civic and expert- 
driven science.
In 2005 it is interesting (as illustrated in Figure 7.2) the way that the fields in Durban and 
Cape Town diverged. At the national level and in Durban the regulative institutional 
dimensions strengthened as the AQMA, Green Scorpions, Clean Fuels legislation and MPP 
all were implemented and to a certain degree enforced. Enref s permit exceedances and 
subsequent fine exemplifies this trend. In Cape Town, although there was a degree of 
regulative and normative pressure driven by local regulators and community activists, there 
was little substantive institutional change. SDCEA continued to use rights-based logic to hold 
Sapref and Enref to account, whereas activists in Cape Town pursued a more managerial 
environmentalism. Where Calref and Enref continued to lose legitimacy, Sapref appeared to 
gain legitimacy through superior environmental processes and outcomes.
7.3 2006: The institutionalisation of regulation
In 2006 the fields in Durban and Cape Town were linked because of fuel shortages, marked in 
grey, and clean fuels projects, indicated in olive. Perhaps most distinguishing about Figure 7.3 
is the tightly clustered issues related to regulation at the national level highlighted in blue. 
Similar to 2005, issues related to building regulatory capacity, the Green Scorpions and 
implementation of the AQMA were all pertinent. Durban’s MPP, also in blue, overlapped 
with regulatory discourse at the national and local levels. Also in Durban, Enref s permit 
continued to be debated, in blue, and community activism focused on South Durban’s spatial 
development plan, in green. Sapref and Enref though were hindered by incidents, marked in 
red, that were caused by local power failures and the knock-on effects of upgrading to cleaner 
fuels. Calref had a comparatively quiet year. Although gas shortages and power outages did 
impact the refinery, Calref received some positive press through the implementation of an
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environmental upgrade. 2006 marks the end of this analysis, and as will be discussed, most of 
this discursive space was dominated by issues related to changing regulative dimensions.
7.3.1 The South Durban Basin
As indicated by the large green contour, South Durban Basin spatial planning continued to 
gain attention in the media. The planning process was underway to move Durban 
International Airport to the north of the city, and residents from the affluent northern suburbs 
fought the fast-tracked airport project on the grounds of noise pollution (De Boer 2006).
Also gaining much press was the publication of the MPP health study in August (indicated by 
the blue contour). It confirmed that children living in the Basin had a “substantially” greater 
risk of developing asthma compared with children living in the north of the city (Camie 
2006a: 3). The R7million study was expected to have significant implications on further 
industrial expansion in the Basin. Although the study did not investigate cancer rates in the 
city it warned that there was a clearly elevated risk of getting cancer in Basin because of high 
levels of VOCs, and it recommended that Durban Muni set up a cancer registry (Camie 
2006a). The study was conducted by a joint team of researchers from South Africa and the US 
(Camie 2006a). The University of Michigan -  Durban research connection (which began in 
1996 as per discussion in section 5.4) helped to facilitate learning within Durban’s 
occupational and environmental health research community (Acad6 2006).
Bobby Peek commended the city council for taking “such a bold step to undertake and 
support this research” and highlighted that South Durban Basin communities could use the 
study to “call on the government to act urgently and even seek legal measures against it, if 
they felt not enough was being done in terms of legislation and monitoring” (Tolsi 2006: 34). 
D’Sa called the study a ‘victory’ for South Durban residents an underscored that “the research 
findings support that the major sources of pollution are arising from the petrochemical and 
associated industries as well as other significant fossil fuel energy users” (Mthembu 2006: 3). 
The triumphant tone of Peek and D’Sa underscored the significance of these emergent 
normative and regulatory institutional dimensions. Firm legitimacy, at least in Durban, was 
now quite clearly morally governed and legally sanctioned. The question remained as to what 
strategic action Sapref and Enref would take in order to maintain or repair legitimacy.
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Figure 7.3: 2006 field dynamics
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Enref began the year with the news that South Africa’s competition tribunal had turned down 
the proposed Engen-Sasol merger. The tribunal felt it would create a “cartel” in the inland 
fuel market (Swindells 2006: para 6). The proposed merger would have created Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s biggest fuel retailer, and it was fiercely opposed by multinational firms such as BP, 
Shell, Chevron and Total (Swindells 2006: para 6). This ruling was a significant setback for 
Engen. Staff morale hit a low point and the firm’s future remained uncertain (IndlO 2006). It 
can be inferred that this uncertainty hindered the ability of Enref to make long term plans for 
refinery environmental upgrades. As an Enref manager confirmed, in 2006 financial resources 
were constrained within the refinery (Ind4 2006).
As indicated by the red contours in Figure 7.3 Enref continued to be affected by incidents. A 
fire broke out at the refinery in April, which reduced its capacity by about 60 percent for two 
weeks. During Enref s follow up investigation D’Sa noted that Enref s new open-door policy 
had allowed him and two other community leaders to be taken into the refinery and watch the 
cleanup process and investigate the extent of the damage (Goldstone 2006: 2). Here Enref s 
changing internal and external processes are evident, the refinery continued to openly engage 
with the community’s more radical activists.
Enref had difficulty meeting permit requirements for a second year, as indicated by the blue 
contour. Enref s scheduled trade permit stated that it would not break SO2 laws more than 35 
times during the year; it in fact broke its emission levels 111 times in 2005 (Camie 2006b: 4). 
Hartmann reflected that in retrospect Enref should have never agreed to such “ambitious” 
permit conditions, because it was not in a position to lower its SO2 levels adequately until 
2010 (Camie 2006b: 4). Enref was the first company in the country to be granted a new 
permit, and it was concerned “that other large companies in Durban were not required to 
comply with similar stringent requirements - including other refineries that continued to 
operate under less stringent conditions” (Camie 2006b: 4).
Hartmann proposed that the maximum number of annual pollution exceedances be relaxed. A 
meeting had been called to with city officials, the refinery and community groups to assess 
the refinery’s performance and options for meetings its new permit (Camie 2006b). Rajah 
Naidoo, MRA and Merebank Councillor as of 2006, said it seemed that Enref wanted to “alter 
agreed timeframes unilaterally and delay the urgent need for pollution reduction”, he
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explained: “It is not acceptable for the refinery to simply say that it cannot meet the permit 
conditions” (Camie 2006b: 4).66 Here Enref sought to manipulate its external legitimating 
environment as opposed to conform to it.
In October, another municipal power failure forced Enref to shutdown, which resulted in a 
plume of black smoke, pale dust and additional flaring (Inggs 2006a). D’Sa went on the 
offensive, and a journalist commented that “the stand-off between Engen and D’Sa is 
legendary” (Jones 2006: 6). Hartmann, Enref s general manager, responded: “I hear what he 
(D’Sa) is saying. It doesn’t do anything for his credibility. It isn’t helpful. It would be far 
more constructive if he engaged with us and understood what was going on” (Jones 2006: 6). 
D’Sa’s role as iconic community activist appeared to be taken less seriously by both industry 
and media stakeholders. His refusal to engage with Enref was a polarising position that had 
proven controversial with some of SDCEA’s staff over the years (ComlO 2006).
Sapref made significant headway in repairing its host community legitimacy and quelling its 
critics when it announced early in 2006 that it would replace its entire 12km long network of 
underground pipelines at a cost of R340million rather than simply patching and repairing 
rusty sections (Camie 2006c: 5). Apparently the R340million price tag for replacement was 
“not very different” from the cost of selective repairs (Camie 2006c). Sapref had changed its 
legitimation strategy to ‘conform’ to community expectations as opposed to trying to select or 
manipulate different aspects of community understandings. Enref on the other hand opted for 
selective repairs at a cost of less than RIOOmillion. A spokesperson said the company did not 
believe replacement was necessary and suggested that Enref s pipelines were probably “in 
much better condition than those of Sapref’ (Camie 2006c: 5). This community “win” with 
Sapref would be contrasted with Enref s perceived unwillingness to comply with community 
requests. Enref s legitimacy was yet again undermined. The ability to access financial 
resources appears to be a key distinguishing feature between the two firms.
66 Long time community activist Rajah Naidoo became a SDB Councillor in 2006. He ran as an ‘independent’ 
and beat his ANC counterpart. Tragically, Naidoo was murdered in 2007, allegedly because of a property deal 
gone bad (Makhaye 2007; Premdev 2007). This incident underscores the level of crime and violence prevalent in 
the Basin. Naidoo was a relatively affluent lawyer, who had moved out of Merebank and had set up his law 
practice on the Bluff. His role as Councillor was an interesting one that had the potential to shake civil society up 
in the Basin, as SDCEA and Naidoo did not always see eye to eye (ComlO 2006).
250
As indicated by the grey contours fuel shortages plagued South Africa in 2006. In February 
Sapref was only running at 65 percent of capacity due to “minor repairs” being carried out on 
one of its units (Business Day 2006b). South Africa faced more fuel shortages because Natref 
had broken down as well, as indicated by the red contour (Business Day 2006b: para 1). The 
knock on effects from the shaky implementation of the clean fuels regulations and subsequent 
fuel shortages would be a significant contribution to South Africa’s trade account deficit 
(Business Day 2006a).
Towards the end of the year incidents at both Sapref and Enref (indicated by the red contours 
in Figure 7.3) highlighted the aging infrastructure at the plants. A worker was burned on a 
Sapref tanker that was loading a solvent and he was air lifted to hospital. In October, a fire 
broke out on a diesel desulphurisation unit (SAPA 2006). The fire was the second incident in 
the Basin in three weeks; earlier in October a power outage had led to a gas leak at Enref 
(Premdev 2006). Peek said he called the refinery shortly after the fire started, and was told 
nobody knew where it was (Premdev 2006: 2). It is apparent how closely the refineries were 
monitored by the local communities. SDCEA often found out about incidents before the 
refineries’ management knew about them because of the organisation’s pollution hotline 
(NG05 2006; NG06 2006; NG07 2006). This form of community-driven governance has 
been termed ‘community environmental policing’ by O’Rourke and Macey (2003) in a study 
of NGOs that have successfully used the Bucket Brigades to influence the environmental 
performance of refineries in the US. As discussed in Chapter 6, the Durban activists were 
significantly influenced by these US-based NGOs.
7.3.2 Cape Town’s northern suburbs
South Africa’s growing economy put significant stress on its aging infrastructure. As 
indicated by the red and grey contours in Figure 7.3 Calref had to shutdown due to a power 
outage in January 2006. Fuel shortages in the Western Cape were exacerbated by this upset 
(Du Plessis 2006). South Africa and Calref were being impacted because Eskom, the state 
power utility, struggled to meet increasing electricity demand (Cape Argus 2006).
In April, Cape Town Muni launched its air quality management plan, which aimed to have the 
cleanest air in Africa (Van Gass 2006). In order to rid the city of its brown haze problem it 
targeted air pollution in the informal settlements and vehicle emissions, which contributed 
about 60 percent to the city’s brown haze phenomena (Van Gass 2006). Cape Town actually
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started monitoring its air quality in 1958 and was at the forefront of combating air pollution in 
South Africa (Van Gass 2006). As previously discussed in section 7.1.2, although Cape Town 
and Durban had different geographical characteristics and thus different air quality problems, 
Cape Town’s superior air quality monitoring expertise was overtaken by Durban in the mid 
2000s.
Calref celebrated its 40th anniversary in November. It was a significant event, where 
numerous VIPs descended on the refinery, and the president of Chevron Global Refining, Jeet 
Bindra, spoke at the event (Watkins 2006). Chevron’s attendance and visible role of Bindra is 
indicative of its parent company’s increasing interest in repairing Calref s host community 
legitimacy.
It is also interesting to note that in 2006 Calref was served notice by DEAT of an intention to 
issue a directive after its string of pollution incidents from 2004 to 2006 (LGov9 2006; 
LGovlO 2006; NGovl 2006). This regulative pressure was revealed in interviews but not in 
press articles. This highlights an interesting difference between the Durban and Cape Town 
press -  in Durban, this type of regulatory threat most likely would have been picked up and 
reported by the press, whereas in Cape Town, even though community activists knew of this 
development, the press either were not informed or chose to not report on it.
7.3.3 National level
In February, in an effort to build capacity within the Green Scorpions, DEAT announced it 
would appoint 800 environmental management inspectors across the country by middle of the 
year (Inggs 2006b; Ensor 2006). Capacity was being built within the new environmental 
management inspectorate as the US EPA and UK Environment Agency conducted air quality 
management training in South Africa.
The first national ambient air quality standards were published for public comment in June
(Ensor 2006). Peek reflected on the importance of the new standards:
Mandela’s visit to Durban South marked a new chapter for the environmental 
justice movement in South Africa. This movement has grown rapidly in Durban 
South. The movement hopes that having gazetted these standards, the government 
will seek to give them meaning by developing complementary systems -  good 
monitoring and emission standards. This will gives these standards real meaning.
Now for the next round in the battle for clean air. (Peek 2006: 14)
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Peeks’ comments foretold where the debate might move next: beyond ambient air quality 
standards to defining emissions standards for industry and updating industrial facilities’ 
pollution permits.
EIA regulations also were coming under scrutiny. National government officials had voiced 
concern that “the planning system (including EIA) unnecessarily hampers the development of 
business” (Weaver and Sibusiso 2006: para 3). Again, this conflict between environment and 
development continued to be played out in various environmental regulatory arenas as South 
Africa exhibited quite strong economic growth in the mid-2000s (see section 1.4.2). Finally, 
cross-national capacity building continued to occur. The Danish government funded a 
R275million programme within DEAT to address urban environmental problems such as air 
pollution and waste management by 2010.
In 2006, of particular interest is how Enref s host community legitimacy continued to be 
contested, whereas Sapref made progress repairing its legitimacy by conforming with 
community demands (related to replacing its underground pipelines). Calref also more 
seriously addressed community concerns as its parent company Chevron took interest in the 
refinery’s environmental performance. Although incidents still plagued the refineries, 
Durban’s field became more significantly structured around implementation of regulation, 
whereas Calref s was less structured, but still influenced by national level regulation and 
initiatives at the municipal government level. At the national level, regulation (i.e. the 
AQMA) continued to be implemented and enforcement capacity expanded. Significant cross­
scale interaction was underway as officials from the US, UK and Denmark descended on 
South Africa to help build implementation capacity within different spheres of government. 
Given implementation was devolved to local authorities and municipalities, the potential for 
uneven outcomes was building.
7.4 Analysing organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
As in Chapters 5 and 6, this analysis distils the data into categories at the macro and micro 
levels of analysis to facilitate comparison of how and why each refinery’s environmental 
performance differed. This study posits that organisational field dynamics, moderated by firm 
legitimation strategies and characteristics, will influence a firm’s corporate environmental 
performance. There is an iterative interaction between the macro and micro over time. The 
following discussion will identify how, in Durban and Cape Town between 2004 and 2006,
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field structuration was influenced by the interaction and coproduction of institutional actors, 
institutional logics and governance structures. How and why each firm has acted and reacted 
to these field dynamics will help explain differences in corporate environmental performance.
7.4.1 Macro level: field structuration
At the macro level, using ‘detectable units of analysis’ as described in section 2.4.1, the 
degree of field structuration can be analysed. Durban’s organisational field exhibited more 
indicators of structuration than did Cape Town’s. The network diagrams (Figures 7.1 -  7.3) 
and Figure 7.4 indicate there is a consistently high interaction between issues and actors. 
Overall citations were 336 in 2004, 363 in 2005 (which equalled 2001, the other highest), and 
298 in 2006. When comparing the citation subtotals between Tables 7.1 and 6.1 there are two 
contrasting features. First, the citations for Durban and Cape Town are different (Durban’s are 
higher than Cape Town’s) but consistently high from 2004 to 2006, whereas from 2000 to 
2003 Durban’s remained relatively high, but Cape Town’s fluctuated. The second unique 
feature of Table 7.1 is that citations for the ‘other’ category increased remarkably. This makes 
sense because from the network diagrams it is clear that the ‘blue contours’ and ‘grey 
contours’ mostly pertain to issues at the national level. The national government’s efforts to 
regulate the refineries and national fuel shortages clearly populated the refineries’ 
organisational fields. As elaborated above in sections 7.1 to 7.3, unique to this chapter is the 
structuration of a distinct organisational field related to environmental performance at the 
national level. It follows that there was a change in role and authority of field level actors 
engaged in the issue areas related to the environmental governance of Enref, Sapref and 
Calref; national government actors had entered the field and occupied a space of authority 
between 2004 and 2006.
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Figure 7.4: Analysing structure and agency 2004 - 2006
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Table 7.1: Type of actors and frequency of citations 2004 - 2006
Type Subcategory Citations
200^ 2005 2006
Dur Cpt Oth Dur Cpt Oth Dur Cpt Oth
Academic Academic 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
CBO 28 8 0 24 18 4 15 1 1
Civil
Society
NGO 5 0 16 10 0 8 15 0 0
INGO 7 2 1 2 0 2 0 0 0
Other civ soc 19 0 1 7 13 5 10 J 3
Labour 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Local Gov 13 5 1 28 4 0 7 5 4
Govern­ Prov Gov 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 3
ment Nat Gov 9 12 36 7 10 35 6 3 42
Inti Gov 0 2 2 0 0 2 1 1 7
Enref/Engen 55 0 0 26 0 1 41 0 0
Industry
Sapref/Shell/B
P
41 0 0 35 0 0 38 0 0
Calref/Caltex 0 48 0 0 59 2 0 38 0
Other
industry
3 4 5 6 16 31 5 12 32
Media Media 3 2 0 4 0 2 0 0 1
Subtotal 186 88 62 149 122 92 139 63 96
Total 3 3 6 363 2 98
Well-defined interorganisational relationships did result in discursive patterns within these 
distinct fields. In Durban, the Peek-D’Sa ‘double act’ continued. The dual-pronged strategy of 
D’Sa engaged primarily at the local level with rhetoric aimed at industrial polluters, and Peek 
engaged at the local, provincial and national levels is evident in the network diagrams. This 
coordinated effort was unique to Durban. As evident in Table 7.1, Durban had both CBOs and 
NGOs engaging in the field whereas Cape Town only had CBOs.67 Durban also had a more 
active municipal government participating in the field than Cape Town, particularly in 2005, 
when Enref was fined for exceeding its new permit requirements. However, the national 
government citations were consistently higher in Cape Town than in Durban. This 
demonstrated the national government’s increasing concern with Calrefs environmental 
performance and the economic implications of the fuel shortages in the Western Cape, as well 
as Durban’s unique devolved multi stakeholder initiative to manage air pollution, the MPP.
67 SDCEA in Durban and the TVRA in Cape Town were coded as CBOs whereas Groundwork is coded as an 
NGO.
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‘Other industry’ had a large number of citations in Cape Town and at the national level in 
2005 and 2006; this again is related to the fuel shortages in the Western Cape and Gauteng.
The construction of institutional logics is underpinned by the ideational dispositions of the 
dominant actors. Some key patterns, distinctions and themes emerged. In Durban, SDCEA 
and Groundwork continued to engage utilising the logic of environmental justice and 
corporate accountability in organisational fields at the host community, national and 
international levels. In contrast, in Cape Town the TVRA engaged at the host community and 
national levels occasionally utilising rights-based rhetoric but generally participated with the 
more cooperative logic of managerial environmentalism. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, 
broadly speaking, this logic of managerial environmentalism dominated the regulatory space 
at the host community and national levels both in Durban and Cape Town. However, it is 
important to clarify that the environmental justice activists in Durban did not oppose the 
promulgation of the AQMA and the implementation of the MPP; in fact, SDCEA and 
Groundwork participated in the formulation of these regulatory processes and monitored and 
enforced their progress.
It is also important to highlight that civil society was not homogeneous within the two host 
communities. In Durban, Peek and D’Sa framed issues differently but were closely aligned 
and regularly communicated. Rajah Naidoo of the MRA had fallen out with SDCEA in the 
early 2000s and had become a city councillor representing the Bluff in 2006. He supported 
SDCEA but did not actively participate within it. The balance of discursive and dispositional 
power perhaps tipped towards Naidoo in 2006 when he became councillor (Coml 1 2006; 
NG06 2006). Other community members supported SDCEA and Naidoo’s more conflictual 
engagement style, particularly related to protesting against unjust pollution levels, but chose 
to engage more constructively with the refineries through Enref and Sapref s community 
liaison forums and social investment programmes (Com8 2006; Com9a 2006; Com9b 2006). 
It appeared that community sentiment in 2006 was becoming less aligned with Peeks and 
D’Sa’s environmental justice rhetoric.
In Cape Town, there were strong personalities in the community that did not always agree on 
a community-company engagement style. For example Andy Birkinshaw, TVRA chairman, 
often used rights-based rhetoric but participated relatively cooperatively with regulators 
(NG09 2006; NGO 11 2006), Nicholas Lang, a retiree come community activist, was deeply
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sceptical of corporate promises (Com 12 2006), and Michael Longden-Thurgood, a retired 
nuclear engineer, attempted to engage more constructively (Coml3 2006). However, as 
demonstrated by the network diagrams, Birkinshaw emerged the public figure representing 
Cape Town’s northern suburbs.
How did the interaction between actors, issue areas and institutional logics influence the 
emergence of governance structures? Changing regulatory institutions can be identified in 
three related fields: Durban, Cape Town and the national level. Implementation of air quality 
regulations was no longer a case of ‘i f  but ‘when’. The national government promulgated the 
AQMA, formed the Green Scorpions, implemented clean fuels regulations and began to 
reassess the EIA regulations. Durban implemented the MPP and Cape Town formed an air 
quality management plan. The refineries had to implement the clean fuels requirements and 
Enref and Sapref received new permits under the MPP. All three refineries continued to 
engage with local stakeholders and make environmental improvements.
Although there is a general trend of increasing regulatory pressure at the national and local 
levels, the organisational fields diverged upon close examination of the discursive spaces in 
Durban and Cape Town. The normative understandings of ‘appropriate’ social and 
environmental performance had changed significantly in the Basin since 1994. From 2004 to 
2006 the regulative dimension gained credibility as regulation at the local and national level 
become implemented and enforced. What was interesting about the MPP was that, although a 
regulative institution, it still provided the space for normative understandings to be debated 
(as evident by the findings from the health study in 2006). In Cape Town, the norms of 
socially appropriate corporate environmental behaviour had changed, but the 
institutionalisation process evolved differently. Regulatory threats lingered within the field, 
but did not gain authority like in the South Durban Basin. This demonstrated the power of 
discursive strategies. Activists in the Basin acted as entrepreneurs to create cross-scale spaces 
of contestation over what constituted legitimate corporate environmental performance; 
whereas those in Cape Town’s northern suburbs engaged with Calref in a more measured and 
conciliatory fashion within the host community and country. Entrepreneurs in the Basin 
created the space for new regulatory structures, those in Cape Town did not have such 
success.
258
However, it is not altogether surprising that the discursive strategies utilised in the Basin 
would yield collective action prior to those in Cape Town’s northern suburbs. The 
characteristics of the people and the places were very different. The rights-based and 
historically embedded frames utilised by the institutional entrepreneurs in Durban yielded 
more collective action. In addition, the municipal government’s priorities may have differed
f a
given the perceived impacts of industry on pollution-related issues. Also at the national 
level, although regulatory pressures emerged it would take time for these processes to be 
implemented. National regulators began to put pressure on Calref, but the organisational 
fields continued to differ significantly between Durban and Cape Town.
7.4.2 Micro level: organisational legitimacy
Refinery legitimation strategies, as alluded to above, not surprisingly differed. Enref 
continued to have quite low field level legitimacy, which was influenced by continued plant 
upsets, permit exceedances, debate over the creation of refinery buffer zones, the failed Sasol- 
Engen merger, and vociferous verbal attacks by D’Sa and SDCEA. Its CLF was less 
organised and effective than Sapref s. Although SDCEA boycotted both community-company 
engaged forums, members within SDCEA did attend as individuals or as members of other 
community organisations (Com8 2006; Com9a 2006; Com9b 2006).
Sapref, on the other hand, began to repair its organisational legitimacy. A dual pronged 
approach was taken between subsidiary and parent companies. Sapref s CLF became a 
legitimate community-company engagement forum within the Basin. It was run by an 
independent facilitator and it resulted in community-driven social and environmental 
outcomes. Sapref EHS, sustainability and communication managers participated regularly in 
the forum, as did a variety of community-based organisations which sought to influence the 
refinery behaviour and possibly benefit from its social investment funds. From interviews, 
CLF meeting minutes and the subsequent report produced by Sapref it appeared that the 
multistakeholder initiative did build a degree of trust and mutual understanding (Com8 2006; 
Sapref 2008; Com9a 2006; Com9b 2006). Evidence of this trust building can be found in the
68 It is important to recognise, that in the South Durban Basin industrial facilities (the oil refineries, paper 
producer and sugar refinery) were responsible for a comparatively large portion, i.e. 80%, o f the S 0 2 pollution 
load (SA DEAT 2007b); whereas in Cape Town, industry was estimated to contribute only 22% to the area’s 
“Brown Haze” air pollution problem (Wicking-Baird et al. 1997). However, the primary component o f  Brown 
Haze is PM2.5 emissions; thus S 0 2 and other emissions may still significantly impact Calref s host communities 
(as evident by the ongoing health study politics in the Northern Cape Town communities).
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variety of projects that have been implemented to date, which include (Sapref 2008): a 
“greening” (i.e. environmental landscaping) programme at the refinery; an odours leaflet to 
help South Durban residents identify odours and their possible causes; a “sniffer” mobile air 
monitor to measure air quality within and around the refinery; painting the refinery stacks a 
more visually pleasing light grey (the colour was chosen by CLF members); and a youth 
soccer development programme in the Basin. It is important to recognise that these projects 
were chosen and designed by Forum participants. Critics, though, felt that the CLF was a 
greenwash approach, accommodating community concerns to legitimise business-as-usual. 
Peek and D’Sa even went so far as to call the CLF a “dangerous” deliberate intervention to 
destabilise community opposition and relations in the Basin (NG05 2006; NG06 2006).
Sapref sought legitimacy by developing shared understanding with community members, and 
by conforming to the community demands. A large area of disagreement between local 
communities and Sapref was over action to be taken as a result of the 2001 petrol leak. Sapref 
initially said it would conduct selective repairs of its pipelines, but in late 2005 it decided to 
replace the seven supply lines instead. NGOs claimed victory, but Sapref insisted that it was a 
business decision (Indl3b 2006; NG06 2006). This perhaps symbolised a turning point for 
the refinery’s legitimation strategy.
Sapref s parent company Shell also actively took action to help repair the refinery’s host 
community legitimacy. As discussed Shell agreed to a direct line of communication from its 
fenceline communities to the highest level of decision making within Shell (FOEI 2005), 
though more recent correspondence with Shell representatives suggest that this linkage was 
not continued (Indl6 2007). Equally interesting is the lack of engagement of activists with 
Petronas, the parent company of Enref. As Desmond D’Sa remarked, “We are putting 
together a huge campaign against Engen, in South Africa not in Malaysia. The Malaysians 
just won’t listen to us. So we will campaign in South Africa” (NG06 2006).
Calref lost legitimacy with community and government representatives. The refinery’s string 
of incidents, coupled with its key role in the Western Cape fuel shortages served to undermine 
its legitimacy. Steve Woodruff, Calref s general manager, attempted to repair the refinery’s 
poor reputation with genuine intentions, but was undermined by continual plant upsets. In 
2006 it appeared that Chevron had finally stepped in. A new general manager arrived, Gordon 
Smith, and Chevron executives attended refinery events and actively spurred the refinery
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employees to achieve ‘operational excellence’ (Indl5 2006). As will be discussed in Chapter 
8, the role of refinery managers was significant in terms of repairing host community 
legitimacy.
7.5 Chapter summary
From 2004 to 2006 the organisational fields became structured in different ways. In Durban 
the regulative institutional dimensions matured and began to significantly impact corporate 
environmental behaviour. In Cape Town regulative dimensions did not gain authority, and 
there was little substantive change in corporate environmental performance. As discussed 
above this divergence was related to the discursive strategies, characteristics and resources of 
actors participating within the field. The superior ability of institutional entrepreneurs to wield 
discursive power and assume roles of authority was clearly apparent in Durban, but not in 
Cape Town. Durban Muni’s proactive response to the perceived environmental injustices of 
industrial pollution was in stark contrast to Cape Town’s more reactive approach to governing 
its industrial polluters. A field at the national level also emerged, as national regulation 
promulgated and began to be implemented.
Evident from this analysis is that the implementation of the regulation was patchy, time- and 
resource intensive. An optimistic start was made in Durban. Whether or not innovative 
multistakeholder initiatives to govern industrial pollution could be established in other 
contexts remained an open question. Given Cape Town, the municipality with arguably the 
most resources and civil society capacity, could not successfully govern corporate 
environmental performance raises difficult questions for civil society leaders and government 
authorities.
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8 COMPARING THE PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL 
CHANGE
The problem that new institutionalist research has run into is that most empirical 
efforts have focused on environmental changes that are not effectively linked to 
the activities of individuals and organizations...This ambiguity regarding the 
neoinstitutional theory of action is at the core of its weakness. The details of 
micro-level action are needed to explain how macro-level institutions change. 
(Hirsch and Loundsbury 1997: 411-412)
One of the goals of this research is to unpack the ‘black box’ of institutional theory by 
identifying mechanisms of institutional and organisational change. The aim here is to distil 
key findings through a comparative analysis of institutional and organisational change in 
relation to the three oil refineries. Chapter 8 combines insights from Chapter’s 4 through 7 to 
address the study’s overarching aim, to explain how and why corporate environmentalism has 
evolved in South Africa’s post-apartheid fuel oil industry. As the above quote suggests, the 
structuration of the organisational field was not a quasi-automatic process; in fact, multiple 
actors internal and external to the firms at multiple scales participated in the process of field 
structuration.
In Durban, Enref and Sapref s organisational field related to the issue of industrial pollution 
started out in the mid-1990s as unstructured and fragmented. By the end of this study’s time 
period, 2004 to 2006, it had remarkably changed -  the field was governed by a local multi­
stakeholder initiative known as the MPP, which had successfully reduced SO2 emissions in 
the South Durban Basin by 45 percent between 2000 and 2005 (Jones 2005: 12). In Cape 
Town, like Durban, controversy and contestation characterised Calref s organisational field 
related to industrial pollution, but comparatively little substantive institutional change 
occurred from 1994 to 2006. New regulative governance structures to mitigate industrial 
pollution did not emerge in Cape Town as they did in Durban. The fields in Durban and Cape 
Town in fact bifurcated in the early 2000s.
By addressing how and why corporate environmentalism evolved over time the study 
establishes both theoretical insights into the processes and mechanisms of institutional and 
organisational change and policy relevant outcomes within and beyond South Africa. The
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goal is not to uncover “universal laws of human behaviour”, nor is it “atheoretical descriptive 
narrative”; it is to establish middle-range theory, where mechanisms of institutional and 
organisational change can be identified for a specific set of situations and circumstances 
(Campbell 2004: 63-64). As Campbell (2004: 63) explains, mechanisms can be defined as the 
“processes that account for causal relationships among variables”; specifying causal 
mechanisms is moving beyond correlation to identify not only that a relationship exists but 
also how one explanatory factor affects another.
Chapter 1 established a multi-scale, multi-actor framework to typologise drivers of corporate 
environmentalism; Chapter 2 established a framework of MNC complexity and organisational 
field dynamics utilising institutional and organisational theory. Chapter 8 will now identify 
mechanisms of institutional and organisational change in order to develop theoretical insights 
stemming from this study’s results. This chapter begins by using diagrams to compare the 
findings from Chapters 4 through 7. The analytical framework (Figure 2.2) developed in 
Chapter 2 is then illustrated with key findings and propositions. Sections 8.2 to 8.5 identify 
how key events or institutional junctures, actors’ agency, firm level factors, and host 
community/country context are critical in the process of institutional and organisational 
change, and section 8.6 revisits the overarching themes of power and scale within the 
analysis. Key mechanisms or propositions are highlighted (see Figure 8.5) in order to distil 
this study’s research findings and to identify avenues for future exploration.
8.1 How and why has corporate environmentalism evolved?
In Chapter 2, section 2.2, it was posited that organisational field dynamics, moderated by 
parent company and subsidiary legitimation strategies and characteristics, would influence a 
refinery’s environmental performance. As discussed in Chapter 7, broadly speaking, given 
differences between parent-subsidiary relations and resources, this was the case. Sapref had 
stronger oversight from Shell than Enref and Calref had from Petronas and Chevron; Sapref 
subsequently repaired its host community legitimacy more significantly than Enref and 
Calref. In order to gain further analytical insight, the process of institutional and 
organisational change is compared between the three refineries.
Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 distil for each refinery the key corporate environmental performance 
indicators, as discussed in Chapter 4 (Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5), in one diagram together with 
the field level dynamics, key events and changing governance structures/institutional
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dimensions identified in Chapters 5 through 7. These figures facilitate comparison between 
internal and external drivers of corporate environmental performance within and between the 
firms. As discussed in section 4.4.2, on a scale of negative five to plus five, ratings were 
assigned per year for categories of environmental performance; these include internal 
processes (off-white), external processes (light green), internal outcomes (pink) and external 
outcomes (light blue). For example, in 1998 Enref received a plus five on external processes 
for establishing a GNA and a three on internal outcomes for setting targets for emissions 
reductions based upon the GNA. The indicators were derived iteratively from the analysis of 
the media and interview data. However, these analytical conclusions could be made more 
rigorous by having consensus among a research team as opposed to a single investigator 
(Eisenhardt 1989).
Figure 8.1: E nref s promising start and ongoing environmental performance struggle
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Similarly the field level issue areas, as illustrated in the network diagrams in Chapters 5 
through 7, are represented in Figures 8.1 to 8.3 in five categories: incidents (red); civil 
science/health studies (yellow); activism (green); regulation (blue); and market related issues
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(dark grey). These were assigned numeric ratings per year from zero to negative five. The 
negative rating is for the illustrative purpose of juxtaposing the positive environmental 
performance indicators above the x-axis to the field level dynamics below the x-axis. For 
example, in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 the category marked in yellow (civic science and health 
studies) was given a negative five rating in 2000 because in the South Durban Basin a local 
journalist’s story about cancer in the Basin attracted much media attention, and Groundwork 
and SDCEA used the bucket air sampling technique to raise awareness of cancer causing air 
pollutants in the Basin. These events were given the maximum negative five rating because of 
how these studies affected framing processes and institutional dimensions. Environmental 
performance indicators deemed negative, such as Enref s fine in 2005 and Calref s directives 
in 2005 and 2006, are also represented below the x-axis as negative internal outcomes (in 
pink) (see Excel file titled env_perf_data.xls in the enclosed CD).
From the analytical narrative in Chapters 5 through 7 five key events or institutional 
junctures, i.e. moments in time when the organisational field was particularly fragmented or 
in a process of transition, were identified between 1994 and 2006. These institutional 
junctures occur at different times, for different reasons and yield different outcomes for each 
of the refineries.
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Figure 8.2: SapreFs legitimacy crises and evolution as a ‘fast follower’
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Also represented in Figures 8.1 to 8.3 are the changing governance structures or institutional 
dimensions. These line graphs illustrate how the regulative, normative and cultural/cognitive 
institutions change over time for each refinery.69 A scale of zero to five is used to code the 
changing institutional dimensions on a yearly basis; zero indicates weakly developed 
institutions and five strongly developed institutions. For example in Figure 8.1, Enref had 
quite weak external governance of environmental performance in 1994. Thus, all the 
institutional dimensions were graded one, but by 2006 its host country/community institutions 
dimensions for corporate environmental performance had become well defined. Therefore, 
Enref received a five for the normative and cognitive, and a four for the regulative 
institutional dimensions. The actual assigned number is not of primary concern; what is 
relevant is the trend over time and the pattern that emerges between the different institutional 
dimensions and their relation to other field level dynamics and events.
69 See the worksheets for Enref, Sapref and Calref in the Excel file titled env_perf_data.xls to view justification 
for these estimates.
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Figure 8.3: C alref s comparative lack of institutional and organisational change
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How and why corporate environmentalism changed over time will now be explored by 
comparing and contrasting a variety of factors emerging from the analysis that influenced 
field structuration and corporate environmental performance outcomes, including: events, 
institutional logics, governance structures, actors’ agency, firm factors and host community 
context. After each section propositions are identified, in order to distil key insights from this 
study and mechanisms of institutional and organisational change. Figure 8.4 illustrates how 
the various propositions are related to the framework of MNC complexity and organisational 
field dynamics discussed in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2).
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Figure 8.4: Propositions related to MNC complexity and organisational field dynamics
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8.2 Events, institutional logics and governance structures
Within this study, key events or critical institutional junctures acted as lightening rods to 
trigger fragmentation and (re)structuration processes (see section 2.3). These moments in time 
created ‘windows of opportunity’ for multiple stakeholders, internal and external to the firms, 
to contest and construct new understandings of legitimate environmental performance (see 
e.g. Folke et al. 2005; Kingdon 1995). The events often disrupted existing understandings and 
enabled opportunities for actors to create or influence discursive spaces within the field. Key 
events corresponded with changes in governance structures and refinery environmental 
performance efforts in all three cases. The literature on institutional change and organisational 
behaviour has highlighted the importance of events in (re)structuring organisational fields 
(Hoffman 1999; Hoffman and Ocasio 2001). Here the analysis goes one step further and 
categorises types of events and identifies how field level actors use discursive strategies to 
construct institutional logics and governance structures at the site level. It is important to 
recognise how events influenced field level processes and firm legitimacy within host 
communities, which has important ramifications for the management of a firm’s social license
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to operate. The following discussion highlights linkages between field dynamics and 
institutional change through a brief recap of the analytical narrative elaborated in Chapters 5 
through 7.
8.2.1 A contested process of institutional and organisational change 
1994 to 1999: The pollution struggle emerges
At the beginning of the research period Calref, Enref and Sapref were impacted by significant 
events that created critical junctures in the structuration of the organisational field related to 
their environmental performance. As indicated in Figures 8.1 and 8.2, in 1994 both Enref and 
Sapref s institutional dimensions were not well defined. However, as indicated in Calref s T1 
in Figure 8.3, its general manager’s pollution reduction promise was spurred by a MRC report 
into the effects of Calref s pollution on local residents and community outcry in opposition to 
Calref s production increases and perceived health impacts. This event opened up the space 
for institutional construction and, as per the dominant logic of technocratic managerial 
environmentalism, the normative institutional dimension gained strength.
Calref proactively engaged with community stakeholders the earliest out of the three 
refineries, as indicated by the increase in environmental performance external processes and 
internal outcomes in Figure 8.3’s bar graph for 1994. Enref followed in 1995, but Sapref did 
not substantively engage with community stakeholders until six years later. The second major 
event which structured Calref s field was its broken pollution reduction promise in 1997 (T2 
in Figure 8.3). The manager had to renege on his promise to reduce emissions by 80 percent 
after profit margins began to fall as the Asian Crisis loomed. This ‘broken promise’ event 
coupled with an increase in SO2 emissions that year significantly damaged Calref s 
legitimacy. The event acted as a turning point for Calref: it catalysed community activism, 
reinforced community-company distrust, and limited the opportunity for a GNA to be 
established between Calref and its surrounding communities. Also influencing Calref s 
institutional environment was the publication of Cape Town’s “brown haze” study and the 
refinery exceeding SO2 WHO guidelines. A process of fragmentation occurred, and, as 
indicated in Figure 8.3, both normative and cognitive institutional dimensions were 
influenced by these events.
In Durban, as indicated by T1 in Figure 8.1, President Mandela’s visit to Enref in 1995 
impelled the refinery into engaging with external community stakeholders and started a
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process of internal learning. As indicated by Enref s line graph in Figure 8.1, the refinery’s 
normative and cognitive institutional dimensions became more structured. Enref s attempts to 
establish a Responsible Care CAER committee in 1994 and 1995 influenced the emergence of 
managerial environmentalism and environmental justice logics in the Basin. Enref willingly 
opened itself up to stakeholder scrutiny in order to legitimise itself within the new South 
Africa prior to Mandela’s visit. This event sparked a process of cultural/cognitive transition 
where the accepted beliefs in the Basin began to change in relation to the environmental 
legitimacy of the fuel oil refineries. Enref s success in establishing a GNA with community 
groups in 1998/1999 (T2 in Figure 8.1) demonstrated its commitment to improving its internal 
and external environmental performance. This voluntary regulative initiative influenced 
Enref s future environmental performance improvements.
Sapref on the other hand was impacted by internal parent company scrutiny after an explosion 
occurred in 1998 (T1 in Figure 8.2). This event created the space for both internal and 
external oversight regarding its management processes, thus the narrowing of its normative 
institutional dimension is indicated in Figure 8.2. Also influencing normative understandings 
more generally in the Basin in 1998 was the publication of the preliminary CSIR report on air 
pollution in the Basin.
In the mid to late 1990s a degree of organisational isomorphism occurred in Durban. Both 
Enref and Sapref were affected by changing host community norms and beliefs in the mid- 
1990s. The environmental justice discursive frame utilised by Durban activists in the mid to 
late 1990s was competing for discursive power with the win/win logic of managerial 
environmentalism and the powerful logic of economic growth and industrial expansion 
(although the Asian Crisis dampened to some extent the latter two logics). Normative and 
cognitive institutions were influenced by the interaction of these competing logics. Cape 
Town’s community groups used a different discursive strategy. They used a technocratic 
approach to engage with industry and government officials to seek efficient and effective 
environmental outcomes; they engaged primarily utilising the discourse of managerial 
environmentalism as opposed to rights-based rhetoric (although that began to change in 
1999).
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2000 to 2003: Spaces o f contestation
In 2000 the institutionalisation of environmental performance related to all three fuel oil 
refineries was influenced by the advent of civic science. An example was Groundwork and 
SDCEA’s Bucket Brigade campaign. Groundwork took air samples in both Durban and Cape 
Town. This community-based air monitoring initiative significantly raised the profile of 
cancer causing volatile organic compounds (VOCs), such as benzene, in public discourse. 
This ‘event’ is marked on Enrefs timeline as T3, Saprefs as T2 and Calrefs as T3. It is 
interesting to note that this is the only event that impacted the discursive spaces (i.e. fields) in 
Durban and Cape Town at the same time for all three refineries. It is evidence of the 
discursive power of the logics of environmental justice coupled with that of information- 
based regulation.
In 2000, affecting both Enref and Sapref, a local journalist’s investigative story on abnormally 
high incidences of cancer in the Basin sparked much public concern (also Enrefs T3 and 
Sapref s T2). This concentration of interest in the Basin caught the attention of national 
government. An action plan (which later evolved into the MPP) was initiated by the 
Environment Minister to address these local level air pollution and environmental issues. In 
Durban, the media took not only an active role in reporting but also in constructing the issue 
areas (see e.g. Barnett 2003; Barnett and Scott 2007). This is a clear example of how 
community and media-driven institutional logics resulted in a quasi-regulatory response.70 In 
addition, in 2002 the Settlers School health study was published which fuelled community 
health concerns, the WSSD took place in Johannesburg which brought international attention 
to the plight of South Durban’s residents and, in 2003, SDCEA published its influential 
comparison study of refineries in Durban versus Denmark.
A combination of proactive media, civil society activism and academic-driven health studies 
constructed public perception in the Basin and heavily influenced the normative and 
cultural/cognitive host community institutional dimensions for Enref and Sapref. It had 
become accepted belief that these refineries were ‘killing’ local people, and it was socially 
appropriate to demand these industrial facilities clean up their acts and insist government 
implement and enforce the right to a clean and healthy environment. Enref received backlash
70 ‘Quasi’ because the resulting regulation (the MPP) was a multistakeholder initiative founded on the principles 
of partnership, transparency, information and accountability.
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from its host community when in 2002 its efforts to receive planning approval to increase 
production were bitterly opposed by SDCEA and attempts to renew its GNA failed (Enrefs 
T4). Here dissonance between community and industry normative and cognitive 
understandings is evident, largely driven by the logic of economic growth and industrial 
development.
Sapref was notably impacted by high profile events in the early 2000s. In 2000 Sapref s 
managing director apologised for significantly underreporting its SO2 emission since 1995 
(also T2 in Figure 8.2). This was a watershed moment for the refinery. It was the first time it 
had openly engaged with its community stakeholders and held itself to a level of public 
accountability not required by law. A second event occurred in 2001 when one of the 
refinery’s underground pipelines leaked about a million litres of petrol in a residential area 
(Camie 200Id). This incident negatively impacted Sapref s organisational legitimacy spurring 
much activism and regulatory scrutiny (T3 in Figure 8.2). Provincial government issued 
Sapref a directive in 2001 after a string of incidents. Given this series of events, Sapref s 
normative, cultural/cognitive and regulative dimensions were all increasingly affected. 
However, after 2001 there was little mention of regulatory efforts until 2005 as indicated in 
Figure 8.2. Although the line graph in Figure 8.2 is simplistic, it does demonstrate the trend 
that Sapref s external legitimating environment became significantly more structured in the 
early 2000s.
In 2000-2001, Calref s field was also structured because of incidents and civic science (T3 
Figure 8.3). Groundwork’s Bucket Brigades, like in Durban, raised the profile of carcinogenic 
air pollutants, and Calref failed to plan for a proper sulphur disposal solution after the 
chemical plant which processed its excess sulphur was due to close in 1999. As indicated in 
Figure 8.3, regulation briefly strengthened: In 2001 the Western Cape government prosecuted 
Calref for constructing a sulphur disposal processing unit without a proper EIA. Calref s poor 
planning is indicative of relatively lax internal management processes. Interestingly, in 2002 
there was very little indication of civil society or regulatory pressure on Calref (as indicated in 
Figure 8.3), but in 2003 Calrefs host community normative and cultural/cognitive 
institutional dimensions were structured by the publication of a UCT health study 
commissioned by the NCAMTG which found higher levels of asthma among children located 
next to the refinery. This form of health study politics is again an example of a contested logic
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of managerial environmentalism, i.e. a technocratic science-driven governance process. Quite 
different than the underlying institutional logics at play in the South Durban Basin.
2004 to 2006: Divergent fields
Towards the end of the research period Enrefs host community and regulatory legitimacy 
was increasingly challenged (indicated by T5 in Figure 8.1). The MPP was being 
implemented and the AQMA was in the process of being promulgated. Enrefs string of 
incidents between 2004 and 2006 hardened community activism as articulated through the 
logic of environmental justice. Indicative of the emerging managerial environmentalism logic 
in Durban, Enref became the first refinery to receive its revised pollution permit under new air 
quality regulations in 2005. The refinery had difficulties meeting its SO2 permit requirements 
and was fined R10,000 for violating Durban Municipality’s by-laws. Community activists 
hoped this nominal fine would set precedence for future legal action under the new 2005 
AQMA. As demonstrated in Figure 8.1, host community cultural/cognitive and normative 
understandings became more structured from 2003 onwards. However, as indicated in the line 
graph in Figure 8.1, the terms of Enrefs permit (i.e. regulatory institution) appeared to be 
slightly discordant with community beliefs and normative understandings as Enref negotiated 
with government to get more lenient terms in 2006.
In contrast, Sapref made efforts to repair its host community legitimacy between 2004 and 
2006. It became more strategic with its stakeholder engagement processes (T4 in Figure 8.2), 
chose to replace instead of repair its underground pipelines, and received a new pollution 
permit (T5 in Figure 8.2). Although Sapref did have a few incidents during this time period, 
the focus on Sapref in the media diminished, particularly in comparison with Enref. The 
refinery’s general manager was rarely cited in the press, and Sapref s Community Liaison 
Forum succeeded in building a degree of trust and understanding with certain members of the 
community (SDCEA was noticeably absent). As indicated in Figure 8.2, regulatory 
institutions strengthened as Sapref s new permit was issued in 2005. It appears that Sapref s 
regulatory dimensions had essentially conformed to host community beliefs and norms. There 
did not appear to be significant discord within its host community and regulative legitimating 
environment.
Calref on the other hand had a high profile incident in 2004 when water accidentally mixed 
with hot crude oil and a plume of steam sprayed oil over the property of local residents
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(Dreyer 2004a) (T4 in Figure 8.3). This ‘oil rain’ incident catalysed the field with outcries 
from community members, the media and national regulators. Given Calref s continued 
incidents in 2005 its host communities maintained a critical stance on the refinery. However, 
as indicated by the decreasing cultural/cognitive institutional dimensions in Figure 8.3, host 
communities appeared to engage less actively with Calref in 2006 as regulatory pressure
71increased. In 2006 Calref was served notice by DEAT of an intention to issue a directive
after a string of pollution incidents (LGov9 2006; LGovlO 2006; NGovl 2006). Similar to
Sapref, but yet with considerably less host community legitimacy, the regulative, normative
and cognitive institutional dimensions related to Calref s host community organisational field
appeared to be at similar levels in 2006 (all rated a three in Figure 8.3). This was most likely a
transitional year for the refinery as it was receiving considerable regulatory pressure and,
finally, parent company pressure from Chevron to improve its environmental performance.
The following propositions can be inferred from this discussion:
Proposition la: Key events/institutional junctures will affect existing 
understandings and create opportunities for actors to influence field  
fragmentation and/or (re)structuration.
Proposition lb: Activists employing the logics o f  environmental justice and 
corporate accountability will affect field  structuration more significantly than 
actors employing the logics o f managerial environmentalism.
Proposition lc: The strength, persistence and quality o f normative and cultural- 
cognitive institutional change within a firm 's organisational field  will precede 
and significantly affect the possibility o f  regulative change.
8.2.2 Categorising the event history
The institutional junctures that emerge from the analysis can be categorised on a two by two 
grid as illustrated in Figure 8.4. The event history is analysed according to the degree to 
which they represented conflict versus consensus in relation to the firm’s environmental 
performance and chance versus choice in relation to the origins of the event. Conflict versus 
consensus not only makes intuitive but also theoretical sense as this research is interested in 
the dialectic between institutionalisation processes (i.e. structure) and micro level power and 
politics (i.e. agency). Chance versus choice is also consistent with this study’s analytical 
approach, as it refers to the role of agency within field level processes. What was not expected 
from this mapping exercise was the way types of events clustered within the grid. After colour
71 These findings were demonstrated in the network diagrams, which came from newspaper data and from the 
interview data.
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coding the institutional junctures according to the key actor/incident driving the discursive 
process -  e.g. red for incidents, blue for government, green for civil society and purple for 
industry -  clusters emerged.
Refinery incidents, in red, were chance events that led to conflict. Civil society driven events, 
in green, were predominantly conflictual. They may have emerged in response to corporate 
environmental behaviour, but these discursive strategies were ‘chosen’ by civil society actors 
to varying degrees. For example, Calref s broken promise in 1997 (C2 in Figure 8.4) resulted 
in a strong community and media response, but this community campaign was a direct 
response to a corporate activity. This can be compared to the E3 and S2, which coincided with 
the Durban-based journalist’s cancer study and Groundwork’s Bucket Brigade campaign. 
These interventions demonstrated strategic interventions by civil society actors and were 
indirect responses to Sapref and Enref s environmental behaviour. In addition, given the 
prevalence of protest activism and rights-based discourse employed in Durban, community- 
driven events (E4, S2 and E3) in Durban are categorised as more conflictual than those in 
Cape Town (C3 and C2).
Government responses to refinery pollution tend to be in the centre of the grid, striking the 
middle ground between conflict and consensus and demonstrating choice versus reacting to 
events. The institutional junctures influenced by industry’s choice were initiatives and 
activities that aimed to achieve consensus (underpinned by the logic of managerial 
environmentalism and partnership) with its various stakeholders. For example, Enref s GNA 
in 1998/1999 is an excellent example of a consensus-seeking event that was strongly 
influenced by the refinery’s choice, i.e. legitimation strategy. Sapref also made important 
strides particularly towards the end of this research period, from 2004 onwards to repair its 
host community legitimacy through choosing to engage in activities that would seek 
consensus or host community legitimacy. A trend can be seen where Sapref s early ‘events’ 
were characterised by chance and conflict, whereas towards the end of the research period its 
‘events’ were much more consensual and driven by industry strategy.
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Figure 8.4: Categorising the event history
Conflict < ................... = £ >  Consensus
Chance
S3
C4
C5
C2
E4
C3S2
S4 S5 E2E3
Choice
Enref T1 -5 = Figure 8.1 Sapref T1 -5 = Figure 8.2 Calref T1-5 = Figure 8.3
Red = incidents Green = civil society Blue = government Purple = industry 
Figure 8.4 demonstrates how conflictual and potentially polarised the host community 
environments have been for the refineries. The critical institutional junctures have been 
significantly impacted by civil society activism. Also apparent from the diagram is that 
consensus does not occur by chance. Consensus requires a deliberative and strategic approach 
by the refineries. Calref and Enref attempted early in the research period to build consensus 
and host community legitimacy but poor corporate and community relations hindered these 
ambitions. Section 8.3 considers what might influence these divergent outcomes.
A key question is the degree to which consensus should be the desired outcome. In other 
words, is conflict necessary for superior environmental performance gains to be made and 
outcomes that are more just for host communities? This question is considered in the final 
chapter. The following proposition can be distilled from this analysis:
Proposition Id: An industrial facility in the process o f  repairing host community 
legitimacy will affect fie ld  structuration through constructing events/institutional 
junctures that are characterised by consensus.
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8.3 Agency in field dynamics
The importance of agency in field dynamics is apparent from the analysis in Chapters 5 
through 7 and from Figure 8.4. Key actors influenced the discursive framing of issues, which, 
in some cases, instigated events/institutional junctures. The examination of relational forms of 
power is central to this analysis. As illustrated in the network diagrams in Figures 5.9, 6.5 and 
7.4, key actors were densely networked and centrally located. These were often civil society 
actors who held positions of authority within the field given their influence over framing 
processes. They achieved discursive power through both coercive and cooperational 
strategies. However, media, government and industry all engaged in field debate. As 
discussed in section 2.4.1, the firm itself can demonstrate agency through its legitimation 
strategies. This section considers the influence of firm, civil society and government actors in 
shaping field dynamics.
8.3.1 General Managers and internal champions
Internal actors within the firm can strongly influence corporate strategy (Andersson and 
Bateman 2000; Schaefer 2004; Sharma 2000). For example, Enref s choice in the mid-1990s 
to proactively engage with community stakeholders was largely influenced by internal 
champions. Calref s choice in 1994 to reduce emissions by 80 percent (which it subsequently 
failed to achieve) and Sapref s choice in 2000 to open up and engage with community 
stakeholders largely came down to the leadership of the refineries’ general managers. The role 
of the refinery general manager emerged as a crucial factor in influencing community- 
company relations (Ind3 2006). Indeed Richard Parkes, Sapref s general manager from 1999 
to 2004, had his ‘road to Damascus’ moment in 2000 and started a culture shift within 
Sapref; however, his goodwill was unleashed into an environment of complete distrust (Ind2 
2006; Ind3 2006).
Rajah Naidoo, MRA Chairman and local councillor highlighted how the incentive structures
for refinery managers could impact site level performance:
I think that all managers without exception are simply using this as a stepping 
stone to something higher, is clear. They will come here trying to establish a 
relationship with the community. This being an activist community. How they 
control their activist community will determine their future success... (Comil 
2006)
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The use of the term ‘control’ by Naidoo is highly relevant. Bamaby Briggs, Shell’s SPMU’s
director, stressed how Wayne Pearce, Sapref s new General Manager from 2004, would better
understand than previous general managers the historical context in the Basin given Pearce’s
experience managing community conflict at the Shell Norco refinery in Louisiana, US (Ind2
2006). Naidoo’s observations appear to be correct -  Pearce was general manager of Sapref for
three years but he moved on in 2007. Although the rapid turnover in refinery general
managers may be disruptive, when the ‘right’ person takes the helm, it appears to yield
results, as Desmond D’Sa explained his willingness to work with Pearce:
I am a bulldog fighter. I could have a go at Sapref every day, but I realised I had 
to pull back a bit and give these guys an opportunity. So I have had talks with 
Wayne Pearce and I haven’t been attacking them in public. If I do attack them it is 
in a meeting. You don’t take something outside a meeting that you agreed upon. I 
think we’ve moved forward but it is just the trust factor. A year ago Shell 
promised us some information then Wayne Pearce came in and said I am not 
going to give it to you. I said look that is not right...I think we need to work 
around the trust issue but we giving them the space. The last five months I said no 
press releases around Shell, just phone and write to them directly. I hope that this 
collaboration continues. (NG06 2006)
Sapref and Shell have exerted a form of cooperational and agenda setting power through the
strategic placement of general managers. Enref on the other hand had internal pressure in the
mid-1990s from employees such as Alan Munn, Enref s sustainability manager, to drive
changes in refinery management culture, when community activism began to emerge in
Wentworth in 1994 (Ind4 2006; Acad7 2006; Ind5 2006; Ind7 2006). As Tony Camie
recalled:
At that stage (in 1994), the (Enref) refinery manager was based in Cape Town. He 
struck people as having a very arrogant stance and he was really there trying to 
explain away a lot of issues, and he wants to cut meeting short, has plane to catch.
You know and stuff...very get this over with. Didn’t go down very well. (Acad7 
2006)
Another industry insider highlighted how John Mackey, Enref General Manager from 1999 to 
2002, and Alan Munn impacted the refinery’s community relations: “I mean with John 
Mackey and Alan, Engen has found a much better understanding of community dynamics. 
Locally have community interaction, not just about environment stuff, also about social 
development” (Ind7 2006).
Calref also had influential general managers. In 1994, Mike Rademeyer, Caltex Chairman and 
Calref Managing Director, made the promise to reduce emissions by 80 percent over five 
years. However, as discussed, this ‘promise’ was never fulfilled and created distrust in the
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adjacent communities. A local retired nuclear engineer living in Table View had a measured
perspective on the succession of Calref general managers:
Part of the reason (why the GNA fell through with Calref) was the fundamental 
issue of could refinery managers be trusted. This used to come out at the meetings 
quite a lot. The community lost confidence in the refinery managers. The 
successor to Rademeyer was Paul Buley, and he was certainly responsible for a lot 
of the improvements that were implemented, particularly the tail gas plant for 
removing sulphur before it burnt through into the stack. He was quite successful.
His successor was only there for a short time, a man named Paul Allinson, a Brit.
Paul Buley was South African. Then they had an American one (Steve Woodruff)
...for about three years. Doesn’t matter who he is from the community’s point of 
view, you don’t trust them. But I can assure you that he was a rather remarkable 
individual, very human, highly approachable. His grasp of the legislation was 
remarkable; I was very impressed with him. He did some additional measures to 
reduce the sulphur emissions. (Com 13 2006)
Confirming the prevalence of community distrust, Andy Birkinshaw was concerned that the
rapid succession of refinery managers led to accountability gaps:
You (the general manager) will go in and run the refinery and still do 96,000 bpd 
of oil. You will all do same, but when you leave you leave all your relationships.
So a new refinery manager says, oh no so and so said that, not me, what are you 
talking about...You know that’s how you can get past government. That’s how 
you can get past community. That’s how you can continue the process and not 
have anyone accountable -  keep him for a couple years and change him, I think 
that is the philosophy behind it. (NGOl 1 2006)
In each of the three refineries general managers or internal champions at different points in 
time demonstrated leadership skills that opened up new possibilities for community-company 
engagement. However, Sapref was the only one that appeared to be successfully repairing its 
legitimacy towards the end of the research period. The existing literature on internal 
environmental or sustainability champions emphasises the influence of individuals such as 
corporate executives and environmental managers within a firm (Andersson and Bateman 
2000; Schaefer 2004; Sharma 2000), yet this study, in addition to individuals within the firm, 
recognises the importance of parent-subsidiary oversight and strategic management, i.e. how 
general manager turnover at the facility level may influence environmental performance 
processes and outcomes.
The policy recommendations from these findings are mixed -  extending refinery managers’ 
tenure could have negative community impacts if the manager does not have the skills or 
interest in improving host community legitimacy and environmental performance, and there is 
the risk that a general manager may overpromise and under deliver as in Calref s case. These
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are risks that need to be considered along with the potential distrust that is perpetuated 
through the revolving door of refinery managers, particularly with regards to Sapref and 
Calref. The following propositions emerge from this analysis:
Proposition 2a: The strategic deployment o f general managers with experience 
and understanding o f  community-company relations will positively affect a firm 's 
social license to operate within a given host community.
Proposition 2b: Rapid turnover o f general managers will undermine community- 
company trust.
Proposition 2c: Internal champions will significantly affect corporate 
environmental legitimation strategies during times o f field (re)structuration.
8.3.2 Civil society and the media
Civil society actors on the other hand acted as institutional entrepreneurs to influence field 
institutional logics and governance structures (DiMaggio 1988; Lawrence and Phillips 2004) 
(see also section 2.3.1). Scholars have highlighted the power of institutional entrepreneurship 
in fragmented fields (Maguire et al. 2004) as well as in structured fields (Greenwood and 
Suddaby 2006). As Maguire and colleagues (2004) highlight, there has been comparatively 
little research on how the skills and strategies used by institutional entrepreneurs may vary in 
relation to field level context (i.e. if a field is fragmented, structured or in a period of 
transition). This study contributes to this literature on the role of agency in field level 
dynamics by examining how the discursive strategies utilised by activists in two different host 
community contexts influences the process of institutional and organisational change.
Civil society actors in South Africa wielded significant discursive power that sought to 
contest refinery expansion, underperformance and outdated regulation. As indicated in Figure
8.4 civil society employed discursive strategies to disrupt and reconfigure formal and 
informal rules. Bobby Peek and Desmond D’Sa emerged as community leaders in South 
Durban sparked by Mandela’s visit in 1995. They formed SDCEA in 1996 and worked 
successfully with Enref to establish its GNA in 1998/99. As Peek gained international 
recognition and formed the NGO Groundwork, Peek and D’Sa formed a sort of double act 
engaging at both national and community levels to campaign for environmental justice. D’Sa 
and Peek were densely networked within the network graphs particularly from 2000 onwards. 
This coincides with their effort to instigate civic science and community monitoring schemes
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in both South Durban and Cape Town. International NGOs were also influential in building 
civil society capacity in South Africa. Groundwork linked the California-based NGO 
Communities for a Better Environment, and introduced the Bucket Brigades to South Africa.
In 2002, the WSSD attracted a flood of international activists to Durban. Greenpeace dropped 
banners from Sapref and Groundwork became a FOEI chapter. The WSSD significantly 
raised the international profile of the pollution struggle in Durban. However, interestingly, 
very little activism occurred in relation to Calref during that time. This perhaps can be 
explained by the different host community contexts (as discussed below in section 8.5); the 
activists’ framing processes would have more cultural fit and resonance in South Durban 
because of its historical legacy of injustice. Every time Enref or Sapref had an upset or 
incident or threatened to expand production (in Enref s case), SDCEA acted as the 
communities’ pollution police. Through this pollution struggle, D’Sa and Peek gained iconic 
status at the local level.
In Cape Town, Andy Birkinshaw, Chairman of the TVRA, emerged as the community leader 
that would continuously put pressure on Calref, particularly after its 1997 broken promise to 
reduce SO2 emissions by 80 percent. In 1999, Birkinshaw linked with the Durban activists, 
and through those networks learned new techniques to use the media strategically. Because of 
Groundwork’s linkage with FOEI, D’Sa and Peek became shareholders in Shell and travelled 
multiple times to the company’s AGM in Europe to protest and voice grievances. Activists 
continued to put pressure on Shell International, and, as discussed in section 7.2.1, succeeded 
in meeting with Shell’s CEO in 2005. Although this direct line of communication was not 
continued, the level of sophistication of this multi-scale activism is noteworthy. Equally 
interesting is the lack of engagement of activists with Petronas, the parent company of Engen. 
Cape Town’s activists did not actively engage with Chevron either (NG09 2006). Although 
they did send letters to Chevron corporate but were told that it was a domestic issue that 
would be dealt with at the subsidiary level. This is a significant difference between the 
engagement strategies of Cape Town and Durban’s community-based activists, as Cape 
Town’s activists did not pursue parent company protest strategies.
As discussed in section 6.3.1, the local media in Durban took an active role in shaping field 
structuration. Tony Camie, a local journalist, investigated and publicised the hypothesised 
link between relatively high rates of cancer in the Basin and the petrochemical industries (T3
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in Figure 8.1 and T2 in Figure 8.2). In Cape Town, the media was significant but appeared to 
be less proactive in shaping the discursive spaces. How can this difference be explained? 
Barnett’s (2003) research into the transformation of South Africa’s post-apartheid media 
provides insight. He explores how opportunities for “media-oriented political action” has been 
opened up and “realised in practice by movements in civil society” (ibid: 4). He demonstrates 
that since democracy, there was a “de-politicisation of ownership” in the newspaper sector, 
and that commercialisation pressure led to changes in editorial policy and newsroom 
demographics.
Media bias was mitigated against in this study by including articles from every source 
collected in the network analysis. In other words, everything from trade press, international 
newspapers and the major newspapers in South Africa were included in the network analysis 
sample. Further analysis could compare and contrast how the different news sources reported 
the issues, but this is beyond the scope of this study. However, Barnett’s insight into how the 
newspaper sector was restructured, in particular its role in field structuration in Durban, is 
relevant:
My argument is that, in the context of a general political realignment in the post­
apartheid period, the organisational and economic restructuring of print and 
broadcast media has meant that the value of certain sorts of community-based 
social movements to news organisations has been significantly enhanced. The 
Independent group dominates Durban’s commercial newspaper market. This 
includes the city’s main quality daily, The Mercury, the more populist afternoon 
title the Daily News, and the Sunday Tribune. Since 1994, when the Argus 
newspaper group was unbundled by Anglo-American to the Irish-owned 
Independent group, there has been a determined effort to re-position the group’s 
papers, to maintain and extend readerships in the face of increasing competition 
for revenue from other media. The internal restructuring of the group, with an 
increasingly assertive marketing-led strategy, has engendered a shift in the 
objectives of news making towards focussing on “people-oriented” Stories 
reflecting the changes in the “new” South Africa. At the same time, affirmative 
action has altered the make-up of newsrooms, and there has been the introduction 
of programmes to promote “developmental journalism” as part of professional 
development schemes. It is here that newsroom demographics are important, in so 
far as journalists from historically disadvantaged communities bring with them 
not only different news values, but more substantively, they are also likely to be 
connected to alternative social networks, with relationships to sources in 
previously marginalised communities as well as with actors who have moved into 
positions of social power in government and business. (Barnett 2003: 9-10)
Barnett (2003: 8) found a similar result to this study, that there was an “almost exponential
increase in news stories about environmental issues” in the 1990s. He attributes this increase
of environmental news coverage not only to the “structural and organisational shifts” within
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the newspaper sector, but also to community-based activists in South Durban, coordinated by
SDCEA, who mobilised media attention to put pressure on both industry and government
(Barnett 2003: 9). As Barnett highlights (2003: 16), the pollution struggle has yielded
substantial ‘wins’ in South Durban:
Government and corporate initiatives to tighten up emission control, to set up 
consultative forums, or to fund further research, are now routinely contextualised 
as being responses to the sustained mobilisation of local communities...Prior to 
1999-2000, the standard response of the main industries, and particularly of the 
two oil refineries in South Durban, was one of secrecy and denial. In the last two 
or three years, these companies have overhauled their press and public relations 
operations, becoming significantly more proactive in disclosing leaks when they 
occur and more assertive in the press in promoting their initiatives in the wider 
community.
What could help explain the differences in institutional outcomes between South Durban and 
Cape Town’s northern suburbs then is the success of attracting media attention. The 
engagement strategies of Cape Town’s activists were less consistently protest-oriented than 
were those in Durban. This may have been due to both the dispositions of the activists and 
Cape Town’s media sources. Protest from middleclass white communities were perhaps not 
deemed as ‘newsworthy’ as protest strategies from historically disadvantaged communities. 
The activists in Durban were legitimised by international recognition (Peek’s Goldman 
Environmental prize in 1998) and the leadership of SDCEA (Barnett 2003: 12).
Although communities in the northern suburbs did unite under the Anti-Pollution Alliance,
the NCAMTG and the TVRA, the Anti-Pollution Alliance and the NCAMTG in the mid-
1990s aimed to establish consensus with Calref on voluntary emissions reduction
programmes. The TVRA, under the leadership of Andy Birkinshaw, in the late 1990s
emerged to lead protest activities. In comparison to Durban, there did not appear to be as
much momentum from the TVRA to get consistent access to the media, as demonstrated by
the lack of media coverage of air pollution issues in Cape Town’s newspapers during certain
years of this research period (e.g. 200land 2002). As Barnett (2003: 20) concludes:
...if  media restructuring can be interpreted as opening up new opportunities, it 
should not be forgotten that the capacity to make the most of these is likely to be 
sharply differentiated spatially, socially, and in terms of what issue is at stake...
The democratic potential of media, old and new, depends on the ability of actors 
embedded in civil society to practice well-worn political virtues, by adopting 
appropriate repertoires of protest, effectively mobilising resources, and 
establishing legitimacy amongst constituencies.
283
This study’s findings support Barnett’s observation that “media-oriented political action” is 
context-specific. Future research could take this finding further, but comparing and 
contrasting how the media is leveraged by community activists in areas deemed ‘pollution 
hotspots’ under the new AQMA. Given the influence community-based activists had on field 
structuration, a variety of propositions can be distilled:
Proposition 2d: Community activists with access to a sympathetic press will be 
more successful in influencing field dynamics, and from the analysis it follows 
that historically disadvantaged South Africans will have better access to the 
media than white South Africans.
Proposition 2e: Community activists that direct campaigns at parent companies in 
addition to subsidiaries will have more success in affecting environmental 
performance.
Proposition 2f: Community activists/institutional entrepreneurs that are well- 
articulated with international activist/capacity building networks will affect host 
country/community field  structuration more significantly than those which are 
not.
8.3.3 Spheres of government
Although civil society was influential in shaping field processes, actors within the spheres of
government were also significant, as indicated by the blue-shaded events in Figure 8.4.
Within Durban’s local government, Selva Mudaly, Director of Environmental Health, and
Siva Chetty, Programme Manager for MPP, cleverly negotiated the middle ground between
consensus and conflict to implement hybrid governance arrangements (i.e. the MPP and
pollution permits). As Siva Chetty explained:
Shell and Engen improved performance because of pressure, including 
international pressure. Shell announced a renewable energy component -  can 
prove it -  through pressures. That is our role to bring change: government to take 
the opportunity with the right constitution, and democracy is the ultimate provider 
of that. (LGov3 2006)
In Cape Town, the local government air quality and health officials appeared to be highly 
qualified but less innovative. An interesting juxtaposition emerged from the analysis -  Cape 
Town had the most sophisticated air quality monitoring system in South Africa until Durban 
eclipsed it in the mid 2000s. Worrying for Cape Town that many of the ‘old guard’ air quality 
management specialists appeared to be close to retirement (LGov8 2006; Ind7 2006; LGov9 
2006; LGovlO 2006).
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Also quite different between Durban and Cape Town was that the air quality specialists and 
health enforcement officials were predominantly ‘historically disadvantaged South Africans’ 
in Durban whereas in Cape Town they were not. This may explain why Hans Linde, Cape 
Town’s former air quality manager and a white South African, was moved to the provincial 
government as air quality manager -  possibly to make way for HDSA employees at local 
government (Ind7 2006). Institutional memory and capacity was a severe problem within all 
spheres of South Africa’s government. As Cape Town’s senior air pollution managers retire 
or move on, hiring skilled replacements and building technical capacity within the workforce 
was a large issue (LGovlO 2006; LGov9 2006). In addition, for those talented young 
employees there are many incentives to move through posts quickly and thus the issue of staff 
turnover is one that regulators needed to address (LGov3 2006).
Spurred by refinery incidents and Groundwork and SDCEA’s campaigning, national 
government began to take a serious look at industrial pollution in the Basin. Regulators at the 
national level were influential in putting pressure on industry from the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Deputy Environment Minister Rejoice Mabudafhasi used tough rhetoric to name and 
shame industrial polluters and Environment Minister Valli Moosa launched the MPP in 2000. 
The new Environment Minister Marthinus Van Schalkyk began to more clearly bridge the 
fields between Durban and Cape Town with his rhetoric in 2004. As the national level 
discursive spaces related to regulation and enforcement took shape between 2004 and 2006, 
national actors such as Peter Lukey, Head of Air Quality Management, became more 
prominent in the network diagrams. Lukey was a former environmental justice activist with 
Earthlife South Africa before joining government (Ind4 2006). Also in Cape Town, as in 2006 
Calref was served a pre-directive related to its string of incidents dating back over the 
previous few years. Here local, provincial and national regulators came together with NGOs, 
community and refinery representatives to discuss, in conciliatory fashion, how the regulatory 
and permitting process would proceed in relation to Calref s subpar performance (NGovl 
2006). In Cape Town, national government officials such as Melissa Fourie from the 
Enforcement Directorate (i.e. Green Scorpions) began to weigh in on implementation of 
NEMA in relation to industrial polluters, although ultimately the regulation of industrial 
polluters was to be devolved to local government (NGovl 2006).
Questions remained as to how responsibilities for implementation and enforcement of 
environmental laws were going to be devolved from the national to the provincial and local
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spheres of government. This transition, particularly in Durban, was marked by conflict 
between the local Durban Health Department officials charged with enforcing pollution 
control in South Durban and national DEAT officials (NG05 2006); in Cape Town, the 
process was still in its infancy in 2006 (NGovl 2006). Although outside the scope of this 
study, the politics within and between the different spheres of government related to the 
implementation of new environmental laws such as the air quality regulations would make a 
fascinating study and an appropriate follow up to this piece of work. From the discussion, two 
propositions may be generalised to other newly democratic developing country contexts:
Proposition 2g: In a new constitutional democracy and emerging economy 
context, government will take a facilitative role in governing corporate 
environmental performance, carefully negotiating the terrain between cooperative 
and coercive governance.
Proposition 2h: In a developing and transitional country context, the devolution 
o f environmental governance to the local level will be hindered by lack o f  
institutional memory and capacity to implement and enforce regulations.
8.4 Firm legitimacy and characteristics
Also relevant in the identification of mechanisms of institutional and organisational change 
are how firm characteristics such as resources and culture may influence each firm’s 
legitimation strategies and subsequent environmental performance outcomes. Although the 
refineries were of similar complexity and refined similar crudes in a coastal region, there were 
significant differences between the legitimation strategies and characteristics of the firms. The 
resource-based view of the firm literature identifies resources as tangible, intangible and 
personnel-based firm assets. Organisational culture can be broken down into the study of 
changing structures/processes, norms and beliefs within firms.
One of the limitations of this study was the dearth of primary data gathered related to these 
internal factors. Although a variety of corporate managers and industry experts were 
interviewed, corporate culture was not able to be evaluated through action research, a large 
number of interviews or participant observation. Non-public data could also not be gathered 
on these different types of resources. However, it can be inferred how access to resources and 
corporate culture may differ between the three refineries. Through in depth analysis of the 
study’s primary and secondary data it has been observed how the firms responded to external 
pressures and how internal parent company pressure differed between the three refineries. The
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environmental performance data presented in Chapter 4 also provides insight into firm 
resources and culture.
Some themes emerged from the data. First, as discussed above in section 8.3.1, internal 
champions and leadership drove environmental performance improvements. Second, a key 
differentiator was the role of the parent company and corporate culture.
8.4.1 Parent company influence and access to resources
Sapref s environmental performance improved significantly after Shell became more actively
involved. Enref and Calref did not have such proactive parent company pressure (or internal
legitimacy risks). It can be inferred that internal parent company oversight and resources (i.e.
tangible, intangible and personnel based) were influential. Bobby Peek highlights the
relationship between parent company, corporate culture and host community legitimacy risks:
Sapref are changing their pipelines for the whatever reason they say, but they 
change, but there has been good changes in Sapref, they have reduced their 
pollution. Shit man it use to smell, let’s be frank...Um, they (Sapref) will allow us 
to come in, they will play the politics and we will play the politics now, but we 
have access to what we need... There is still a debate about information but we’ve 
managed to create that change in Sapref, and Shell and BP, it is because they have 
their HQ in London. Engen HQ and Petronas are in the middle of Malaysia, come 
on, who the hell knows what is on them you know, corporate culture in some parts 
of the world definitely there are benefits of having it in other places.
So I think at that level within a globalised world there are those strengths of the 
fact that these offices are in the North, and we can call them and embarrass them 
at the very least, yes so that is the strength. So that’s why Engen I believe now, 
although they were the forerunner in making changes, they were a South African 
company, now they are a Malaysian company they’re not going to move as much 
now. Now Sapref is moving faster. (NG05 2006)
Here the role of the parent company and ability of activists to engage with MNC home
country stakeholders is important. This type of reputational capital is more relevant for a
MNC headquartered in Europe than one in Malaysia. Chevron also appeared to take a hands
off approach towards Calref up until the very end of the research period. An industry insider,
who wanted to remain anonymous, felt like Chevron “let them go”, that as an American
company they would take advantage of the lax regulation while they could. This in fact
corresponds to Andy Birkinshaw’s recollection of what Calref s general manager Paul Buley
said to him in the late 1990s: “Paul Buley said to me, Andy we will not change until
legislation changes because we have a permit that allows us to operate in the way that we
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operate, until that permit changes we won’t change. That was around 1998 or 1997” (NG09 
2006).
Another industry insider, who wanted to remain anonymous, gave insight into Petronas’
approach to environmental management: “I don’t think the environment is that serious for
them ...it’s a sidestroke, it is not key to how they operate.” Wayne Hartmann, Enref General
Manager, confirmed this suspicion about Petronas’ oversight:
JV: Is there much input from Petronas on your environmental strategy?
WH: Very little. There are discussions that happen between practitioners locally 
and Petronas. But the strategy section developed internally. Frankly it is not even 
in corporate vocabulary developing that strategy. More often than not, not 100% 
to 0% but highly skewed to us developing that strategy. You need to understand 
that an element of corporate culture in there too. It is pretty much an empowered 
one and a decentralised one.
Here Hartmann raises an interesting point -  the ability of subsidiaries to influence their parent
company. This would make an interesting topic for future research, particularly whether
South-South or South-North investment has influenced corporate environmental behaviour
within South-based MNCs. From the discussion it follows that:
Proposition 3a: Subsidiaries o f  oil companies headquartered in Europe will 
receive more international, home country and parent company pressure than 
subsidiaries o f  oil companies headquartered in the US and/or developing 
countries (e.g. Malaysia).
8.4.2 Corporate culture
What also emerged, particularly in Durban, was a strong difference between corporate
cultures. For example Selva Mudaly, Durban Muni’s Director of Environmental Health
highlighted the differences between Sapref and Enref:
I can pick up the phone at any time and call Wayne Hartmann and say we have a 
problem can we meet, it is serious, and immediately he can give you an 
appointment. With Wayne Pearce and even when this guy Richard Parkes was 
there he was so involved with international things he was never available, but he 
(Richard Parkes) was accessible. Wayne Pearce, we have never had dialogue with 
him... so although he is quite friendly, and a good guy to deal with I suppose, he 
gets tied up with so much other issues. He seems to have given too much of power 
to Lora (Lora Rossler was Sapref s Sustainability Manager) and she doesn’t see 
the bigger picture. You have got to look at this at a very macro level. Not only for 
Sapref within that fence. (LGov4c 2006)
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Other examples were given about how Sapref brought lawyers to negotiations of their 
pollution permit, which offended Durban Muni’s Health Department (LGov4c 2006). In 
addition, as Mudaly stressed there were strong differences in management styles between the 
refineries:
With Allan Munn you get decisions...with Wayne Hartmann he can give you 
decisions on the floor...he doesn’t have to consult with anybody’s 
board...Whereas with Sapref seems to be different style of management, where 
people have no authority to make decisions. They have to go back to a panel of 
people, which is not a good system of managing... (LGov4c 2006)
As Hartmann highlighted:
For example our approach to deal with environment performance issues. We don’t 
take an approach which says talk to my lawyer. Part of the culture of organisation. 
Again different approaches by different companies... Um, with us, you’ll have 
discussion with individuals. Pretty much corporate culture will then come out. 
Engaging in an open and honest type of approach. Unfortunately there are times 
when that can be abused. (Ind5 2006)
On the one hand, being the subsidiary of Shell allowed for community activists to name and
shame the parent company in its home country, but on the other hand, Sapref s corporate
noculture was secretive and closed. Engen clearly identified itself as an “African” firm and, as 
Alan Munn explained, attempted to change internal culture by sending executives on 
sustainability courses in the UK (Ind4 2006). As Hartmann reiterated: “Your culture largely 
comes from your leadership team in my view” (Ind5 2006). As highlighted in section 5.2.1, 
Enref was unique in comparison to Sapref and Calref, particularly in the early to mid 1990s as 
Engen was privately listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange thus opening it up to public 
scrutiny. A culture of openness distinguishes Enref from Calref and Sapref perhaps given that 
for part of its existence it has been a true South African (i.e. domestic) firm.
An interesting paradox emerged from this analysis. Sapref had consistently better 
environmental performance and host community legitimacy by the end of the research period, 
as identified in my analysis in Chapter 4 and reiterated by both Desmond D’Sa and Bobby 
Peek in interviews. However, Enref had a more open, communicative and partnership-driven
72 Indeed, it was very difficult to get access to Sapref. It took me two years to get an interview with managers at 
the refinery. Wayne Pearce, Sapref s general manager, was supposed to attend, in the end he did not. Out of the 
three refineries it was the only one I could not record and the only one where I did not meet the general manager. 
Even with Bamaby Briggs from Shell trying to get me access, Sapref was very hesitant to meet. However, this 
could be interpreted as a more strategic approach to stakeholder engagement than the other refineries, as I was 
not one of their critical stakeholders.
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approach to stakeholder engagement. Even though Enref had superior intentions, they were 
constrained by the refinery’s close proximity to communities (as discussed in the next 
section), apparent lack of resources and parent company influence. Calref also appeared to 
stumble through repairing host community legitimacy because of lack of resources (both 
material and personnel-based) and parent company oversight. This study has found that parent 
company influence and access to resources trump corporate culture at the facility level. The 
following propositions would make interesting topics for future research:
Proposition 3b: Parent company influence and access to resources will more 
significantly affect host community legitimacy and environmental performance 
outcomes than corporate culture at the facility level.
Proposition 3c: Industrial facilities with a culture that identifies more closely with 
that o f  its host country/community will be more cooperative corporate neighbours 
than firms with corporate cultures that do not identify as closely with their host 
country/community contexts.
8.5 Host community context
From the analytical narrative in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the evidence of divergent fields and 
environmental performance outcomes, host community context has emerged as an 
explanatory factor. As discussed in section 5.1, Cape Town’s northern suburbs and the South 
Durban Basin were very different in terms of history, people, place and economy. The study 
of how context may influence organisational change processes is not new (Pettigrew 1990, 
1997); however, the influence of site-level context on institutional and organisational 
processes and outcomes is underemphasised within new institutionalism. The role of history, 
people, place and economy may significantly influence site level corporate environmental 
performance. Some key differences emerged between the South Durban Basin and Cape 
Town’s northern suburbs.
8.5.1 The legacy of spatial planning
Enref and Sapref operated in communities that were relocated under apartheid to live on the
refineries’ fencelines. As an environmental consultant in Durban recalled:
When Engen opened in 1953, its closest residents were 3km away. As Durban 
grew, residents got closer and closer -  then the apartheid act (Group Areas Act) 
put people next to refinery. Local authority at the time was against it, but national 
legislation was superior to local bylaws. A combination of politics and expediency 
combined to create horrendous social conditions... (Ind6 2006)
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The way spatial planning evolved in the South Durban Basin was a significant factor in 
influencing community engagement strategies towards Enref and Sapref a community 
member explained:
Sapref is difficult to get access to, if you going to stage a protest or strike it is very 
difficult. Whereas Engen is very vulnerable because they are in the community.
So they get more. (Com9b 2006)
The location of the refineries, Enref in the midst of communities and Sapref slightly more
isolated, influenced the evolution of company culture and engagement strategies. As Trevor
Chom, Engen’s Environmental Affairs Manager, recalled:
JV: In those early days (mid 1990s) it seemed like Engen opened up before Sapref 
did.
TC: Well before.
JV: Why do you think that was?
TC: Because we were closer.
JV: Next to the community, their first target?
TC: The desire was in us, first, maybe because we had a closer relationship with 
the community. Sapref dragged their feet for a good number of years before they 
came to the party, and then almost reluctantly but I think they are now with the 
same sort of vigour as we are. (IndlO 2006)
In contrast, white middle-class communities moved by choice to live around Calref. As
Nazeema Abraham, Calref s HSE manager, explained:
...it’s a more middle class community around the area here (than the South 
Durban Basin)...although people will use the terminology of environmental 
justice, but it’s not the poor living around, in fact it’s the affluent community. I 
was asked why I did not live close to the refinery and I said I could not. At the 
time, 10 years ago, people of colour could not live around the refinery. This was a 
place that was in fact reserved for the white people of South Africa...
The degree to which firms are confronted with host community legitimacy risks and are
open and cooperational is related to the proximity of local residents. It follows that:
Proposition 4a: Industrial facilities in closest proximity to local residents will 
have the most difficulty maintaining host community legitimacy (i.e. social 
license).
Proposition 4b: Industrial facilities located closest to local residents will be more 
open and cooperative with host communities than those located further away.
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8.5.2 History, ideology and place
It is also interesting to compare the history of activism and ideology in the two contexts.
During apartheid, Merebank was a hotbed for resistance and ANC support:
The history of environment in south Durban has been very much intertwined with 
the ANC liberation struggle. The ANC was very close with the Merebank 
Residents Association (MRA). And the MRA was commonly known as a front for 
the ANC underground...and Merebank residents have been mobilising for the last 
30 or 40 years, so quite some time. (NG05 2006)
Engagement around environmental issues in the Basin pre-dates democracy:
Within the confines of the apartheid state you have the predominantly working 
class Afrikaans speaking whites on the Bluff raising environmental concerns 
about the refineries, separate from the Merebank people. And in the middle you 
have the coloured community of Wentworth who have a much poorer I believe 
economic outlook on life both from the Merebank and Bluff white side. And they 
are more caught up in the day to day struggle.. .(NG05 2006)
The rise of Wentworth activism marked the beginning of the post-apartheid pollution struggle
in the Basin, as Bobby Peek explained:
So we rely on Wentworth refinery for work, but in the 1990s and democracy, 
people in Wentworth where Desmond and I live start recognising this thing the 
environment. And we start putting forward a much more radical approach to 
environment. So then what is now emerging from the Bluff and from the 
Merebank people, they are caught up in a series of negotiations to participate in 
changing this industry. The Wentworth folk start emerging in this debate in 1994 
and it was precipitated or catalysed by Engen coming to the community and 
saying we want to develop with you a community and awareness emergency 
response system. (NG05 2006)
This history is relevant given the type of discursive strategies Wentworth activists D’Sa and
Peek adopted throughout the research period.
In Cape Town post-apartheid activists also drew on historical legacies to engage with industry
and government. For example, Andy Birkinshaw highlighted the role of poor planning and
regulation in allowing the conflict between communities and industry to occur:
Yes you (Calref) were here first, but only a third of your size... who allowed you 
to expand when residential community was growing, government! Who allowed 
you to pollute, government! (We) got under government’s collar. Other 
communities didn’t think that way, didn’t have same background and 
education.. .(NG09 2006)
The white middleclass communities that moved to the areas adjacent to Calref engaged with
refinery management through stakeholders meetings dating back into the 1980s (LGov9
2006). Gordon Smith, Calrefs general manager in 2006, highlighted some interesting
historical issues related to refinery maintenance:
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The refinery is 40 years old this year. We are well aware of the political situation 
here. During the apartheid years there of course was an oil embargo on, which led 
to the development of Sasol. The refinery process would take crudes, anything it 
could get from anywhere. Horrible crudes and things other people wouldn’t 
refine. The operation of the refinery was terribly disrupted by this. What refineries 
like is constant feed, what they don’t like is change. The refinery was difficult to 
control on this unbalanced diet if you like, which led to environmental expulsions.
In the 1960s, 70s and 80s I suppose this was acceptable, and then where the 
refinery was just a greenfield site. (Indl5 2006)
What is similar between the three refineries is that they all refined sub-par crudes, which had
knock on effects for refinery environmental performance. Nevertheless, the historical context
of the human geography in Cape Town and Durban was very different.
The rise of Wentworth activism and the post-apartheid pollution struggle in Durban brought a 
more radicalised edge to community-company relations in the Basin. The power of rights- 
based discourse, highlighting the injustices of the past, was apparent throughout the analysis. 
In unpacking mechanisms of institutional and organisational change this is a relevant point. 
There is a clear difference between ‘place’ in the South Durban Basin and Cape Town’s 
northern suburbs. Identities were constituted differently within these contexts. The in depth 
analytical narrative in Chapter’s 5 to 7 has highlighted how place-based identities influenced 
discursive strategies and the emergence of institutional logics. From the analysis, historically 
disadvantaged South Africans have had more success influencing the institutionalisation of 
corporate environmental performance in South Durban than the historically privileged white 
South Africans have in Northern Cape Town. It would be interesting to test this finding, as 
summarised in proposition 4c, in other contexts within South Africa:
Proposition 4c: Historically disadvantaged South Africans will have more success 
in influencing the institutionalisation o f corporate environmental performance 
than historically privileged white South Africans.
8.5.3 Economy
It emerged from the analysis the importance of the structural context of the economy in 
influencing field structuration. Refining is a strategic industry in South Africa, it plays a 
critical role as a key source of tax revenue, foreign exchange, jobs and human resource 
development (Whyte 1995). South Africa’s economic growth strategy and the liberalisation 
and expansion of the fuel oil industry influenced the evolution of the field. For example,
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refinery capacity expansion (i.e. de-mothballing) in the early 1990s influenced Calref s T1 
and arguably the stream of events afterwards. The drive for production expansion also 
precipitated Enref s T4, and much of the controversy that surrounded Enref in the 2000s. As 
Bamaby Briggs highlighted, Sapref was also interested in expanding production at some point 
in the future:
From Wayne’s point of view (Saprefs GM in 2006)...he says to Siva (Siva 
Chetty, Programme Manager for MPP) I want to have a refinery that is twice as 
big that it is now, and I want it to have less environmental impact and I want it to 
be the best for Shell or BP to invest your money. Now those are incredible 
statements, very simple, but if we got that then South Africa benefits more. Get all 
the taxation for less impact. (Indl6 2007)
This structural power of the logic of economic growth and industrial expansion constrained
the realm of possible governance outcomes. A recommendation from this study is that
refineries more strategically consider how structural market and economic shifts (e.g. drives
for economic growth and refinery expansion) could detrimentally affect their environmental
performance and host community and country legitimacy.
Interestingly, the Asian Crisis in 1998 may have ‘bought time’ for community activists, 
particularly in Durban, and enabled community capacity to be built before much of the drive 
for industry expansion occurred. Refinery expansion was brought to a standstill as economic 
growth faltered. This episode parallels the 2008/2009 economic crisis. The ‘silver lining’ of 
these disruptive events is that they may provide the opportunity for stakeholders at multiple 
scales to become more organised in order to develop understanding to better mitigate and 
prevent industrial pollution. Given these findings, proposition 4d outlines two avenues for 
future research.
Proposition 4d: The logic o f  economic growth and industrial expansion in an 
emerging economy will constrain the realm o f possible environmental governance 
outcomes; however, economic crisis and uncertainty provides a window o f  
opportunity fo r  institutional actors to disrupt and/or restructure field  level 
processes and subsequent corporate environmental performance outcomes.
8.6 Power and scale within the process of institutional and organisational change
As highlighted in Chapter 1, much of the existing work on the greening of industry focuses on 
one scale of governance without adequately accounting for the socio-spatial complexities, 
either external or internal to the firm, which influence the take up and implementation of
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corporate environmentalism at the site level. In addition, institutional and organisational 
theory has been critiqued for underspecifying the role of agency and power in field dynamics. 
Throughout the analytical narrative this study has highlighted how different modes of power 
and scale have influenced field structuration. This section distils these various discussions in 
order to summarise how power and scale were exercised and constituted within this study.
8.6.1 Modes of power
As discussed in section 2.3.1, a typology was adapted from Arts and Van Tatenhove (2004) to 
identify modes of power of specific interest to institutional and organisational theory -  the 
dual-direction of influence between the field and the firm. Relational, dispositional and 
structural forms of power were identified. Relational power exists on a continuum from 
coercive to cooperational and can be identified by the interaction and knowledge-based 
politics between field level actors (e.g. Lukes’ first and second dimensions of power and 
Litfin and Hajer’s discursive conceptions of power). Dispositional power indicates the 
position of actors in field dynamics mediated by rules and resources, and structural power 
highlights how the social and economic contexts in which actors are embedded co-determine 
the capacities for organisations to act (Arts and Van Tatenhove 2004: 351).
In 1994 South Africa was a country in transition, the power balance of business-state 
collusion under apartheid was under threat. Relational, dispositional and structural forms of 
power had favoured business under apartheid. The opportunity remained strong for structural 
forms of power and the control of business interests to dominate environmental governance 
under a post-apartheid pro-capitalist and pro-growth government agenda. Yet civil society had 
the opportunity to mobilise against perceived injustices within the new South Africa, as the 
state began to rebuild its environmental regulatory frameworks.
Within this new democracy field dynamics were largely driven by relational forms ofpower. 
Much of the refinery field contestation at the host community level can be explained through 
an interpretation of Lukes’ first and second dimensions of power (or as Arts and Van 
Tatenhove (2004: 353) explain, ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’ forms of power). The 
contestation around particular issues such as Calref s broken promise, Sapref s pipeline leak, 
Enref s expansion plans and the role out of regulation such as Durban’s MPP and the AQMA 
can at one level be characterised as examples of one-dimensional power. At the surface, at 
least from what can be gleaned from newspaper articles, it would appear that conflict of
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interests were being overtly debated. Yet a more nuanced interpretation of the data, 
particularly with insight from interviews, sheds a different light.
Refineries were found to engage in agenda setting activities, to prevent or encourage certain
decisions to be taken. This is similar to Lukes’ second dimension of power. For example, after
Enref was fmed 10,000 rand for SO2 exceedances in 2005 it sought to negotiate directly with
local government more lenient terms for its licence agreement. Yet it is a fine line between
manipulation and shared decision-making. Enref was the first petrochemical industry to go
through the permitting process under the AQMA. Enref s sustainability manager commented
on how the refinery was working with local authorities to “get the balance right”:
We were the first petrochemical industry to go through that process. We made a 
few mistakes. Most notably on how we handled the flare issue and SO2 transition 
issues. But those are now being talked about; we will get those rewritten in a more 
practical way. They don’t want to shut us down, but we must do better. It’s just 
getting the balance right. (Ind4 2006)
Also indicative of using power covertly to manipulate outcomes, Durban Muni’s health 
department officials described Sapref s behaviour in negotiating its pollution permit as 
“shadow boxing” (LGov4b 2006). Sapref would try to obstruct certain courses of action by 
withholding information, bringing corporate lawyers to meetings, etc. The refinery appeared 
to take advantage of regulatory uncertainty. For example, in a 2006 debate about the potential 
of Sapref having SO2 permit violations, the refinery raised concern about the location of air 
monitoring stations. A local government official commented that questioning the efficacy of 
the air quality monitoring system “has been a (i.e. Sapref s) trump card, an excuse to get out 
of bad performance” (PGov4 2006).
Calref, on the other hand, was less engaged in ‘shadow boxing’ with Cape Town Muni, as it
lacked internal and external processes, as a Cape Town air pollution manager commented:
In the past I've had very good cooperation from Chevron (i.e. Calref). They do 
have a good management team. Sometimes they get the idea that they will try to 
hide things. They had a leak the other day but then they said they had no one to 
report to which I found extremely strange. They said they don't know when to 
report something. I told them if you're in doubt, report it to the authorities and let 
them know about it. Little things like that that also gives them a bad name. 
(LGov9 2006)
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Community activists also influenced and set the agenda related to industrial pollution. They 
pursued both overt and covert strategies. Issue shaping was something SDCEA and 
Groundwork pursued through a combination of discursive and knowledge-based strategies, 
e.g. through naming and shaming in the media and the production of civic science and 
educational material. The TVRA in Cape Town also pursued behind the scenes approaches. 
For example, in 2005 they took a bucket air sample that found VOC emissions 64 times 
higher than normal. Birkinshaw used this data to coerce Calref and the government to 
implement real-time VOC monitoring in the area: “I didn’t take those results to media; I 
played with local, provincial and national government and the refinery” (NG09 2006). 
However, as discussed in section 8.3.2, the Durban activists, who consistently employed 
logics of environmental justice and corporate accountability, affected field structuration more 
significantly than Cape Town activists who engaged utilising the logics of managerial 
environmentalism.
Yet local government also sought to govern refineries’ environmental performance through
overt and covert methods. For example, after Calref s string of incidents in the early 2000s
the local government requested they submit NEMA incident reports. There was uncertainty
around exactly what constituted a NEMA incident and how the local authorities would use the
information, as one industry insider explained:
They (the government) got Calref to put in a whole stack of NEMA incidents. 
Whereas they weren’t asking anybody else to do these things. So then they had all 
this data on the refinery, and then they came back with the pre-directive. Which is 
what the refinery said in the beginning, you know, that “if you only get us to fill 
these reports in, then you are going to have a pile of them somewhere, and it’s 
going to come back and bite us” ... “Oh no, no...” (said the government) (Indll 
2006)
Here local, provincial and national government regulators shaped the agenda by gathering 
enough information to prosecute Calref at a later date. This was a covert strategy. A 
cooperational guise resulted in a coercive outcome. In Durban, as discussed in section 7.3.1, 
the health department manipulated the permit requirements for the refineries. They made ISO 
certification, a voluntary environmental management system (EMS), mandatory as part of the 
new schedule trade permits in the Basin: “We have ingeniously married the EMS, ISO 
certification system, together with our auditing. So the outcomes of the EMS must read into 
our permitting system when it comes to environmental performance” (LGov4b 2006). “Even 
the ISO people are asking to see our schedule trade permit... that’s how far we have gone 
with it... it’s a bit of a success” (LGov4c 2006). Local regulators cleverly ‘South Africanised’
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international norms and standards to the local level to govern the refineries’ environmental 
performance.
In addition, material or dispositional power, as discussed in section 8.4.1 and 8.4.2, 
significantly influenced the structuration of Sapref s organisational field. From 2003, Sapref 
began to repair its host community legitimacy because of parent company pressure and access 
to resources. When compared to Enref s continuing legitimation crises towards the end of the 
research period, Sapref s access to superior resources and capabilities demonstrate a powerful 
host community advantage. Confirming this finding, Calref s consistently low host 
community legitimacy was perpetuated because of lack of resources (both material and 
personnel-based) and parent company oversight. In Durban activists were able to employ 
discursive and knowledge-based strategies (relational power) to influence governance 
outcomes, whereas Cape Town’s activists were less successful. How can this difference be 
explained? From a dispositional perspective, the activists in Durban were reasonably well- 
resourced full-time campaigners, whereas Cape Town’s community leaders volunteered their 
time. Given the historical legacies, access to a sympathetic press, and the environmental 
protection priorities of the ANC government, the historically disadvantaged South African 
campaigners in Durban had superior access to decision-making processes than their 
historically privileged counterparts in Cape Town. How these community-based actors were 
positioned in field dynamics differed because of historical legacies, existing and emerging 
rules (i.e. institutions), and resources.
Market- and economy-related themes were also prominent in the analysis, as highlighted in
section 8.5.3, which indicate underlying structural forms o f power. As discussed in section
1.5.3, in 2006 President Mbeki identified environmental regulation as obstructing economic
and social development, hence EIA regulations were streamlined. As the director of pollution
and waste management within the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Agriculture and
Environmental Affairs highlighted:
The government generally speaking sees the environment as a stumbling block to 
development, and in fact we have been charged to do what we call developmental 
environmental management, that means we don’t stop growth. So we have looked 
inward, we are not against development; we just want development that is 
responsible. (PGov4 2006)
Indeed Durban Muni’s director of environmental health confirmed this view:
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South Africa is in a situation where economic development is a priority it is 
number one on the agenda. So you can’t destroy economic development. Now 
where do you find the balance, and nobody is bold enough to find that step... not 
the minister of DEAT, not the deputy minister who is supposed to be 
resigning...(LGov4c 2006)
As indicated in section 8.5.3, refinery expansion resulted from South Africa’s economic
growth path, and as Durban’s environmental health officials pointed out: “Whenever you
have increased production rates you have an increase in bad performance, complaints etc”
(LGov4b 2006). The analysis has demonstrated that in both Durban and Cape Town,
increased industry expansion, environmental pollution and refinery incidents have been met
with vociferous community-driven activism. Here, structural producer-driven power was not
deterministic (e.g. Carter 2007: 185-186), as discursive power wielded by civil society has
yielded results, more so in Durban than Cape Town.
In fact, community-driven discursive debate, which on the one hand can be analysed as a 
form of relational power, can also be considered a dominant discourse in the early 2000s in 
Durban, thus exhibiting characteristics of a structural mode of power. The logic of 
environmental justice and corporate accountability significantly influenced local and national 
politics during this time, and stymied the logic of managerial environmentalism. It can be 
argued that community activists coerced government and industry stakeholders into a type of 
consensus on issues related to implementation of the AQMA, MPP and schedule trade permits 
in the Basin. Knowledge-based power driven by civil society actors catalysed field 
structuration in the early 2000s, and in this sense co-determined the capacity for organisations 
to act. Cape Town activists, as indicated by the fragmented field, did not establish such 
dominant influence over Calref s organisational field.
Why this bifurcation between activists in Durban and Cape Town? The behaviour of 
individuals and organisations is influenced by external (e.g. historical and place-based) and 
internal (e.g. beliefs and culture) contexts. It follows, similar to the discussion in section 
8.5.2, that industry, government and civil society actors in Cape Town engaged with less 
success given their different norms and beliefs informed by white middle-class experiences, 
as opposed to the African, Coloured and Indian activists in South Durban, who experienced 
and continued to articulate the apartheid injustices of the past. As discussed in 8.3.2 the media 
also appeared more sympathetic to the ‘stories’ of South Durban’s communities.
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Although dispositional and structural modes of power are still highlighted in the above 
analysis, relational and knowledge-based power, particularly in Durban, dominated field 
structuration and catalysed processes of institutional and organisational change.
8.6.2 The politics of scale and networks
This study has also found that a politics of scale and networks impacted Saprefs 
organisational field considerably, whereas Calref and Enref s fields pertained to mostly host 
community and country dynamics. This is particularly relevant given the divergent 
environmental performance outcomes between the three refineries. It follows that the firm 
with the most home country and international reputation risks will pursue superior 
environmental performance strategies at the site level. Clearly though the process of field and 
firm dynamics was more complex than this. When considered over time, it is very interesting 
to note that Sapref, given Shell’s international notoriety in the 1990s with the Brent Spar and 
Nigeria debacles, turned a blind eye to community grievances until the early 2000s. It was 
actually the transformation in attitude of the general manager at the refinery and an increased 
interest in its parent company that began the process of change.
How did South Africa’s policies of economic and regulatory liberalism impact the socio- 
spatial processes of environmental protection? Indeed there was a devolution of regulatory 
control to the local authorities as stipulated in the constitution, but the capacity to implement 
and enforce environmental regulation appeared to gain momentum throughout the research 
period as opposed to be hollowed out. As argued in section 1.5, in the late 1990s the field of 
environmental and air pollution management lacked formal authority, given that the air 
pollution laws were based upon 1965 legislation and that government regulators had limited 
capacity to enforce existing permits. Air pollution regulation in 1994 was equivalent to that in 
the US in the early 1970s (Lents and Nikkila 2000: 4). South Africa had a tremendous 
opportunity to accelerate its development and environmental protection pathways, which, to 
varying degrees, was achieved. As evident in Chapter 7, a new ‘field’ at the national level 
took shape, and new air quality regulation and enforcement capacity within all spheres of 
government rapidly progressed. However, a word of caution, the devolution and 
implementation of these new regulations in various localities may yield fragmented outcomes. 
It is likely that municipalities like Durban and Cape Town have superior resources and 
expertise to other localities.
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As discussed in section 1.3.1, it was expected that direct or command and control regulation 
would have little influence over each refineries’ corporate environmental performance, that 
self- and voluntary regulation would have more significant impact. Mandatory regulation of a 
modem standard did not get implemented in Durban until the new permitting process took 
place in 2005 and 2006, and in Cape Town, Calref s new air pollution permit had yet to be 
formulated. The performance improvements that the refineries did make during this time were 
in fact a form of self- or voluntary regulation. Yet the refineries knew in the early 2000s that 
new air pollution regulations were in the pipeline. Some of the environmental performance 
improvements, and potential reticence by Calref to improve emissions beyond a certain point, 
may have been due to the impending threat of regulation. From a scalar perspective, South 
Africa’s environmental protection regulatory and enforcement capacities were influenced by 
cross-scale interaction. As highlighted throughout the analytical narrative, various 
governments (e.g. the UK, US, Norway and Denmark) took a keen interest in capacity 
building initiatives within South Africa’s spheres of government and civil society.
Also from a scalar perspective, section 1.3.2 posited that Sapref and Calref would have more 
international, home country and parent company pressure than Enref. Interestingly, Sapref 
was more significantly impacted by international norms and standards as it was the first 
refinery to implement ISO 14001 and to begin publishing stakeholder reports. Calref was in 
fact the laggard in the study, perhaps (as highlighted in section 8.3.2) because Cape Town 
community activists did not wage international campaigns at Chevron. Enref was in fact the 
first mover in Durban seeking to engage with community groups and reduce emissions before 
Sapref, but its resource constraints and sensitive location in the heart of the community has 
exacerbated its environmental legitimacy.
Related to community-driven governance, section 1.3.3 posited that Cape Town’s white 
middle-class host communities would engage more cooperatively with Calref and achieve 
more significant corporate environmental performance gains than South Durban’s Indian, 
Coloured and African communities. Calref s fenceline communities did engage more 
cooperatively but they achieved fewer corporate environmental performance gains from 
Calref than South Durban’s communities did with Enref and Sapref. South Durban’s 
community activists engaged with a mix of coercive and cooperational approaches utilising 
the rhetoric of environmental justice and corporate accountability. They shaped field level 
discourse through a combination of protest activities and community-driven science and
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knowledge politics, catalysed by a sympathetic press. Enref and Sapref, given the norms of 
corporate citizenship within the new South Africa, did not resist engaging with its fenceline 
communities, although Enref demonstrated a more open and communicative culture than 
Sapref.
What is particularly interesting is how community-based organisations and individuals 
utilised scalar and network-based strategies to achieve local goals. Early on in the 
analysis activists in Wentworth resisted Enref s attempt to implement a Responsible 
Care initiative. Here international norms and standards were called into question as a 
merely symbolic gesture to legitimise business as usual. This resistance to top-down 
diffusion of global norms and standards significantly influenced the ‘South 
Africanisation’ of local governance outcomes. In 1998 when Bobby Peek received the 
prestigious Goldman Environmental Prize in California the international spotlight, i.e. a 
highly networked international community, descended on South Durban. However, it 
was in the early 2000s that Durban activists strategically employed a politics of scale 
and networks to restructure field dynamics. Through community-based monitoring and 
enforcement networks, the Bucket Brigades were introduced into South Africa and a 
local campaign against Shell was begun. Groundwork became a Friends of the Earth 
Chapter and local activists became shareholders of Shell and travelled to London to 
protest at its AGM. The WSSD in 2002 brought international media to Durban, but 
comparatively little activity to Cape Town’s northern suburbs. Where Durban’s activists 
strategically engaged with corporate neighbours using a wide array of discursive 
strategies from the local to global, Cape Town’s activists played the game at the host 
community and country scales. As highlighted in section 8.5.2, place-based identities 
have influenced scalar strategies and the emergence of institutional logics and 
governance structures. The above discussion highlights how the politics of scale and 
networks have influenced the diffusion and potential unevenness of corporate 
environmental outcomes.
8.7 Chapter summary
Corporate environmentalism has evolved in the post-apartheid South African fuel oil industry 
in complex and context-specific ways. Although organisational field dynamics structured the 
realm of possible governance outcomes, each refinery’s environmental performance was 
influenced by parent company and subsidiary legitimation strategies and characteristics. By
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comparing and contrasting Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 it is apparent that corporate environmental 
performance was to a certain degree institutionalised in Durban; however, in Cape Town, the 
field remained fragmented with less defined trends of field structuration and corporate 
environmental performance improvements. Enref and Sapref s graphs are quite similar -  they 
both demonstrate that environmental performance generally improved throughout the research 
period -  whereas Calref s illustrates a more fragmented start-and-stop type process. As 
highlighted throughout the analysis Sapref appeared to have gained superior host community 
legitimacy and environmental performance results from 2004 to 2006. The key differences in 
comparison to Enref and Calref s field dynamics and environmental performance outcomes 
were not only Shell’s parent company oversight and Sapref s access to resources, but also the 
fact that activists in Durban campaigned against Shell, whereas campaigns were not directed 
at Petronas or Chevron.
How can divergence between these processes of institutional and organisational change be 
explained? Chapter 8 has identified a variety of mechanisms/propositions of institutional and 
organisational change related to events, institutional logics, governance structures, actors’ 
agency, firm factors and host community context. Section 8.6 has highlighted how these 
diverging processes are characterised by differing modes of power (i.e. the rise of relational 
and knowledge-based power over dispositional and structural power) and a politics of scale 
and networks. The ‘black box’ of institutional and organisational change has been explored 
and illuminated for these refineries during a specific time period. A universal theory of 
corporate environmentalism was not the goal; instead middle range theory of corporate 
greening within a developing country/emerging market context was established which should 
help guide future studies. Chapter 9 revisits the overarching aim and objectives of the study in 
light of the research findings.
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9 CONCLUSIONS
As identified in the Chapter 1, little analytical research has taken place on the evolution of 
corporate environmentalism in developing country contexts. Previous work fails to recognise 
the complexity and interaction between international, regional, home and host country 
governance mechanisms. Often analysis is limited to one type of governance structure or at 
the level of industry sectors, therefore limiting the ability to explain changes in subsidiary or 
site level environmental behaviour. Much of the literature on corporate greening describes and 
prescribes corporate activity; there is a gap in our understanding of how and why the social 
and environmental performance of MNCs in developing countries is contested and 
constructed.
This study seeks to rectify these shortcomings by exploring how and why corporate 
environmentalism has evolved in post-apartheid South Africa’s oil refining sector. To address 
this primary research question, two secondary questions are posed, which include how the 
environmental performance of Sapref, Enref and Calref has evolved since democratisation in 
South Africa (addressed in Chapter 4), and how and why each refinery’s environmental 
performance has differed (addressed in Chapters 5 through 8). The thesis makes the 
explanatory claim that differences in refinery environmental performance are a function of 
complex interactions between the macro (organisational fields) and micro (firm legitimacy 
and characteristics) analytical units of analysis.
The study’s overarching aim is to contribute to our theoretical, empirical and policy 
understanding of corporate greening in a developing country context. To achieve the 
overarching aim and research questions, six research objectives are outlined in Chapter 1, 
which include:
1. To develop a novel analytical framework utilising institutional and organisational 
theory, informed by debates on the spatialities of corporate environmentalism;
2. To introduce agency and power into the analysis of institutional and 
organisational theory in order to identify mechanisms of institutional and 
organisational change;
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3. To expose the complex dynamics and drivers of corporate environmentalism at the 
site level;
4. To develop a unique research design which utilises methodological triangulation in 
a process-oriented/longitudinal study;
5. To identify the policy-practical lessons learned from the analysis of corporate 
greening in post-Apartheid South Africa; and
6. To explore the generalisability of the research findings within and beyond South 
Africa and to recommend avenues for further study.
The thesis has achieved its aim by, inter alia:
• moving beyond overly simplistic top-down (globalisation and national regulation) 
and bottom-up (community-driven) accounts of corporate greening to expose the 
complex dynamics of institutional and organisational change;
• employing a novel research design and use of social network analysis to explore 
changing actor spaces of corporate environmentalism; and
• highlighting how corporate environmentalism and environmental policy is being 
implemented in a fragmented fashion in South Africa.
This chapter concludes by reflecting upon the study’s objectives and highlighting its 
theoretical, empirical and policy implications, as well as limitations and opportunities for 
further research.
9.1 Theoretical and empirical implications
This study has broken new ground in the frontier of institutional and organisational field 
analysis given its novel research design and subject matter. It is a theoretically informed 
problem-oriented study that has identified mechanisms of institutional and organisational 
change through rigorous qualitative methods. Objectives 1, 2 and 3 have indeed been 
achieved, as the study analyses how and why the environmental performance of industrial 
installations in an emerging economy evolved over time and uses a unique mix of analytical 
constructs, methodologies, and longitudinal analysis, which to the best of the author’s 
understanding has not been incorporated into one study before.
As discussed in section 2.1, to unlock the ‘black boxes’ of institutional and organisational 
theory a rigorous analytical and methodological approach is needed, which pays close
305
attention to both structure and agency in institutional processes. An original framework of 
MNC complexity and organisational field dynamics (see Figure 2.2 and Figure 8.4) was 
established, which enabled the analysis to highlight the importance of field level dynamics 
(macro) and firm strategies and characteristics (micro) in shaping and constraining corporate 
environmental performance at the host community level (objective 1). As Hoffman points out: 
“By connecting institutional and organizational level analysis, new and more complex models 
of change can explain the genesis and alteration of legitimate corporate practice” (2001b: 
150).
This macro-micro analytical framework enabled the introduction of agency and power into 
the analysis of organisational and institutional change (objective 2). As discussed in section 
2.3.1, to better account for the processes of institutionalisation and institutional change, 
organisational and institutional theorists have recently called for a (re)focus on agency and 
power (Clegg et al. 2006). This study addressed this concern through the adoption of a 
framework developed to analyse power within policy practices by Arts and Van Tatenhove 
(2004) (see section 2.3.1). As discussed in section 8.6.1, although dispositional and structural 
modes of power are apparent and relevant within the analysis, relational and knowledge-based 
power, particularly in Durban, dominated field structuration and catalysed processes of 
institutional and organisational change. This finding is significant as it demonstrates the 
important role of civil society at and between multiple scales of analysis (local to global) in 
institutionalising corporate greening in distinct relational and discursive spaces in South 
Africa (i.e. Durban vs. Cape Town).
Indeed, this study has identified how discursively constituted socio-spatial processes occur in 
practice through its novel historical tracing of the actor spaces of corporate environmentalism, 
and thus sheds light on the ‘black boxes’ of institutional analysis -  the origins of institutions 
and the mechanisms of institutional and organisational change (see section 2.1). This study 
also breaks new ground in the study of corporate greening in developing countries (objective 
3) as it moves beyond overly simplistic top-down (globalisation and national regulation) and 
bottom-up (community-driven) accounts of corporate environmentalism by exposing the 
complex dynamics of institutional and organisational change between host, home and 
international organisational fields (see Figure 8.4).
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Empirical contributions (objective 4) are also achieved. The study develops a unique research 
design and combination of units of analysis and multiple methodologies in a process- 
oriented/longitudinal study. Particularly novel are the use of social network diagrams to 
visualise changing actors spaces of corporate environmentalism over time. To the best of the 
author’s knowledge, it is the first time that such an analysis has been undertaken. The social 
network diagrams, distilled from newspaper article analysis, illustrate how actors and issues 
interact and how relational patterns evolve over time. The accompanying ‘thick’ qualitative 
narrative (distilled from primary and secondary data, see Chapter 3) provides insight into the 
contestation and structuration of the organisational fields, i.e. the macro-micro dynamics. A 
longitudinal comparative analysis (from 1994 to 2006) is employed to consider how the 
organisational field of industrial air pollution is structured as related to three fuel oil refineries 
in two localities: Durban and Cape Town. This chronological approach facilitates the analysis 
of processes and mechanisms of institutional and organisational change. A future output of 
this study may be to team up with an expert in the use of network analysis software to explore 
different ways to visualise the data.
9.2 Policy implications
Objective 5 is to identify the policy relevant lessons from this study. There were a variety of 
policy-practical research findings including the influence of subsidiary characteristics on 
environmental performance, the role of key events and host community conflict, the role of 
institutional entrepreneurs and general managers, and the influence of host community 
context and the logic of environmental justice on corporate greening outcomes.
As discussed in section 3.5, one of the key categories of research relevance is surprise value. 
For example, it was surprising to find that Sapref had the superior host community legitimacy 
and environmental performance by the end of the research period. From a refinery cultural 
perspective this was counter-intuitive, as Enref had a more open and cooperative host 
community approach, but parent company pressure and resources tipped this balance. This 
provides both policy makers and civil society leaders (i.e. institutional entrepreneurs) with 
insight into the dispositional and relational factors that may influence superior corporate 
environmental performance. These mechanisms of organisational change may prove relevant
73 There are ways to view longitudinal network analysis in three-dimensional diagrams and movies.
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when seeking to attract foreign direct investment. For example, would a host government and 
community prefer to have a subsidiary of an international oil company or a national oil 
company invest in building refining capacity? Access to resources and parent company 
oversight are relevant factors.
As discussed in section 8.2, events or institutional junctures provided ‘windows of 
opportunity’ for multiple stakeholders to contest and construct new understandings of 
legitimate environmental performance. It was surprising to find that, after categorising the 
event history, conflict was associated with all of the community-driven initiatives and 
consensus with the industry-driven ones. A key question emerges from this analysis which 
has policy-practical relevance: is conflict necessary for superior environmental performance 
gains to be made and outcomes that are more just for host communities? For example, would 
Sapref have made the strategic changes it did without community activism and contestation, 
would Enref have implemented ISO 14001 in 2006 if it were not for community pressure on 
both local regulators and the firm, and would Calref s parent company Chevron have taken 
notice of Calref s sub par environmental performance if DEAT had not served the refinery a 
notice of an intention to issue a directive because of pollution incidents in 2006? We can 
conclude that host community conflict is a necessary but not always sufficient prerequisite to 
instigate refinery environmental performance improvements. Many other factors involved 
have led to differentiated outcomes between the three refineries. The important role that 
community conflict and contestation has played within the structuration of organisational 
fields in South Africa calls into question the win-win managerial environmentalism literature. 
Indeed, the author is already the primary investigator on a three-year project to explore in 
depth to what extent communities can engage with the extractive industries to institutionalise 
accountability mechanisms and maximise host community sustainable development 
benefits.74
Also of policy relevance is the critical role of institutional entrepreneurs, particularly 
community activists, the media, and internal corporate sustainability champions and general 
managers, in influencing field structuration processes and environmental performance 
improvements. As highlighted throughout the analysis, the Durban activists engaged
74 For more information about this project see www.lse.ac.uk/communitvcapacities
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successfully with international activists to put pressure on industry (i.e. Shell) in its home and 
host country. In addition, international actors helped to build capacity within the local, 
provincial and national spheres of government. This cross-scale interaction played an 
important role in influencing normative, cognitive and eventually regulative governance 
structures. Examples of top-down, bottom-up and network-based scalar politics are evident 
from the analysis. Yet questions remained as to how responsibilities for implementation and 
enforcement of environmental laws were going to be devolved from the national to the 
provincial and local spheres of government. As highlighted in sections 8.3.3 and 9.1.2, the 
politics within and between the different spheres of government related to the implementation 
of new environmental laws such as the air quality regulations would make a fascinating study.
In addition, this study found that the role of the media was significant in enabling community 
activists to name and shame industrial polluters. This process of framing facilitated the 
changing role and authority of field actors. This type of “media-oriented political action” 
(Barnett 2003), particularly in Durban, provided community activists access to the discursive 
power to influence institutional outcomes. As discussed in section 8.3.2, future research could 
take this finding further, by comparing and contrasting how the media is leveraged by 
community activists in areas deemed ‘pollution hotspots’ under the new AQMA and how 
different news sources reported the issues.
The research also found that the role of refinery general managers is crucial for maintaining 
host community legitimacy. One of the issues raised was the constant turnover of these 
figureheads every two to three years. This revolving door of refinery managers has 
opportunities and risks -  the opportunity exists for firms to repair legitimacy when the ‘right’ 
manager takes the reigns but potential community-company distrust may be perpetuated. 
Companies should strategically consider how host community expectations and trust could be 
maintained through consistent policies and practices as these transitions occur. Also, the 
impact of structural market and economic patterns could undermine community-company 
trust as the drive for economic growth and refinery expansion dominates the field. Expansion 
yields environmental pollution and recession often means redundancies. This boom and bust 
cycle can perpetuate poor community-company relations. Firms, community leaders and local 
authorities should engage proactively to mitigate the consequences of misunderstanding.
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The theoretical framework anticipated that external host community context would be an 
important differentiator within this study, and the research results confirmed this. This place- 
based and scalar process of institutional and organisational change is a significant finding in 
relation to policy ramifications. Host community context has implications for the study of 
environmental justice. Intuitively, one would expect that industrial facilities operating in close 
proximity to low-income and non-white communities would have lower environmental 
performance than facilities operating near middle to high-income white communities. The 
evidence demonstrated it was exactly the opposite: Sapref and Enref outperformed Calref. 
Perhaps then in post-apartheid South Africa industrial facilities operating in close proximity 
to minority communities (i.e. white) will have lower environmental performance than 
facilities operating non-minorities (Historically Disadvantaged South Africans). This is a 
controversial hypothesis that would need more investigation to claim with confidence (see 
Proposition 4c in Chapter 8). A more likely explanation is that the way Sapref and Enref s 
organisational fields were structured in the South Durban Basin is a unique finding. 
Investigation into the contestation of corporate environmentalism beyond Durban and Cape 
Town is needed.
9.3 Limitations and future research
In addition to the theoretical, empirical and policy implications, it is important to recognise 
the limitations of this study and suggest avenues for future research. Indeed, objective 6 
highlights the need to explore the generalisability of the research findings within and beyond 
South Africa and to recommend avenues for further study.
From a theoretical perspective, this study sought to establish middle-range theory, where 
mechanisms of institutional and organisational change were identified for a specific set of 
situations and circumstances (Campbell 2004: 63-64). The distinction between macro 
(structure) and micro (agency) levels of analysis has provided a hurdle to overcome in the 
study of corporate environmental behaviour at the site level; however, the framework of MNC 
complexity and organisational field dynamics (Figure 2.2) and the propositions identified in 
Chapter 8, should help guide future studies. Future research can build on this study to refine 
models of institutional and organisational change. A logical next step is to develop and test 
hypotheses related to the research results found in this study using large-N studies and 
quantitative methods. A quantitative study could work in conjunction with more in depth 
qualitative case studies in various countries as discussed below. However, from a more
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‘critical’ analytical perspective, Jordan (2008: 30) highlights how the study of environmental 
governance has a pluralist bias (e.g. Lukes’ first and second dimensions of power), and that 
this risks overlooking potential sources of structural power. This study recognised the 
influence of structural forms of power, particularly the logic of economic growth and industry 
expansion. Yet further research could explore in more depth how other theoretical approaches 
(e.g. Foucault’s concept of ‘govemmentality’) may reveal insight into “governance for what 
and for whom” (Jordan 2008: 30).
One of the empirical challenges of this study was the voluminous amount of data that was 
collected through the multiple methodologies. It was a challenge to distil the data into 
meaningful comparisons. The development of Figures 5.9, 5.10, 6.5, 6.6 and 7.4 iteratively 
evolved during the research process. These diagrams helped distil the core themes and 
research findings, which informed the construction of Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. A project of 
this complexity would benefit from working with a team of researchers. As Eisenhardt (1989) 
highlights, more rigorous qualitative research results are possible by having consensus among 
a research team as opposed to a single investigator. In addition, all of the data that was used in 
this study was either in the public realm or from interviews. If proprietary internal data to the 
firms was accessible, then a more detailed analysis of internal aspects, such as resources and 
culture, could have been conducted. In addition, access to Sapref was very challenging and it 
was not possible to get access to parent companies other than Shell. It took two years to get an 
interview at Sapref, and Shell’s offices in London greatly facilitated follow up. Nonetheless, 
parent company pressure and internal refinery characteristics could be inferred from interview 
and secondary data sources.
One of this study’s strengths is that it engages with the understudied area of corporate 
greening in a developing country context. The study of the contestation of corporate 
environmentalism in post-apartheid South Africa sheds light on processes of institutional and 
organisational change. However, the study only focuses on the fuel oil industry. It remains to 
be seen if the results are generalisable to the synthetic fuel oil industry (e.g. Sasol) and other 
industrial sectors, such as pulp and paper or the mining sectors in South Africa. There is scope 
here for further research. Another area for future work is to explore the ability of subsidiaries 
to influence its parent company. As highlighted by Engen’s progressive effort to mainstream 
sustainability education within its leadership team, how could Engen influence Petronas’ 
organisational behaviour? This would make an interesting topic for future research,
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particularly whether South-South or South-North investment has influenced corporate 
environmental behaviour within South-based and state-owned MNCs.
Finally, given South Africa’s unique historical and economic context, the question remains 
whether or not these results are generalisable to other developing or middle-income country 
contexts. Future research should build on this study by developing a large number of in-depth 
qualitative case studies in various countries to compare and contrast how industrial facilities, 
both MNC, state-owned and domestic companies, engage with field level pressures. By 
focusing on middle-income countries such as Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, Indonesia, China and 
India for example, comparison would be facilitated. In addition, concentrating on the 
subsidiaries of one company, such as all of Shell or Chevron’s oil refineries in multiple 
country contexts, would be a highly relevant approach.
9.4 Concluding remarks
The results highlight how and why corporate environmentalism in the post-apartheid fuel oil 
sector has changed over time. A process of institutional and organisational change unfolded as 
corporate environmental behaviour was substantially influenced by discursive power wielded 
by civil society and the media. Key events structured periods of organisational field 
fragmentation and (re)structuration. In Durban, where Enref and Sapref are located, changing 
normative and cognitive institutions drove the evolution of regulation as an internationally 
networked civil society demanded accountability from the private and public sectors. In Cape 
Town, where Calref is located, the organisational field remained fragmented, thus framing 
processes did not achieve collective action, and institutional and organisational change 
evolved more slowly. As social and environmental risks amplify from the local to global, 
MNCs struggled to maintain legitimacy in both host and home countries. The company with 
the most significant home country and parent company pressure, Sapref, made the most gains 
in repairing its legitimacy.
These results have policy relevance within and beyond South Africa. As South Africa’s 
environmental regulatory structures evolve and mature a risk remains that they will be 
implemented in a fragmented fashion. Durban’s success in reducing air pollution was in part 
due to a unique combination of context, agency (on the part of civil society, industry and 
government) and events. It remains to be seen if the 2005 AQMA will have similar success in 
rolling out air quality management initiatives in South Africa’s other pollution hotspots. This
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study’s finding in relation to the mitigation of industrial pollution in Cape Town’s northern 
suburbs does not yield optimism.
Beyond South Africa, the processual approach adopted here is applicable to the study of 
changing environmental performance of industrial facilities in developed and developing 
countries. Although South Africa’s processes of change are unique given its recent transition 
to democracy, research in emerging economies is urgently needed. It would greatly facilitate 
the development of theory if a large number of context specific, host community level case 
studies were developed that identified mechanisms of institutional and organisational change 
related to industrial facilities. This is important because, as demonstrated in this study, the 
development of environmental governance structures and processes is not ‘quasi-automatic’ 
as gross domestic product grows -  it is in fact the result of scalar and place-based politics.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Social network analysis key word searches
The table below details the key word searches that were used to find newspaper and news 
portal articles related to the three oil refineries Sapref, Enref and Calref. A total of 809 articles 
were coded for inclusion in the social network analysis as discussed in Chapter 3. A variety of 
local, national and international news sources were utilised. The spreadsheets with the 
original newspaper articles, and the data coded per year are included on the enclosed CD.
Table A.l: Key word searches
Refinery Key words News web-based 
search engine
Comments
Sapref Sapref Sabinet,
LexisNexis, IOL, 
Business Day, 
Mail & Guardian
Searches updated 24 October 2007
Enref “Engen
refinery”,
Enref,
Genref, 
“Engen and 
Durban”
Sabinet,
LexisNexis, IOL, 
Business Day, 
Mail & Guardian
Searches updated 24 October 2007
Calref Calref, Caltex 
refinery, 
“Chevron 
refinery”
Sabinet,
LexisNexis, IOL, 
Business Day, 
Mail & Guardian
Searches updated 24 October 2007
Chevron Sabinet Searches updated 24 October 2007 
Did not use Chevron in other 
search engines because yielded far 
too many results
General
searches
“Oil refinery 
and air”, “Air 
pollution”
Sabinet,
LexisNexis, IOL, 
Business Day, 
Mail & Guardian
Searches updated 24 October 2007
314
News sources: Sabinet: a South African online information portal, SA Media database 
searches: www.Sabinet.co.za
Mail & Guardian: a national weekly newspaper: http://www.mg.co.za/ 
Business Day: South Africa’s main financial newspaper: 
http://www.bday.co.za/
Independent Online (IOL): a variety of South African local and national 
papers: http://www.iol.co.za/
LexisNexis’ all English language news search engine: 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/home/
Number of 
articles:
809 articles were coded that were published within the time period of 
1994-2006
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Appendix B: Interview topic guides
Civil society: Academics, Community, Media, and NGOs:
1. Basic background and general information
a. Overview of my study and my background
b. Interviewee role and background
c. History of organisation (if applicable)
i. What has been organisation’s engagement strategy? How has it evolved?
ii. Where do you get your funding?
d. Key moment’s in evolution of campaign (if applicable)?
i. Where is the campaign headed now?
2. Environmental governance
a. At the national level
i. Government: e.g. the Air Quality Management Act (AQMA) and 
environment inspectorate (Green Scorpions),
ii. Civil society: e.g. networks of environmental justice activists within South 
Africa?
iii. Are there legal teeth within the regulatory framework to litigate?
b. At the local level
i. How does the provincial government and municipality govern air quality? 
How has South Durban’s Multi-Point Plan (MPP) evolved; what are the 
issues and successes? How has Cape Town’s air quality management plan 
evolved?
ii. Is access to information on refinery performance and air quality sufficient? 
Key barriers?
iii. How has activism evolved? Who are most relevant people/organisations 
engaged in the debate?
iv. Has trust been built with local community and refineries (in the South 
Durban Basin (SDB) and Cape Town)?
v. Is there community solidarity on the issues?
c. At the international level
i. Do you network with international organisations; if so, who and how?
ii. Do you engage with the parent companies? Please explain.
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iii. What other international factors and actors influence corporate 
environmental behaviour? 
d. What are key successes and limitations of government?
i. How has integration of three spheres of government evolved?
ii. Capacity of local, provincial, and national govt?
3. Industry
a. What are the differences between Sapref and Engen in Durban, and Chevron in 
Cape Town, in terms of corporate culture, environment performance, and 
engagement with stakeholders?
b. Has the refineries’ environmental performance changed or improved?
c. What were major drivers of changes in corporate environmental performance? E.g. 
was it because of proactive corporate strategy, civil society pressure, or 
government regulation?
d. What has been role of parent companies?
e. What are ongoing issues for the refineries? Please explain.
4. Wrapping up
a. What is your organisation’s end goal? What would you like to see happen with 
regards to the environmental regulation and performance of the refineries?
b. Who are the most influential people engaged in this debate?
i. Who should I talk to next?
Government
1. Basic background and general information
a. Overview of my study and my background
b. Interviewee role and background
c. History/remit of their department and sphere of government
d. How is department organised?
e. How many staff/enforcement people?
2. Environmental governance
a. Government: how has the process of air quality management evolved? Where is it 
at and where is it headed?
i. How is refining industry regulated (specifically in relation to air 
emissions)? What is role of municipal, provincial and national spheres of 
government?
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ii. Role of provincial government in relation to Durban/Cape Town 
municipality?
iii. What stage is AQMA implementation in?
iv. How is SDB MPP or Cape Town air quality management plan 
progressing? Has it been a success?
v. Other initiatives or needed capacity?
vi. Are there legal teeth now? Enforcement capability?
b. Civil society
i. What is engagement strategy of community groups and NGOs? How 
representative is SDCEA and Table View Residents Association of the 
community?
ii. To what degree is civil society and media pressure responsible for driving 
change?
iii. Has information become more transparent and accessible to civil society? 
When?
iv. Has trust been built in SDB or Cape Town?
c. International
i. How much do international factors influence local level outcomes?
ii. Have international actors engaged in capacity building or funding or 
government or civil society? Please explain.
3. Industry
a. How is industry responding? What is role of industry in regulatory process?
b. Has environmental performance of industry changed/improved? Why do you think 
it has (or has not)?
c. Is access to information an issue for government or communities? How is 
knowledge shared?
d. Engen vs. Sapref and Chevron, how do they respond to regulatory pressure? 
Different approaches to environmental and social responsibility?
4. Wrapping up
a. Where is this debate headed, e.g. is the ‘Durban model’ transferable?
b. Lessons for government? Lessons for civil society? Lessons for industry?
c. Any individuals or organisations that have been influential in this debate that we 
haven’t mentioned?
d. Who should I speak to next?
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Industry
1. Basic background and general information
a. Overview of my study and my background
b. Interviewee role and background
c. Corporate history, ownership, type of refinery (in comparison to others)
d. General business climate in South Africa and in general
e. Relationship between parent company and subsidiary, how much autonomy, how 
much influence on corporate environmental performance?
2. Corporate environmental performance
a. What are the major corporate social and environmental issues facing the refinery?
b. How has the refinery’s social and environmental performance evolved?
i. Does the refinery have an environmental strategy? How has it evolved? 
What were key turning points?
c. When have significant management practices and processes been put in place?
i. Do you have an environmental management system; is it ISO 14001 
certified?
ii. Do you have a stakeholder management plan? How has this evolved? Who 
are main stakeholders?
d. Communication strategy
i. What procedures for internal and external communications?
ii. How deal with complaints and incidents?
e. Structure and culture
i. Who is responsible for social and environmental performance (how many 
staff)? Who do they report to?
ii. What is attitude towards these programmes within company (from workers 
to senior managers)?
iii. Do you have training or education programme and/or rewards or incentive 
schemes to work towards these goals?
f. When have upgrades/environmental improvements been made to the refinery?
g. Do you have emissions and/or incidents data? Can you share this?
i. Do you have a CSR or sustainability report? When did you start reporting? 
Do you report according to any guidelines? Is it third party verified and/or 
audited?
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ii. Is the information available on your website?
h. What are key differences between Engen, Sapref and Chevron?
3. Environmental governance: How has the governance of air pollution evolved?
a. Who are the influential people and organisations involved in this debate?
b. How has the debate changed over time?
c. How have engagement strategies of various actors changed over time? 
International, national, and local?
d. Government
i. How are you regulated in terms of your environmental performance with 
specific reference to air emissions? When/how has this changed?
ii. What is the role of spheres of government in regulating the refineries? 
National, provincial, and municipal government?
iii. With regards to management of air pollution, what have been the dominant 
governance mechanisms? (e.g. the GNA, RMEF, MPP, AQMA, etc)
iv. Do you have a new permit as per the AQMA?
e. Local context
i. What type of community lives around the refinery? How has this evolved?
ii. What was the influence of apartheid planning?
iii. Do the communities trust the refinery’s management? What are barriers to 
achieving trust?
f. International
i. What international factors drive refinery environmental performance?
ii. What international actors are engaged in the debate? What is their role?
iii. Have international norms and standards (such as ISO 14001, OECD 
Guidelines, etc) influenced your environmental performance? Which ones? 
How evolved?
4. Economic factors
a. Do market, resource constraints impede improvements in social and environmental 
performance?
b. Has failed Sasol merger impacted environmental improvement progress in last two 
years? (specific to Engen)
5. Wrapping up
a. Where is the debate headed? What are the areas of greatest concern for industry?
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b. Any lessons learned from your engagement in the process of environmental 
improvement in post-apartheid South Africa?
c. Any individuals or organisations that have been influential in this debate that we 
haven’t mentioned?
d. Who should I speak to next?
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Appendix C: Interviewee list
Interview
reference Year Date Name Title Organization
Case
study Category
acadl 2004
7-Sep-
04
Chris
Buckley
Professor,
Pollution
Research
Group
University of 
KwaZulu Natal Durban Academic
acad2 2004
7-Sep-
04
Dr Rajen 
Naidoo
Deputy
Director:
Centre for 
Occupational & 
Environmental 
Health
Nelson Mandela 
School of 
Medicine Durban Academic
acad3 2004
7-Sep-
04
Glenn
Robbins
Research 
Fellow, Centre 
for Civil 
Society
University of 
Kwazulu-Natal Durban Academic
acad4 2004
7-Sep-
04
Richard
Ballard
Professor, 
Centre for Civil 
Society
University of 
Kwazulu-Natal Durban Academic
acad5 2004
10-
Sep-
04 Di Scott
Professor, 
School of Life 
&
Environmental
Sciences
University of 
KwaZulu Natal Durban Academic
acad6 2006
10-
Apr-
06
Dr Rajen 
Naidoo
Deputy
Director:
Centre for 
Occupational & 
Environmental 
Health 
Department
Nelson Mandela 
School of 
Medicine Durban Academic
acad7 2006
9-Sep-
06
Eugene
Caimcross
Professor, 
Department of 
Physical 
Science
Peninsula 
Technicon, 
Cape Town Both Academic
coml 2004
8-Sep-
04
Deepchund
Ramchurren
Community
member
South Durban, 
House of 
Worship, 
SDCEA 
member Durban Community
com2 2004
8-Sep-
04 Roy Nair Pastor
South Durban, 
House of 
Worship, 
SDCEA 
member Durban Community
com3 2004
8-Sep-
04 Carl KnaufF
Community
member
Bluff Ridge 
Conservancy, 
SDCEA 
member Durban Community
com4 2004
8-Sep-
04
Dr
Seetharam
Community
member
Merebank
Environmental
Action
Committee
(MEAC) Durban Community
com5 2004
9-Sep-
04
Patricia
Dove Director
Wentworth 
Organisation of Durban Community
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Women
(WOW)
com6 2004
10-
Sep-
04
Michelle
Simon
Environmental
consultant
Self-employed, 
former SDCEA 
employee Durban Community
com7 2006
4-Apr- 
06 Mark Colvin Director
Centre for Aids 
Development 
Research and 
Evaluation, 
former SDCEA 
member Durban Community
com8 2006
10-
Apr-
06 Ivan Moses Deputy Chair
Merebank
Residents
Association
(MRA),
SDCEA
member Durban Community
com9a 2006
11-
Apr-
06
Patricia
Dove Director
Wentworth 
Organisation of 
Women 
(WOW) Durban Community
comlO 2006
12-
Apr-
06
Michelle
Simon
Environmental
consultant
Self-employed, 
former SDCEA 
employee Durban Community
coml 1 2006
13-
Apr-
06
Rajah
Naidoo
Chairman and 
Councillor
MRA and local 
councillor Durban Community
coml2 2006
6-Sep-
06
Nicholas
Lang
Community
Activist
Community of 
Milnerton
Cape
Town Community
coml 3 2006
6-Sep-
06
Michael
Longden-
Thurgood
Community
member
Table View 
community
Cape
Town Community
com9b 2006
11-
Apr-
06 Jane Smith Manager
Wentworth 
Organisation of 
Women
(WOW), former 
trade unionist Durban
Community 
and Labour
pgovl 2004
6-Sep-
04 Peter Kuyler
Assistant 
Director of 
Environmental 
Impact 
Management
KwaZulu-Natal 
Department of 
Agriculture and 
Environmental 
Affairs Durban Government
pgov2 2004
6-Sep-
04
Timothy
Fasheun
Director: 
Pollution and 
Waste
Management
KwaZulu-Natal 
Department of 
Agriculture and 
Environmental 
Affairs Durban Government
lgovla 2004
8-Sep-
04 Siva Chetty
Programme 
Manager for 
Multi-Point 
Plan
eThekwini
Municipality
(Durban) Durban Government
lgovlb 2004
8-Sep-
04
Mervyn
Chetty
Environmental
Health
Manager
eThekwini
Municipality
(Durban) Durban Government
lgov2a 2004
9-Sep-
04 Bruce Dale
Environmental
Health
Manager
eThekwini
Municipality
(Durban) Durban Government
lgov2b 2004
9-Sep-
04
Selva
Mudaly
Director
Environmental
eThekwini
Municipality Durban Government
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Health (Durban)
lgov3 2006
30-
Mar-
06 Siva Chetty
Programme 
Manager for 
Multi-Point 
Plan
eThekwini
Municipality
(Durban) Durban Government
lgov4a 2006
4-Apr-
06 Bruce Dale
Environmental
Health
Manager
eThekwini
Municipality
(Durban) Durban Government
lgov4b 2006
4-Apr-
06
Rajesh
Hooblal
Assistant
Director,
Environmental
Health
eThekwini
Municipality
(Durban) Durban Government
lgov4c 2006
4-Apr- 
06
Selva
Mudaly
Director
Environmental
Health
eThekwini
Municipality
(Durban) Durban Government
pgov3 2006
7-Apr-
06 Sbu Llela
Manager,
Environmental
Impact
Management
KwaZulu-Natal 
Department of 
Agriculture and 
Environmental 
Affairs Durban Government
pgov4 2006
7-Apr-
06
Timothy
Fasheun
Director: 
Pollution and 
Waste
Management
KwaZulu-Natal 
Department of 
Agriculture and 
Environmental 
Affairs Durban Government
lgov5 2006
12-
Apr-
06 Jessica Rich
Policy
Coordination
and
Implementation
Environmental
Management
Department
eThekwini
Municipality
(Durban) Durban Government
lgov6 2006
13-
Apr-
06 Lee Deathe
Spatial plan 
manager
eThekwini
Municipality
(Durban) Durban Government
lgov7a 2006
4-Sep-
06 Ivan Toms
Director: City 
Health
City of Cape 
Town
Cape
Town Government
lgov7b 2006
4-Sep-
06
Ivan
Bromfield
Manager: 
Specialised 
Health Services
City of Cape 
Town
Cape
Town Government
lgov8 2006
4-Sep-
06 Hans Linde
Air quality 
manager
Department of 
Environmental 
Affairs and 
Development 
Planning, 
Western Cape
Cape
Town Government
lgov9 2006
6-Sep-
06
Ossie
Oswald Area Manager
City of Cape 
Town
Cape
Town Government
lgovlO 2006
7-Sep-
06
Grant
Ravenscroft
Manager: Air
Quality
Laboratory
City of Cape 
Town
Cape
Town Government
ngovl 2006
8-Sep-
06
Melissa
Fourie
Directorate:
Enforcement
Department of 
Environmental 
Affairs & 
Tourism, 
Republic of 
South Africa Both Government
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pgov5 2006
8-Sep-
06
Joog
Roelotge
Deputy
Director,
Operational
Policy
Department of 
Environmental 
Affairs and 
Development 
Planning, 
Western Cape
Cape
Town Government
indla 2004
7-Sep-
04 Alan Munn
Sustainability
Manager Enref Durban Industry
indlb 2004
7-Sep-
04
Wayne
Hartmann
General
Manager Enref Durban Industry
indlc 2004
7-Sep-
04
Willen
Oosthuizen
Production
Manager Enref Durban Industry
ind2 2006
15-
Feb-
06
Bamaby
Briggs Director
Shell Social 
Performance 
Management 
Unit Durban Industry
ind3 2006
23-
Mar-
06 Robin Aram Consultant
Aram 
Associates, 
former Shell 
vice president 
of external 
affairs Durban Industry
ind4 2006
3-Apr- 
06 Alan Munn
Sustainability
Manager Enref Durban Industry
ind5 2006
10-
Apr-
06
Wayne
Hartmann
General
Manager Enref Durban Industry
ind6 2006
12-
Apr-
06
Arend
Hoogervorst Director
Environmental
consultant Durban Industry
ind7 2006
18-
Apr-
06
Gerrit
Komelius Director
Airshed 
Planning 
Professionals, 
former Sasol 
employee Both Industry
ind8 2006
21-
Jul-06
Bamaby
Briggs Director
Shell Social 
Performance 
Management 
Unit Durban Industry
ind9 2006
1-Sep- 
06
Nazeema
Abraham
Manager 
Health, 
Environment 
and Safety Calref
Cape
Town Industry
indlO 2006
5-Sep-
06
Trevor
Chom
Environmental
Affairs
Manager Engen Durban Industry
indll 2006
6-Sep-
06
Nazeema
Abraham
Manager 
Health, 
Environment 
and Safety Calref
Cape
Town Industry
indl2 2006
11-
Sep-
06
Anton
Moldan
Environmental
manager
South Africa
Petroleum
Industry
Association
(Sapia) Both Industry
indl3a 2006
12-
Sep-
06 Dixon Lowe
Environmental
manager Sapref Durban Industry
indl3b 2006
12-
Sep-
Laura
Rossler
Sustainability
Manager Sapref Durban Industry
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06
indl3c 2006
12-
Sep-
06
Margaret
Rowe
Communicatio 
ns Manager Sapref Durban Industry
indl4 2006
14-
Sep-
06 Anonymous Industry expert Industry expert
Cape
Town Industry
indl5 2006
15-
Sep-
06
Gordon
Smith
General
Manager Calref
Cape
Town Industry
indl6 2007
26-
Feb-
07
Bamaby
Briggs Director
Shell Social 
Performance 
Management 
Unit Durban Industry
medial 2006
13-
Apr-
06 Tony Camie Reporter
Independent 
News & Media Durban Media
ngol 2004
2-Sep-
04
Ardiel
Soeker
Air quality
project
manager
Groundwork - 
Cape Town Both NGO
ngo2 2004
6-Sep-
04
Desmond
D'Sa Chairman
South Durban
Community
Environmental
Alliance
(SDCEA) Durban NGO
ngo3 2004
8-Sep-
04 Bobby Peek Director Groundwork Both NGO
ngo4 2006
27-
Mar-
06
Roger
Hammond Director Living Earth Durban NGO
ngo5 2006
7-Apr-
06 Bobby Peek Director Groundwork Both NGO
ngo6 2006
10-
Apr-
06
Desmond
D'Sa Chairman SDCEA Durban NGO
ngo7 2006
10-
Apr-
06 Farida Kahn Manager SDCEA Durban NGO
ngo8 2006
11-
Apr-
06 Di Dold
Durban
Director
Wildlife and 
Environment 
Society of 
South Africa Durban NGO
ngo9 2006
4-Sep-
06
Andrew
Birkinshaw Chairman
Table View
Residents
Association
Cape
Town NGO
ngolO 2006
8-Sep-
06
Ardiel
Soeker Housing NGO
Formerly
Groundwork Both NGO
ngoll 2006
11-
Sep-
06
Andrew
Birkinshaw Chairman
Table View
Residents
Association
Cape
Town NGO
ngol 2 2006
14-
Sep-
06
Desmond
D'Sa Chairman SDCEA Durban NGO
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Appendix D: Coding frames
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Appendix E: Tables on organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Table A.2: 1994: organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Context Organisational field dynamics Firm level
Key events, 
scalar politics 
and power
Key actors and 
issues
Institutional
logics
Governance
structures/
institutional
dimensions
Legitimacy and 
characteristics
Durban Events: N/A 
Scale: N/A 
Power: N/A
Actors: Enref, 
Sapref, SA 
government 
Issues: market 
factors and 
refinery 
expansion
N/A Little evidence 
of change
Enref under 
shareholder 
scrutiny, Sapref 
no action
Cape Town Events: Calref 
promise 
Scale: host 
community: 
MAQP politics 
Power: Issue 
shaping: 
industry seeking 
to shape issues 
and agendas 
through MRC 
study; Coercive: 
media and local 
residents are 
critical of MRC 
study’s findings
Actors: Calref,
MRC,
Milnerton
Committee,
CPT
communities,
Kynoch, CPT
muni and SA
government
Issues:
Refinery
expansion,
environmental
health,
industrial
pollution and
industry
commitments
Emergent 
logic o f 
managerial 
environ­
mentalism: 
‘let’s get the 
science 
right’; 
Emergent 
participatory 
logic:
stakeholders
seeking
cooperative
solution
Beginning of
normative
change
Calref engages 
with
community and
makes
emissions
reduction
commitment;
cultural change
within Calref
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Table A.3: 1995: organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Context Organisational field dynamics Firm level
Key events, scalar Key actors Institutional Governance Legitimacy and
politics and power and issues logics structures/
institutional
dimensions
characteristics
Durban Events: Mandela’s Actors: Logic o f Beginning of Enref
Enref visit Enref, SDB economic normative proactively
Scale: Cross-scale: communiti growth and change and engages
international norms es, industry very beginning community;
(Responsible Care Mandela, deregulation: of regulative Sapref no
initiative) meeting Durban industry change; action
resistance at local muni and expansion in cognitive
level Sapref process; change within
Power: Agenda Issues: Emergent logic community
setting: Enref tries Environme ofprotest
to set agenda ntal activism and
through pollution, environmental
consultative industrial justice:
process; Coercive: pollution Communities
community resists and pro­ oppose Enref
consultation; business/ consultation;
Cooperational: economic Emergent logic
national growth o f managerial
government seeks environ­
consensus between mentalism:
communities and Enref and
company government
seek
cooperative
governance
processes
Cape Events: N/A Actors: Logic of Continued Calref attempts
Town Scale: National- Calref, economic normative to implement
local: national Kynoch growth and pressure 1994
government puts and CPT industry commitment
pressure on Calref; comm.- deregulation: and continues
Host community: unities industry to engage with
MAQP process Issues: expansion local
continues Pro- continues; stakeholders
Power: Coercive: economic Logic of
national govt growth and managerial
pressure building; industrial environ­
Cooperational: pollution mentalism:
community leaders MAQP process
engage with Calref evolves
to implement
MAQP
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Table A.4: 1996: organisational field dynamics
Context Organisational field dynamics Firm level
Key events, scalar 
politics and power
Key actors 
and issues
Institutional
logics
Governance
structures/
institutional
dimensions
Legitimacy and 
characteristics
Durban Events: Durban 
health study; 
SDCEA founded 
Scale: Cross-scale: 
international 
academics help 
produce local level 
health studies 
Power: Structural: 
logic of economic 
growth and 
industry expansion; 
Coercive: 
community reacts 
negatively to 
Sapref s expansion 
plans
Actors: 
Engen, U of 
Michigan, Dr 
Naidoo, 
Sapref, P. 
Fransen- 
Sapref and B. 
Peek 
Issues: 
Environment 
al health and 
pro-economic 
growth
Logic of 
economic 
growth: driving 
industry 
expansion 
plans; Logic o f 
environmental 
justice: is 
emergent as 
community 
activists 
organise
Normative 
dimensions 
(mainly related 
to Enref s 
environmental 
performance) 
continue to 
evolve
Enref
negotiates with 
communities; 
Sapref loses 
legitimacy over 
expansion 
plans
Cape
Town
Events: Cape Town 
health study 
Scale: Host 
community: MAQP 
politics 
Power:
Cooperational: 
multistakeholder 
engagement as part 
of MAQP process
Actors: CPT
communities,
Calref and
MAQP
Issues:
Environment
al health and
industrial
pollution
Logic of 
managerial 
environmentali 
sm: MAQP 
process
Normative
dimensions
contested
Calref 
legitimacy in 
balance after 
inconclusive 
health study
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Table A.5: 1997: organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Context Organisational field dynamics Firm level
Key events, 
scalar politics 
and power
Key actors and 
issues
Institutional
logics
Governance 
structures/  
institutional 
dimensions
Legitimacy
and
character­
istics
Durban Events: Asian 
crisis
Scale: Cross­
scale: SEA is an 
example of 
policy transfer 
from EU/UK 
Power: Agenda 
setting: local 
government 
setting agenda 
and shaping 
issues through 
SEA process; 
Cooperational: 
SDCEA 
negotiates with 
Enref
Actors: Engen, 
Petronas and 
SA government 
Issues: 
Economic 
growth, 
industry 
investment
Logic of 
managerial 
environ­
mentalism: 
emergent SEA 
process, SDCEA 
negotiating with 
Enref
Some local
government
normative and
regulative
action through
commissioning
SEA
Enref
negotiates
with
communities; 
Sapref no 
action
Cape
Town
Events: Asian 
crisis, Calref s 
broken promise 
Scale: Cross­
scale: Refinery 
‘promise’ 
affected by Asian 
crisis, WHO 
guidelines impact 
refinery 
legitimacy 
Power: Coercive: 
community- 
company 
conflict; 
Structural: 
impact of 
economic crisis
Actors: Calref, 
CPT
communities,
NCAMTG,
CPT muni,
Caltex, Kynoch
and Anti-
Pollution
Alliance
Issues:
Economic
growth,
environmental
health,
industrial
pollution and
industry
distrust
In flux Normative 
contestation; 
cognitive 
change within 
community
Calref loses 
legitimacy as 
reneges on 
emissions 
reduction 
commitment
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Table A.6: 1998: organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Context Organisational field dynamics Firm level
Key events, 
scalar politics 
and power
Key actors and 
issues
Institutional
logics
Governance
structures/
institutional
dimensions
Legitimacy and 
characteristics
Durban Events: Sapref 
explosion, SDB 
SEA,
Asian crisis
Scale: Cross-
scale'. Peek
receives
international
environmental
prize
Power:
Coercive:
SDCEA
questioning
SEA processes/
outcomes
Actors: Sapref, 
British
Petroleum, B. 
Peek, Durban 
muni and SDB 
industry 
Issues:
Environmental
justice,
environment
vs.
development, 
contested 
science and 
economic 
downturn
Logic o f 
environmental 
justice: Peek 
receives 
Goldman Prize; 
Logic o f 
managerial 
environmentalism 
: SEA process 
ongoing
Normative 
contestation 
through 
debating 
SEA results
Enref
negotiates with 
communities; 
Saprefloses 
legitimacy 
because of 
incidents
Cape
Town
Events: Asian
crisis
Scale:
National-local:
industrial
action
Power:
Structural:
power of
economic crisis
Actors: Calref
and Chemical
Workers’
Industrial
Union
Issues:
Economic
downturn and
industrial
action
In flux Little
evidence of 
change
Calref attempts 
to negotiate 
with
communities
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Table A.7: 1999: organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Context Organisational field dynamics Firm level
Key events, scalar 
politics and power
Key actors 
and issues
Institutional
logics
Governance
structures/
institutional
dimensions
Legitimacy and 
characteristics
Durban Events: Enref 
GNA, V. Moosa 
rhetoric; 
Groundwork 
founded
Scale: Cross-scale: 
GNA model is 
‘learned’ from 
experience in US 
and UK; National- 
local: Moosa 
targets point 
polluters; Host 
community politics: 
e.g. SEA;
Power: Coercive: 
SDCEA protesting 
SEA outcomes, 
national 
government 
threatening action; 
Cooperational: 
consensual power 
manifest through 
GNA process
Actors: B.
Peek, SDB
communities,
Enref and V.
Moosa-
DEAT
Issues:
Environment
al justice,
environment
vs.
development, 
economic 
downturn and 
constitutional 
rights
Logic of 
environmental 
justice: SDCEA 
protests SEA 
outcomes, 
Groundwork is 
founded;
Logic o f 
managerial 
environmentalism 
: e.g. GNA and 
SEA
Normative 
and voluntary 
regulative 
change with 
Enref GNA
Enref gains 
legitimacy 
through GNA; 
Sapref no 
action
Cape
Town
Events: V. Moosa 
rhetoric
Scale: National- 
local: Birkinshaw 
engaged Human 
Rights
Commission; 
Moosa targets point 
polluters
Power: Coercive: 
community 
activists and media 
exerting coercive 
pressure, national 
government 
threatening action
Actors: Table 
View
residents, A.
Birkinshaw,
Calref and P.
Buley-Calref
Issues:
Environment
al justice,
constitutional
rights and
economic
downturn
Logic o f
environmental
justice:
Birkinshaw
adopts
constitutional 
rights discourse
Normative 
and cognitive 
change as 
community 
members 
approach SA 
Human 
Rights 
Commission
Calref 
continues to 
lose legitimacy 
as community 
activism grows
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Table A.8: 2000: organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Context Organisational field cynamics Firm level
Key events, scalar 
politics and power
Key actors 
and issues
Institutional
logics
Governance
structures/
institutional
dimensions
Legitimacy
and
character­
istics
Durban Events: SDB cancer 
study; Bucket 
Brigades
Scale: Cross-scale: 
Bucket Brigades 
inspired by US 
activists; Host 
community politics 
Power: Issue 
shaping: Sapref did 
not disclose full 
emissions in 1990s; 
Agenda setting and 
issue shaping: 
Bucket Brigades, 
investigative 
journalism and 
‘cancer alley’; 
Cooperative and 
coercive process: 
National govt sought 
new governance 
processes and 
directed industry to 
fund health study
Actors: 
Sapref, R.P. 
Sapref,
Enref, B.P.
Groundwork,
Mercury,
SDB comm., 
D.L. CBEUS, 
R.M. DEAT, 
V.M. DEAT 
Issues: Air 
pollution, 
environ­
mental 
health, civic 
science 
refinery 
incidents, 
refinery 
distrust and 
regulatory 
threats
Logic of
information-
based
regulation and 
environmental 
justice: Bucket 
Brigades; 
Logic o f 
managerial 
environmentali 
sm: polluter 
pays principle 
and public- 
private 
partnership
Normative 
change 
influenced by 
investigative 
journalism and 
civic science; 
National 
regulative 
threat and 
proposed new 
environmental 
governance 
initiative
Sapref 
engages with 
community 
stakeholders; 
Enref makes 
env upgrade
Cape
Town
Events: CPT sulphur 
disposal; Bucket 
Brigades
Scale: Cross-scale: 
Bucket Brigades 
instigated by 
Groundwork and US 
activists, linkages 
between Cape Town 
and Durban; Host 
community politics 
Power: Coercive: 
community activists 
going to press with 
air sampling results, 
provincial 
government 
threatening action 
against Calref
Actors: 
Calref, P.B. 
Calref,
AECI, CPT 
comm., W.C. 
gov., R.M. 
DEAT, V.M. 
DEAT 
Issues: Air 
pollution, 
refinery 
incidents and 
regulatory 
threats
Logic of
information-
based
regulation:
Bucket
Brigades; Logic 
of managerial 
environ­
mentalism: 
provincial 
government 
threatens action
Normative 
change spurred 
by civic 
science, local 
regulative 
threat
Calref loses
legitimacy
with
communities
and
regulators
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Table A.9: 2001: organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Context Organisational field cynamics Firm level
Key events, scalar Key actors Institutional Governance Legitimacy and
politics and power and issues logics structures/
institutional
dimensions
characteristics
Durban Events: Enref labour Actors: D.D. Logic of Some cognitive Sapref loses
disputes; SDCEA, B.P. environ­ and normative legitimacy -
Sapref pipeline Groundwork, mental change pipeline
incident Scale: R.N. MEAC, justice, influenced by incident, Enref
Cross-scale: Bucket V.M. DEAT, corporate incidents, local loses
Brigades (with help R.P. Sapref, account­ regulative legitimacy -
from US activists) Durban ability and change under expansion
continues for three Muni, Sapref, information- negotiation plans and
years, to be spread to SDB comm., based labour dispute
other SA host Enref, regulation:
communities, contract Bucket
international workers Brigades;
campaign against Issues: Logic o f
Shell instigated Refinery managerial
because of petrol leak incidents, environ­
at Sapref; Host environment mentalism:
community politics vs. Enref s
Power: Coercive: development, planning
MRA exerts pressure environ­ permission
on Enref, SDCEA mental and EIA
and local/provincial health, controversy;
government exert refinery Logic o f
coercive pressure on distrust, civic participation
Sapref; Structural: science, and
logic of profit regulatory partnership:
maximisation / threats and MPP is
economic growth workers’ contested by
instigates Enref s rights industry and
expansion plans civil society;
Logic of
economic
growth:
Enref s
expansion
plans
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Cape
Town
Events: CPT sulphur Actors: Logic of Some Calref loses
disposal Calref, A.B. managerial normative legitimacy with
Scale: Host country TVRA, CPT environmenta change -  start communities
and community: comm., P.B. lism: UCT of health study, and regulators
Bucket Brigade Calref health study, local regulative
linkages with Issues: Air Calref fine change - Calref
Durban, provincial pollution and fined
government fine refinery
Calref; Host incidents
community politics
Power: Agenda
setting: community
leaders seeking to
shape agenda and
issues through
commissioning UCT
health study;
Coercive: provincial
government fines
Calref
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Table A.10: 2002: organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Context Organisational field dynamics Firm level
Key events, scalar 
politics and power
Key actors and 
issues
Institutional
logics
Governance 
structures/  
institutional 
dimensions
Legitimacy
and
character­
istics
Durban Events: Enref
expansion
SDB health study
Sapref pipeline
incident
WSSD
Scale: Cross-scale: 
International 
campaign against 
Shell starts in earnest, 
US academics help 
with health study, 
reference to WHO 
guidelines, WSSD 
catalyses attention on 
Durban, international 
linkages to build 
regulatory capacity; 
Host community 
politics
Power: Coercive: 
Peek and D’Sa exert 
pressure on Sapref 
via the media, 
SDCEA exerts 
pressure on Enref; 
Camie (a journalist) 
exerts pressure on 
industry, Sapref 
exerts pressure on 
Durban muni, Enref 
loses power and 
legitimacy as 
expansion is 
contested and GNA is 
not renewed; 
Cooperative: Durban 
muni remains 
cooperative, 
consensual power of 
Settlers health study 
(dispersed funding 
base) but leads to 
controversial findings
Actors: D R.P. 
Sapref, SDCEA, 
Sapref, M.R. 
Sapref, D.D. 
SDCEA, B.P. 
Groundwork, 
Groundwork, 
Greenpeace, 
Durban Muni, 
Norwegians, N.S. 
KZN, W.H.
Enref, S.S. health 
study, C.M. Sapia 
Issues: Refinery 
incidents, 
environmental 
health,
environment vs.
development,
environmental
justice, corporate
accountability,
contested
science, distrust,
government
accountability,
regulatory
pressure and
market
liberalisation
Logic o f 
environ­
mental 
justice and 
corporate 
account­
ability; Logic
o f
information- 
based and 
community- 
driven 
regulation: 
Bucket 
Brigades; 
Logic o f 
managerial 
environ­
mentalism: 
clean fuels 
regs and 
discussion of 
new air 
quality 
guidelines; 
Logic o f 
participation, 
partnership 
and capacity 
building: in 
relation to 
implementing 
MPP
Cognitive 
bifurcation -  
community 
vs.
companies; 
normative 
change 
within host 
and home 
fields
influenced by 
activism, 
health study 
and incident; 
regulative 
change under 
negotiation
Sapref‘under 
siege’ but 
tries to repair 
legitimacy 
through 
response to 
incident -  
also parent 
company 
pressure on 
Sapref; Enref 
unable to 
maintain 
legitimacy 
with host 
communities 
e.g. GNA 
renewal fails
Cape
Town
Events: WSSD 
Scale: N/A 
Power: N/A
Actors: N/A 
Issues: N/A
No obvious 
change
No obvious 
change
No obvious 
change
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Table A .ll: 2003: organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Context Organisational field cynamics Firm level
Key events, scalar 
politics and power
Key actors and 
issues
Institutional
logics
Governance
structures/
institutional
dimensions
Legitimacy
and
character­
istics
Durban Events: Shell 
activism 
Enref expansion 
Scale: Cross-scale: 
home and host 
country campaign 
against Shell (Durban 
activists travel to 
Shell’s AGM); 
national-local levels: 
AQM Bill under 
negotiation; host 
community politics 
Power: Coercive: 
SDCEA and LRC 
exert legal pressure 
on Enref, Enref 
counters with legal 
defence and wins 
planning permission, 
a credible regulatory 
threat from national 
government; 
Structural: economic 
growth logic 
underpins Enref s 
planning approval; 
Issue shaping and 
agenda setting: 
SDCEA and 
Groundwork reports; 
Resource-based: 
Sapref makes 
significant 
environmental 
upgrade, 
demonstrates 
significant resources 
to do so
Actors: Sapref, 
R.P. Sapref, B.P. 
Groundwork, 
D.D. SDCEA, 
R.M. DEAT, 
SDCEA, W.H. 
Enref, Enref, 
Shell, Durban 
Muni, FOEI, 
SDB community 
Issues:
Environment vs.
development,
knowledge
politics,
environmental
justice,
international
activism,
government
accountability
and regulatory
pressure
Logic o f 
environmental 
justice and 
corporate 
accountability: 
SDCEA battles 
over Enref s 
planning 
permission; 
Logic of 
managerial 
environ­
mentalism: 
Enref s
expansion EIA 
gets approved, 
AQM Bill is 
debated; Logic 
of economic 
growth and 
industrial 
development: 
Enref s
expansion plan 
is approved
Normative
institutions
contested;
regulative
institutions in
flux -  a
credible
regulatory
threat
emerging
Enref has 
low host 
community 
legitimacy 
but gains 
some 
regulatory 
legitimacy; 
Sapref tries 
to repair 
legitimacy, 
evidence of 
cultural 
change; 
Shell loses 
legitimacy 
in relation 
to SDB
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Cape Events: UCT health Actors: Calref, Logic of Normative Calref
Town study A.B. TVRA, managerial change loses
Scale: Host S.W. Calref, environ­ spurred by legitimacy
community politics UCT health mentalism: health study, but uses
Power: Issue shaping study, Cape technocratic regulative renewed
and agenda setting: Times, C.M. governance change under concil­
Community-driven as Sapia through health negotiation iatory tone;
UCT health study is Issues: Market study politics possibly
published; Coercive: issues, although AB Calref
threat of community environmental does threaten cultural
legal action, but does health, regulatory legal action, change
not materialise into pressure, and AQM Bill with SW
action corporate and 
govt.
responsibility
debated remarks
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Table A.12: 2004: organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Context Organisational field dynamics Firm level
Key events, scalar 
politics and power
Key actors 
and issues
Institutional
logics
Governance 
structures/  
institutional 
dimensions
Legitimacy
and
character­
istics
Durban Events: SDB incidents 
Scale: Cross-scale: 
home and host country 
campaign against Shell 
(Durban activists travel 
to Shell’s AGM); Host 
community-country 
interaction: AQM Bill 
under consultation;
Host community 
politics
Power: Coercive: 
SDCEA exerts pressure 
on local government to 
improve air monitoring 
data and hold polluters 
to account, SDCEA 
contests Sapref s 
pipeline report, Durban 
activists put pressure on 
Shell at AGM; Issue 
shaping/Agenda 
setting: SDCEA 
educates and shapes 
agendas in Basin 
through educational 
tools (e.g. distributing 
flaring leaflet); SDCEA 
loses legitimacy with 
some community 
leaders, Sapref exerts 
power to shape agendas 
as CLF begins in 
earnest; Resource- 
based: Enref appears to 
be more resource 
constrained when 
implementing clean 
fuels regs;
Cooperative: MPP 
implemented 
cooperatively but 
questions remain as to 
outcomes
Actors: B.P.
Groundwork,
D.D.
SDCEA,
SDCEA,
Settlers
Primary
School,
Sapref, W.H.
Enref,
Durban Muni 
Issues: 
Refinery 
incidents, 
regulatory 
implement­
ation,
community 
activism and 
capacity 
building, and 
refinery 
upgrades and 
actions
Logic o f 
environ­
mental 
justice and 
corporate 
account­
ability: 
SDCEA 
exerts 
pressure on 
local govt, 
Sapref and 
Enref; Logic
o f
managerial 
environ­
mentalism: 
SDCEA 
contests 
Sapref s 
pipeline 
report, MPP 
continues to 
be
implemented
Regulative 
change with 
implement­
ation of MPP
Enref
continued
low host
community
legitimacy,
Sapref and
Shell try to
repair
legitimacy,
some
cultural
change
with
Sapref s
clean fuels
project and
CLF
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Cape
Town
Events: Calref 
incidents
Scale: Host community 
politics
Power: Coercive: 
Strong national govt 
response after Calref 
black rain incident
Actors: A.B.
TVRA, LRC,
Cape Argus,
Calref, S.W.
Calref
Issues:
Refinery
incidents,
community
frustration,
pressure on
regulators
and
regulatory
pressure
Logic of 
managerial 
environ­
mentalism: 
air quality 
monitoring 
system needs 
improvement
Regulative
threat
Calref
loses
legitimacy 
with com­
munities, 
regulators 
and media
National Events: AQMA 
consultation; Green 
Scorpions 
Scale: Cross-scale: 
international capacity 
building to help 
implement and enforce 
regulations (particularly 
from US and UK); 
National-local levels: 
AQM Bill under 
consultation 
Power: Coercive: 
implementation of 
clean fuels regs; 
Cooperative: AQM Bill 
consultations continue; 
Agenda setting: EIA 
regulations streamlined
Actors:
DEAT,
M.V.S.
DEAT, V.M.
DEAT,
Green
Scorpions
Issues:
Regulatory
and
enforcement
pressure
Logic o f 
managerial 
environ­
mentalism: 
on spectrum 
from
coercive to 
cooperative; 
Logic o f 
cooperation 
and
consultation: 
AQM Bill; 
Logic of 
coercion: 
Green 
Scorpions
Regulative
and
enforcement
change
N/A
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Table A.13: 2005: organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Context Organisational field dynamics Firm level
Key events, scalar 
politics and power
Key actors 
and issues
Institutional
logics
Governance
structures/
institutional
dimensions
Legitimacy
and
character­
istics
Durban Events: MPP 
implementation/ 
enforcement; Enref 
fine
Scale: Cross-scale: 
international capacity 
building in Durban 
muni, local and 
international 
campaign against 
Shell; Host 
community politics 
Power: Coercive: 
Enref fined because 
of emissions 
exceedances, MPP 
adopts innovative 
permitting approach, 
requires firms to 
become ISO 14001 
certified, SDCEA 
puts coercive 
pressure on Enref and 
Sapref, but mostly 
through symbolic 
comments by D’Sa in 
local media; Shell 
puts pressure on 
Sapref, SDCEA and 
FOEI network put 
pressure on Shell 
through meeting with 
CEO.
Actors: D.D. 
SDCEA, B.P. 
Groundwork, 
R.N. MRA, 
Daily News, 
Sapref, W.H. 
Enref, S.M. 
Durban 
Muni, S.C. 
Durban Muni 
Issues: 
Regulatory 
implement­
ation and 
success, 
regulatory 
enforcement, 
refinery 
incidents, 
clean fuels 
projects, 
environment 
vs.
development, 
environment­
al health, fuel 
shortages
Logic o f 
environmental 
justice and 
corporate 
accountability: 
SDCEA exert 
pressure on 
Enref and 
Sapref; Logic 
of managerial 
environ­
mentalism: 
Durban 
permitting 
process is 
‘South
Africanised’, 
Enref exceeds 
new permit 
requirements 
and is fined
Regulative 
change with 
implement­
ation of MPP 
and permits
Enref lost 
legitimacy 
with permit 
exceed­
ances, 
Sapref 
maintained 
legitimacy 
and had a 
relatively 
low profile 
in field; 
cultural 
change at 
Shell with 
CEO 
engage­
ment
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Cape
Town
Events: Calref 
incidents; Fuel 
shortages 
Scale: Host 
community politics 
Power: Coercive: 
local and national 
government to review 
Calref s permits;
Issue shaping: 
Birkinshaw 
highlights 
discrepancies 
between Calref s 
environmental 
performance and EU 
environmental 
standards; Lack of 
consensus in Cape 
Town communities 
on engagement 
strategy
Actors: A.B. 
TVRA, S.W. 
Calref,
Calref, Cape 
Town airport 
Issues: 
Refinery 
incidents, 
community 
activism, 
regulatory 
pressure, 
environment­
al health, fuel 
shortages
Logic o f 
managerial 
environ­
mentalism: AB 
to discuss 
incidents with 
Calref and 
disputes 
placement of 
air monitors, 
regulators to 
review Calref s 
permits
Normative 
and limited 
regulative 
pressure
Calref lost
legitimacy
as incidents
continued;
some
cultural
change as
Calref GM
recognises
community
concerns,
but still
contests
UCT study
National Events: AQMA 
implementation; 
clean fuels projects; 
fuel shortages 
Scale: Cross-scale: 
international capacity 
building to 
implement and 
enforce regulations 
(particularly from US 
and UK); national- 
local levels: AQMA 
to be implemented by 
local regulators 
Power: Coercive: 
Clean fuels regs 
implemented 
coercively, 
enforcement activity 
ramped up; 
Cooperative and 
coercive: AQMA 
utilises mixed 
approach
Actors: P.L. 
DEAT, SA 
Govt 
Issues: 
Regulatory 
implement­
ation and 
enforcement
Logic o f 
managerial 
environ­
mentalism: on 
spectrum from 
coercive to 
cooperative and 
devolution of 
implementation 
to local level; 
Logic o f 
cooperation 
and
consultation
Regulative
and
enforcement
change
N/A
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Table A.14: 2006: organisational field dynamics and firm legitimacy
Context Organisational field dynamics Firm level
Key events, scalar 
politics and power
Key actors 
and issues
Institutional
logics
Governance
structures/
institutional
dimensions
Legitimacy
and
character­
istics
Durban Events: Sapref 
pipelines; MPP health 
study
Scale: Cross-scale: 
health study published, 
consortium of local and 
international 
academics; host 
community politics 
Power: Agenda setting: 
MPP health study 
legitimises health 
concerns and 
recommends cancer 
registry, D’Sa and Peek 
confer legitimacy to 
MPP health study 
findings; Cooperational 
and issue shaping: 
Enref implements new 
open door policy, Enref 
negotiates for more 
lenient permit terms, 
Sapref replaces 
pipelines; Resource- 
based: Enref 
financially constrained 
to make environmental 
upgrades, Sapref not 
financially constrained 
and replaces pipelines; 
Coercive: activists 
exert pressure on Enref 
during permitting crisis 
and after incidents
Actors: D.D. 
SDCEA, B.P. 
Ground­
work, SDB 
communities, 
SDB 
children, 
Sapref,
Enref, W.H. 
Enref Issues: 
Regulatory 
implement­
ation and 
success, 
regulatory 
enforcement, 
refinery 
incidents, 
clean fuels 
projects, 
environment 
vs.
development,
fuel
shortages
Logic of 
environ­
mental 
justice and 
corporate 
account­
ability: 
SDCEA exert 
pressure on 
Enref and 
legitimise 
MPP health 
study 
findings; 
Logic of 
managerial 
environ­
mentalism: 
Enref seeking 
more lenient 
permitting 
terms, Sapref 
replaces 
pipelines
Regulative
and
normative 
change with 
implement­
ation of MPP 
and permits
Enref
legitimacy
continued to
be contested;
Sapref
repaired
legitimacy
with pipeline
replacement;
possible
cognitive
change at
Sapref
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Cape
Town
Events: CPT AQMP 
Scale: Cross-scale: 
parent company 
pressure; Host 
community politics 
Power: Agenda setting: 
Cape Town air quality 
management plan 
launched; Coercive 
pressure: parent 
company pressure, 
Calref served directive
Actors:
Calref, C.M.
Sapia
Issues:
Refinery
incidents,
fuel
shortages,
clean fuels
project,
power
outages,
refinery
upgrade
Logic o f 
managerial 
environ­
mentalism: 
Calref served 
directive and 
increasing 
parent 
company 
oversight
Regulative 
pressure with 
publication 
of CPT 
AQMP and 
impl. of 
directive
Calref
attempted to
repair
legitimacy
with Chevron
visit and
water
treatment
plant
upgrade;
Chevron
strategy
change
National Events: AQMA 
standards
Scale: Cross-scale: 
international capacity 
building to implement 
and enforce regulations 
(particularly from US, 
UK and Denmark), 
international 
standards/guidelines 
influence SA ambient 
air quality standards; 
National-local levels: 
implementation of 
AQMA will be uneven 
Power: Coercive: 
capacity of 
environmental 
inspectorate being 
built; Cooperational: 
Peek confers legitimacy 
to draft SA ambient air 
quality standards; 
Agenda setting: 
planning system and 
EIA regs under review
Actors: 
Natref, Sasol, 
M.V.S. 
DEAT, P.L. 
DEAT, 
USEPA 
Issues: 
Regulatory 
implement­
ation and 
enforcement
Logic o f 
managerial 
environ­
mentalism: 
win/win 
environment- 
development 
solutions 
sought by 
environment 
minister; 
Logic o f 
coercion: 
capacity of 
environ­
mental 
inspectorate 
being 
expanded
Regulative
and
enforcement
change
N/A
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